➡️ Oil markets are taking notice of Vostok Oil now, with Reuters publishing on it today. We have published several notes on it of late, including an update yesterday.👇
➡️ Interesting from Reuters: "Two industry sources expect exports to average ~150kbd this year...largely supplied from Rosneft's mature Vankor fields." 
➡️ We agree most of the oil will come from the Vankor Cluster for now. However, 150kbd seems high without finding some additional ice-class tankers.
#Russia #Oil #VostokOil
https://ronaldpsmith.substack.com/p/vostok-oil-production-rates-with

LNG in Q3: the Strait of Hormuz stays shut

Despite the occasional headline about Qatari or Emirati LNG carriers transiting the Strait of Hormuz, the flow is immaterial: 240 thousand tonnes per day in January–February and 2–30 thousand tonnes per day ever since.

Inside the Gulf, flows have been redistributed: the Gulf states' own needs are now covered exclusively by Qatari and Emirati gas. Peak consumption in July–August reached 40 thousand tonnes per day; in winter it will drop to 12 thousand tonnes per day.

Qatari and Emirati LNG remains locked inside the Gulf.

Our base case: restricted shipping at 5–25% of pre-war volumes persists for the foreseeable future, including the 2026/27 gas winter.

#LNG #Hormuz #Qatar #UAE #SealaTerminal @seala_ai

LNG in Q3: winter–summer price spread went negative this gas summer

Throughout this gas summer the winter–summer price spread in the EU was negative.

That made seasonal storage a loss-making trade. For injection to be commercially attractive, the winter price has to exceed the summer price plus the cost of storage, gas transportation, financing and hedging.

Private EU energy companies therefore had no incentive to inject gas into storage.

On the LNG market the EU has played the part China plays on the oil market: a price-sensitive buyer that steps back when prices rise.

#LNG #EU #CEGH #SealaTerminal @seala_ai

LNG in Q3: European UGS at 77 bcm

Gas in EU and UK storage stood at 77.1 bcm on 24 September 2026.

Stocks are well below previous years' levels. This reflects a trend towards lower summer injections and a growing share of spot LNG in supply during peak winter demand.

Theoretical deferred demand: 50 thousand tonnes per day if the shortfall is bought back evenly across the gas winter, or 150 thousand tonnes per day if it is bought only in the coldest months.

#LNG #EU #UK #UGS #SealaTerminal @seala_ai

LNG in Q3: who supplies China now

Disappearance of Qatari cargoes has freed up room on the Chinese market.

In Q2–Q3 China cut LNG imports in response to the shortage and higher prices, the same reaction we saw on the oil market.

Australia has again increased LNG deliveries to China, temporarily reversing its downtrend.

The US is back on the Chinese market, but so far with test cargoes. Whether they continue depends on the outcome of the Xi–Trump summit.

Russian supply is growing, though not dramatically yet. The EU ban on Russian LNG takes effect on 1 January 2027. China is the only alternative market for Yamal LNG. Novatek is preparing for it and expanding the Arctic LNG 2 fleet for deliveries to China, its only outlet. Ahead is a winter of high LNG demand, a window for Russia to raise supply.

In Q1–Q2 2027, carriers with Russian Arctic LNG will have to sail around the whole of Eurasia and probably Africa. That multiplies the tonnage requirement on top of an existing shortage of vessels.

#LNG #China #Russia #Novatek #YamalLNG #ArcticLNG2 #SealaTerminal @seala_ai

LNG in Q3: the winter outlook, $1,000+ per thousand cubic metres

From September, baseline LNG demand traditionally rises, reaching 42 million tonnes per month in December–January, +15% versus September.

Deferred demand from the EU and UK (the gas not injected into storage) will add another 1.5 million tonnes per month across October–March, or 4.5 million tonnes per day in December–January, depending on the energy companies' tactics. There is also an extreme and risky option: drawing storage down to zero and pushing the demand into next gas summer.

China's deferred demand will probably also return to the market, but it is price-sensitive.

This adds pressure on spot LNG supply and hence on spot prices (JKM and, to a large extent, TTF) in the cold months. December and January are the tightest; February and March depend on how the European winter turns out.

Our spot price expectation: $1,000+ per thousand cubic metres (about $28/MMBtu) at LNG importers' ports (TTF, JKM) in October 2026 – March 2027. In the coldest months, December and January, prices may touch $1,200+ per thousand cubic metres (about $34/MMBtu).

#LNG #JKM #TTF #gasprices #winter2026 #SealaTerminal @seala_ai

➡️ We are seeing a lot of comments that it is still amazing that oil isn't a lot higher than $100/bbl, despite the fact that flows through the Oman corridor are picking up significantly.
➡️ The fact is, however, that oil IS higher than $100/bbl - a lot higher - but a refining shortage and record crack spreads have masked it. Crude has become a poor proxy for the cost of energy.
➡️ Diesel at $210/bbl "feels like" WTI is at $185, gasoline at $150 "feels like" WTI is at $130,* and consumers don't care that refiners are capturing most of the higher prices rather than producers.
➡️ Solve that wee refining problem - but not the crude supply issues - and crude prices would likely go up substantially.
➡️ In other words, the instincts of experienced oil observers, which are screaming that oil prices should be higher, are not wrong, but we have to break the habit of using the price of crude as our main proxy.
*Data as of Sept. 22.
#oil

➡️ The drone campaign against Russian refineries is affecting environmental rules not only in Russia, but in Texas.
➡️ According to Austin's KXAN👆, Governor Abbot is not only widening the use of lesser-taxed farm diesel, but is also lowering Texas' own emission rules and has requested the EPA "waive federal ultra-low sulfur diesel requirements."
➡️ This follows in the tracks of Russian authorities, who eased that country's environmental requirements last October to allow the production of Euro-3 fuels again vs. Euro-5.
➡️ The underlying driver is the same - Ukraine's stepped-up drone campaign on Russian refineries.️ One effect of that campaign was a ban on Russian diesel exports this summer, resulting a loss of ~750kbd of diesel for international markets.
➡️ The Russian export ban is one of two key drivers of record-high diesel cracks in the US, the other being the Iran Crisis, which also interdicted a substantial amount of diesel exports.
#Russia #Texas #Diesel

Global oil and gas condensate market in September 2026 — Seala monthly review

Traffic through Strait of Hormuz rose in September on the back of USA efforts. Daytime transits are gradually being added to the night-time passages of shuttle tankers. Loadings and transits through the strait are carried out in radio silence, with AIS transponders switched off. Crude from the shuttles is transferred ship-to-ship off Fujairah (UAE), Sohar (Oman) and other ports onto line-haul tankers that carry it to the buyers' ports.

Middle East crude loadings outside the Strait of Hormuz fell in September versus August. The key reason is the suspension of loadings at Yanbu. The damage to the pumping stations of Saudi Arabia's East–West pipeline on 10 September and its temporary shutdown became the event of the month on the global oil market. A new round of Yemeni attacks followed on 30 September. Such interruptions of Saudi crude exports have a big chance of becoming regular. A further factor reducing the availability of Middle East crude to customers is the need to route Saudi barrels from Yanbu to Asian buyers around Africa, with Ansar Allah controlling Bab el-Mandeb Strait by fire. Saudi Arabia is assembling a military coalition for an invasion of Yemen; the preliminary line-up includes Pakistan and Türkiye.

Saudi Arabia, UAE, Russia and USA were the leading seaborne crude exporters in September.

China, India and USA were the leading seaborne crude importers. East Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) and India slightly reduced crude imports in September, most likely because of the longer voyage of August's Saudi barrels and the overall rise in prices.

Number of attacks on Russian refineries declined in September after a record August, but remains extremely high. Effects of Ukrainian, USA, EU and UK attacks on Russia's refining sector are cumulative. A second wave of the fuel crisis is under way across Russia.

Refinery outages in Middle East and Russia, together with bans on CPP exports from Russia, China and other countries, are prolonging the fuel crisis worldwide. Refining margins are at record highs.

As expected, crude prices continued to rise in September and returned to the levels of March–April, that is, to shock level. The key drivers are Houthis and shortages in fuel markets. Crude prices still do not reflect the cost of product basket, and shortage of available refining capacity worldwide is the main reason. Seala's forecast is unchanged: in base case of continued restricted shipping through Strait of Hormuz and tensions around Horn of Africa, crude at buyers' ports will stay at USD 100+ per barrel through October. Substantial price increases are also expected for natural gas and LPG in importing markets.

Full review (in Russian): https://seala.ru/analytics/oil2026september
Data: Seala Terminal.

#oil #crude #Hormuz #SaudiArabia #Russia #China #India #fuelcrisis #SealaTerminal @seala_ai

Egypt’s gas balance continues to change rapidly, and for the worse. In July, for the first time, domestic gas production accounted for less than half of domestic gas consumption: record demand (208 mcm per day) coincided with a record‑low production level (103 mcm per day).

Now, Egypt’s population and industry are supplied with gas from USA, Israel, and, in the near future, Cyprus.

#Egypt #USA #Israel #Cyprus #LNG #SealaTerminal @seala_ai

Arctic LNG 2 loadings hit a record in September

LNG loadings in Q3 amounted to 1.3 million tonnes. This indicates that the first train running at 79 % utilisation.

#ArcticLNG2 #Novatek #LNG #Russia #SealaTerminal @seala_ai

LNG market in Q3 2026

There is a temporary lull in Middle East again in the end of Q3. The pause in military operations at the beginning of the quarter and the resumption of shipments of Qatari and Emirati gas from Persian Gulf turned out to be temporary. The period of recovery was followed by a new round of attacks, and everything returned to sporadic voyages of gas carriers through Strait of Hormuz. The oil market trend of increased oil shipments through Strait of Hormuz using old shuttle tankers was not picked up by the LNG market: the impact of a UAV strike on an LNG carrier could be much greater than on an oil tanker.

LNG market has found a new temporary balance in Q3. US and other producers replaced isolated Qatari and Emirati LNG production capacities. Seasonally high LNG demand of Persian Gulf countries was met by Qatari and Emirati supplies. Low injection of natural gas into EU underground gas storages, coupled with a decline in demand in China and other Asian countries for expensive spot LNG supplies, led to a temporary stagnation in overall worldwide LNG demand. Spot prices for imported LNG remained high in importing countries, but did not reach a shock level.

As of 29.09.2026, there were 51 large and middle scale LNG plants with sea access in the world, including partially idle ones, with a total operational LNG liquefaction capacity of 473 MTPA. 11 plants were fully or partially idle with total non-operational capacity of 77 MTPA, including united LNG plant in Qatar and Das Island LNG in UAE.

In 2026, 26 MTPA of LNG capacity is expected to be commissioned. USA dominates this process - it will account for 52% in 2026. War in Middle East delayed Qatari and Emirati newbuilds.

USA remained to be number one supplier of LNG to the global market in Q3 2026. Australia is the second. Russia is the third.

In July, domestic natural gas consumption in Indonesia amounted to 145 mcm per day — a record since 2017. Given that production has been relatively stable since 2020, the growth in consumption is reducing amount of LNG available for export. LNG exports in July were the lowest since 2014 — only 28 mcm per day. Indonesia will lose a status of LNG exporter in a few years.

As of 29.09.2026, there were 224 regasification terminals in the world with total regasification capacity of 1137 MTPA.

Regasification capacities of 77 MTPA are expected to be commissioned in 2026 year. Y-o-Y growth is 6%. China’s share in capacity build up is 53%. Egypt, India, Honduras and Germany are in top 5.

China was the main importer of LNG in the world as result of Q3. Japan is the second. South Korea is the third.

As of 29.09.2026, stocks of active natural gas in UGS of EU and UK amounted to 77.7 bcm. Stocks are significantly lower than in previous years. It is the lowest volume since 2021.

Egypt’s gas balance continues to change rapidly, and for the worse. In July, for the first time, domestic gas production accounted for less than half of domestic gas consumption: record demand (208 mcm per day) coincided with a record‑low production level (103 mcm per day). Now, Egypt’s population and industry are supplied with gas from the United States, Israel, and, in the near future, Cyprus. Egypt was importer #6 in Q3.

As of 29.09.2026, there were 874 operational linear LNG carriers with 63.9 MT of total cargo hold capacity. LNG carriers with 7.3 MT of total cargo hold capacity are expected to be commissioned in 2026. It will be all-time high value. Expected Y-o-Y increase is 16%.

Full report is here: https://www.seala.ai/analytics/lng-report-2026-q3

#LNG #TerminalSeala #USA #Australia #Russia #China #Japan #SouthKorea @seala_ai

➡️ Trump announced he has agreed with Putin to import Russian diesel to the US starting very soon.👆
➡️ The 500k tons in November is 125kbd, a fraction of the ~3.8mmbpd of US diesel demand, between commodity prices move on the margin, so this might make a difference, one it arrives.
➡️ Can Russia export 125kbd of diesel? Yes...probably...maybe. In normal times, the country produced about 2mmbpd and exported about 1mmbpd. After months of drone strikes on refineries, Russia is probably exporting no more than 100-150kbd, and that to nearby, 'friendly' countries.
➡️ However, harvest is over, which might free up 100kbd additional diesel. Meanwhile, the state ongoing race between spear and shield (drone attacks and refinery defense/repair) is very difficult to judge from the outside, but a marginal shift in favor of one side or another could make these numbers easy to hit or exceed...or impossible.
#Russia #Trump

On the US “permission” for Russian diesel supplies to USA and other Western countries

Despite the generally positive tone, Trump’s document contains several key nuances worth keeping in mind.

The decision is driven by the state of the US fuel market. The global diesel shortage has drained US inventories and pushed up domestic prices. With the midterm elections approaching, this is a sore point for the administration.

There is, of course, no question of any “lifting of sanctions”, even for diesel: Trump has only granted a temporary exemption until 7 April.

An important point, spelled out directly in the document, is the ban on transferring money to the Russian Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Russia and the National Wealth Fund. Yet every ton of fuel generates payments to these institutions, even if not directly. Only the first pilot shipment will show how this works in practice.

It is worth remembering that a “sale”, as USA understands it, does not always mean the seller gets paid. In a good share of deals involving USA, a “sale” amounts to confiscation of the goods: the “sale” of Iranian oil by a US court order with no money going to Iran; the “sale” of Venezuelan oil by decision of the US viceroy in Venezuela with no money going to Venezuela; the “sale” of Lukoil’s foreign assets with no money going to Lukoil. Far from everyone in USA, at every level from the president down to a poor soul in Los Angeles, understands that goods have to be paid for.

Russia immediately began lifting its domestic restrictions on diesel exports. But those restrictions were introduced not because of US decisions but because of the high level of refinery outages in Russia. The outages have not gone anywhere: they remain at their peak, and the fuel balance leaves no room for diesel exports on a systematic basis. The stated export ceiling of “300 thousand tons in the near term” — just three tanker cargoes over the next month or more — is direct confirmation that Russia has no spare volume.

The deal will become material only if there are no new attacks on refineries and terminals (there were some this morning), if refineries are repaired after the attacks already carried out (reaching a diesel surplus will take another 1–2 months, with no new attacks), and if money for the pilot cargoes can be transferred freely.

So in practice the statement has a very limited effect and is driven by the domestic situation in USA, not by any wish to mend relations with Russia. But any positive step these days has a far larger indirect effect: it strengthens the position of other Russian hydrocarbons in third, neutral countries. And that is far bigger money than diesel deliveries to USA under this temporary “permission”.

#USA #Russia #DieselFuel #Trump @seala_ai

Our comments for Financial Times on availability of Russian diesel fuel for export to USA

Russia as of now is not suffering significant diesel shortage, and 800 kt pledged for the first two months were “relatively small” for Russia.

If strikes continue at the current pace, exporting 3+5 million tons in further months without hurting the domestic market would become impossible.

https://www.ft.com/content/445b2856-a276-4d4c-bdea-44799d771c21?syn-25a6b1a6=1

#USA #Russia #DieselFuel #SealaTerminal @Seala_ai

—❗️🇺🇸/🇮🇷 BREAKING: The IRGC Navy announces that all vessels turning off their transponders will be considered enemy vessels and ‘dealt with harshly and decisively’

@Middle_East_Spectator

➡️ An interesting data point on Chinese gas production, which has stopped growing y/y the last few months.👆
➡️ Read across to Russia’s Power of Siberia-2 gas project: That contract has not been signed despite many years of negotiations. One theory as to why is that Beijing is unsure if it needs so much gas after 2040 due to:
(a) Rising renewable generation perhaps undermining demand growth; and
(b) Years 6% compounded growth in domestic gas production.
This news casts some doubt on the second of those propositions.
➡️ We have no insight as to why Chinese production growth may have stopped, or if it a temporary hiccup or the beginning of a new phase. However, take away the production growth, and the projected need for natural gas imports starts to rise substantially, and Power of Siberia-2 (now "Power of Baikal") starts to take on a different strategic significance.
#Russia #China #LNG

In Middle East, a spark is once again bursting into flame

As always in Middle East, a lull is followed by a new round of hostilities. This year the cycle runs about 3–4 months: one and a half to two months of active fighting and about as much of calm. A sort of Middle Eastern El Niño. Right now we are watching exactly this switch from the quiet phase to the turbulent one.

Trouble for oil traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has resumed. A second supertanker (VLCC) in three days has struck a sea mine. There are other incidents as well.

UAE has decided to enter the war in Yemen on the side of Saudi Arabia against Houthis. Earlier this year UAE lost a battle in Yemen to Saudi Arabia. Ansar Allah has been attacking Saudi oil and gas infrastructure quite effectively. UAE’s entry into the war puts all of its infrastructure at risk, including the bypass crude export route via Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman. UAE is among the world’s top four seaborne crude exporters, alongside Saudi Arabia, USA and Russia.

USA will resume military action against Iran in early to mid-November.

Of the usual participants in the brawl, only Israel, Palestine and Lebanon remain relatively calm for now.

And oil was at USD 110 per barrel during the period of relative calm and the programme of releasing crude and fuels from state reserves.

#Iran #SaudiArabia #UAE #Yemen #Oil #SealaTerminal @seala_ai

Germany officially stole Russian tanker Eventin (9308065)

The tanker, carrying a cargo of oil, was detained in Germany in March 2025.

#Germany #piracy #crudeoil @seala_ai

Our data and comments for Forbes on dynamics of Russian LNG exports

In the first three quarters of 2026, 11.3 million tons of LNG were delivered from Yamal LNG to Europe — this is 3 % less than in the same period of 2025 (11.6 million tons).

In Q3 2026, Yamal LNG accounted for almost half of Russia’s total LNG exports. Starting from 1 January 2027, EU will impose a complete self‑ban on imports of Russian LNG. Arctic LNG 2, Gazprom LNG Portovaya, and Kriogaz Vysotsk (initially oriented towards the European market) have already fallen under EU’s self‑ban earlier. The ban does not eliminate sales market for Yamal LNG, but it significantly complicates logistics and increases costs per unit of delivered gas. China is the only realistic alternative market for LNG from Yamal LNG, as demonstrated by the experience of Arctic LNG 2 and Gazprom LNG Portovaya.

Due to a 22‑fold reduction in Qatari LNG supplies to China following the outbreak of the conflict in the Middle East, space opened up in Chinese market — Russia increased its LNG deliveries to China 2.4‑fold (from 1.4 to 3.4 million tons) in Q3 2026.

During winter, when gas demand rises, Russian producers may get a “window of opportunity”; however, in Q1–Q2, LNG carriers from Arctic projects will likely have to take a long route — circumnavigating Eurasia and possibly Africa as well.

It is expected that during the current gas winter, global gas prices in importing countries (TTF, JKM) will remain above USD 1,000 per thousand cubic meters, and during the peak demand period (December 2026 — January 2027) they may exceed USD 1,200.

https://www.forbes.ru/biznes/570596-skovannyj-gaz-kuda-pojdet-rossijskij-spg-posle-zapreta-na-postavki-v-evropu

#LNG #Russia #Novatek #TerminalSeala @seala_ai