📜🇷🇺🇺🇦〽️ Comment on Ukraine's low Civilian Casualties⚡️

Since February 24, when the special military operation to demilitarize and de-Nazify Ukraine started, the Ukrainian conflict has showed a 2% ratio of civilian casualties.

In other words, for every 100 deaths, 98 are military, only 2 civilians.

This is simply the lowest ratio of civilian deaths in the history of great conflicts since the WWI.

If you want to compare with some NATO's wars data, in Korea the ratio was 74%, in Vietnam 46%, in Yugoslavia 56%.

What does that mean?

Simple: Russian forces are really concerned about the risks of the military moves and do their best in order not to kill civilians.

Not even the recent attacks on infrastructure generated a significant number of civilian deaths.

In my opinion, winning such an intense conflict without causing a notorious number of civilian casualties should be reason enough for Vladimir Putin and General Surovikin receive the Nobel Prize together.

The most atrocious dictatorship of our era is being defeated virtually without civilian deaths as collateral damage.

This also reveals that the West does not care about civilians in its wars around the world, since we see more civilian deaths in much less intense conflicts.

And, of course, a relevant fact is that most of these civilian deaths in Ukraine are provoked by Kiev's forces themselves, which deliberately shell demilitarized areas in Donbass, mainly in central Donetsk.

Also, these data does not include the pre-Russian intervention scenario. Since 2014, tens of thousands of civilians were brutally killed by Ukrainian military in Donbass. If these numbers are considered, certainly the figures would be much more shocking.

To sum it up, we can say that the low ratio of deaths is an exclusively Russian achievement.

On the part of Kiev, which is nothing more than a NATO proxy, the deliberate assassination of civilians is still a "tactic".

But for the Russians things work in a different manner.

⚡️🇷🇺🇺🇦💥On Ukraine's Self Firing in #Kherson⚡️

The centre of #Kherson has been under fire since this morning (24 Dec 2022). Ten civilians were killed and more than 55 wounded.

The Ukrainians, naturally, immediately blamed the Russians for everything.

Don't feed us bread, let us kill a Khokhol?!

But they themselves published photos from the sites of the attack, where, according to them, at least 6 missiles from MLRS flew in.

And I show you on the basis of their photos that the attack was carried out by Ukraine itself. Here are the locations of the arrivals, here are the places where the main mass of fragments flew and the map.

It took me 30 minutes at the most! Which hints at the level of organisation of the setup.

Like in Mariupol, when Azov started a massive shelling of the outskirts when ours were still not even close.

Fantastic scum and we know where they live.

The reasons for the AFU's strike on #Kherson can only be guessed at.

According to a number of experts, the explosion of a HIMARS rocket in #Kherson could have been caused by interference with the guidance system by Russian or Ukrainian electric signals systems, leading to a change in the trajectory of the rocket as it flew towards its target on the left bank.

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⚡️🇷🇺🇺🇦⛓ On Russian Military Captives - Analysis by @Rybar and @Milchronicles⚡️

🇬🇧 Translation by our Partners:
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🔎 Part 👉 1 - 4 or👇

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⚡️🇷🇺🇺🇦💥 On the Downing of an Su-25 Attack Aircraft near #Kramatorsk; pub. 22:51⚡️

🔹 Today, reports emerged in the Ukrainian segment of the Telegram about a Su-25 attack aircraft being hit in the sky over #Kramatorsk and crashing somewhere in the vicinity. The press service of the Ukrainian Air South command said that it was a Russian aircraft. However, there is a 99% chance it was not.

▪️ The approximate area where the Su-25 fell is in the vicinity of #Shebelkovka near the #Kramatorsk reservoir. Russian aviation has been practically unable to go deep into Ukrainian territory since last summer because of the enemy's unsuppressed air defence systems.

Yes, in some cases, Su-34 front-line bombers can go several kilometers to drop bombs, but neither they, nor even Su-25s, fly near #Kramatorsk.

According to some information, the Wagner PMC aviation in this regard is somewhat less constrained in operations in comparison with the Aerospace Forces and can operate behind the frontline. But they also does not strike in the vicinity of the #Slavyansk agglomeration due to the large distance.

▪️ In addition, residents of #Kramatorsk were filming this afternoon a Su-25 flying over the city in the direction of #Seversk. The aircraft was shot down around 3pm and crashed west of the #Kramatorsk agglomeration.

The attack aircraft itself took off either from an airport in #Dnepropetrovsk or from the airfield in #Mirgorod in the #Poltava region, from where tactical aviation aircraft are active for flights in the #Kharkov region and over the AFU-occupied part of the DPR.

🔹 How was it hit?

➖ According to colleagues from Turned to War channel @voenacher, the Ukrainian Su-25 was shot down by a R-37 guided air missile from a Su-35S fighter jet, most likely while approaching #Kramatorsk. We do not know the exact route and rely only on the words of eyewitnesses.

➖ Another possibility is friendly fire. Ukrainian air defence units, as well as mobile MANPAD units, could have easily mistaken the Su-25 flying on a combat mission (or vice versa) for a Russian one and hit it.

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⚡️🇷🇺🇺🇦📐 On the Tactics of the AFU at #Dnieper - @Rybar's Analysis⚡️

Since late January, Ukrainian formations in the #Kherson region have been much more active in using reconnaissance groups on small speedboats and boats. The enemy is thus monitoring the activities of Russian troops and assessing the risks of landing a tactical landing on the left bank of the #Dnieper.

🔹 What are we talking about?

➖ 24 January near the settlements of #Dnepryany - #Korsunka
➖ 31 January near Kruglik lake near Bolshoy Potemkin Island
➖ 2 February near Krugloye Island in Yegorlyk Bay south of #Kinburn Peninsula
➖ 3 February near Dolgiy Island in Yegorlyksky Bay

In all cases, the AFU did not achieve any significant results, with artillery and assault groups of Russian units defeating Ukrainian SRGs. More than a dozen boats and dinghies were sunk. However, despite the lack of prospects and heavy losses, the Ukrainian formations are not going to stop the sorties to the other side.

🔹 Why?

▪️ It is important for the Ukrainian command to keep the Russian troop group stationed on the left bank in tension. The sorties and sabotage in different parts of the front from the Kinburn Spit to Novaya Kakhovka allow stretching the RF Armed Forces' defences and preventing the redeployment of released forces to other directions.

The length of the front when calculating from #Kakhovka to Kinburn Spit is more than 160 km, and even more from #Energodar area. Covering the rear from possible saboteur infiltration is vital for maintaining security in the liberated territories.

▪️ In addition, the constant use of SRGs makes it possible to assess the state of the Russian army's defence along the #Dnieper. By "probing" various areas, Ukrainian formations intend to identify the least defended for planning a possible crossing of the river.

🔹 Is this possible?

At the moment, a full-scale operation to cross the #Dnieper to the left bank is virtually impossible. The AFU would need enormous resources to carry out such a plan, which the #Kherson region currently lacks.

Most of the regular army units have been withdrawn and transferred to other areas, including #Donetsk, #Soledar and #Zaporozhye. In the region of #Kherson, Territorial Defence forces, mercenaries and detachments of Special Forces and GUR remain.

▪️ However, theoretically, such attempts are possible in the future to restrain our troops in order to force them to move reinforcements to this section and denuding other lines, but not in one or two sections, but in several at once.

In order to distract attention and create the appearance of a main strike, the AFU is likely to ford the #Dnieper near Novaya Kakhovka, #Lvovo, near #Kherson, near Golaya Pristan, and also attempt to land troops in the south and north of the #Kinburn peninsula.

Such an option, if anchored on the left bank, would make it possible to disperse the efforts of the Russian grouping, cut through the defensive lines and secure a bridgehead before the main forces arrive. The forces of the 49th Separate Engineer Brigade are now practically at full strength on the right bank.

📌 The Tactical Task under such a scenario will be to consolidate on the #Kinburn peninsula, which is of great importance for the AFU both in terms of information and propaganda, and strategically to secure #Ochakov and strike at the flank of the RF Armed Forces grouping.

Dozens of new boats and boats have already been deployed to #Kherson and #Ochakov. Strategically, the success of such an operation will make it possible to divert the attention of the RF Armed Forces and strike in a more significant direction - #Zaporozhye.

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⚡️🇷🇺🇺🇦🔎 @Rybar Analysis on the Creation of New Formations in the AFU⚡️

It is no secret that the Ukrainian authorities are intensively mobilising citizens across the country and recruiting everyone who can somehow handle weapons into the armed forces.

If before this process only partially affected Ukrainians in the centre or east of the country and residents of the west, now the situation is different. In #Ternopil region alone they want to enlist about 60,000 people.

Continue reading 👉 Part 1 - 2

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⚡️🇷🇺🇺🇦⚔️ Battle for #Ugledar - #Chronicle & Rybar Analysis; Part 1/3⚡️

Photo and video 👉 footage of a broken Russian military convoy has spread around the net.

Many assigned the losses wrongly to the 155th Marines Brigade of the Pacific Fleet, which is active in areas southeast of #Ugledar, but this is not the case.

According to the feedback bot, the equipment may have belonged to the 35th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 41st Combined Arms Army (sort of transferred to the operational subordination of the 29th CA).

Regardless of whose equipment it was, the incident is an extremely tragic and unpleasant episode, comparable to the losses of convoys in #Belogorovka, #Brovary, north of #Popasna, in the #Kherson region.

To understand what really happened and who was responsible for sending the column unprotected into the open field, we do a review of the fighting in the #Ugledar Area.

Read here the 👉 Chronicle

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⚡️🇷🇺🇺🇦⚔️ Battle for #Ugledar - Rybar Analysis; Part 2/3⚡️

🔹#Chronicle of the Battle for #Ugledar

▪️ On 23-24 January, fighters from the 155th Pacific Fleet Brigade and the 7th OBTF #Kaskad swooped through the AFU defence and occupied the dacha areas west of #Nikolskoye. The general plan was for several formations to advance simultaneously with a broad front: the plan was to "take #Ugledar in a pincer". But the Marines and #Kaskad, unfortunately, were the only ones who succeeded in breaking through the fighting lines.

Taking advantage of the effect of unexpectedness, the RF Armed Forces took the enemy by surprise: during intense fighting, they advanced towards the populated area, driving out units of the AFU's 68th Separate Jager Infantry Brigade and 72nd Mechanized Brigade towards #Ugledar and the South Donbass mine.

▪️ On 25 January, joint efforts by Marines and Kaskadians reached dacha areas southeast of #Ugledar, entrenching themselves in private homes. Disorganisation in the ranks of the AFU allowed for entrenchment. The first reports emerged of Russian units entering the town itself.

Throughout the day, assault units of the AFU's 72nd Mechanized Brigade tried unsuccessfully to counterattack from #Ugledar and the mine area. Nevertheless, the initial objective of the Russian troops to cut off the supply to #Ugledar was not achieved. The AFU managed to hold the line.

▪️ On 25-26 January, the Russian fighters advanced to the outskirts of the dachas. Separate assault units carried out raids on the outskirts of #Ugledar itself near the pumping station. Concurrently, an advance began from the direction of #Pavlovka towards the southwestern outskirts of #Ugledar.

However, the Ukrainian command had already begun to reinforce the defensive grouping in the town, artillery firing positions had been moved to a safe distance, and mortar crews were ceaselessly mining the approaches. In the meantime, the motorized rifle units of the RF Armed Forces were still unable to reach their planned positions.

▪️ By 27 January, the AFU was able to build a dense defence in #Ugledar. At least three companies were operating at 1km. The supply along the #Ugledar - #Konstantinovka - #Maryinka route was not cut off either physically or by fire. Ukrainian reinforcements were deployed at the main hubs.

▪️ The Marines, supported by artillery and aviation, continued fighting at the dachas near #Ugledar despite the complicated situation. The transfer of additional units of the AFU from the #Soledar direction began.

With each passing day, Ukrainian formations were pulling in more and more reserves to hold this important strategic location. Remote mining of streets and approaches continued - almost all the fields were covered in mines even before the offensive, and during the week of fighting the AFU installed over a hundred more barriers.

Marines of the 35th Naval Brigade and paratroopers of the Ukrainian Air Assault Forces' 80th Separate Air Assault Brigade arrived in #Ugledar to replace the 72nd Brigade, which had suffered heavy losses, and a battalion and tactical group was moved to #Bogatyr to create an operational reserve. Later, the 21st Battalion of the 56th Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade, equipped with UAVs and night vision devices, was noted, and a few days ago a BTGr of the 53rd Mechanized Brigade was spotted near #Ugledar. ATGM crews were placed in multi-storey buildings and long-range artillery was firing at the Russian positions.

The initiative of the RF Armed Forces was intercepted!

Read here 👉 Part 3/3

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⚡️🇷🇺🇺🇦⚔️ Battle for #Ugledar - Rybar Analysis; Part 3/3⚡️

▪️ By the end of January the offensive initiative of the RF Armed Forces had all but collapsed. Due to severe weather conditions, aviation could not operate and drones could not be used.

By February 5 the fighting had practically passed into a positional phase. The RF Armed Forces' artillery and aviation were actively firing on the AFU concentration areas, which had lost more than two hundred men killed during the offensive.

The bodies of the dead were impossible to remove due to the lack of transport vehicles and the active fire of the Russian army. The corpses were either simply left behind or taken to the South Donbass mine, where they were abandoned. Kraken nationalists arrived to prevent fleeing the positions.

▪️ In fact, an offensive by the Marines and OBTF alone became simply impossible. Another strike from #Nikolskoye in the direction of the #Maryinka - #Ugledar route and the South Donbass mine was needed to constrain AFU resources and cut off supplies.

▪️ It was at this stage that the entry of motorized infantry troops into the battle to strike the flank of the enemy with an armored fist was imminent and could no longer be delayed. However, an adequate military plan was never properly implemented.

🔹What happened?

Before any offensive, adequate preparation - reconnaissance, artillery and engineering - is necessary to achieve the objectives. UAV crews and forward scouts identify enemy positions, while artillerymen, together with aviation, fire on strongholds and fortifications.

At the same time, Signals Intelligence teams must ensure complete suppression of communications and drones, and engineer and sapper troops must clear the surrounding terrain - otherwise the offensive is doomed to failure.

The delayed engagement of motorized infantry units and the ensuing defeat of the convoy was only possible because of the general unpreparedness of the infantry forces engaged in the area.

The mine clearance of the approaches and the inadequate use of all available electronic warfare equipment led to the predictable result of a fairly narrow opening in the minefield, through which the column of armored vehicles rushed.

The entire route was tracked by UAVs and shot through by artillery and anti-tank crews.

🔹Who is to blame?

We can lay the blame on the command of the group as much as we like but in this particular case the cause of the tragic events was the general unpreparedness of the commanders of battalion and tactical levels, the lack of teamwork of the units involved and the failure to fulfil the combat mission.

The motorized rifle units should have engaged in combat almost simultaneously with the marines, but this did not happen. The unit commanders, probably fearing punishment, reported that their subordinates were fully prepared for the assault, which was far from reality.

Because of absence of elementary cover of radio-electronic and air defence systems and also objective difficulty of full clearance of all approaches to #Ugledar and the dachas (well and insufficient efforts, we shall be honest), there was simply no other variant of movement. The entire convoy was in plain view from the AFU positions at the #Ugledar heights.

However, all the equipment was not destroyed, as the Ukrainian media claimed. Some of it was only damaged and some was left intact. Under favourable conditions it can be pulled out and repaired. Judging by the open hatches, most of the personnel were successfully evacuated, but there were fallen and, alas, they will not be returned.

📌 Fear of the chain of command, the unwillingness to use the experiences of the first SMO year and the usual bureaucracy are the main reasons for the incident. A systemic change is needed in the approach to combat operations - both at the operational-tactical and simply tactical levels. Otherwise Belogorovka and #Ugledar will be repeated from time to time.

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⚡️🇷🇺🇺🇦🪖 @Rybar's Analysis on Total Mobilisation and the Combat Payment Situation in #Ukraine⚡️

📈 Amid an increase in casualties and cases of surrenders, Ukrainian authorities have stepped up forced mobilisation across #Ukraine.

Replenishment of losses is being carried out by conscripting all citizens into the ranks of the AFU, regardless of whether they have a deferment or severe health problems.

🔹 What is the situation on the home front?

The main tasks of mobilization are assigned to the staff of territorial recruitment centres.

Each of them must fulfil the recruitment plan set by the Ukrainian authorities.

If more are recruited, bonuses are awarded; in the reverse situation, the officer may be called up to the front himself.

▪️ The abolition in #Ukraine of additional payments for security forces on the home front has led to a tightening of mobilisation.

To carry out the plan, armed patrols are on duty on the streets, searching for male personnel and promptly sending them to the front.

▪️ State-owned enterprises have been instructed to provide a list of the 20% least valuable employees who can be mobilised as a priority.

▪️ At the same time, the Ukrainian authorities have initiated total checks on members of the security services and their family members for possible cooperation with Russia.

Even if distant relatives are found in #Russia, the most severe penalties can be imposed on an employee.

🔹 What is the situation with combat pay?

The Ukrainian leadership has stripped 100,000 hryvnia bonuses from fighters and their support staff who are not involved in combat operations on the front.

▪️ Liaison officers, drivers and engineers, even on the line of contact, cannot claim extra pay.

In the event of such an employee's death, their family will not be able to receive the allowance.

▪️ Any payments are only for those on a mission to defeat the enemy, and all others, including AFU soldiers away from the front, can only claim the standard peacetime salary.

🔹What are the implications of this?

Deprivation of additional payments has further exacerbated sentiments among members of Ukrainian formations and their support staff.

▪️ In the armed forces, the AFU command records an exodus of fighters with the legal right to leave military service.

At the same time, the Ukrainian leadership will be able to compensate for the loss of even a quarter of the personnel of the armed forces at the expense of mobilization resources.

▪️ However, the discharged fighters will be replaced not only by untrained unmotivated mobilized soldiers, but also by those with various health problems.

📌 The Ukrainian leadership will use such fighters as expendable material, leaving the most professional units behind or sending them for training under the supervision of NATO instructors.

The main task of the newly mobilised units is to hold the line until elite units are trained and sufficient Western equipment arrives.

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