Victoria Channel

Dr My-Le Trinh
Sydney, Australia

"My legal proceedings as a medical practitioner initially arose from two complaints. The first, referred to as the Westmead complaint, originated from an intern who was instructed by her supervisor, Professor Naren Gunja, to make a complaint against me.

The second complaint was made by John Smith. John Smith was not a patient of mine. He alleged that a friend of his had been prescribed ivermectin by me. As later became apparent, John Smith had stolen the prescription from the pharmacy to which I had personally submitted it for dispensing. How John Smith obtained the prescription is now the subject of a police investigation. Despite this, his complaint was relied upon as part of the basis to suspend my registration.

These two complaints were baseless and were ultimately used as the pretext to suspend my registration. Although both complaints were later quietly withdrawn, a secret third complaint was subsequently created by the Medical Council.

This third complaint was unlawful. It was initiated by the same three Medical Council members who had already adjudicated my matter and imposed my suspension. In effect, after judging my case and suspending me, those members became the complainants and referred the matter to the Health Care Complaints Commission (HCCC) for investigation. It is on the basis of this unlawful third complaint that I am now before the Tribunal, facing proceedings to cancel my registration.

Following these developments, my legal team filed an application for a merit review under s 150A of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (NSW). That application was unsuccessful. Shortly thereafter, the landmark decision in Pridgeon was handed down, clarifying that the Medical Council’s use of s 150 should be confined to exceptional circumstances, which were plainly not present in my case, and that s 145D(1) operates as a protective provision for health practitioners.

I subsequently commenced an application for judicial review pursuant to s 145D(1). At the same time, I filed a further judicial review (JR 41), challenging issues concerning the delegation of statutory powers. The Medical Council had itself provided proof of deficiencies in its delegation of power, making it appropriate and necessary to bring that challenge at the time. The legislation required that these matters be raised before the Tribunal prior to any appeal to the Court of Appeal. The courts granted approval for both matters to be heard together.

However, the Tribunal delayed the release of its decision in the second matter, which in turn delayed my ability to proceed with judicial review. That decision was released only one week after I published a video on social media publicly pleading for the decision to be handed down.

During this period of delay, the HCCC initiated proceedings under s 149C, seeking cancellation of my registration. My barrister at the time advised me that the Tribunal would never release the decision in the second matter and that I would never obtain a hearing in the Court of Appeal. I did ultimately obtain a hearing in the Court of Appeal, but both challenges were dismissed, with costs ordered but not ultimately pursued. The panel consisted of a newly appointed judge and two retired judges, which I did not understand.

Following the Court of Appeal judgment, I had 28 days in which to consider whether to seek special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia. During this critical period, I faced intense pressure—not from the HCCC, but from NCAT—to proceed with the substantive hearing, despite having provided medical certificates from my treating practitioners. At the same time, I received a letter of intention to sue from the patient involved in the matter, and the HCCC took steps to summon my treating doctor. The cumulative effect of these events during the appeal window meant that, in practical terms, I was unable to properly consider or pursue an application for special leave.

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72 viewsChris, 03:29