The Limits of Power in a World without Rules
Most observers agree that we are witnessing a gradual disintegration of the rule-based international order. Power politics, unilateralism, and the resurgence of strong states and strongmen appear to be replacing norms, institutions, and predictable rules.
Yet this trend is neither linear nor unconstrained. The power of strong states and dominant leaders is not unlimited. It is increasingly self-limiting, constrained by mechanisms that often operate indirectly and with a delay.
Several such blocking or impeding mechanisms are already visible:
1. Self-inflicted strategic costs (“worst-practice effects”)
Aggressive actions often generate outcomes that directly undermine the aggressor’s own interests: economic isolation, technological backwardness, capital flight, demographic decline, or long-term security overstretch. Instead of demonstrating strength, such actions erode state capacity and strategic flexibility over time.
2. Economic veto players inside powerful states
Even highly centralized systems depend on complex economic ecosystems. Export-oriented industries, financial markets, energy companies, and global supply-chain actors tend to favor predictability, legal security, and stable rules. When geopolitical disruption threatens profits, investment horizons, or access to markets, these actors exert quiet but persistent pressure for restraint or partial normalization.
3. Bureaucratic and institutional inertia
Large states are not unitary actors. Militaries, central banks, regulatory agencies, courts, and regional administrations often prioritize continuity, risk minimization, and institutional survival. This inertia can slow down, dilute, or quietly sabotage radical policy shifts driven by political leadership.
4. Alliance friction and coordination costs
Even dominant states rarely act alone. Coalitions, client states, and informal partners impose constraints through negotiation fatigue, burden-sharing disputes, and diverging threat perceptions. Maintaining leadership within alliances becomes increasingly costly when rules are replaced by ad-hoc coercion.
5. Domestic legitimacy erosion
Rule-breaking abroad frequently translates into legitimacy problems at home. Rising costs of living, reduced mobility, declining welfare, and loss of future prospects gradually weaken popular consent—even in authoritarian or hybrid regimes—forcing leaders to spend more resources on repression and control.
6. Path dependency of global systems
Trade regimes, financial infrastructure, technological standards, and legal frameworks have deep path dependencies. Attempts to bypass or dismantle them often lead to inefficiencies and fragmentation that even powerful states struggle to compensate for unilaterally.
7. Temporal asymmetry between power and consequences
Strongmen tend to operate on short political or personal time horizons, while the negative consequences of norm erosion accumulate slowly but relentlessly. This asymmetry means that today’s displays of power often mortgage future options.
In short: while the rule-based international order is under severe strain, its erosion does not automatically translate into unconstrained dominance by the strong. Power exercised outside stable rules tends to generate counter-pressures—economic, institutional, societal, and systemic—that limit, delay, or partially reverse the trend.
The emerging global order may thus be less rule-based, but it is unlikely to become a world of unlimited power without costs.
Most observers agree that we are witnessing a gradual disintegration of the rule-based international order. Power politics, unilateralism, and the resurgence of strong states and strongmen appear to be replacing norms, institutions, and predictable rules.
Yet this trend is neither linear nor unconstrained. The power of strong states and dominant leaders is not unlimited. It is increasingly self-limiting, constrained by mechanisms that often operate indirectly and with a delay.
Several such blocking or impeding mechanisms are already visible:
1. Self-inflicted strategic costs (“worst-practice effects”)
Aggressive actions often generate outcomes that directly undermine the aggressor’s own interests: economic isolation, technological backwardness, capital flight, demographic decline, or long-term security overstretch. Instead of demonstrating strength, such actions erode state capacity and strategic flexibility over time.
2. Economic veto players inside powerful states
Even highly centralized systems depend on complex economic ecosystems. Export-oriented industries, financial markets, energy companies, and global supply-chain actors tend to favor predictability, legal security, and stable rules. When geopolitical disruption threatens profits, investment horizons, or access to markets, these actors exert quiet but persistent pressure for restraint or partial normalization.
3. Bureaucratic and institutional inertia
Large states are not unitary actors. Militaries, central banks, regulatory agencies, courts, and regional administrations often prioritize continuity, risk minimization, and institutional survival. This inertia can slow down, dilute, or quietly sabotage radical policy shifts driven by political leadership.
4. Alliance friction and coordination costs
Even dominant states rarely act alone. Coalitions, client states, and informal partners impose constraints through negotiation fatigue, burden-sharing disputes, and diverging threat perceptions. Maintaining leadership within alliances becomes increasingly costly when rules are replaced by ad-hoc coercion.
5. Domestic legitimacy erosion
Rule-breaking abroad frequently translates into legitimacy problems at home. Rising costs of living, reduced mobility, declining welfare, and loss of future prospects gradually weaken popular consent—even in authoritarian or hybrid regimes—forcing leaders to spend more resources on repression and control.
6. Path dependency of global systems
Trade regimes, financial infrastructure, technological standards, and legal frameworks have deep path dependencies. Attempts to bypass or dismantle them often lead to inefficiencies and fragmentation that even powerful states struggle to compensate for unilaterally.
7. Temporal asymmetry between power and consequences
Strongmen tend to operate on short political or personal time horizons, while the negative consequences of norm erosion accumulate slowly but relentlessly. This asymmetry means that today’s displays of power often mortgage future options.
In short: while the rule-based international order is under severe strain, its erosion does not automatically translate into unconstrained dominance by the strong. Power exercised outside stable rules tends to generate counter-pressures—economic, institutional, societal, and systemic—that limit, delay, or partially reverse the trend.
The emerging global order may thus be less rule-based, but it is unlikely to become a world of unlimited power without costs.
🔥1
iceur-school.at
Critical Skills for International Work in Crisis Environments
After the Old Order: Building a Brave New World of International Cooperation
Despite the escalating crisis of international law and international organizations, the emerging new world does not have to be one of unbridled power and violence.
Yes, we are living through a period in which core pillars of the international order are under strain. Rules are contested, institutions are bypassed, and power politics has returned with force. Yet history—and the present—also show something else: countervailing tendencies that point toward a different future.
Across regions and sectors, we see:
— Resilient international cooperation at the technical and professional level, even when high politics is polarized
— Transnational networks of cities, NGOs, scientists, humanitarian actors, and businesses solving concrete problems beyond formal diplomacy
— New norms in the making, from climate accountability to human security, digital governance, and post-conflict reconstruction
— A growing demand for professionals who can navigate complexity, uncertainty, and cultural difference rather than relying on rigid rulebooks
The next international order will not be shaped only by states or treaties. It will be shaped by people with skills: people who can translate between worlds, manage conflict without escalation, design institutions under pressure, and act ethically when formal authority fails. The concept of “international missions” will be enlarged to cover these forms of international cooperation.
That is precisely where our Course on Skills for International Work comes in.
This course is not about abstract ideals. It is about forming agents of the new international order:
— Professionals who understand how international organizations work
— Practitioners who can operate when institutions are weak but stakes are high
— Analysts and negotiators trained to think in scenarios, probabilities, and power relations
— Individuals who can combine strategic realism with normative responsibility
In a fragmented world, the alternative to brute force is not naïve idealism—it is competence.
If the old order is eroding, the question is not whether change will happen, but who will be prepared to shape what comes next.
Our course is designed for those who do not want to merely observe the crisis of international order—but to actively contribute to building its successor.
Although the course started yesterday, it is not too late to join.
You can still:
— enroll in the current group until the end of this week, through January 11,
— or reserve a place in the next group, which we are planning for the end of the month.
We are opening an additional group due to the limited number of places in each cohort.
This allows you to choose the option that best fits your schedule and learning preferences, without missing the opportunity to participate.
Despite the escalating crisis of international law and international organizations, the emerging new world does not have to be one of unbridled power and violence.
Yes, we are living through a period in which core pillars of the international order are under strain. Rules are contested, institutions are bypassed, and power politics has returned with force. Yet history—and the present—also show something else: countervailing tendencies that point toward a different future.
Across regions and sectors, we see:
— Resilient international cooperation at the technical and professional level, even when high politics is polarized
— Transnational networks of cities, NGOs, scientists, humanitarian actors, and businesses solving concrete problems beyond formal diplomacy
— New norms in the making, from climate accountability to human security, digital governance, and post-conflict reconstruction
— A growing demand for professionals who can navigate complexity, uncertainty, and cultural difference rather than relying on rigid rulebooks
The next international order will not be shaped only by states or treaties. It will be shaped by people with skills: people who can translate between worlds, manage conflict without escalation, design institutions under pressure, and act ethically when formal authority fails. The concept of “international missions” will be enlarged to cover these forms of international cooperation.
That is precisely where our Course on Skills for International Work comes in.
This course is not about abstract ideals. It is about forming agents of the new international order:
— Professionals who understand how international organizations work
— Practitioners who can operate when institutions are weak but stakes are high
— Analysts and negotiators trained to think in scenarios, probabilities, and power relations
— Individuals who can combine strategic realism with normative responsibility
In a fragmented world, the alternative to brute force is not naïve idealism—it is competence.
If the old order is eroding, the question is not whether change will happen, but who will be prepared to shape what comes next.
Our course is designed for those who do not want to merely observe the crisis of international order—but to actively contribute to building its successor.
Although the course started yesterday, it is not too late to join.
You can still:
— enroll in the current group until the end of this week, through January 11,
— or reserve a place in the next group, which we are planning for the end of the month.
We are opening an additional group due to the limited number of places in each cohort.
This allows you to choose the option that best fits your schedule and learning preferences, without missing the opportunity to participate.
🤝1
iceur-school.at
Critical Skills for International Work in Crisis Environments
📢 Course Relaunch Announcement
In response to numerous inquiries from individuals and organizations, we are preparing a relaunch of our course “Skills for International Work.”
🎓 What to expect:
• A comprehensive recorded lecture series, allowing you to engage with the material flexibly and at your own pace
• The opportunity to submit questions in writing, so specific institutional and field-related challenges can be addressed directly
✨ Expanded tier participants will also receive:
• Access to a dedicated live consultation session for deeper discussion, contextual clarification, and tailored guidance
📅 The official relaunch date will be announced shortly.
In response to numerous inquiries from individuals and organizations, we are preparing a relaunch of our course “Skills for International Work.”
🎓 What to expect:
• A comprehensive recorded lecture series, allowing you to engage with the material flexibly and at your own pace
• The opportunity to submit questions in writing, so specific institutional and field-related challenges can be addressed directly
✨ Expanded tier participants will also receive:
• Access to a dedicated live consultation session for deeper discussion, contextual clarification, and tailored guidance
📅 The official relaunch date will be announced shortly.
❤3
Two Mirrors, One Atlantic:
How the US and Europe Keep Working Together Despite a Mutual Misreading
Transatlantic relations today resemble a couples’ therapy session in which both partners are highly educated, deeply sincere — and absolutely convinced the other one is the problem.
Everyone is calm.
Everyone is articulate.
And everyone is responding to a conversation that is happening entirely in their own head.
On one side of the ocean, the incumbent US government looks at Europe and immediately recognizes a familiar domestic drama.
Europe becomes a vast projection screen onto which American political anxieties are enthusiastically beamed.
Are the Democrats still in charge over there?
Are they losing rural voters?
Have woke leaders finally succeeded in destroying Western civilization by promoting metric units, gender-neutral pronouns, and the uncontrolled influx of “aliens” who stubbornly turn out to be doctors?
Europe, in this view, is subconsciously processed as a kind of extended US liberal coalition:
regulatory,
morally confident,
faintly scolding,
and always one badly timed election away from collapse.
Brussels is imagined as Washington, D.C. — but with better bread and worse messaging.
On the other side of the Atlantic, Europe looks at Washington and sees something else entirely.
Not Democrats or Republicans, but a scary image.
America becomes a living laboratory for what happens when right-wing populist movements grow too large, too fast, and gain unlimited access to social media, cable news, and constitutional loopholes.
America looks at Europe and thinks:
Europe looks at America and thinks:
Both interpretations are wrong.
Both are emotionally understandable.
And both are applied with the serene confidence of people who have absolutely not checked whether the analogy still works.
And yet — this is the truly absurd part —
between the projections,
the misunderstandings,
the press conferences that answer different questions than the ones asked,
the committees,
the treaties,
and the quiet heroism of mid-level officials who speak fluent Acronym,
the Atlantic alliance is still alive.
How the US and Europe Keep Working Together Despite a Mutual Misreading
Transatlantic relations today resemble a couples’ therapy session in which both partners are highly educated, deeply sincere — and absolutely convinced the other one is the problem.
Everyone is calm.
Everyone is articulate.
And everyone is responding to a conversation that is happening entirely in their own head.
On one side of the ocean, the incumbent US government looks at Europe and immediately recognizes a familiar domestic drama.
Europe becomes a vast projection screen onto which American political anxieties are enthusiastically beamed.
Are the Democrats still in charge over there?
Are they losing rural voters?
Have woke leaders finally succeeded in destroying Western civilization by promoting metric units, gender-neutral pronouns, and the uncontrolled influx of “aliens” who stubbornly turn out to be doctors?
Europe, in this view, is subconsciously processed as a kind of extended US liberal coalition:
regulatory,
morally confident,
faintly scolding,
and always one badly timed election away from collapse.
Brussels is imagined as Washington, D.C. — but with better bread and worse messaging.
On the other side of the Atlantic, Europe looks at Washington and sees something else entirely.
Not Democrats or Republicans, but a scary image.
America becomes a living laboratory for what happens when right-wing populist movements grow too large, too fast, and gain unlimited access to social media, cable news, and constitutional loopholes.
America looks at Europe and thinks:
“These are Democrats with accents.”
Europe looks at America and thinks:
“This is what happens when the far right gets Wi-Fi and a Supreme Court.”
Both interpretations are wrong.
Both are emotionally understandable.
And both are applied with the serene confidence of people who have absolutely not checked whether the analogy still works.
And yet — this is the truly absurd part —
between the projections,
the misunderstandings,
the press conferences that answer different questions than the ones asked,
the committees,
the treaties,
and the quiet heroism of mid-level officials who speak fluent Acronym,
the Atlantic alliance is still alive.
❤1
The courses at the ICEUR School are unique in their depth, rigor, and practical orientation.
Teaching is delivered by a truly world-class faculty combining academic excellence with real-world modeling and policy experience.
All programs include structured training in GeNIe 5.0, accessible at every level—from foundational skills for beginners to advanced modeling techniques. The clear objective is to enable participants to develop, justify, and present transparent, defensible, and decision-relevant models.
A defining feature of the ICEUR School is its contractual partnership with BayesFusion, which goes far beyond standard software training. Courses include lectures and direct interaction with the creator of the software, as well as the opportunity for students to purchase and use privileged licenses under favorable conditions.
We are proud that the success of this approach has not gone unnoticed—and that some competitors have already begun to copy our model.
👆👆👆
Teaching is delivered by a truly world-class faculty combining academic excellence with real-world modeling and policy experience.
All programs include structured training in GeNIe 5.0, accessible at every level—from foundational skills for beginners to advanced modeling techniques. The clear objective is to enable participants to develop, justify, and present transparent, defensible, and decision-relevant models.
A defining feature of the ICEUR School is its contractual partnership with BayesFusion, which goes far beyond standard software training. Courses include lectures and direct interaction with the creator of the software, as well as the opportunity for students to purchase and use privileged licenses under favorable conditions.
We are proud that the success of this approach has not gone unnoticed—and that some competitors have already begun to copy our model.
👆👆👆
❤1
Mission Ready — New Course Intake Announced
In response to strong interest from both individual professionals and institutional partners, we are pleased to announce a new intake for the course
Mission Ready: Essential Skills for International Work in Crisis Environments.
🗓 Course start: 3 February 2026
This course is designed for professionals working — or preparing to work — in international missions, humanitarian operations, policy environments, and other crisis-affected settings. It focuses on practical analytical skills, decision-making under uncertainty, and operational thinking in complex environments.
Participants will engage with real-world scenarios, applied analytical tools, and expert-led sessions aimed at building mission-level readiness rather than abstract theory.
Further details on pricing and participation options are available on the course page.
In response to strong interest from both individual professionals and institutional partners, we are pleased to announce a new intake for the course
Mission Ready: Essential Skills for International Work in Crisis Environments.
🗓 Course start: 3 February 2026
This course is designed for professionals working — or preparing to work — in international missions, humanitarian operations, policy environments, and other crisis-affected settings. It focuses on practical analytical skills, decision-making under uncertainty, and operational thinking in complex environments.
Participants will engage with real-world scenarios, applied analytical tools, and expert-led sessions aimed at building mission-level readiness rather than abstract theory.
Further details on pricing and participation options are available on the course page.
iceur-school.at
Critical Skills for International Work in Crisis Environments
✍1
Beyond the Hype: Using Artificial Intelligence Responsibly in Complex and Uncertain Worlds
Artificial intelligence has revolutionized information processing to such an extent that one may legitimately wonder how humanity managed to operate for so long without it. Yet AI is far more than a buzzword or a passing technological hype.
Institutions and individuals who merely join the bandwagon risk wasting time, energy, and financial resources. The decisive factor is not adoption per se, but how this powerful technology is understood and applied.
In fields such as medicine, engineering, or biology, cutting-edge AI techniques are indispensable and often unavoidable.
In other domains, however — most notably political science, sociology, and parts of economics and business decision-making — a far more cautious and reflective approach is essential.
These fields are characterized by data that are incomplete, ambiguous, and structurally uncertain.
While Bayesian networks are well suited to handling noisy and uncertain information, users can easily fall into the trap of false precision — imposing point estimates or deterministic relationships where no robust rules of operationalization exist.
Interval-based approaches are often nearly as powerful analytically, yet far more reliable in describing reality.
Although this may limit the apparent sophistication of inference, it produces outcomes that are defensible, transparent, and realistically grounded.
This balance between analytical power and well-understood modesty lies at the core of ICEUR’s educational philosophy.
Drawing on extensive experience in training students and professionals, ICEUR combines AI-based modeling tools — such as GeNIe 5.0 — with carefully selected lectures by leading experts on the key challenges of the contemporary world and the processes driving rapid and sustainable transformation.
The goal is not to produce narrowly specialized data scientists, but to provide participants with:
• a solid foundation in model-based thinking
• a clear understanding of the limits, risks, and opportunities of AI-supported analysis
Our current course, Skills in International Work in Difficult Situations, exemplifies this approach.
Participants develop their own models under continuous, individualized supervision and consultation. The faculty includes highly qualified IT experts — including the creator of GeNIe 5.0 — who explain complex algorithms without hiding understanding behind impenetrable mathematical formalism.
🧑🏼🎓ICEUR’s courses are designed for intellectually curious individuals committed to personal and professional development, who seek not only technical competence, but also sound judgment when dealing with uncertainty, complexity, and real-world decision-making.
Artificial intelligence has revolutionized information processing to such an extent that one may legitimately wonder how humanity managed to operate for so long without it. Yet AI is far more than a buzzword or a passing technological hype.
Institutions and individuals who merely join the bandwagon risk wasting time, energy, and financial resources. The decisive factor is not adoption per se, but how this powerful technology is understood and applied.
In fields such as medicine, engineering, or biology, cutting-edge AI techniques are indispensable and often unavoidable.
In other domains, however — most notably political science, sociology, and parts of economics and business decision-making — a far more cautious and reflective approach is essential.
These fields are characterized by data that are incomplete, ambiguous, and structurally uncertain.
While Bayesian networks are well suited to handling noisy and uncertain information, users can easily fall into the trap of false precision — imposing point estimates or deterministic relationships where no robust rules of operationalization exist.
Interval-based approaches are often nearly as powerful analytically, yet far more reliable in describing reality.
Although this may limit the apparent sophistication of inference, it produces outcomes that are defensible, transparent, and realistically grounded.
This balance between analytical power and well-understood modesty lies at the core of ICEUR’s educational philosophy.
Drawing on extensive experience in training students and professionals, ICEUR combines AI-based modeling tools — such as GeNIe 5.0 — with carefully selected lectures by leading experts on the key challenges of the contemporary world and the processes driving rapid and sustainable transformation.
The goal is not to produce narrowly specialized data scientists, but to provide participants with:
• a solid foundation in model-based thinking
• a clear understanding of the limits, risks, and opportunities of AI-supported analysis
Our current course, Skills in International Work in Difficult Situations, exemplifies this approach.
Participants develop their own models under continuous, individualized supervision and consultation. The faculty includes highly qualified IT experts — including the creator of GeNIe 5.0 — who explain complex algorithms without hiding understanding behind impenetrable mathematical formalism.
🧑🏼🎓ICEUR’s courses are designed for intellectually curious individuals committed to personal and professional development, who seek not only technical competence, but also sound judgment when dealing with uncertainty, complexity, and real-world decision-making.
🎓 ICEUR School of Political Forecasting pinned «Mission Ready — New Course Intake Announced In response to strong interest from both individual professionals and institutional partners, we are pleased to announce a new intake for the course Mission Ready: Essential Skills for International Work in Crisis…»
iceur-school.at
Critical Skills for International Work in Crisis Environments
Why choose the 2nd release of Mission Ready?
Most sending organizations do offer pre-deployment training. And they should.
But those courses come with an inherent limitation:
they cannot always say what really goes wrong in the field.
As an independent institution, we can.
The second release of Mission Ready was redesigned to focus precisely on the recurring, real-world problems that professionals encounter during field missions — problems that are often well known, but rarely addressed openly due to diplomatic sensitivities, institutional hierarchies, or political constraints.
_____________________________
What makes this release different?
1️⃣ Unfiltered realism
We zoom in on the typical operational, interpersonal, and decision-making challenges that arise after arrival in the field.
No polished narratives — just practical insight grounded in experience.
_____________________________
2️⃣ Freedom from institutional blind spots
Because we are not a sending organization, we are free to critically examine:
• coordination failures
• information gaps
• leadership and accountability issues
• ethical gray zones
• stress, burnout, and informal coping mechanisms
These are the issues that shape missions in practice — and careers in the long run.
_____________________________
3️⃣ First-of-its-kind mission companion IT tool
For the first time, Mission Ready introduces a custom-built IT tool designed specifically for field professionals.
It is:
• carefully balanced between structure and flexibility
• usable during deployment, not just training
• relevant beyond a single mission
This tool is not a learning gimmick.
It is a long-term companion, supporting reflection, decision-making, and professional development — whether your career continues in the field or transitions beyond it.
_____________________________
4️⃣ Designed for growth, not just deployment
Most sending organizations do offer pre-deployment training. And they should.
But those courses come with an inherent limitation:
they cannot always say what really goes wrong in the field.
As an independent institution, we can.
The second release of Mission Ready was redesigned to focus precisely on the recurring, real-world problems that professionals encounter during field missions — problems that are often well known, but rarely addressed openly due to diplomatic sensitivities, institutional hierarchies, or political constraints.
_____________________________
What makes this release different?
1️⃣ Unfiltered realism
We zoom in on the typical operational, interpersonal, and decision-making challenges that arise after arrival in the field.
No polished narratives — just practical insight grounded in experience.
_____________________________
2️⃣ Freedom from institutional blind spots
Because we are not a sending organization, we are free to critically examine:
• coordination failures
• information gaps
• leadership and accountability issues
• ethical gray zones
• stress, burnout, and informal coping mechanisms
These are the issues that shape missions in practice — and careers in the long run.
_____________________________
3️⃣ First-of-its-kind mission companion IT tool
For the first time, Mission Ready introduces a custom-built IT tool designed specifically for field professionals.
It is:
• carefully balanced between structure and flexibility
• usable during deployment, not just training
• relevant beyond a single mission
This tool is not a learning gimmick.
It is a long-term companion, supporting reflection, decision-making, and professional development — whether your career continues in the field or transitions beyond it.
_____________________________
4️⃣ Designed for growth, not just deployment
❤1
Will there be international field missions in the future?
Despite financial and political constraints, field missions remain indispensable.
Scarcity and political fragmentation
→ increase uncertainty
→ amplify the cost of errors
→ weaken formal reporting channels
Precisely the conditions under which on-the-ground presence adds the most value.
Field missions enable:
• real-time sensemaking
• trust-building
• early warning
• political signaling
All of which cannot be replicated remotely.
While the form of field missions must adapt — becoming leaner, more modular, and more analytically integrated — their functional necessity has not diminished.
In constrained environments, presence is not a luxury.
It is a risk-management instrument.
Despite financial and political constraints, field missions remain indispensable.
Scarcity and political fragmentation
→ increase uncertainty
→ amplify the cost of errors
→ weaken formal reporting channels
Precisely the conditions under which on-the-ground presence adds the most value.
Field missions enable:
• real-time sensemaking
• trust-building
• early warning
• political signaling
All of which cannot be replicated remotely.
While the form of field missions must adapt — becoming leaner, more modular, and more analytically integrated — their functional necessity has not diminished.
In constrained environments, presence is not a luxury.
It is a risk-management instrument.
👍3
YouTube
Four Years of War: Why Russia Failed to Win a Quick War Against Ukraine
In this lecture, British journalist and political analyst Anatol Lieven examines one of the central miscalculations of the war in Ukraine: why the near-unani...
Four Years of War in Ukraine
A new analytical video series by ICEUR
February 24 marks four years since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine. Over this period, the war has shattered expectations of a quick outcome and become a key driver of change in the international order.
The ICEUR semester “War in Ukraine” began in February 2025, just ten days before the third anniversary of the war. Today, on the threshold of the fifth year, we are starting to publish selected highlights from those lectures on YouTube — not as hindsight reinterpretation, but as a time-stamped analytical snapshot.
🎥 Lecture #1 — Anatol Lieven
Why Russia Failed to Win a Quick War
British journalist and political analyst Anatol Lieven examines one of the central miscalculations of 2022: why expectations of a rapid Russian victory proved wrong in both the West and Russia itself. The lecture explores strategic illusions, urban warfare, and the political consequences of a prolonged conflict.
A new analytical video series by ICEUR
February 24 marks four years since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine. Over this period, the war has shattered expectations of a quick outcome and become a key driver of change in the international order.
The ICEUR semester “War in Ukraine” began in February 2025, just ten days before the third anniversary of the war. Today, on the threshold of the fifth year, we are starting to publish selected highlights from those lectures on YouTube — not as hindsight reinterpretation, but as a time-stamped analytical snapshot.
🎥 Lecture #1 — Anatol Lieven
Why Russia Failed to Win a Quick War
British journalist and political analyst Anatol Lieven examines one of the central miscalculations of 2022: why expectations of a rapid Russian victory proved wrong in both the West and Russia itself. The lecture explores strategic illusions, urban warfare, and the political consequences of a prolonged conflict.
❤2
YouTube
Four Years of War: Why Ukraine’s Choice of Independence Provoked Russia
This lecture examines the deeper political roots of Russia’s war against Ukraine, arguing that the conflict did not begin in 2022 — or even in 2014 — but can...
Four Years of War in Ukraine
An analytical video series by ICEUR
The war in Ukraine is often perceived as a sudden rupture. Yet many of the political and societal fault lines that made it possible had been forming long before 2022.
The ICEUR semester “War in Ukraine,” launched in February 2025, was dedicated to examining these longer-term processes, strategic miscalculations, and forecasting failures. Now, on the threshold of the fifth year of the war, we continue publishing selected lecture highlights on YouTube as a time-stamped analytical snapshot.
🎥 Lecture #2 — John Lough
Why the war began earlier than it seems
This lecture takes us back to 2004 and the Orange Revolution, when Ukrainian society openly asserted its commitment to an independent political path. That choice became a fundamental challenge to Kremlin assumptions and the starting point of a long-term confrontation.
The lecture focuses on:
— Ukrainian societal agency well before 2022
— Strategic miscalculations in Moscow
— The failure of attempts to externally control Ukraine
— How political choice evolved into sustained conflict
This lecture invites viewers to see the war not as a sudden crisis, but as the outcome of a prolonged political process.
An analytical video series by ICEUR
The war in Ukraine is often perceived as a sudden rupture. Yet many of the political and societal fault lines that made it possible had been forming long before 2022.
The ICEUR semester “War in Ukraine,” launched in February 2025, was dedicated to examining these longer-term processes, strategic miscalculations, and forecasting failures. Now, on the threshold of the fifth year of the war, we continue publishing selected lecture highlights on YouTube as a time-stamped analytical snapshot.
🎥 Lecture #2 — John Lough
Why the war began earlier than it seems
This lecture takes us back to 2004 and the Orange Revolution, when Ukrainian society openly asserted its commitment to an independent political path. That choice became a fundamental challenge to Kremlin assumptions and the starting point of a long-term confrontation.
The lecture focuses on:
— Ukrainian societal agency well before 2022
— Strategic miscalculations in Moscow
— The failure of attempts to externally control Ukraine
— How political choice evolved into sustained conflict
This lecture invites viewers to see the war not as a sudden crisis, but as the outcome of a prolonged political process.
👍2
YouTube
Four Years of War: Russia’s Patronage System in the Occupied Regions
This video highlights one of the most revealing analytical moments from the ICEUR semester War in Ukraine, recorded in early 2025.As Russia’s war against Ukr...
Four Years of War in Ukraine
An analytical video series by ICEUR
As the war continues, attention increasingly shifts from battlefield developments to the systems of governance established in the occupied territories. Military control is only one layer; institutional integration is another.
The ICEUR semester “War in Ukraine,” launched in February 2025, examined not only military dynamics but also the political and administrative mechanisms shaping the conflict. Now, on the threshold of the fifth year of the war, we continue publishing selected lecture highlights on YouTube as a time-stamped analytical snapshot.
🎥 Lecture #3 —Nikolay Petrov. Russia’s Patronage System in the Occupied Regions
This lecture explores the Kremlin’s regional patronage system — a model first tested after the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and expanded following 2022. Under this scheme, Russian regions are assigned responsibility for specific districts and municipalities in occupied Ukrainian territories.
The lecture focuses on:
— Lessons learned from Crimea
— The centralization of decision-making
— The role of Russian regions as “curators” of occupied areas
— The political logic of integration
— How institutional structures reinforce control
This lecture invites viewers to examine the war not only as a military conflict, but as a structured system of governance and long-term political consolidation.
An analytical video series by ICEUR
As the war continues, attention increasingly shifts from battlefield developments to the systems of governance established in the occupied territories. Military control is only one layer; institutional integration is another.
The ICEUR semester “War in Ukraine,” launched in February 2025, examined not only military dynamics but also the political and administrative mechanisms shaping the conflict. Now, on the threshold of the fifth year of the war, we continue publishing selected lecture highlights on YouTube as a time-stamped analytical snapshot.
🎥 Lecture #3 —Nikolay Petrov. Russia’s Patronage System in the Occupied Regions
This lecture explores the Kremlin’s regional patronage system — a model first tested after the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and expanded following 2022. Under this scheme, Russian regions are assigned responsibility for specific districts and municipalities in occupied Ukrainian territories.
The lecture focuses on:
— Lessons learned from Crimea
— The centralization of decision-making
— The role of Russian regions as “curators” of occupied areas
— The political logic of integration
— How institutional structures reinforce control
This lecture invites viewers to examine the war not only as a military conflict, but as a structured system of governance and long-term political consolidation.
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YouTube
Four Years of War: February 24 — A Shock for Russia’s Pro-Government Elite
In this lecture, economist and political analyst Vladislav Inozemtsev examines one of the least discussed aspects of the war’s beginning: the shock it produc...
Four Years of War in Ukraine
An analytical video series by ICEUR
As the war continues, February 24, 2022 is increasingly viewed not only as a geopolitical rupture, but as a moment of internal institutional shock within Russia itself. Beyond battlefield developments, the origins of the war reveal important insights into how strategic decisions are made inside the Russian political system.
The ICEUR course “War in Ukraine” examines not only military dynamics, but also the institutional, economic, and political mechanisms that shaped the launch of the full-scale invasion. As part of this analytical series, we continue publishing selected lecture fragments on YouTube as analytical snapshots.
🎥 Lecture #4. Fragment. — Vladislav Inozemtsev. The Internal Shock of February 24 (ссылка)
This video presents a fragment of a lecture by economist and political analyst Vladislav Inozemtsev, dedicated to one of the least discussed dimensions of the war’s beginning: the surprise it reportedly produced within Russia’s own pro-government elite.
According to the lecture, even key institutions — including the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance — were not fully prepared for a full-scale conventional invasion across a 1,300-kilometer front. Until the final days, many signals pointed toward a more limited scenario resembling the Crimea model: recognition and potential annexation of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics.”
The decision to launch a large-scale invasion marked a rupture with those expectations.
The lecture focuses on:
— Institutional unpreparedness for full-scale war
— The gap between political signaling and actual decision-making
— The personalization and centralization of power
— The economic and financial consequences of sudden escalation
— What this episode reveals about the nature of Russia’s political regime
This fragment invites viewers to reconsider February 24 not only as the start of a military campaign, but as an internal institutional moment that exposed the logic of power, secrecy, and centralized decision-making within the Russian system.
An analytical video series by ICEUR
As the war continues, February 24, 2022 is increasingly viewed not only as a geopolitical rupture, but as a moment of internal institutional shock within Russia itself. Beyond battlefield developments, the origins of the war reveal important insights into how strategic decisions are made inside the Russian political system.
The ICEUR course “War in Ukraine” examines not only military dynamics, but also the institutional, economic, and political mechanisms that shaped the launch of the full-scale invasion. As part of this analytical series, we continue publishing selected lecture fragments on YouTube as analytical snapshots.
🎥 Lecture #4. Fragment. — Vladislav Inozemtsev. The Internal Shock of February 24 (ссылка)
This video presents a fragment of a lecture by economist and political analyst Vladislav Inozemtsev, dedicated to one of the least discussed dimensions of the war’s beginning: the surprise it reportedly produced within Russia’s own pro-government elite.
According to the lecture, even key institutions — including the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance — were not fully prepared for a full-scale conventional invasion across a 1,300-kilometer front. Until the final days, many signals pointed toward a more limited scenario resembling the Crimea model: recognition and potential annexation of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics.”
The decision to launch a large-scale invasion marked a rupture with those expectations.
The lecture focuses on:
— Institutional unpreparedness for full-scale war
— The gap between political signaling and actual decision-making
— The personalization and centralization of power
— The economic and financial consequences of sudden escalation
— What this episode reveals about the nature of Russia’s political regime
This fragment invites viewers to reconsider February 24 not only as the start of a military campaign, but as an internal institutional moment that exposed the logic of power, secrecy, and centralized decision-making within the Russian system.
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We are pleased to officially announce the start date of our upcoming course:
🗓 The program begins on 27 February.
This year’s course opens with a special introductory lecture by Christoph Bilban, representative of the Austrian Ministry of Defence.
Topic of the opening lecture:
Evolution of international organizations.
Their role in an increasingly complex global environment.
This is particularly good news for our participants.
Christoph Bilban brings deep institutional insight into how international organizations function from the inside — how mandates evolve, how political realities shape operational frameworks, and how crisis environments transform institutional behavior.
In a world where international missions face increasing uncertainty, fragmentation of alliances, and overlapping mandates, understanding the internal logic of organizations is not optional — it is essential.
Mission Ready is designed for professionals, analysts, and practitioners who aim to work — or already work — in international, humanitarian, diplomatic, or security environments.
Throughout the program, we focus on:
• strategic decision-making under uncertainty
• institutional dynamics in crisis settings
• operational constraints and political realities
• practical tools for navigating complex environments
If you are preparing for international field work — or seeking to deepen your analytical and practical understanding of crisis systems — this course is built for you.
We look forward to welcoming you on 27 February.
Mission Ready: Critical Skills for International Work in Crisis Environments
🗓 The program begins on 27 February.
This year’s course opens with a special introductory lecture by Christoph Bilban, representative of the Austrian Ministry of Defence.
Topic of the opening lecture:
Evolution of international organizations.
Their role in an increasingly complex global environment.
This is particularly good news for our participants.
Christoph Bilban brings deep institutional insight into how international organizations function from the inside — how mandates evolve, how political realities shape operational frameworks, and how crisis environments transform institutional behavior.
In a world where international missions face increasing uncertainty, fragmentation of alliances, and overlapping mandates, understanding the internal logic of organizations is not optional — it is essential.
Mission Ready is designed for professionals, analysts, and practitioners who aim to work — or already work — in international, humanitarian, diplomatic, or security environments.
Throughout the program, we focus on:
• strategic decision-making under uncertainty
• institutional dynamics in crisis settings
• operational constraints and political realities
• practical tools for navigating complex environments
If you are preparing for international field work — or seeking to deepen your analytical and practical understanding of crisis systems — this course is built for you.
We look forward to welcoming you on 27 February.
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YouTube
Four Years of War: Why Russia Without Ukraine Is Not an Empire.
Why does Ukraine occupy such a central place in Russian strategic thinking?In this lecture, Robert Müller, Austrian Ambassador to Ukraine, reflects on the st...
Four Years of War in Ukraine
An analytical video series by ICEUR
As the war in Ukraine continues, its deeper strategic roots are increasingly viewed not as a product of short-term political decisions, but as the result of long-standing geopolitical and imperial thinking. At the center of this logic lies Ukraine.
The ICEUR analytical series examines the war not only through military events, but through the strategic, institutional, and historical frameworks that shaped it. As part of this series, we continue publishing selected lecture fragments on YouTube as analytical snapshots.
🎥 Lecture #6. Fragment. — Robert Müller
Ukraine’s Strategic Importance: Why Russia Without Ukraine Is Not an Empire
This video presents a fragment of a lecture by Robert Müller, Austrian Ambassador to Ukraine, reflecting on why Ukraine occupies a central place in Russian strategic thinking.
The lecture revisits one of the most frequently cited geopolitical formulations — that without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire — and places it in a broader historical and institutional context. The discussion traces this logic from the Tsarist period through the Soviet Union and into post–Cold War Russia, emphasizing continuity rather than rupture.
The lecture focuses on:
— Ukraine’s demographic and political weight in the Soviet system
— The persistence of imperial strategic logic beyond specific leaders
— Why Ukraine is perceived as a structural pivot, not a peripheral issue
— The significance of 2014 and the qualitative escalation in 2022
— What this reveals about Russia’s understanding of power and status
This fragment invites viewers to look beyond immediate battlefield developments and consider the deeper strategic assumptions that continue to shape the war — and the European security order more broadly.
An analytical video series by ICEUR
As the war in Ukraine continues, its deeper strategic roots are increasingly viewed not as a product of short-term political decisions, but as the result of long-standing geopolitical and imperial thinking. At the center of this logic lies Ukraine.
The ICEUR analytical series examines the war not only through military events, but through the strategic, institutional, and historical frameworks that shaped it. As part of this series, we continue publishing selected lecture fragments on YouTube as analytical snapshots.
🎥 Lecture #6. Fragment. — Robert Müller
Ukraine’s Strategic Importance: Why Russia Without Ukraine Is Not an Empire
This video presents a fragment of a lecture by Robert Müller, Austrian Ambassador to Ukraine, reflecting on why Ukraine occupies a central place in Russian strategic thinking.
The lecture revisits one of the most frequently cited geopolitical formulations — that without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire — and places it in a broader historical and institutional context. The discussion traces this logic from the Tsarist period through the Soviet Union and into post–Cold War Russia, emphasizing continuity rather than rupture.
The lecture focuses on:
— Ukraine’s demographic and political weight in the Soviet system
— The persistence of imperial strategic logic beyond specific leaders
— Why Ukraine is perceived as a structural pivot, not a peripheral issue
— The significance of 2014 and the qualitative escalation in 2022
— What this reveals about Russia’s understanding of power and status
This fragment invites viewers to look beyond immediate battlefield developments and consider the deeper strategic assumptions that continue to shape the war — and the European security order more broadly.
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YouTube
Regional Impact of the New World Order. Graduation Ceremony
This video presents the official diploma ceremony for graduates of the ICEUR School of Political Forecasting course “Regional Impact of the New World Order.”
Diplomas were awarded on behalf of the Austrian Federal Ministry for European and International…
Diplomas were awarded on behalf of the Austrian Federal Ministry for European and International…
The Second ICEUR Semester — Successfully Completed!
We are truly delighted to share that the diploma ceremony for graduates of the course “Regional Impact of the New World Order” has taken place.
This marks the second semester of the ICEUR School of Political Forecasting — and we are genuinely proud that everything came together successfully. Finally! Despite a complex international environment, demanding schedules, and participants joining from different time zones, the program was completed and our graduates received their well-deserved diplomas.
Diplomas were awarded on behalf of the Austrian Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs by Thomas Mühlmann, Head of the Department for Eastern Europe and Turkey.
Diplomas were also presented by Vice President of ICEUR and Founder of the ICEUR School, Prof. Hans-Georg Heinrich, who emphasized the importance of analytical rigor and probabilistic thinking in times of global turbulence.
For us, this is not just the end of a semester — it is another step forward in the development of ICEUR as an international educational platform.
▶️ The ceremony video is available hier.
We are truly delighted to share that the diploma ceremony for graduates of the course “Regional Impact of the New World Order” has taken place.
This marks the second semester of the ICEUR School of Political Forecasting — and we are genuinely proud that everything came together successfully. Finally! Despite a complex international environment, demanding schedules, and participants joining from different time zones, the program was completed and our graduates received their well-deserved diplomas.
Diplomas were awarded on behalf of the Austrian Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs by Thomas Mühlmann, Head of the Department for Eastern Europe and Turkey.
Diplomas were also presented by Vice President of ICEUR and Founder of the ICEUR School, Prof. Hans-Georg Heinrich, who emphasized the importance of analytical rigor and probabilistic thinking in times of global turbulence.
For us, this is not just the end of a semester — it is another step forward in the development of ICEUR as an international educational platform.
▶️ The ceremony video is available hier.
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Military Diplomacy and the Return of Regional Wars
At first glance, it may seem that we have entered an era in which the world’s superpowers can act with near impunity. Yet the ongoing military intervention in Iran shows that even the most powerful states operate within significant constraints.
1️⃣ Regional limits
The conflict is likely to remain regional.
Russia, though formally aligned with Tehran, lacks both the capacity — and perhaps the willingness — to provide meaningful support. Moscow may quietly hope for a geopolitical trade-off — Ukraine in exchange for Iran — rather than risk deeper entanglement.
China, meanwhile, continues to cultivate the image of a peace-loving great power while applying gradual pressure on Taiwan. Neither Moscow nor Beijing appears inclined to escalate the situation into a global confrontation.
At the same time, the strike on Iran may embolden other regional actors. If Washington no longer prioritizes its role as a global peacemaker, long-suppressed rivalries elsewhere could resurface.
We may witness multiple, parallel regional conflicts — not a single world war, but simultaneous expressions of a more permissive strategic climate.
2️⃣ Temporal constraints
Time is another limiting factor.
A prolonged military engagement would weigh heavily on domestic politics. No U.S. administration can comfortably approach midterm elections amid an open-ended conflict.
At the same time, political leadership may feel compelled to demonstrate a more favorable outcome than what critics once labeled “the worst treaty ever” — referring to the nuclear agreement concluded under the Barack Obama administration.
3️⃣ Limits of scale
Scale presents its own constraints.
With the United States unwilling to deploy large numbers of ground troops — and with “system change” declared as the objective — Washington and Israel would have to rely heavily on internal unrest within Iran.
Yet this reliance inherently limits the use of overwhelming force:
a reckless bombing campaign would undermine the very domestic uprising required for political transformation.
Conversely, Iran’s capacity to inflict sustained strategic damage on Israel — let alone the United States — remains limited. This asymmetry further reinforces the conflict’s contained character.
4️⃣ A shifting global framework
On the global level, the normative framework of international politics is changing.
The post–Cold War aspiration toward peaceful conflict resolution has lost much of its traction. In its place emerges a form of military diplomacy — where force is used not as a last resort, but as a calibrated instrument of negotiation.
The emerging order is not one of unlimited superpower dominance.
Rather, it is an order of constrained coercion — where power is exercised within political, regional, and strategic boundaries.
At first glance, it may seem that we have entered an era in which the world’s superpowers can act with near impunity. Yet the ongoing military intervention in Iran shows that even the most powerful states operate within significant constraints.
1️⃣ Regional limits
The conflict is likely to remain regional.
Russia, though formally aligned with Tehran, lacks both the capacity — and perhaps the willingness — to provide meaningful support. Moscow may quietly hope for a geopolitical trade-off — Ukraine in exchange for Iran — rather than risk deeper entanglement.
China, meanwhile, continues to cultivate the image of a peace-loving great power while applying gradual pressure on Taiwan. Neither Moscow nor Beijing appears inclined to escalate the situation into a global confrontation.
At the same time, the strike on Iran may embolden other regional actors. If Washington no longer prioritizes its role as a global peacemaker, long-suppressed rivalries elsewhere could resurface.
We may witness multiple, parallel regional conflicts — not a single world war, but simultaneous expressions of a more permissive strategic climate.
2️⃣ Temporal constraints
Time is another limiting factor.
A prolonged military engagement would weigh heavily on domestic politics. No U.S. administration can comfortably approach midterm elections amid an open-ended conflict.
At the same time, political leadership may feel compelled to demonstrate a more favorable outcome than what critics once labeled “the worst treaty ever” — referring to the nuclear agreement concluded under the Barack Obama administration.
3️⃣ Limits of scale
Scale presents its own constraints.
With the United States unwilling to deploy large numbers of ground troops — and with “system change” declared as the objective — Washington and Israel would have to rely heavily on internal unrest within Iran.
Yet this reliance inherently limits the use of overwhelming force:
a reckless bombing campaign would undermine the very domestic uprising required for political transformation.
Conversely, Iran’s capacity to inflict sustained strategic damage on Israel — let alone the United States — remains limited. This asymmetry further reinforces the conflict’s contained character.
4️⃣ A shifting global framework
On the global level, the normative framework of international politics is changing.
The post–Cold War aspiration toward peaceful conflict resolution has lost much of its traction. In its place emerges a form of military diplomacy — where force is used not as a last resort, but as a calibrated instrument of negotiation.
The emerging order is not one of unlimited superpower dominance.
Rather, it is an order of constrained coercion — where power is exercised within political, regional, and strategic boundaries.
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YouTube
Hossein Kermani: “There Was No Other Option” — On Iran’s Political Crisis
In this interview excerpt, Hossein Kermani, a political communication researcher and professor at the University of Vienna, reflects on the current political...
🎥 “No one wants to see bombs, but there was no other option.”
We are publishing an excerpt from an interview with Hossein Kermani — a researcher in political communication and professor at the University of Vienna.
In this video, Kermani reflects on the political crisis in Iran and explains why, in his view, many Iranians no longer believe that peaceful reforms are possible.
According to him, Iranian society has spent years trying different paths to achieve change — from public protests and civic activism to participation in elections. However, the systematic suppression of even small demonstrations and the continued rejection of reform demands have led many people to feel that there are almost no alternatives left.
Kermani also discusses the possible consequences of the current crisis and the chances for political change in the country.
Hossein Kermani is a professor at the University of Vienna and a lecturer at the ICEUR School.
He will also participate in the new ICEUR summer semester starting in late April.
We are publishing an excerpt from an interview with Hossein Kermani — a researcher in political communication and professor at the University of Vienna.
In this video, Kermani reflects on the political crisis in Iran and explains why, in his view, many Iranians no longer believe that peaceful reforms are possible.
According to him, Iranian society has spent years trying different paths to achieve change — from public protests and civic activism to participation in elections. However, the systematic suppression of even small demonstrations and the continued rejection of reform demands have led many people to feel that there are almost no alternatives left.
Kermani also discusses the possible consequences of the current crisis and the chances for political change in the country.
Hossein Kermani is a professor at the University of Vienna and a lecturer at the ICEUR School.
He will also participate in the new ICEUR summer semester starting in late April.
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