Because of this, the Russians are likely already eyeing Druzhkivka as their next target. Just like Kostyantynivka, it's one of the 4 biggest cities of Ukrainian-controlled Donbas that also constitute a formidable urban defense belt. Druzhkivka has just a bit fewer inhabitants than Kostyantynivka but is half its size: 33 km². This city, too, sits on the Kryvyi Torets River valley but is divided into 3 parts because of the Kazenyi Torets River. It also has a sizable high-rise and industrial area. Let's look at some defensive strong and weak spots.
Picture: deepstatemap.live
Picture: deepstatemap.live
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By itself, the city starts quite well. 1. 2 very big areas on the south and east flanks made up of open fields. Some might note that in military theory, fields are the opposite of good for defense, and he wouldn't be mistaken, but the drone era has changed this, and operating in areas with limited cover except treelines is less than ideal for an attacking force. In particular, it's also important to note that it's not a simple field-field battle in this case, because the Ukrainians have Druzhkivka always on their backs to provide centralized logistical, drone, and accumulation support, while the Russians wouldn't have anything except Kostyantynivka behind them (which is not really behind them). This means that the closer to Druzhkivka the Russians come, the stronger Ukraine's advantage becomes, being able to strike exposed Russian logistics and infiltration routes in big swaths of open terrain: a drone paradise. All this is exacerbated for the Russians by the barbed wire and ditches placed and dug by the Ukrainians in this time, slowing infiltrations down and giving even more time to Ukrainian drone operators to work.
Picture #1: deepstatemap.live
Picture #2: playframap.github.io
Picture #1: deepstatemap.live
Picture #2: playframap.github.io
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2. Urban defenses. In red, in the city center, the DMZ factory offers safe accumulation points and tall and complex building structures. The porcelain factory and a mine on the west flank of the city are situated on dominant heights overlooking Druzhkivka and Raiske (as such, the fields south of Druzhkivka as well), which constitutes a great place to position communication equipment for signal maximization and even further enhancement of drone effectiveness in the fields around the city. In green, we can note a pretty big high-rise area, with the 7th Microdistrict in yellow being a key defensive stronghold: urban fighting positions can be easily set up there, directly overlooking the fields south of the city. In blue, the Kryvyi and Kazenyi Torets rivers divide the city into 3 operational areas, also forming a chokepoint in its northern part, complicating organized Russian advancements. In orange, big forests are situated on tactical heights behind the city, offering good improvised accumulation hubs and drone positions. The topography is also friendly to defensive efforts, with the hill on the west flank serving as great artillery and drone zones, together with the forests' cover.
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Fortifications. Exploiting the time Kostyantynivka, Chasiv Yar, and the Dobropillia sector held firmly, the Ukrainians have been slowly (and chaotically) placing a lot of barbed wire, as well as digging some ditches. As said, coupled with the large swaths of open terrain, these make for prime working conditions for Ukrainian drone operators.
Picture: playframap.github.io
Picture: playframap.github.io
But now, let's look at weak spots and areas the Ukrainians must pay attention to and, ideally, must reinforce before it's too late. 1. Not a lot of error margin available on the west flank. Russian forces are already quite close to the dominant hill west of Druzhkivka. If they were to get a stable foothold there, they would likely choose to immediately send a lot of drone operators and eventually mortars and light artillery to repeat what was done with Kostyantynivka: focus on logistics (and flatten the city). Though it must be said that Ukrainian forces fortified this area more or less appropriately. Going straight northwest isn't really an option for Russia, as the Zolotyi Kolodyaz section of the New Donbas Line blocks the way: it would be extremely costly to pass through. The only passage is straight north, but it was made into a narrow chokepoint by building another vertical line east of this passage. Furthermore, the capable 1st Corps "Azov" has been holding confidently and continues to do so in this sector of the frontline.
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The following routes might become possible preferred Russian infiltration routes.
In the southwest one, Raiske's southern hamlet might become a small accumulation base for Russians going into Druzhkivka, and it's also at the convergence of 2 gulleys, which the Russians might use to move into the hamlet a bit more safely.
Along the route there are also bushy areas, and once infiltrators enter the Hirnyk district, the urban area merges seamlessly all the way into central Druzhkivka.
Though, between the hamlet and Hirnyk, there are up to 4 barbed wire lines, and the area doesn't have dense cover, so it might be turned into a small kill zone.
The main problem is on the southeast flank, where Kostyantynivka's, Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka's, and Druzhkivka's urban zones merge almost seamlessly if not for a couple of open areas between the 3 towns and some rare barbed wire lines.
This is the route that is most likely to become Russia's preferred, as it's the one that offers the most possibility of going undetected, as well as the one that offers the most cover from Ukrainian FPVs.
In my opinion, the bulk of the Ukrainian infantry should be stationed in this "residential area line" that goes from Kostyantynivka to Druzhkivka to constitute strong physical blocking positions for Russian infiltrators (it would be necessary to engage in small arms fire, so reinforcing these positions would be productive), as well as the Raiske-Hirnyk area for the same reasons.
On the southern flank, there are a couple of good routes with almost continuous treelines that the Russians could follow to reach southern Druzhkivka, and the most likely ones, in my opinion, are highlighted in the picture.
In general, we note how Raiske and Osykove constitute chokepoints, and efforts should be done to reinforce these areas to turn them into kill zones.
In the southwest one, Raiske's southern hamlet might become a small accumulation base for Russians going into Druzhkivka, and it's also at the convergence of 2 gulleys, which the Russians might use to move into the hamlet a bit more safely.
Along the route there are also bushy areas, and once infiltrators enter the Hirnyk district, the urban area merges seamlessly all the way into central Druzhkivka.
Though, between the hamlet and Hirnyk, there are up to 4 barbed wire lines, and the area doesn't have dense cover, so it might be turned into a small kill zone.
The main problem is on the southeast flank, where Kostyantynivka's, Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka's, and Druzhkivka's urban zones merge almost seamlessly if not for a couple of open areas between the 3 towns and some rare barbed wire lines.
This is the route that is most likely to become Russia's preferred, as it's the one that offers the most possibility of going undetected, as well as the one that offers the most cover from Ukrainian FPVs.
In my opinion, the bulk of the Ukrainian infantry should be stationed in this "residential area line" that goes from Kostyantynivka to Druzhkivka to constitute strong physical blocking positions for Russian infiltrators (it would be necessary to engage in small arms fire, so reinforcing these positions would be productive), as well as the Raiske-Hirnyk area for the same reasons.
On the southern flank, there are a couple of good routes with almost continuous treelines that the Russians could follow to reach southern Druzhkivka, and the most likely ones, in my opinion, are highlighted in the picture.
In general, we note how Raiske and Osykove constitute chokepoints, and efforts should be done to reinforce these areas to turn them into kill zones.
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On the eastern flank, the Russians will likely take as preferred the railway route, going exactly on top of the tactical heights. It will be possible for them to use this as a sort of "infantry highway" because of its westward direction, as well as the cover it offers along most of the way.
Because of this, it would be very useful for Ukraine to start cutting trees along the way to facilitate FPV work on infiltrators taking this route and establishing physical infantry blocking positions, for which even a modest number of infantry would be enough.
Placing barbed wire transversally relative to the railway's direction would also be very productive.
From the railway it's also possible to note treelines and small forests going straight down into the Kryvyi Torets' River valley, and eventually into Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka and Druzhkivka itself.
Though, here as well, it must be said that Ukrainian engineering obstacles are very dense, especially barbed wire, which seems to be quite promising.
In general, the tactical heights themselves in this area are also threatening to the Ukrainians because of the negative consequences that would affect Druzhkivka if Russian UAV operators were to take positions here: once again, logistics going in and out of the city would be at risk, even worse if both the hill on the west flank and this hill were to come under Russian control.
Because of this, it would be very useful for Ukraine to start cutting trees along the way to facilitate FPV work on infiltrators taking this route and establishing physical infantry blocking positions, for which even a modest number of infantry would be enough.
Placing barbed wire transversally relative to the railway's direction would also be very productive.
From the railway it's also possible to note treelines and small forests going straight down into the Kryvyi Torets' River valley, and eventually into Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka and Druzhkivka itself.
Though, here as well, it must be said that Ukrainian engineering obstacles are very dense, especially barbed wire, which seems to be quite promising.
In general, the tactical heights themselves in this area are also threatening to the Ukrainians because of the negative consequences that would affect Druzhkivka if Russian UAV operators were to take positions here: once again, logistics going in and out of the city would be at risk, even worse if both the hill on the west flank and this hill were to come under Russian control.
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In conclusion, the defense of Druzhkivka has very good potential, with some weak spots that the Ukrainians must be careful to cover appropriately.
Capable units are also stationed in this general direction of the front, and barring unforeseen catastrophes and/or Russian breakthroughs, which should never be excluded from thought and analysis, the battle for Druzhkivka's approaches might last as long as Kostyantynivka and exhaust the Russians in this area enough to thwart their plans for a south-north attack into the last strongholds of Ukrainian-controlled Donbas, thereby forcing them to search more costly ways of advancing through the New Donbas Line.
Capable units are also stationed in this general direction of the front, and barring unforeseen catastrophes and/or Russian breakthroughs, which should never be excluded from thought and analysis, the battle for Druzhkivka's approaches might last as long as Kostyantynivka and exhaust the Russians in this area enough to thwart their plans for a south-north attack into the last strongholds of Ukrainian-controlled Donbas, thereby forcing them to search more costly ways of advancing through the New Donbas Line.
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If you would like to help the defenders of Kostyantynivka to make it so that this analysis will hopefully never be used, you can do so here:
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Huljajpole. After 6 months of fighting, the first three 2024-style strongpoints, plus a small forest, were finally consolidated by Russians over the Ukrainian obstacle line running in this direction.
Meanwhile, Russian infiltrations up to the railway are now consistent.
Though, it has to be said that obstacles still work reliably even when captured and behind the LoC (on both sides), acting as chokepoints and hard passages for reinforcements and logistics.
Together with the swampy area of the Haichur River and the river itself, the Ukrainians might still have a chance of stopping the Russian momentum here.
Further behind, in the Ukrainian rear, construction of the third obstacle line is in full swing and is at a good degree of completion at the time of writing.
The Russian "offensive window" towards Orikhiv and further towards Zaporizhzhia, by now, is already over, and operational space is now firmly closed by strong defensive lines, but their successes in the area still have to be taken seriously and not underestimated.
Meanwhile, Russian infiltrations up to the railway are now consistent.
Though, it has to be said that obstacles still work reliably even when captured and behind the LoC (on both sides), acting as chokepoints and hard passages for reinforcements and logistics.
Together with the swampy area of the Haichur River and the river itself, the Ukrainians might still have a chance of stopping the Russian momentum here.
Further behind, in the Ukrainian rear, construction of the third obstacle line is in full swing and is at a good degree of completion at the time of writing.
The Russian "offensive window" towards Orikhiv and further towards Zaporizhzhia, by now, is already over, and operational space is now firmly closed by strong defensive lines, but their successes in the area still have to be taken seriously and not underestimated.
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Forwarded from SHALIN ✙
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Forwarded from MYROSHNYKOV
На олександрівсько-новопавлівському напрямку продовжуються активні дії нашого війська.
Окрім зачисток декількох населених пунктів, які ще тривають, є й нові просування.
Йдеться про створення нових сірих зон в глибині оборони ворога з подальшою зачисткою.
Ворог тут страждає логістично, бо найближчий великий "хаб" - це аж Велика Новосілка, майже 20 км від ЛБЗ.
Комар вони також юзають, але там поруч перетин річок Вовчої та Мокрих Ялів, тому можливості обмежені.
Окупанти банально не врахували, що зараз не 2024 рік з каскадним обрушенням батальйоних районів оборони, а до наступних потенційних великих "хабів" (Новопавлівка, Межова, Покровське) вони ще не дійшли та не закріпилися.
А від Великої Новосілки полями та річками багато особового складу та техніки не перекинеш - наші дрони не сплять.
🇺🇦Підписатися на канал🇺🇦
Окрім зачисток декількох населених пунктів, які ще тривають, є й нові просування.
Йдеться про створення нових сірих зон в глибині оборони ворога з подальшою зачисткою.
Ворог тут страждає логістично, бо найближчий великий "хаб" - це аж Велика Новосілка, майже 20 км від ЛБЗ.
Комар вони також юзають, але там поруч перетин річок Вовчої та Мокрих Ялів, тому можливості обмежені.
Окупанти банально не врахували, що зараз не 2024 рік з каскадним обрушенням батальйоних районів оборони, а до наступних потенційних великих "хабів" (Новопавлівка, Межова, Покровське) вони ще не дійшли та не закріпилися.
А від Великої Новосілки полями та річками багато особового складу та техніки не перекинеш - наші дрони не сплять.
🇺🇦Підписатися на канал🇺🇦
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Forwarded from Офіцер
Таке відчуття, що у підарів закінчилась не тільки броня, а і ниви, буханки, жигулі… штурмові дії, якщо вони є, то здійснюють виключно на китайських мотоциклах, броню навіть для переміщення о/с взагалі майже не використовують…
Такі мальчікі дуже класно улітають від FPV, навіть від прильоту поряд)
Офіцер ✙ | Підписатись
Такі мальчікі дуже класно улітають від FPV, навіть від прильоту поряд)
Офіцер ✙ | Підписатись
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Forwarded from Офіцер
Добропілля щомісяця полірують близько 500-700 КАБів🤯
Фактично цей засіб зараз у ворога замінює далекобійну артилерію, при чому точність та ефективність такої зброї набагато краща, в порівнянні з артою.
Саме КАБів критично нам не вистачає для ураження цілей на тактичному рівні, адже противник в свою чергу може собі дозволити систематично закидати авіабомбами окремі наші позиції.
Також зараз, в умовах насиченої сітки ворожих засобів ППО, працювати нашій авіації доволі складно, зачасту противник намагається здійснити пуски ракет по наших винищувачах… тому ворог домінує в цьому напрямку і нам необхідно тут нарощувати потужності як виробництва власних КАБів, так знищувати вороже ППО та нарощувати кількість носіїв авіабомб.
Офіцер ✙ | Підписатись
Фактично цей засіб зараз у ворога замінює далекобійну артилерію, при чому точність та ефективність такої зброї набагато краща, в порівнянні з артою.
Саме КАБів критично нам не вистачає для ураження цілей на тактичному рівні, адже противник в свою чергу може собі дозволити систематично закидати авіабомбами окремі наші позиції.
Також зараз, в умовах насиченої сітки ворожих засобів ППО, працювати нашій авіації доволі складно, зачасту противник намагається здійснити пуски ракет по наших винищувачах… тому ворог домінує в цьому напрямку і нам необхідно тут нарощувати потужності як виробництва власних КАБів, так знищувати вороже ППО та нарощувати кількість носіїв авіабомб.
Офіцер ✙ | Підписатись
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