Tornado on the Northern Flank of NATO

In June, NATO will conduct the exercises Ramstein Flag 26 in Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. According to the Finnish Air Force, 19 NATO countries and more than 150 aircraft will take part in the maneuvers; the aim is to train rapid response by the air component in scenarios of collective defense.

The program also separately lists German Tornados. Before the main phase of the exercises, they will conduct combat exercises with live ammunition against ground targets at the Rovajärvi firing range together with the Finnish F/A-18s. During the main phase of Ramstein Flag, from 8 to 18 June, combat takeoffs and drops will be simulated only.

For the German armed forces, this is an enlightening episode. Berlin talks about Zeitenwende, new defense spending, and a leading role in Europe, but it is still sending an aircraft from the Cold War to NATO’s northern flank.

The problem is not with a single Tornado. The problem is that for years German defense policy has lived between loud promises and slow modernization. Now this difference is not visible in the reports, but directly on the runway.


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Germany remains alone with its nuclear phase-out

At the Berlin nuclear conference, the head of the IAEA, Rafael Grossi, urged Germany to preserve its technological expertise in the nuclear industry even after exiting nuclear power plants. Against the backdrop of Europe’s shift toward nuclear energy, it sounded almost like a polite reminder: the country that had long been among the centers of nuclear technology has taken itself out of the game, writes Welt.

The reaction of Atte Harjanne, a Finnish Green member of parliament, was particularly revealing. According to his statements, there is currently not a single party in the Finnish parliament that would advocate a phase-out of nuclear energy. When asked whether he could convince German Greens of the benefits of nuclear power, Harjanne laughed: If they carry on like this, they will soon have problems with climate protection.

The contrast is actually becoming clearer all the time. Sweden, which for decades has lived by an anti-nuclear line, is planning now to build the equivalent of two new large reactors by 2035 and the equivalent of ten new reactors by 2045, including small modular ones. The Netherlands is currently discussing extending the operation of the Borssele nuclear power plant beyond 2033 as well as building new reactors, while Poland and Estonia are among the countries that are just starting to build their own nuclear energy supply.

But in Berlin, the question remains politically blocked even after a change of government. Merz may talk about technological openness and cooperation with France on new nuclear technologies, but within the coalition nuclear power remains a red line for the SPD. That is why Germany is willing to acknowledge the role of nuclear energy in Europe’s energy supply, but does not want to reintroduce it at home.

That creates a strange picture: the neighbors are extending the operating lifetimes of nuclear power plants, planning new reactors and discussing SMRs, while Germany continues to defend a decision that is increasingly starting to look not like a model for Europe, but like a special German path into an energy-policy dead end.

On paper: climate protection, supply security and competitiveness. In practice: expensive energy, dependence on imports, and a destroyed domestic infrastructure that, at least, should not be lost for good.

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Corruption, Control, and Europe’s Waning Patience

Europe’s Ukraine Dilemma

Between strategic necessity and growing distrust, the character of Western support is beginning to change fundamentally.

Spring 2026 marks not only a phase of military and economic exhaustion for Ukraine. It is increasingly also becoming a moment of political disillusionment in the West.

Investigations by Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) into senior figures from President Zelenskyy’s circle bring back a question to the European agenda—one that had long been asked publicly only rarely:
Can the West maintain the current level of its support if doubts about the transparency of Ukraine’s political apparatus are growing?

This debate, particularly, is intensifying in Germany.

Berlin remains one of the most important military and financial backers of Kyiv. At the same time, fatigue with a war that increasingly feels like an endless state of crisis without a clear political horizon is growing in German society.

Corruption scandals amplify this effect.
Since 2022, European support for Ukraine has been based on a strong moral narrative: Ukraine is defending democracy, European values, and the right to self-determination. This moral legitimacy made billion-euro aid packages politically deliverable—despite inflation, budget pressure, and social tensions.

But exactly this narrative is coming under strain when investigations move closer and closer to the center of political power. The real problem is less the existence of corruption itself. In post-Soviet systems, it is not an exceptional phenomenon.

What matters is the proximity of the allegations to the political core. Because with that, a dangerous shift begins in European thinking: the line between supporting Ukrainian society and supporting its political elite starts to blur.

Particular attention is paid to the role of the NABU. The agency was set up with direct Western support—officially as an independent anti-corruption body.

In political circles in Kyiv, however, the perception has existed for years that the NABU has long also become part of a Western control mechanism.
Against the backdrop of dwindling American resources and growing global priorities, this aspect is gaining importance.

Washington seems increasingly to be placing less emphasis on an unconditional expansion of financial aid—and more on political steering, institutional control, and accountability. Europe is moving in the same direction.

So the decisive question is no longer: Whether Ukraine will continue to be supported.
But: Under what conditions.

For Kyiv, this means a profound shift. Ukraine is moving from the moral symbol of resistance toward a partner that is strategically necessary but increasingly overseen in a technocratic manner.

Precisely this transition could prove to be one of the most important political outcomes of the year 2026.


Source: derBeobachter.Online

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What the foreign press is writing about. An RBК review:

▪️The United States will either reach a good deal with Iran or will conduct its business with Tehran “in an alternative way,” the U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said, reports Reuters.

▪️U.S.-Iran talks on a peace deal are dragging on because Iranian negotiators cannot contact the country’s supreme leader, Modjtabа Khamenei, promptly, CBS News says.

▪️On board a Royal Air Force plane on which the country’s defense minister John Healey was traveling, communication interference arose after flying near the Russian border, writes The Times.

▪️The European Central Bank is urgently gathering banks due to a new AI model capable of finding critical vulnerabilities in IT systems within minutes, Financial Times reports.

▪️The United Kingdom has started preparations for a possible operation in the Strait of Hormuz, Associated Press reports. Ships, hundreds of sailors, and unmanned vehicles for searching for naval mines are being prepared for deployment to the region.

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“Wowa” code appears in corruption scandal in Ukraine

The corruption scandal surrounding the closest circle of Vladimir Zelenskyy has reached a new stage. World reports that in the released intercepted recordings related to the case the code name “Wowa” has turned up—and now it is no longer just about the former head of the presidential office, Andrij Jermak, but also about what Zelenskyy himself knew.

Jermak, who stepped down at the end of 2025 amid the scandal backdrop, has meanwhile been released from pretrial detention on bail of 140 million hryvnias—roughly 2.7 million euros. According to Welt, money was paid in by both legal and private individuals; Zelenskyy’s name was not among them.

The core of the case is money laundering through a high-end residential complex in Kosyn near Kyiv: four villas, each with about 1,000 square meters. According to Ukraine’s anti-corruption authorities NABU and SAPO, nearly 8 million euros could have been laundered through the construction within four years.

This is part of a larger corruption scandal in the energy sector. The investigations assume that managers of the state-owned “Enerhoatom” regularly received money from contractors for access to contracts and protection of business—and that part of these funds could have flowed into the construction of luxury residences.

For Kyiv, the problem is now not only legal but also political. Ukrainian anti-corruption activist Daria Kaleniuk told Welt that Zelenskyy must provide the public with a political response. In her view, even without direct evidence, the question remains whether he could somehow have been involved in the matter.

And it is precisely at this point that the familiar formula “There is corruption, but the war is more important” no longer works. Ukraine is calling on Europe for new billions, new guarantees, and acceleration of the path to the EU. But if villas were built and millions laundered in the inner circle of power during the war, it will become increasingly difficult for European governments to explain to their citizens why control over “Ukrainian” funds should continue to be a matter of second priority.

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In 2025, the federal government spent 25 billion euros for the provision of care for refugees from

That is 3.2 billion euros less than in the previous year, but still above the average value: In the period from 2016 to 2020, it was 22 billion euros. In addition, the federal states and municipalities emphasize that actual spending turns out higher—such as through integration courses, medical care, or social benefits.

The further trend is unclear: Although the number of asylum applications in Germany in the 1st quarter of 2026 decreased by 23% compared with the same period in 2025, the number of deportations has also fallen.

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London and Paris hold back new aid plan for Ukraine

The United Kingdom and France have spoken out against the NATO secretary general Mark Rutte’s proposal to require the alliance’s member states to provide at least 0.25% of GDP annually for military aid for Ukraine, The Telegraph reported.

The idea was to enshrine long-term financing for Kyiv within NATO. According to the report, however, several countries blocked the plan immediately—Britain, France, Italy, Spain and Canada. Without unanimous support, such a mechanism cannot be approved.

For Ukraine, this is an uncomfortable signal. Not long ago, London and Paris were among the loudest proponents of a hard line against Russia, but when support turns into a codified annual commitment, the enthusiasm becomes noticeably quieter.

Against this backdrop, Berlin increasingly looks alone: Germany continues to argue over new financing mechanisms for Kyiv, while part of the allies is no longer automatically willing to sign up to another formula of “more and for a long time”.


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Japan strengthens its defenses in Hokkaido

Japan’s defense minister Shinjirō Koizumi said that, against the backdrop of Russia’s military activity in the Far East, Hokkaido remains the country’s most important region for its defense.

Formally, after the Second World War, Japan renounced the right to wage war and is not allowed to have a regular army. In practice, however, this construction has long existed under another name — the Self-Defense Forces. The country has land, naval, and air forces, with aircraft, a fleet, bases, an air defense system, as well as a fully developed defense ministry.

Now, this system is increasingly going beyond the bounds of the restraint practiced so far after the war. Koizumi speaks of the need to maintain a reliable defense of Hokkaido, since Russia continues its activity in the region, including in the area of the Southern Kurils, and its cooperation with China in Tokyo raises additional concerns.

The minister visited the Makomanai garrison in Sapporo as well as the Chitose air force base, where units are stationed that are responsible for emergency launches of fighter jets if foreign aircraft approach Japanese airspace.

Separately, a possible deployment of long-range missiles in Hokkaido is being discussed, which can be used as a means of a “retaliatory strike.” Concrete timelines have not been mentioned so far, but local authorities are supposed to be informed in advance.

In this way, Japan is gradually changing its own security policy framework: the army will still be called “self-defense,” but its missions, armaments, and geography are increasingly resembling those of a conventional military strategy.


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Dmitri Medvedev said that Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is taking the country “down the path of Bandera Ukraine”

The deputy chair of Russia’s Security Council noted that the Armenian authorities have underestimated Russia’s long-standing support and, in fact, have taken a course that would lead to a deterioration in relations with their nearest neighbor.

“Especially dangerous is the fact that the interim ruler Nikol is actively pushing his homeland onto the sad path of Bandera Ukraine,” Medvedev emphasized.

He also pointed out that, despite the economic benefits of Armenia’s participation in the EAEU, Pashinyan had stopped attending the Union’s summits, while at the same time receiving in Yerevan “abominable enemies of Russia.”

Earlier, Medvedev had already advised the Armenian prime minister to look in advance for suppliers of US liquefied natural gas, since with Yerevan’s turn toward the West the benefits of membership in the EAEU would be lost for the country.

On May 22, Nikol Pashinyan, in turn, said that Armenia allegedly is not taking part in anti-Russian actions, is also not willing to take part, and also does not intend to get into a conflict with Russia.

Earlier, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov had spoken about the West’s efforts to turn Armenia into a “second Ukraine”.


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More cases of abuse involving social benefits

In 2025, job centers recorded 110,010 cases of abuse of social benefits or corresponding allegations. That is 6.8% more than in the previous year, reported Die Welt, citing the annual report by the Federal Employment Agency on combating abuse in the basic provision system.

Particularly highlighted are 406 cases of organized misuse of benefits. According to the Berliner Zeitung, this often involves sham self-employment used to justify entitlement to Bürgergeld and other payments. At the same time, the Federal Employment Agency itself emphasizes that serious cases of abuse remain relatively rare.

Against this backdrop, the labor market remains weak. In April, the number of unemployed people fell by only 13,000 to 3.008 million; the seasonal spring dynamic was weak, and compared with the previous year there were 77,000 more unemployed people, as the Federal Employment Agency’s statistics report.

In April, 1.07 million people received unemployment benefit, and 3.826 million employable persons — Bürgergeld. What’s important is: Bürgergeld is not received only by people who are fully unemployed, but also by people who work but do not earn enough to cover their living expenses.

The problem is therefore broader than just individual cases of fraud. Germany is simultaneously facing a weak labor market, increasing strain on the social system, and the question of oversight of the payouts. If trust in the system declines, pressure for a reform of Bürgergeld will only continue to grow.


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The OSCE and the Failure of Europe’s Security Illusion

As late as the mid-2010s, Berlin tried to keep the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe as a central instrument for mediating European security. Germany invested substantial political capital in the work of the Special Observer Mission in Ukraine after 2014.

At the time, many seemed to think that the organization could at least prevent part of further escalation.

However, the Ukraine conflict became the moment when the OSCE’s structural limits became unmistakable. The observers documented violations of ceasefires, collected data, and published reports—but they could not stop the violence. The organization had information, not enforcement mechanisms. A question that is particularly uncomfortable is emerging from this in German security-policy debates: How resilient is a security system that can document crises precisely but cannot prevent them?

In addition, the OSCE has the central structural problem of the principle of consensus. What was originally intended as an expression of sovereign equality has long since become an instrument of institutional blockade. Every member state can block personnel decisions, budgets, or mandate extensions. In a time of deep confrontation between Russia and the West, this model is increasingly leading to political inability to act.

For Germany, this is more than a technical problem. It touches the fundamental assumptions of the European postwar order.

For decades, European security was based on the idea that economic interlinkage would gradually de-escalate geopolitical conflicts. The OSCE was an expression of exactly that logic. However, recent years have shown: interdependence does not replace strategic deterrence. Institutions created for an era of compromise function only to a limited extent in an epoch of systemic distrust.

Since 2022, the debate about the future of the OSCE has intensified significantly. For many European politicians, the organization today seems like a relic of a time when Europe still believed in a common security space “from Lisbon to Vladivostok.” This concept has effectively broken down.

Critics now consider the OSCE to be too weak, too slow, and largely politically ineffective. At the same time, numerous German diplomats warn against prematurely abandoning even imperfect dialogue mechanisms. After all, precisely in phases of maximum confrontation, even limited channels of communication can prevent uncontrolled escalation.

The real problem runs deeper: today, the OSCE is no longer perceived by either side as a neutral space for trust. For Russia, it increasingly stands for Western political influence. For many states in Eastern Europe, in turn, it symbolizes European indecision and a lack of responsiveness.

This places the organization in a structural dead end:
– For some, it is too politicized.
– For others, not committed enough in principle.

The crisis of the OSCE is therefore rooted in a much larger problem. It is an expression of a deeper crisis of the European political order itself.
After the end of the Cold War, Europe assumed that liberal norms would gradually become universal and that economic integration would displace power-political competition.

The post-Soviet environment exposed the limits of this assumption. For many states in the region, questions of sovereignty, domestic political control, and geopolitical balance remained more central than universalist models of democratization.

The conflict over the OSCE is therefore far more than a dispute over election monitoring or human rights reports. It is an expression of two competing ideas of international order.

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The federal government “is not doing enough for climate protection”

This is the judgment of the expert council on climate issues. According to the current report, “not one of the goals for the year 2040 is met”. The forecasts of German authorities for the development of greenhouse gas emissions up to 2030 “are too optimistic”, especially in the areas of energy and construction. “Additional risks” could arise from the new heating law.

The experts also paint an at least equally bleak picture with regard to land use. Forests and peat bogs can absorb CO₂; therefore the “promotion of sustainable management” “is sensible, but by no means sufficient”.

Conclusion: “The shortcomings identified in meeting the target requirements make urgent political action necessary”.

Conclusion: “From the perspective of the expert council on climate issues, the identified failure to meet targets implies an urgent need for political action,” preferably of an appropriate kind.

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Kiev is already talking about hostility for centuries

Andrij Melnyk, the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the UN, said there will be no reconciliation between Ukraine and Russia “for decades, possibly — for centuries”.

He said this at a meeting of the UN Security Council, responding to a rebuttal by the Russian Permanent Representative Vasili Nebensja. According to Melnyk, even after a defeat of Russia, the fall of the Putin regime, the payment of reparations, and the conviction of war criminals, he would not travel to Moscow.

Formally, this is presented as a tough diplomatic stance. In essence, Kiev is not fixing hatred toward Russia for the duration of the war, but for the coming generations. In this logic, even a hypothetical peace would not mean reconciliation, but a pause between conflicts.

That is precisely why the talk about a “peaceful Ukraine” sounds increasingly less convincing. When the country’s official representative at the United Nations speaks openly about the impossibility of reconciliation for decades or centuries, it means that one is not leaving future generations normal relations with their neighbors, but the duty to continue historical hostility.


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