🇮🇱🇮🇱🇮🇱
The Israeli Air Force used AIR LORA ("Long Range Attack") aeroballistic missiles (photo No. 1), which are a modification of the LORA operational-tactical quasi-ballistic missiles, this is the first time that they are used during a strike on Iranian military-industrial complex facilities.
This is evidenced by the minimum circular error probable (less than 10 m) during a strike on workshops in the industrial zone of the Parchin rocket-making plant in Parchin, captured by Dove optical-electronic satellites of the Earth's surface monitoring company Planet Labs, Inc.
Also, as previously noted, aeroballistic missiles ROCKS (range up to 500 km) and, probably, the strike version of Blue Sparrow (range up to 800 km) were used.
The AIR LORA missiles, capable of performing evasive maneuvers with overloads of up to 20G at a descending speed of about 900 m/s, evaded the measures implemented by the 2 to 4 S-300PMU-2 divisions covering Parchin.
AIR LORA missiles are equipped with advanced INS and jam-proof radio navigation modules, providing a CEP of 10 m.
Let us recall that several months earlier the Israeli concern IAI published a promotional video of the promising aeroballistic missile(video above), demonstrating the ability to destroy the S-300PMU-2/400 air defense missile systems using the "dead funnel" located outside the elevation sector of the 30N6E and 92N6E illumination radars. Consequently, the destruction of these complexes of the Iranian Air Defense Forces may be due to non-compliance with the principle of dispersing the illumination radars on the terrain to overlap these "dead funnels".
It is noteworthy that, for unknown reasons, the Iranian Air Force seems to not have attempted to intercept the Israeli F-16I and F-15I in Iraqi airspace in advance of their ROCKS and AIR LORA missile launch ranges.
Meanwhile, based on the results of the strike, it can be stated that its scale is absolutely not equivalent to the IRGC strike which was way bigger, while the accuracy of the Hel Haavir strike was approximately 15-20 times greater than the accuracy of the Shahab-3B and Fattah-1 missiles. This means that the Iranian military-industrial complex needs to be tightened up in terms of developing high-precision INS and GLONASS/GPS correction modules, which can be done with the help of Russian and Chinese specialists.
#info
#Iskander #S300
#SAM
#Israel #Iran
The Israeli Air Force used AIR LORA ("Long Range Attack") aeroballistic missiles (photo No. 1), which are a modification of the LORA operational-tactical quasi-ballistic missiles, this is the first time that they are used during a strike on Iranian military-industrial complex facilities.
This is evidenced by the minimum circular error probable (less than 10 m) during a strike on workshops in the industrial zone of the Parchin rocket-making plant in Parchin, captured by Dove optical-electronic satellites of the Earth's surface monitoring company Planet Labs, Inc.
Also, as previously noted, aeroballistic missiles ROCKS (range up to 500 km) and, probably, the strike version of Blue Sparrow (range up to 800 km) were used.
The AIR LORA missiles, capable of performing evasive maneuvers with overloads of up to 20G at a descending speed of about 900 m/s, evaded the measures implemented by the 2 to 4 S-300PMU-2 divisions covering Parchin.
AIR LORA missiles are equipped with advanced INS and jam-proof radio navigation modules, providing a CEP of 10 m.
Let us recall that several months earlier the Israeli concern IAI published a promotional video of the promising aeroballistic missile(video above), demonstrating the ability to destroy the S-300PMU-2/400 air defense missile systems using the "dead funnel" located outside the elevation sector of the 30N6E and 92N6E illumination radars. Consequently, the destruction of these complexes of the Iranian Air Defense Forces may be due to non-compliance with the principle of dispersing the illumination radars on the terrain to overlap these "dead funnels".
It is noteworthy that, for unknown reasons, the Iranian Air Force seems to not have attempted to intercept the Israeli F-16I and F-15I in Iraqi airspace in advance of their ROCKS and AIR LORA missile launch ranges.
Meanwhile, based on the results of the strike, it can be stated that its scale is absolutely not equivalent to the IRGC strike which was way bigger, while the accuracy of the Hel Haavir strike was approximately 15-20 times greater than the accuracy of the Shahab-3B and Fattah-1 missiles. This means that the Iranian military-industrial complex needs to be tightened up in terms of developing high-precision INS and GLONASS/GPS correction modules, which can be done with the help of Russian and Chinese specialists.
#info
#Iskander #S300
#SAM
#Israel #Iran
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Luhansk!
Presumably, a strike by MGM-140B ATACMS Block IA operational-tactical ballistic missiles.
It should be noted that the enemy has not used this type of missile weapons on a massive scale for a long time and could have formed a significant arsenal of 100-150 missiles (and possibly more) of this type in 2-3 months. The situation is similar with the SCALP-EG and the 15-20 carriers at the disposal of the Ukrainian Armed Forces - Su-24M frontline bombers and Su-24MR reconnaissance aircraft. It is quite possible that in the last quarter of 2024, the crews of our Buk-M3 SAM, Pantsir-S1 SAM and S-300V4 SAM systems will have to work hard to stop massive strikes by the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
#info
#ATACMS #SCALP
#S300 #SAM
Presumably, a strike by MGM-140B ATACMS Block IA operational-tactical ballistic missiles.
It should be noted that the enemy has not used this type of missile weapons on a massive scale for a long time and could have formed a significant arsenal of 100-150 missiles (and possibly more) of this type in 2-3 months. The situation is similar with the SCALP-EG and the 15-20 carriers at the disposal of the Ukrainian Armed Forces - Su-24M frontline bombers and Su-24MR reconnaissance aircraft. It is quite possible that in the last quarter of 2024, the crews of our Buk-M3 SAM, Pantsir-S1 SAM and S-300V4 SAM systems will have to work hard to stop massive strikes by the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
#info
#ATACMS #SCALP
#S300 #SAM
Why was the standard version of the Kh-59MK2 for external placement spotted on the Su-57?
Before us are the beautiful shots of the 5th generation Su-57 fighter entering the range of application of the Kh-59MK2 multi-purpose tactical missiles for placement on the АКУ-58 external suspension units.
And let techno-gourmets not be confused by the fact that this particular modification of the X-59MK2, previously adapted for the Su-30M2, Su-30SM and Su-34 combat aircraft, is being used, because the Su-57 crews can launch them while at an operational depth of 150-200 km at a very low flight level (350-70 m).
Consequently, even taking into account the use of the Saab-340 AWACS aircraft, which are being prepared for delivery or have already been delivered (they can operate at a depth of up to 250-300 km from the contact line), the PS-890 radar is unlikely to detect the Su-57 against the background of the earth's surface.
If the Su-57 pilots are tasked with striking at a depth of 250 km (which will require reaching the limits of possible detection by the PS-890 radars of the Saab-340 AEW&C aircraft), then it is logical to assume that in order to reduce the radar signature, the Su-57 should be equipped with the internal fuselage version of the Kh-59MK2 with a square fuselage section adapted for placement in the internal fuselage compartments of the Su-57.
#info
#Kh59 #Su57
#AWACS #SAM
Before us are the beautiful shots of the 5th generation Su-57 fighter entering the range of application of the Kh-59MK2 multi-purpose tactical missiles for placement on the АКУ-58 external suspension units.
And let techno-gourmets not be confused by the fact that this particular modification of the X-59MK2, previously adapted for the Su-30M2, Su-30SM and Su-34 combat aircraft, is being used, because the Su-57 crews can launch them while at an operational depth of 150-200 km at a very low flight level (350-70 m).
Consequently, even taking into account the use of the Saab-340 AWACS aircraft, which are being prepared for delivery or have already been delivered (they can operate at a depth of up to 250-300 km from the contact line), the PS-890 radar is unlikely to detect the Su-57 against the background of the earth's surface.
If the Su-57 pilots are tasked with striking at a depth of 250 km (which will require reaching the limits of possible detection by the PS-890 radars of the Saab-340 AEW&C aircraft), then it is logical to assume that in order to reduce the radar signature, the Su-57 should be equipped with the internal fuselage version of the Kh-59MK2 with a square fuselage section adapted for placement in the internal fuselage compartments of the Su-57.
#info
#Kh59 #Su57
#AWACS #SAM
Not everyone knows that the 9A317 self-propelled launchers of the Buk-M2 military SAM system can be equipped with both standard 9M317 anti-aircraft guided missiles with 9E420 ("9Э420") semi-active radar homing heads and 9M317A SAMs equipped with 9B-1103M-200PA ("9Б-1103М-200ПА") active radar homing heads.
In the first case, a single battery of 6x 9A317 self-propelled launchers has only 24 target channels and a firing rate of up to 48-60 targets fired at per minute (naturally, with an additional number of 9A316 launcher-loaders).
When the ammunition load is represented by the 9M317A SAMs with active homing heads, the firing performance of the 9A317 SAM battery can be increased, since when targets are captured by active radar homing heads, the target channels of the 9S36 ("9С36") illumination radars are released.
Moreover, these SAMs are capable of intercepting ultra-low-altitude targets (including kamikaze UAVs and SCALP-EG missiles) beyond the radio horizon. The maximum speed of targets intercepted by this SAM system reaches 1100 m/s.
The video above reportedly shows the interception of the ATACMS Block IA missile of the Ukrainian Armed Forces at the terminal (final) section of the trajectory by a 9M317A interceptor.
#info
#Buk #SAM
#ATACMS
In the first case, a single battery of 6x 9A317 self-propelled launchers has only 24 target channels and a firing rate of up to 48-60 targets fired at per minute (naturally, with an additional number of 9A316 launcher-loaders).
When the ammunition load is represented by the 9M317A SAMs with active homing heads, the firing performance of the 9A317 SAM battery can be increased, since when targets are captured by active radar homing heads, the target channels of the 9S36 ("9С36") illumination radars are released.
Moreover, these SAMs are capable of intercepting ultra-low-altitude targets (including kamikaze UAVs and SCALP-EG missiles) beyond the radio horizon. The maximum speed of targets intercepted by this SAM system reaches 1100 m/s.
The video above reportedly shows the interception of the ATACMS Block IA missile of the Ukrainian Armed Forces at the terminal (final) section of the trajectory by a 9M317A interceptor.
#info
#Buk #SAM
#ATACMS
As reported earlier in the channel "Pantsir-S1" and "Pantsir-S1M" continue their triumphant march on the global arms market.
After successful contracts with the MoD of Serbia, Iraq and the United Arab Emirates, the new customer of the SAM system with unique anti-aircraft and anti-missile capabilities is, for the first time in history, Saudi Arabia, which has traditionally been the operator exclusively of the American medium and long-range SAM systems "Patriot PAC-2 GEM-T/C" and "Patriot PAC-3MSE".
And the fact that the choice fell on the 96K6 line has a number of the most compelling technical justifications.
With an average market price of only 15-17 million dollars per 1 unit, the Pantsir-S1M has a superior potential to the Patriot PAC-2 SAM system in countering low-altitude enemy air attack weapons operating in terrain following mode.
It is well known that the AN/MPQ-65A multifunctional radars included in the Patriot PAC-2 radar architecture (despite their good interference immunity and complex sector operating modes) have an important technical drawback, a positive minimum beam elevation angle of 1 degree.
Consequently, kamikaze UAVs and cruise missiles operating at very low altitudes (30-20m) are in most cases not covered by the lower beam of the AN/MPQ-65 radar pattern (less than 1 degree in elevation), ending up in the "blind zone". This ensures that they can quickly overcome the anti-missile barrier formed by these SAM systems. Moreover, they dont have analogues to the universal low-altitude detection tower 40V6MD for the antenna posts and hardware modules of the MPQ-53/65 radar to increase the radio horizon of operation against low-altitude targets.
The low efficiency of the Patriot PAC-2 was confirmed during the repelling of numerous strikes by the Quds-1 strategic cruise missiles and Qiasif-K2 kamikaze UAVs of the Ansar-Allah units on Saudi Arabian oil refineries, when more than 60-75% of the above-mentioned missiles and drones successfully broke through the anti-missile umbrellas of the Patriot PAC-2 systems.
The Patriot PAC-3MSE air defense missile systems demonstrated higher efficiency, with their highly maneuverable MIM-104F PAC-3MSE interceptor-missiles, thanks to their active Ka-band radar seekers, capturing drones and cruise missiles much more often and continuing the interception without illumination from MPQ-65 radars with a limited beam-drop angle.
But in this case, the Patriot PAC-3 batteries often required the use of E-3A Sentry AWACS aircraft equipped with AN/APY-2 AESA radars to provide target designation. And this is despite the fact that the cost of one MIM-104F missile reaches a huge 3.7 - 4 million dollars (1/4 of the cost of the Pantsir-S1M air defense missile system), and the cost of a Patriot PAC-3MSE air defense missile battery is 270 million dollars.
At the same time, a battery of 6 "Pantsir-S1M" will cost Riyadh only 90-100 million dollars. But what capabilities does it have?
One battery has 24 target channels and a firing rate of up to 72 enemy targets intercepted per minute. At the same time, the "S1M" version uses an advanced guidance radar based on a reflective phased array with a more powerful microwave klystron, providing a detection range of drones with an RCS of 0.01 sq. m at a distance of about 17-20 km, and cruise missiles "Quds-1" with an RCS of 0.1 sq. m of up to 30 km.
Larger targets with a RCS of 0.3 sq. m are detected at a distance of up to 50 km.
The systems in this version can be equipped with the latest 57E6M SAMs with a range of up to 40 km and an interception altitude of up to 23-25 km due to higher-impulse solid-fuel charges of the first stages.
#info
#Patriot #Pantsir #SAM
#Arabia #USA
After successful contracts with the MoD of Serbia, Iraq and the United Arab Emirates, the new customer of the SAM system with unique anti-aircraft and anti-missile capabilities is, for the first time in history, Saudi Arabia, which has traditionally been the operator exclusively of the American medium and long-range SAM systems "Patriot PAC-2 GEM-T/C" and "Patriot PAC-3MSE".
And the fact that the choice fell on the 96K6 line has a number of the most compelling technical justifications.
With an average market price of only 15-17 million dollars per 1 unit, the Pantsir-S1M has a superior potential to the Patriot PAC-2 SAM system in countering low-altitude enemy air attack weapons operating in terrain following mode.
It is well known that the AN/MPQ-65A multifunctional radars included in the Patriot PAC-2 radar architecture (despite their good interference immunity and complex sector operating modes) have an important technical drawback, a positive minimum beam elevation angle of 1 degree.
Consequently, kamikaze UAVs and cruise missiles operating at very low altitudes (30-20m) are in most cases not covered by the lower beam of the AN/MPQ-65 radar pattern (less than 1 degree in elevation), ending up in the "blind zone". This ensures that they can quickly overcome the anti-missile barrier formed by these SAM systems. Moreover, they dont have analogues to the universal low-altitude detection tower 40V6MD for the antenna posts and hardware modules of the MPQ-53/65 radar to increase the radio horizon of operation against low-altitude targets.
The low efficiency of the Patriot PAC-2 was confirmed during the repelling of numerous strikes by the Quds-1 strategic cruise missiles and Qiasif-K2 kamikaze UAVs of the Ansar-Allah units on Saudi Arabian oil refineries, when more than 60-75% of the above-mentioned missiles and drones successfully broke through the anti-missile umbrellas of the Patriot PAC-2 systems.
The Patriot PAC-3MSE air defense missile systems demonstrated higher efficiency, with their highly maneuverable MIM-104F PAC-3MSE interceptor-missiles, thanks to their active Ka-band radar seekers, capturing drones and cruise missiles much more often and continuing the interception without illumination from MPQ-65 radars with a limited beam-drop angle.
But in this case, the Patriot PAC-3 batteries often required the use of E-3A Sentry AWACS aircraft equipped with AN/APY-2 AESA radars to provide target designation. And this is despite the fact that the cost of one MIM-104F missile reaches a huge 3.7 - 4 million dollars (1/4 of the cost of the Pantsir-S1M air defense missile system), and the cost of a Patriot PAC-3MSE air defense missile battery is 270 million dollars.
At the same time, a battery of 6 "Pantsir-S1M" will cost Riyadh only 90-100 million dollars. But what capabilities does it have?
One battery has 24 target channels and a firing rate of up to 72 enemy targets intercepted per minute. At the same time, the "S1M" version uses an advanced guidance radar based on a reflective phased array with a more powerful microwave klystron, providing a detection range of drones with an RCS of 0.01 sq. m at a distance of about 17-20 km, and cruise missiles "Quds-1" with an RCS of 0.1 sq. m of up to 30 km.
Larger targets with a RCS of 0.3 sq. m are detected at a distance of up to 50 km.
The systems in this version can be equipped with the latest 57E6M SAMs with a range of up to 40 km and an interception altitude of up to 23-25 km due to higher-impulse solid-fuel charges of the first stages.
#info
#Patriot #Pantsir #SAM
#Arabia #USA
The "hit-to-kill" kinetic target destruction mode has been implemented, But the most important thing is that the speed of the targets hit, thanks to the software and hardware update of the FCS, can reach 2000 m/s, ensuring the interception of even hypersonic warheads.
Low-altitude targets can be intercepted at altitudes literally from 1 to 23.000 m. And of course, not without a bonus option, represented by the possibility of integrating into the ammunition the latest development of the Tula Design Bureau, the small-sized single-stage SAM interceptors 19Я6, designed to intercept small-sized drones, like the "kamikaze" ones at distances of up to 10 km with minimal depletion of ammunition, because a quadruple cassette with 19Я6 is placed in one standard guide for the 57E6/M SAM.
It should be noted that an important impetus for concluding the contract was the demonstration of the Pantsir-S1M on February 4, 2024, at the international exhibition "World Defense Show" in Saudi Arabia, as reported by the publication "Tulskiye Novosti".
It is also obvious that representatives of the Saudi Arabian defense department, through their own channels and according to official data from Russian sources, were aware of the potential of the Pantsir-S1 and Pantsir-SM in intercepting HIMARS projectiles and Storm Shadow cruise missiles in the SMO zone.
The market for modern Russian weapons, once the war is over, will be quite large, as they have proven their effectiveness at real prices.
Here it is important to emphasise ‘modern’, and not old material that is also present on the battlefield, which leaves to be desired (with a few exceptions).
#info
#Patriot #Pantsir #SAM
#Arabia #USA
Low-altitude targets can be intercepted at altitudes literally from 1 to 23.000 m. And of course, not without a bonus option, represented by the possibility of integrating into the ammunition the latest development of the Tula Design Bureau, the small-sized single-stage SAM interceptors 19Я6, designed to intercept small-sized drones, like the "kamikaze" ones at distances of up to 10 km with minimal depletion of ammunition, because a quadruple cassette with 19Я6 is placed in one standard guide for the 57E6/M SAM.
It should be noted that an important impetus for concluding the contract was the demonstration of the Pantsir-S1M on February 4, 2024, at the international exhibition "World Defense Show" in Saudi Arabia, as reported by the publication "Tulskiye Novosti".
It is also obvious that representatives of the Saudi Arabian defense department, through their own channels and according to official data from Russian sources, were aware of the potential of the Pantsir-S1 and Pantsir-SM in intercepting HIMARS projectiles and Storm Shadow cruise missiles in the SMO zone.
The market for modern Russian weapons, once the war is over, will be quite large, as they have proven their effectiveness at real prices.
Here it is important to emphasise ‘modern’, and not old material that is also present on the battlefield, which leaves to be desired (with a few exceptions).
#info
#Patriot #Pantsir #SAM
#Arabia #USA
The use of the Ka-52M reconnaissance and attack helicopter over the Kaluga Region for a low-altitude interception of the Ukrainian PD-2 kamikaze UAV using the 9M342 Igla-V short-range air-to-air missile (as part of the "Стрелец" complex) with a dual-band short/medium-wave (1.8-3 μm and 3.5- μm) infrared seeker and a range of 5.5-7.5 km (depending on the launch altitude) indicates the beginning of positive shifts in the vision of the Russian Aerospace Forces command in general and army aviation in particular of the concept of forming a low-altitude air defense contour adapted to countering massive strikes by kamikaze UAVs, as well as local strikes using R-360MD Neptune-MD tactical cruise missiles.
Guidance of the scanning "cone" of the 9Э435 infrared homing head onto the heat-contrasting casing of an internal combustion engine or the flare of a turbojet engine of a drone or cruise missile can be accomplished by changing the pitch and yaw angles of the vehicle based on the data from the head-up display (HUD), the "Резец" onboard radar, or the ГОЭС-451М multispectral optical-electronic sighting system.
The maximum speed of targets hit by the Igla-V missile system reaches 1.500km/h with a range of capturing the flare of the turbojet engine of the Neptune-MD cruise missile at a distance of 3.5–3 km and the turbojet engine of the Palyanitsa UAV at a distance of 2.5–2 km.
Technically, it is possible to capture heat-contrast targets on a trajectory at a distance of 5+ km, when the heat-contrast object is recorded only by the thermal imaging channel of the GOES-451M optical-electronic module.
#info
#Ka52 #SAM
#UAV
Guidance of the scanning "cone" of the 9Э435 infrared homing head onto the heat-contrasting casing of an internal combustion engine or the flare of a turbojet engine of a drone or cruise missile can be accomplished by changing the pitch and yaw angles of the vehicle based on the data from the head-up display (HUD), the "Резец" onboard radar, or the ГОЭС-451М multispectral optical-electronic sighting system.
The maximum speed of targets hit by the Igla-V missile system reaches 1.500km/h with a range of capturing the flare of the turbojet engine of the Neptune-MD cruise missile at a distance of 3.5–3 km and the turbojet engine of the Palyanitsa UAV at a distance of 2.5–2 km.
Technically, it is possible to capture heat-contrast targets on a trajectory at a distance of 5+ km, when the heat-contrast object is recorded only by the thermal imaging channel of the GOES-451M optical-electronic module.
#info
#Ka52 #SAM
#UAV
According to Rostec, the Tula Design Bureau has updated the software for the Pantsir fire control system, enhancing the system ability to intercept low-altitude tactical missiles and enemy UAVs.
It is also known that the software for the 9A317M self-propelled launchers of the Buk-M3 complexes has undergone a similar update.
It is well known that even before the upgrade program, the РЛМ СОЦ radar detector demonstrated the ability to detect SCALP-EG tactical missiles at a distance of about 10 km, with the issuance of targeting instructions to the 10ЭС1 optical-electronic module and the 1РС2 "Шлем" millimeter-range guidance radar.
Also in the foreseeable future, large-scale production of the modernized Pantsir-SM will begin, equipped with higher-energy guidance radars 1РС-3 with the ability to capture a targets like the M30A1 GMLRS missile at a distance of 25-27 km.
#info
#Pantsir #Buk
#SAM
It is also known that the software for the 9A317M self-propelled launchers of the Buk-M3 complexes has undergone a similar update.
It is well known that even before the upgrade program, the РЛМ СОЦ radar detector demonstrated the ability to detect SCALP-EG tactical missiles at a distance of about 10 km, with the issuance of targeting instructions to the 10ЭС1 optical-electronic module and the 1РС2 "Шлем" millimeter-range guidance radar.
Also in the foreseeable future, large-scale production of the modernized Pantsir-SM will begin, equipped with higher-energy guidance radars 1РС-3 with the ability to capture a targets like the M30A1 GMLRS missile at a distance of 25-27 km.
#info
#Pantsir #Buk
#SAM
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The low infrared signature of the four-cylinder rotary piston engine allowed the Russian kamikaze UAV Geran-2 (developed and improved on the basis of the Iranian Shahed-136) to successfully evade the FIM-92B anti-aircraft guided missile of the Stinger man-portable air defense system, or of the Polish Piorun air defense system.
It is also known that the Ukrainian Armed Forces use multipurpose tactical missiles AGR-20 (APKWS-II) against Geran-2, which are part of the ammunition load of the L3Harris Vampire missile systems and are equipped with semi-automatic laser-beam control systems similar to those installed on the russian ATGMs.
Such a control system is distinguished by the highest interference immunity with the proper meteorological visibility range, but loses effectiveness in difficult meteorological conditions.
#info
#SAM #Geran #UAV
It is also known that the Ukrainian Armed Forces use multipurpose tactical missiles AGR-20 (APKWS-II) against Geran-2, which are part of the ammunition load of the L3Harris Vampire missile systems and are equipped with semi-automatic laser-beam control systems similar to those installed on the russian ATGMs.
Such a control system is distinguished by the highest interference immunity with the proper meteorological visibility range, but loses effectiveness in difficult meteorological conditions.
#info
#SAM #Geran #UAV
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Interesting footage of an Israeli AH-64A Peten reconnaissance and attack helicopter intercepting a Hezbollah kamikaze UAV using the 30mm M230 automatic cannon with a rate of fire of 650 rounds/min and an initial velocity of 805 m/s.
The ammunition load of this gun also includes M789 armor-piercing shells with armor penetration of 51 mm. It is obvious that Hel Haavir formed several links of low-altitude UAV interception similar to the links of interception based on Mi-28N/NM and Ka-52M in the Russian Aerospace Forces.
#info
#Apache
#UAV #SAM
#Israel #Gaza
Interesting footage of an Israeli AH-64A Peten reconnaissance and attack helicopter intercepting a Hezbollah kamikaze UAV using the 30mm M230 automatic cannon with a rate of fire of 650 rounds/min and an initial velocity of 805 m/s.
The ammunition load of this gun also includes M789 armor-piercing shells with armor penetration of 51 mm. It is obvious that Hel Haavir formed several links of low-altitude UAV interception similar to the links of interception based on Mi-28N/NM and Ka-52M in the Russian Aerospace Forces.
#info
#Apache
#UAV #SAM
#Israel #Gaza
The newest Chinese surveillance radar system has been announced: what are its technical features?
On the sidelines of the International Aerospace Exhibition "Airshow China - 2024", a prototype of the Chinese advanced anti-jamming AESA radar for long-range radar detection in the decimeter L-band (1 to 2 GHz) is on display for visitors.
It is designed for more efficient detection of aerodynamic targets with a small RCS and equipped with airframes that make extensive use of radar-absorbing composite materials and coatings (including stealth fighters with a RCS of 0.07-0.1 sq. m).
A similar conclusion can be made based on the distance between the modules of the antenna web, which is noticeably greater than that of the S-band radar and several times less than that of the Voronezh-M meter-band radar.
The number of receiving and transmitting modules is about 5000-7000 units with individual microwave transistors and attenuators in each with a pulse power of about 700-800 kW and a power consumption in the survey mode of about 110-130 kW.
The expected detection range of targets with a RCS of 0.1 sq. m (equivalent to the F-35A) for this radar can reach 200 km, with a RCS of 1-1.3 sq. m (equivalent to the deck-based multi-role fighter F-18E/F "Advanced Super Hornet" with weapons on pods) about 370-400 km at altitudes of 1.,000+ m and 300 km at altitudes of 5,000 m.
Domestic radars with similar parameters are "Небо-М" (photo No. 1) and "Противник-Г" (photo No. 2).
#info
#SAM #Su57 #F35
#China
On the sidelines of the International Aerospace Exhibition "Airshow China - 2024", a prototype of the Chinese advanced anti-jamming AESA radar for long-range radar detection in the decimeter L-band (1 to 2 GHz) is on display for visitors.
It is designed for more efficient detection of aerodynamic targets with a small RCS and equipped with airframes that make extensive use of radar-absorbing composite materials and coatings (including stealth fighters with a RCS of 0.07-0.1 sq. m).
A similar conclusion can be made based on the distance between the modules of the antenna web, which is noticeably greater than that of the S-band radar and several times less than that of the Voronezh-M meter-band radar.
The number of receiving and transmitting modules is about 5000-7000 units with individual microwave transistors and attenuators in each with a pulse power of about 700-800 kW and a power consumption in the survey mode of about 110-130 kW.
The expected detection range of targets with a RCS of 0.1 sq. m (equivalent to the F-35A) for this radar can reach 200 km, with a RCS of 1-1.3 sq. m (equivalent to the deck-based multi-role fighter F-18E/F "Advanced Super Hornet" with weapons on pods) about 370-400 km at altitudes of 1.,000+ m and 300 km at altitudes of 5,000 m.
Domestic radars with similar parameters are "Небо-М" (photo No. 1) and "Противник-Г" (photo No. 2).
#info
#SAM #Su57 #F35
#China
A demonstrator of a promising self-propelled electromagnetic microwave system for suppressing small-sized FPV drones, as well as low/medium-range reconnaissance UAVs and kamikaze UAVs, was presented by one of the Chinese manufacturers as part of the Chinese exposition on the sidelines of the Airshow China - 2024 exhibition in Zhuhai.
The product is based on the chassis of the Shaanxi HMV3 tactical truck and is represented by a multi-element high-energy and multi-band AESA radar, presumably X/Ku-band waves, capable of detecting drones, and then switching individual groups/arrays of gallium nitride microwave transistors to a high-energy radiation mode with a beam width of less than 1-0.5 degrees in the direction of the enemy UAV.
At distances of less than 10-7 km, this complex is capable of "burning out" the electronic base of drones with high-energy EM rays. It can also disable the onboard electronic equipment of enemy tactical and strategic cruise missiles.
At distances from 10 to 50-70 km, the receiving paths the onboard X-band AESA radars of enemy tactical aviation can be suppressed with a partial (about 50%) reduction in their range. Onboard radars based on passive phased arrays with lower interference immunity can lose up to 70-80% of their effective range at a distance of up to 50-70 km.
This complex is a more advanced embodiment of the concept of the Russian self-propelled generator "Ранец-Е"
#info
#UAV #FPV
#SAM #EW
#China
The product is based on the chassis of the Shaanxi HMV3 tactical truck and is represented by a multi-element high-energy and multi-band AESA radar, presumably X/Ku-band waves, capable of detecting drones, and then switching individual groups/arrays of gallium nitride microwave transistors to a high-energy radiation mode with a beam width of less than 1-0.5 degrees in the direction of the enemy UAV.
At distances of less than 10-7 km, this complex is capable of "burning out" the electronic base of drones with high-energy EM rays. It can also disable the onboard electronic equipment of enemy tactical and strategic cruise missiles.
At distances from 10 to 50-70 km, the receiving paths the onboard X-band AESA radars of enemy tactical aviation can be suppressed with a partial (about 50%) reduction in their range. Onboard radars based on passive phased arrays with lower interference immunity can lose up to 70-80% of their effective range at a distance of up to 50-70 km.
This complex is a more advanced embodiment of the concept of the Russian self-propelled generator "Ранец-Е"
#info
#UAV #FPV
#SAM #EW
#China
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Export air defense missile system "Тор-М2КМ" on KAMAZ chassis from deliveries for Armenia guarding the skies of the Kursk region, August 2024.
"Tors" on a truck chassis in exactly this camouflage coloring were supplied to Armenia since 2019, after which they took part in battles with the Azerbaijani Armed Forces in the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, where they suffered losses.
In 2023 and 2024, the Armenian authorities accused the Russian leadership of allegedly refusing to supply already paid weapons and ammunition to the Armenian Armed Forces.
#info
#SAM
#Tor
"Tors" on a truck chassis in exactly this camouflage coloring were supplied to Armenia since 2019, after which they took part in battles with the Azerbaijani Armed Forces in the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, where they suffered losses.
In 2023 and 2024, the Armenian authorities accused the Russian leadership of allegedly refusing to supply already paid weapons and ammunition to the Armenian Armed Forces.
#info
#SAM
#Tor
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The unified mixed anti-aircraft missile brigade of the Russian Aerospace Forces, which forms a network-centric air defense and missile defense system in the Mariupol operational direction, includes both 6-channel self-propelled firing units 9A317M of the Buk-M3 complexes and 1-channel self-propelled firing units 9A310M1 of the Buk-M1 complexes, as well as the short-range air defense systems Tor-M2 and Tor-M2U.
The work of the latter's crew is captured in the video above.
A positive is that the Tor-M2U PESA radar also has 4 channels like the more modern version.
Unlike the modernized Tor-M2, the U-class system has ammunition based on the early 9M331/D interceptors.
These anti-aircraft missiles are distinguished by their aerodynamic "duck" design (the 9М338К Р3В-МД has a load-bearing body with sections of tail aerodynamic rudders and destabilizers), available overloads of up to 23G (up to 40G for the 9M338K), a maximum speed of up to 1000m/s, a simplified radar fuse, a range of 12 km (up to 16 km for the 9M338K) and an altitude range of intercepted targets from 10 to 10.000 m.
But despite these shortcomings, the 9M331D missiles are capable of intercepting JDAM-ER gliding guided missiles with a probability of 0.7–0.8 at a distance of up to 8 km, 227mm GMLRS guided missiles at a distance of 5km, and GLSDB gliding guided missiles at a distance of 4–3 km.
#info
#SAM
#Tor
The work of the latter's crew is captured in the video above.
A positive is that the Tor-M2U PESA radar also has 4 channels like the more modern version.
Unlike the modernized Tor-M2, the U-class system has ammunition based on the early 9M331/D interceptors.
These anti-aircraft missiles are distinguished by their aerodynamic "duck" design (the 9М338К Р3В-МД has a load-bearing body with sections of tail aerodynamic rudders and destabilizers), available overloads of up to 23G (up to 40G for the 9M338K), a maximum speed of up to 1000m/s, a simplified radar fuse, a range of 12 km (up to 16 km for the 9M338K) and an altitude range of intercepted targets from 10 to 10.000 m.
But despite these shortcomings, the 9M331D missiles are capable of intercepting JDAM-ER gliding guided missiles with a probability of 0.7–0.8 at a distance of up to 8 km, 227mm GMLRS guided missiles at a distance of 5km, and GLSDB gliding guided missiles at a distance of 4–3 km.
#info
#SAM
#Tor
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An unsuccessful attempt to hit a Mi-24 helicopter of the Ukrainian Army Aviation using an FPV drone of the Russian Armed Forces.
The episode took place on the Vremyevskiy salient in the Zaporizhia region, the "helicopter", afraid of coming under fire from air defense systems, launched unguided missiles by pitching up.
Despite the failure, this episode is indicative, the list of games that can be played by both sides has been expanded, and the range of the FPV drone threatens the operation of enemy helicopters even when pitched up.
#info
#Mi24
#UAV #FPV #SAM
The episode took place on the Vremyevskiy salient in the Zaporizhia region, the "helicopter", afraid of coming under fire from air defense systems, launched unguided missiles by pitching up.
Despite the failure, this episode is indicative, the list of games that can be played by both sides has been expanded, and the range of the FPV drone threatens the operation of enemy helicopters even when pitched up.
#info
#Mi24
#UAV #FPV #SAM
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An interesting episode is shown in this video about the battles for Antonovka in the Kurakhovsky direction in the DPR: a pair of Su-25 attack aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces strikes with unguided rockets at the positions of the Kiev regime forces in the landings. And they do this not by pitching up, but by direct fire.
This episode shows the result of systematic work to destroy the air defense systems and radars of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as fire from a pitched position was used precisely because of the danger of being launched by SAM or MANPADS systems. As we can see, in this section of the front, Ukrainian servicemen are simply unloaded into positions where "Rooks" work on them like in a shooting gallery.
A similar situation has developed in the Kursk and Sumy regions, where the Ukrainian command is sending columns of the Ukrainian Armed Forces through the fields, and as you know the equipment and personel is being destroyed by Russian reconnaissance and strike drones, which are not encountering any significant resistance.
#info
#SAM #SEAD
#S8 #Su25
This episode shows the result of systematic work to destroy the air defense systems and radars of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as fire from a pitched position was used precisely because of the danger of being launched by SAM or MANPADS systems. As we can see, in this section of the front, Ukrainian servicemen are simply unloaded into positions where "Rooks" work on them like in a shooting gallery.
A similar situation has developed in the Kursk and Sumy regions, where the Ukrainian command is sending columns of the Ukrainian Armed Forces through the fields, and as you know the equipment and personel is being destroyed by Russian reconnaissance and strike drones, which are not encountering any significant resistance.
#info
#SAM #SEAD
#S8 #Su25
Helicopter-type UAVs "Termit" ("Термит") from the Kalashnikov Group in counteraction to the "kamikaze" drones of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Let's look at one of the promising unmanned platforms capable of minimizing massive strikes by kamikaze drones on our military and energy infrastructure.
In this case, we are talking about the Termit UAV with the laser guided S-8L missile from the Kalashnikov and Kronstadt groups of companies, which are capable of mitigatingthe problem of raids by long-range drones of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the rear warehouses and bases of the Russian Forces.
The Kronstadt company announced the start of serial production of Termit drones in 2023. The number of UAVs of this type delivered to combat units is not reported, but their potential is already partially known to us from the official information announced by the company.
Thus, even during the design stage, the main range of tasks assigned to the МДП-01 "Термит" helicopter-type reconnaissance and attack UAV provided for precision strikes with the 80mm S-8L guided missiles at an operational depth of 70-230+ km (depending on the number and power of the transmitters of the signal for the UAV).
The vehicles can also operate in the enemy's near rear and reach the firing line in a low-altitude mode, minimizing the probability of detection by the enemy radars.
However, using the example of the American APKWS-II guided missiles (also equipped with semi-active laser homing heads) as part of the L3Harris "Vampire" tactical missile systems, we see that the semi-active laser homing heads of the domestic S-8L missiles can also successfully capture laser marks held by the laser rangefinders of the Termits on enemy UAVsof the Ukrainian Armed Forces, including such as the "Lyuty" and the A-22 Foxbat.
And given the fact that the Termit rotary-wing UAVs are equipped with advanced optical-electronic systems with thermal imaging channels, the task of detecting drones such as the A-22 (which attacked Kaspiysk some days ago) by the IR radiation of their engines will be easy.
All that remains is to iluminate the targets so the semi-active laser heads of the S-8L guided missiles follow it.
At the same time, one Termit is equipped with 3x S-8L guided missiles, which means that a squadron of these rotary-wing UAVs is capable of intercepting up to 36 kamikaze drones of the Ukrainian Armed Forces attacking an oil refinery or a military base.
This is a much more economically feasible solution than chasing them with Ka-52M or Mi-28N.
What is even more interesting is that the integration of Igla-V air-to-air missiles into the arsenals of drones. Their dual-band infrared homing heads will not require illumination at all, but will only require precise guidance to a heat-contrast target by controlling the Termit in pitch and yaw.
The number of lighter Igla-V missiles placed on the pylons of each Termit can reach 5-6 units. Consequently, just one squadron will be able to deal with at least 60-72 enemy kamikaze UAVs.
As is known, the maximum flight speed of the Termit helicopter-type UAV can reach 160 km/h, which will be quite enough to intercept slow drones such as the Lyuty or PD-2 on pursuit courses.
#info
#UAV #SAM
#S8
Let's look at one of the promising unmanned platforms capable of minimizing massive strikes by kamikaze drones on our military and energy infrastructure.
In this case, we are talking about the Termit UAV with the laser guided S-8L missile from the Kalashnikov and Kronstadt groups of companies, which are capable of mitigatingthe problem of raids by long-range drones of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the rear warehouses and bases of the Russian Forces.
The Kronstadt company announced the start of serial production of Termit drones in 2023. The number of UAVs of this type delivered to combat units is not reported, but their potential is already partially known to us from the official information announced by the company.
Thus, even during the design stage, the main range of tasks assigned to the МДП-01 "Термит" helicopter-type reconnaissance and attack UAV provided for precision strikes with the 80mm S-8L guided missiles at an operational depth of 70-230+ km (depending on the number and power of the transmitters of the signal for the UAV).
The vehicles can also operate in the enemy's near rear and reach the firing line in a low-altitude mode, minimizing the probability of detection by the enemy radars.
However, using the example of the American APKWS-II guided missiles (also equipped with semi-active laser homing heads) as part of the L3Harris "Vampire" tactical missile systems, we see that the semi-active laser homing heads of the domestic S-8L missiles can also successfully capture laser marks held by the laser rangefinders of the Termits on enemy UAVsof the Ukrainian Armed Forces, including such as the "Lyuty" and the A-22 Foxbat.
And given the fact that the Termit rotary-wing UAVs are equipped with advanced optical-electronic systems with thermal imaging channels, the task of detecting drones such as the A-22 (which attacked Kaspiysk some days ago) by the IR radiation of their engines will be easy.
All that remains is to iluminate the targets so the semi-active laser heads of the S-8L guided missiles follow it.
At the same time, one Termit is equipped with 3x S-8L guided missiles, which means that a squadron of these rotary-wing UAVs is capable of intercepting up to 36 kamikaze drones of the Ukrainian Armed Forces attacking an oil refinery or a military base.
This is a much more economically feasible solution than chasing them with Ka-52M or Mi-28N.
What is even more interesting is that the integration of Igla-V air-to-air missiles into the arsenals of drones. Their dual-band infrared homing heads will not require illumination at all, but will only require precise guidance to a heat-contrast target by controlling the Termit in pitch and yaw.
The number of lighter Igla-V missiles placed on the pylons of each Termit can reach 5-6 units. Consequently, just one squadron will be able to deal with at least 60-72 enemy kamikaze UAVs.
As is known, the maximum flight speed of the Termit helicopter-type UAV can reach 160 km/h, which will be quite enough to intercept slow drones such as the Lyuty or PD-2 on pursuit courses.
#info
#UAV #SAM
#S8