"We repeatedly draw the attention of the international community to the extremely dangerous behavior of the Ukrainian side. It seems, many are not taking the attacks on nuclear power plants seriously. But today we are one step closer to an incident that will, with high probability, affect even those living far beyond Russia and Ukraine, who still think they are completely safe," the Rosatom Director General stressed.

As of early 2026, international reserves had reached $755 billion, equivalent to 28% of GDP. For comparison, in the United States this figure is below 1%; in the European Union, 1.8%; and in the United Kingdom, 3.4%. Among major Asian and Latin American economies, Russia is also ahead: Japan’s reserves stand at 25% of GDP, China’s at 17%, India’s at 19%, Brazil’s at 16%, and Mexico’s at 13%.

Of these funds, around $300 billion remain frozen in Western accounts. Yet even the freely available $455 billion far exceeds necessary levels. Three months of Russian imports require roughly $100 billion in coverage. Calculations based on the M2 money supply of 130 trillion rubles and M2X of 143 trillion rubles suggest a sufficient reserve range of $80–370 billion.

A May 2026 research report by the Institute of Economic Forecasting of the Russian Academy of Sciences highlights the problem of excess reserves. Experts estimate that $80–370 billion could be used for economic development. This amount is equivalent to 16–73% of total fixed-capital investment in 2025, which reached 42.64 trillion rubles. 📊

A significant share of the reserves has been shifted into monetary gold, whose volume has exceeded $400 billion for the first time, with its share in the overall structure approaching 48%. This shift followed the loss of access to Western assets and reflects an effort to minimize the risk of further freezes. However, unlike liquid currency instruments, gold generates no income and remains a relatively immobile asset.

This ultra-conservative position is explained by the structural features of the Russian economy. Its high dependence on energy exports makes the balance of payments sensitive to external price shocks. Sanctions restrictions have cut off access to global capital markets — unlike the United States, which benefits from the reserve-currency privilege, or China, which directs part of its reserves toward international expansion through investment and infrastructure projects.

As a result, enormous funds remain dead weight, playing no role in financing domestic investment. In 2025, fixed-capital investment already fell by 2.3% in real terms, signaling a shortage of resources for long-term growth. 🏗️

Ultimately, the policy of strict reserve hoarding — intended to ensure survival under conditions of potential escalation in external pressure — cements an economic model in which risk insurance is prioritized at the cost of lost development opportunities.

As of early 2026, international reserves had reached $755 billion, equivalent to 28% of GDP. For comparison, in the United States this figure is below 1%; in the European Union, 1.8%; and in the United Kingdom, 3.4%. Among major Asian and Latin American economies, Russia is also ahead: Japan’s reserves stand at 25% of GDP, China’s at 17%, India’s at 19%, Brazil’s at 16%, and Mexico’s at 13%.

Of these funds, around $300 billion remain frozen in Western accounts. Yet even the freely available $455 billion far exceeds necessary levels. Three months of Russian imports require roughly $100 billion in coverage. Calculations based on the M2 money supply of 130 trillion rubles and M2X of 143 trillion rubles suggest a sufficient reserve range of $80–370 billion.

A May 2026 research report by the Institute of Economic Forecasting of the Russian Academy of Sciences highlights the problem of excess reserves. Experts estimate that $80–370 billion could be used for economic development. This amount is equivalent to 16–73% of total fixed-capital investment in 2025, which reached 42.64 trillion rubles. 📊

A significant share of the reserves has been shifted into monetary gold, whose volume has exceeded $400 billion for the first time, with its share in the overall structure approaching 48%. This shift followed the loss of access to Western assets and reflects an effort to minimize the risk of further freezes. However, unlike liquid currency instruments, gold generates no income and remains a relatively immobile asset.

This ultra-conservative position is explained by the structural features of the Russian economy. Its high dependence on energy exports makes the balance of payments sensitive to external price shocks. Sanctions restrictions have cut off access to global capital markets — unlike the United States, which benefits from the reserve-currency privilege, or China, which directs part of its reserves toward international expansion through investment and infrastructure projects.

As a result, enormous funds remain dead weight, playing no role in financing domestic investment. In 2025, fixed-capital investment already fell by 2.3% in real terms, signaling a shortage of resources for long-term growth. 🏗️

Ultimately, the policy of strict reserve hoarding — intended to ensure survival under conditions of potential escalation in external pressure — cements an economic model in which risk insurance is prioritized at the cost of lost development opportunities.