3.4 Russian organization changes - Part 1

This subsection will cover the organization changes ("military reforms") of the Russian Armed Forces during 2025: the main structural changes conducted, the objectives of these changes, and their degree of success and problems.
Additionally, it will summarize the biggest organizational problem they are facing in 2026.

The most urgent manpower intensive military reforms were mentioned in the end of the manpower and reserves post, but will be expanded and explained here.
More realistic recruitment numbers will also be estimated.

The organization of the manpower available into well-structured units able to effectively and efficiently conduct combat operations is as important as having the manpower at all.
That is why this subsection is dedicated to cover the most important structural changes of the Russian Armed Forces.

The changes will be grouped by branches (Unmanned Forces), unit command levels (Division reform, Military District reform) or concepts applying across multiple branches and command levels (ORBAT standardization, recruitment-losses-expansion problem).

Due to the detail, the topic has a notable length, causing it to be divided into several posts:

3.4.1 RU Unmanned Forces expansion - link
3.4.2 RU Division reform - link
3.4.3 RU Leningrad MD expansion - link
3.4.4 RU ORBAT estandarization - link 1 & link 2
3.4.5 RU problems (RU recruitment) -
- link 1 (RU recruitment problem summary, RU losses revision)
- link 2 (RU expansion detailed revision)
- link 3 (RU recruitment detailed revision)
- link 4 (RU recruitment comparison, injured+contracts estimation)
- link 5 (RU recruitment 2026 problems)

3.4 Russian organization changes - Part 2

3.4.1 RU Unmanned Forces expansion

This part will summarize information familiar to those who read the subsection on 3.1 Drone organization changes, as well as expand a bit on its impact on overall organization.

Due to the importance of drones in this conflict, Russia began in late 2024 the creation of their "separate military branch" (under General Staff direct control but with a lower rank than main branches), but the creation was effectively conducted over 2025, as explained in the introduction of 3.1.6 RU drone organization changes 2025.
The objective of this branch was to centralize drone organization & drone research-development to standardize the structure-equipment of UAV/UGV/USV/UUV units, aiming to create an effective and efficient force of drone units to support combat actions with their firepower and exclusive capabilities.

The Russian Unmanned Systems Forces 2025 expansion objectives and results (in terms of units created) were detailed in its respective part of 3.1.6.
Summarizing, many Russian units didn't reach their planned force, with a higher rate of success at higher levels.
Particularly, they failed to form USF Regiments for 80% of their fleets (likely given lower recruitment priority over units fighting in Ukraine) and 50% of their planned USF battalions (prioritizing new ones in Armies & Corps over scaling up Division's UAV companies)

The Russsian Unmanned Systems Forces future plans were detailed in its respective part of 3.1.6.
Essentially, it involves:
- Expansion of Military District's USF Regiments into USF Brigades
- Completing USF battalions plans for 2025 (x26/51 remaining, for every Army, Corps and Division)
- Expanding USF companies into battalions for either all elite brigades (Russian Armed Forces leaked plans for 2026) or all frontline brigades (Ukrainian Military Intelligence claims)
- Creating USF companies for every Motorized Infantry Regiment

Conclusions
The integration of drone units into the Russian USF was completed succesfully, allowing a quick increase of drone standardization, including the display of a quick "development-testing-mass production-mass deployment" cycle in the field of fiber-optic drones, which went from experimental to mass deployment in a few months.

While 2025 plans for unit creation were not completed, it showed an acceptable advance by creating an elite support force as well as increasing their main drone force, resulting in a notable improvement in terms of drone usage, aided by the superiority in fiber-optic drones (now being lost as Ukraine began to copy their designs, and as their combined demand made fiber-optic prices skyrocket).

Ulimately, regarding 2026 plans: the unit creation plans are very ambitious and manpower intensive, considering that they plan an exponential increase in the creation of drone units compared to previous years (for more information, check our chat comment of Russia seeking to have 100k USF members by the end of March, seemingly completed).

Completing these plans would require excelent output by drone training schools and a steady flow of recruits to train, which might not happen or might reduce recruit supply to other Russian forces, slowing other organizational changes or tactical action.

3.4 Russian organization changes - Part 3

3.4.2 RU Division reform

This part will cover in moderate detail the expansion of the number of divisions of the Russian Armed Forces.

The main reason for this change was that the war in Ukraine caused Russia to rethink the structure of their medium level military formations and many of their trained tactics, due to their failures.

A brief explanation of the Russian structure of mid-level units:
Both Divisions and Brigades have integral support elements (tanks, artillery, recon, engineers, non-combat support) in their structures, with their main combat units (infantry, tanks) being Regiments and battalions (respectively).
The main difference between them is that Regiments have their own separate support units while battalions do not and depend on the Brigade ones.

Brigades primarily used the BTG system ("battalion tactical group"), effectively a Brigade dividing its support elements to reinforce its motorized battalions so they can operate independently "like regiments".
This system had well known weaknesses, such as their extremely small infantry component unable to sustain losses (with infantry effectively having the role of pinning enemies down for supporting firepower to quickly wipe out), making them unable to clear dispersed and camouflaged enemies (ambush teams or urban warfare), and weak on prolongued combat.
While it was effective in short wars like the Georgian War, the BTG system struggled compared to Regiments when a few Russian units fought against Ukraine already in 2015, causing Russia to create 10 of the 17 Divisions Russia had at the start of the conflict.

2022: Due to these problems with BTGs, Russia soon began to operate directly using Brigades in early 2022, and due to the evolution from a war of maneuver into a war of attrition requiring much more infantry to hold the frontline solidly (drone surveillance requires fewer troops but is vulnerable to camouflaged infiltration), Russia began to increase the number of their Divisions.

For this purpose, between 2022-2025, Russia created 13 Divisions [9 formed by expanding Brigades, 4 completely newly formed (6th,67th,70th,72nd)], as well as 15 Brigades (mostly by integrating the expanded separatist forces into 9 Brigades, creating 3 brigades for the new 25th Army, and 3 for other units).
Currently, they have 30 Divisions and 44 Brigades.

Units created per year (main combat units, excluding Armies from DPR/LPR/Crimea, and distinguishing "expansion Divisions" since they require about half the manpower than completely new ones):
2022 (low recruitment): 2 Divisions (1 expanded + 1 new)
2023 (high recruitment, medium losses): 3 Divisions (1 expanded + 2 new), 4 Brigades (3 for the new 25th Army + 1 VDV)
2024 (high recruitment, high losses): 3 Divisions (2 expanded + 1 new), 2 Brigades
[1 new Division + 1 brigade forming the new 44th Army Corps]
2025 (high recruitment, high losses): 4 Divisions (4 expanded)

Ukrainian sources disagree on numbers (Mangustu; Sirsky [maybe joining new Divisions+Brigades in his count?]), but all agree that Russia fell short of their plans to form Divisions due to manpower shortages caused by high losses.

Russia claims that in 2025 it created 5 Divisions (4 infantry+1 SAM), 13 Brigades (mostly support) and 30 Regiments (half in Divisions/half support?).
In 2026 it plans to create 4 Divisions (x2 Central MD, x2 Marines), 14 Brigades (mostly support, again) and 39 Regiments (half in Divisions/half support?).

Detailed Russian 2026-2027 plans according to Mangustu:
- Expand 10 Brigades into Divisions (7 Motorized + 2 Marines + 1 Coastal Defense)
- Create 2 fully new Motorized Divisions
- Create 2 new Artillery Divisions (4 Artillery Brigades?).
These changes would make the Russians have an Infantry-Tank force of 42 Divisions+34 Brigades, but many seem over-ambitious compared to Russian MOD ones.

Conclusion
In any way, even the MOD plans for 2026 are reliant on more recruitment or fewer losses than 2025, when they created fewer units (and Divisions often lacked enough infantry).

3.4 Russian organization changes - Part 4

3.4.3 RU Leningrad MD expansion

Among the Russian priorities in their Armed Forces organizational changes was the reinforcement of the Leningrad Military District (LMD), which will be covered in this part.

NATO expansion and district recreation
Due to NATO expansion in Escandinavia (2022 requests, Finland joined in 2023, Sweden in 2024), Russia recreated the Leningrad MD in 2024 towards them by dissolving the Western Military District into the Leningrad and Moscow Military Districts, assigning them the units that were based on their assigned regions.
The Western MD was formed in 2010 by joining these same districts, causing the units of the Leningrad MD (all directly assigned) to be assigned to the newly created 6th Combined Arms Army inside the Western MD. Between 2010-2024, Russia also created two Army Corps (11th, 14th), to control the Coastal Troops units of the Northern and Baltic Fleets (both corps and fleets are now in the Leningrad MD).

This caused that during the recreation of the Leningrad MD in 2024, nearly all its original support units were inside the 6th Army, and most of the Western MD ones went to the Moscow MD, so the new MD lacked most standard support units.
It also was the weakest Military District right after its recreation:
- Motorized-Tank Divisions/Brigades (D/B) per MD in early 2024: Leningrad MD = 1D/4B; Moscow MD = 5D/1B; Southern MD = 6D/18B; Central MD = 4D/8B; Eastern MD = 2D/9B

Due to this weakness, it remained assigned to one of the calmest sectors of the front (the pre-2022 Russia-Ukraine border) and plans to expand it began, but in 2024 with the start of operations in the North Kharkov region and Ukraine's Kursk Offensive it required reinforcements from other districts.

For these reasons, over 2024-2025, Russia strengthened the LMD main combat units and tried to create its 'Military District-standard' support Brigades.

2024:
Russia created the Karelia-based 44th Army Corps (1 new Division + 1 new Brigade), located between the Murmansk-based 14th Army Corps (facing NATO's Norway) and the 6th Army (based in Leningrad region, facing NATO's Baltics), since with Finland joining NATO in 2023 the border with them required additional forces [the MD's remaining 11th Army Corps is located in Kaliningrad, between NATO's Poland and Lithuania].
It also expanded to a division one of two brigades of the 6th Army to cover the border of Leningrad region with Finland.
Overall, 2/3 Divisions and 1/2 Brigades created in 2024 were created in the Leningrad MD.

2025:
Russia continued to reinforce the Leningrad MD to hold the Ukraine frontline, creating there 3/4 Divisions created in 2025 (including 1/2 Naval Infantry Divisions, all created by expanding existing Brigades).
By 2026 they achieved their objective of increasing its strength, now standing as one of the strongest ones in relation to its population.
Motorized-Tank Divisions/Brigades per MD in early 2026: Leningrad MD = 5D/2B (≈60k); Moscow MD = 5D/1B (≈55k); Southern MD = 6D/18B (≈150k); Central MD = 5D/7B (≈85k); Eastern MD = 2D/9B (≈65k)
Aproximate number of soldiers (in those units) per population: 60k/14M (4.3‰ LMD), 55k/39.4M (1.4‰ MMD), 150k/30M (5‰ SMD), 85k/62M (1.4‰ CMD), 65k/8.2M (7.9‰ EMD)

Of these, the Eastern MD is the most militarized per capita, due to limited economic oportunities making military service more attractive and the importance of the border with China & DPRK.
The Southern MD is also highly militarized, since it is the one most often involved in conflicts (Caucasus, Southern Ukraine), with about half its force being based in ex-Ukrainian regions.
The Leningrad MD is the outlier, greatly expanded to defend their wide front with Ukraine and NATO.

The Russian MOD plans for 2026 don't specify units per region.
And 2026 expansion plans according to Mangustu dont put emphasis on any particular region (expansions planned everywhere).
Author opinion: the focus seems to be completing the planned expansion of the USF, and expanding x2 Central MD & x2 Naval Infantry Brigades.

3.4 Russian organization changes - Part 5

3.4.4 RU ORBAT estandarization - Part 1

One of the least noticed but most relatively important changes is that Russia began to equip all higher echelon units created during the war up to the standard structure of equivalent pre-war units (if it existed), since the conflict kept prolonging and previously "interim structures" lacking support elements were impeding these units from conducting military actions appropriately.

This topic will be covered over two parts.
- First, it will very briefly describe the current standard support units for high echelon units, the history of higher-echelon units newly created over the conflict, and a brief summary of the units created over 2025 as far as publicly known.
- Second, it will explain the progress on standardization over 2025 per type of support unit, and finally it will cover the current status of standardization per unit echelon (as of 31st March 2026), comparing it with the Russian plans for unit creation in 2026 (almost all new Brigades will be dedicated to standardization efforts).

PD: If it is requested, a future topic might be produced describing how these standardized suppport elements interact on combined arms operations.

Standards (check the linked ORBAT at the end)
- Military Districts: Brigades (MLRS, Missile, SAM, NBC, Engineer, Spetsnaz, EW, Command, Communications, Logistics, Railway), Regiment (UAV, Maintenance) [some may have several; Russia is also aiming for an Artillery Division per MD near NATO].
- Armies: Brigades (Artillery, Missile, SAM, Command, Logistics), Regiments (NBC, Engineer), battalions (UAV, EW, Communications, Maintenance). For reconnaissance, either spetsnaz company or Recon Brigade, at least.
- Army Corps: no clear standards, maybe Artillery and Missile Brigades, likely Engineer and EW battalions, maybe spetsnaz/recon company
(few reference units, a structure to control an ad-hoc group of units, often in remote locations)
[3rd = created to unify into one unit all the 2022 MOD volunteers;
11th = Kalinigrad exclave;
14th = Murmansk (furthest North Army/Corps);
44th = Karelia (filling the gap between 14th Corps and 6th Army after Finland joined NATO);
68th = Sakhalin-Kuril Islands near Japan]

History of "new" higher-echelon units
Leningrad MD: created in 2024 (covered in the previous post)
3rd,18th,51st CAA: created in 2023 to properly incorporate to the Russian Army some ad-hoc units of mobilized soldiers from ex-Ukrainian regions (LPR, DPR, Crimea - respectively). After incorporation they received new soldiers from the universal recruit pool and began to undergo standardization.
25th CAA: created in 2023 from volunteers of Central MD and Eastern MD, to support the overstretched Zapad grouping (Moscow MD units, located in the Kharkov-Luhansk border) by fighting around Kreminna. Undergoing standardization.
3rd Army Corps: created in 2022 to unify MOD volunteers of 2022
44th Army Corps: created in 2024 (covered in the previous post)
Volunteer, Cossack Corps: created in 2023 to organize some ad-hoc units of Russian volunteer soldiers (Russian Cossacks, and Russian/International volunteers [BARS units and soldiers from absorbed PMCs like Wagner or Redut]).
These last two corps are not standardized since they are not officially part of Russia's Ministry of Defense, with their soldiers being recruited through a different contract, which gives them more service freedom but fewer economic benefits).

Changes over 2025 (follow JohnH105 for live updates):
5 Divisions created:
- 4 Infantry
- 1 SAM Division (single S-500 Regiment, Moscow MD)
[34th Artillery Division & 1/2 of its Artillery Brigades created in 2024]
13 Brigades created:
- 1 artillery (for 34th Artillery Division)
- 2 SAM (total number remaining unclear, 3-5 SAM Brigades)
- 1 Oreshnik ICBM (as it was accepted into service)
- 76th MLRS (for Leningrad MD, completing MD MLRS standard)
- 8 Missile/Command/Logistics [remaining from 13 total]: x6 Missile (Iskander-M TBM) [Armies+Army Corps only], x5 Command-Logistics [Armies only]

3.4 Russian organization changes - Part 6

3.4.4 RU ORBAT estandarization - Part 2

Progress over 2025
Artillery
- Overall, their new Artillery Division standard (one per MD) didn't advance much, creating one Artillery Brigade per year (2024-2025), while allegedly planning 2 more Artillery Divisions (4 Artillery Brigades?).
- In terms of Artillery Brigade standardization (one Artillery Brigade per Army/Corps), they likely completed it for Armies in 2024 (maybe 73rd Brigade of 25th CAA created in 2025?), but 2 Army Corps still lack Artillery Brigades.
MLRS, Missiles, SAM
- Their MLRS Brigade standardization (one per MD) was completed.
- Their Missile Brigade standardization (one per MD/Army/Corps) is complete for MD (according to amalantra), but incomplete for Armies (lacking four, in all "new" ones) and for Army Corps (two lacking).
- Their SAM Brigade standardization (one per MD/Army) is incomplete for MD (Leningrad MD lacks one) and for Armies (lacking four, in all "new" ones).
NBC, Engineers, EW
- Their NBC-Engineer standardizations (one Brigade per MD, one Regiment per Army) is complete for MD, but may be incomplete for Armies (2 NBC Regiments missing for 25th+51st CAA, 2 Engineer Regiments missing for 3rd+51st CAA).
- Additionally, Engineer battalion standardization for Army Corps is likely incomplete (one missing in 14th Army Corps).
- In terms of EW battalion standardization (one per Army/Corps), it is incomplete for both: 3 Armies and 2 Army Corps may be missing them (25th+41st+51st CAA; 3rd+14th AK)
Spetsnaz/Recon
The spetsnaz standardization (>1 Brigade per MD; 1 Recon Brigade/spetsnaz company per Army/Corps) was always completed for MD, and was already completed by late 2024 for all Armies, but the 14th+68th Army Corps may be missing an spetsnaz unit.
Non-Combat Support
- The non-combat support standardization is complete for Military Districts.
- For Armies, both 3rd & 51st CAA are lacking Command and Logistics Brigades (they have smaller than standard non-combat support units), and the 8th CAA may be lacking a Logistics Brigade.

2026 Difference to standards
Military Districts: the Leningrad MD is lacking a SAM brigade, while the Leningrad+Southern MD may have plans to form two Artillery Divisions.
Armies (joining the 3rd, 18th, 25th and 51st CAA): they may be missing 4 Missile Brigades, 4 SAM Brigades, 2 Engineer Regiments, 2 NBC Regiments, 3 EW battalions and maybe they need to expand some non-combat support units (up to 5 more Brigades)
Army Corps (joining all five of them): they may be missing up to 2 Artillery Brigades, 2 Missile Brigades, 1 Engineer battalion, 2 EW battalions, 2 spetsnaz/recon companies

Maximum missing until standardized:
x2 Artillery Brigades [Army Corps only]
x5 SAM Brigade (x1 S-300, x4 Buk)
x6 Missile Brigades [MD completed]
x5 Command-Logistics Brigades [Armies only]
x4 NBC-Engineer Regiments
x5 EW battalions [3 Armies + 2 Army Corps]
x2 spetsnaz companies [Army Corps only]

Minimum missing until standardized (if none of the 2 SAM Brigades or 8 other Brigades are already included):
x2 Artillery Brigades [Army Corps only]
x3 SAM Brigade (x1? S-300, x4? Buk)
x6 Missile Brigades [MD completed]
x5 Command-Logistics Brigades [Armies only]
- 8 Brigades less among Missiles, Command and Logistics (the only Brigade categories where creation numbers were not specified)
x0-4 NBC-Engineer Regiments (might be done)
x0-5 EW battalions [3 Armies + 2 Army Corps] (might be done)
x0-2 spetsnaz companies [Army Corps only] (might be done)

Summarizing:
- Maximum: 20 Support Brigades, 4 NBC-Engineer Regiments, 5 EW battalions, 2 spetsnaz companies remain to be formed.
Some support units (UAV) remain to be discovered.
- Minimum: 10 Support Brigades remain to be formed, many support units remain to be discovered (UAV, combat & non-combat support).
- Russian 2026 plans: Russian plans aim for 14 Brigades (primarily Support), which should cover the minimum Support standardization needs while creating 2-4 non-standard Brigades (for Artillery Divisions or new un-standardized weapon systems)

3.4 Russian organization changes - Part 7

3.4.5 RU problems - Part 1 (Introduction+RU losses)

Russia's main problem, as mentioned in the subsection about reserves and at some points over this subsection, is the lack of enough recruits for all these plans, after replacing losses.

In fact, a revision of the numbers mentioned in 3.3.1 Russian recruitment and losses will be made here (due to the length of the revision) to complete the estimates of losses and provide the context neccessary to understand Russian manpower problems, since the numbers there (fatal losses and claimed recruitment) dont explain it.

To summarize the estimates and conclusions ahead of time: some data was not available publicly (wounded losses in 2024-2025, number of real new recruits, number of volunteers lost by un-renewed contracts), so those had to be replaced with estimates of relatively low quality, so the final estimates are a rough aproximation, not definitive and precise numbers.

First, we will estimate the number of permanent personnel losses:

Fatal Losses
In 3.3.1, Russian fatal losses (KIA = killed in action) in 2025 were estimated (*) as around 80k.
Russian fatal losses: 2022 (20k), 2023 (46k), 2024 (83k), 2025 (80k*).

The number of fatal losses confirmed by mediazona by year (very incomplete for 2025) and soldier type (MOD regular soldiers with "career contracts" [regulars], 2022 mobilized reservists [mobilized], civilian volunteers [volunteers], prisoner volunteers [prisoners], Private Military Corporations [PMC], no data):
2022 (confirmed): 20k (8500 regulars, 1300 mobilized, 2700 volunteers, 4200 prisoners, 800 PMC, 2000 no data)
2023 (confirmed): 45k (7200 regulars, 7500 mobilized, 10k volunteers, 12k prisoners, 1800 PMC, 6600 no data)
2024 (confirmed): 82k (15k regulars, 6500 mobilized, 42k volunteers, 3600 prisoners, 62 PMC, 15k no data)
2025 (confirmed): 36k (6800 regulars, 2000 mobilized, 16k volunteers, 800 prisoners, 52 PMC, 11k no data)

Other losses
To the number of losses we should add the number of soldiers discharged: due to injuries (contracts ended due to combat injuries, disabling or otherwise) or by other reasons (contracts ended due to age-health limits, newly mobilized reservist soldiers rotating 2022-mobilized reservist soldiers might happen in 2026).

‣ Soldiers discharged due to injury-disability
Data on disabled-injured soldiers is scarce due to censorship, data on the changes of disabled russians is incomplete and obscured by multiple changes (changes in disability eligibility requirements, addition of disabled ex-ukrainians registering for aid, better quality prothesis due to war veteran support investment increasing civilian demand...) as well as by the author's poor understandind of the data (poor dataset labeling, poor data explanation/translation).
Some key sources and all compiled statistics on disabled russians will be shared in comments, in case some reader wishes to add information (source 1, source 2, source 3, source 4, source 5).

A source exists for Russian soldiers hospitalized in 2022-2023, but it lacks data for 2024 and 2025, so a later post will provide different estimates for the total injury discharges per year.

‣ Soldiers discharged due to age-health limits
Due to automatic renewal of MOD contracts since September 2022 until the end of SMO, discharges of un-injured soldiers are mostly due to age limits (at 50 years old for most un-promoted soldiers), accounting for around 3% of their force every year [the % of 49 years old recruits in a soldier pool overwhelmingly 18-49 years old].
For Russia's force of 640-710k total (2023,2024,2025), that is about 20-25k retired every year.

‣ TOTAL number of losses (KIA+demobilized), per year
2022: 40k+? = 20k KIA + 10k discharged + ? injury discharged
2023: 70k+? = 45k KIA + 25k discharged + ? injury discharged
2024: 107k+? = 82k KIA + 25k discharged + ? injury discharged
2025: 105k+? = 80k KIA + 25k discharged + ? injury discharged

TOTAL 2022-2025:
312k + ? losses = 227k KIA + 85k discharged + ? injury discharged

3.4 Russian organization changes - Part 8

3.4.5 RU problems - Part 2 (RU expansion)

New soldiers needed (per expansion type and total, for each year)

‣ Main combat units expansion (new or expanded infantry units) Where:
- New Divisions = ND = 10k;
- Expanded Divisions = ED = 5k (expanding a Brigade);
- Low-Infantry Expanded Divisions = LI-ED = 2.5k [in support units];
- New Brigades = NB = 5k
Number of soldiers used:
2022: 15k = 1 ND + 1 NB
2023: 45k = 2 ND + 1 ED + 4 NB
2024: 30k = 1 ND + 2 ED +2 NB
2025: 10k = 4 LI-ED)

‣ Support units expansion
Where:
- New Army/Corps [incomplete] = 5k [support units]
- Support Brigade = 1-1,5k
Plans and final total of support units created:
2022 final reality: 5k = 3rd AK
2023 plans & final claims: 24-31k final = 2 CAA [18th,25th], 14 support brigades [18 claimed - 4 NB]
2024 final claims: 25-30k final = 2 CAA [3rd, 51st], 44th AK, 10 support brigades [16 claimed - 3 ND/ED - 2 NB - 1 artillery division]
2024 plans: 2 CAA [3rd, 51st], 44th AK, 7-14 Div, 16-19 Brig
2025 final claims: 13-19,5k final = 13 support brigades
2026 plans: 24-41k = 4 Divisions [20k likely = 2 Motorized ED+2 Naval Infantry ED]+14 support brigades

‣ Unmanned System Forces expansion (or expansion of UAV units):
2022: 5k UAV expansion* (to 10k UAV operators)
2023: 11k UAV expansion* (to 21k UAV operators)
2024: 22k UAV expansion* (to 43k UAV operators)
2025: 44k USF expansion* (to 87k USF soldiers)
2026 plans: 78k UAV expansion (to 165k USF soldiers)
* estimated using a exponential increase from 2022 to 2025.

‣ Total number of soldiers in units created/planned, per year
2022: 25k = 20k of 3rd AK (main+support units) + 5k UAV units
2023: 80-87k = 45k main + 24-31k support + 11k UAV
2024: 77-82k = 30k main + 25-30k support + 22k UAV
2025: 67-74k = 10k main + 13-20k support + 44k UAV
2026 plans: 112-119k = 20k main + 14-21k support + 78k UAV

TOTAL 2022-2025:
249-268k new unit soldiers = 100k main + 67-86k support + 82k UAV

3.4 Russian organization changes - Part 9

3.4.5 RU problems - Part 3 (Recruitment estimations)

Russian force growth in Ukraine
As visible in our unit expansion estimates (quite realistic), the
total Russian force in Ukraine grew at a relatively constant rate in 2023-2025.

They grew every year according to Ukraine (underestimating 2022-2023 force, overestimating 2023-2025 growth), while remainining stable according to Russia (overestimating 2022-2023 force): 462-680k in 2023 [UA-RU], 603-700 in 2024 [UA-RU], 695-710k in 2025 [UA July-December].

Regardless, Ukraine admits Russian force growth/expansion, so Russia recruited more than they lost.

For ease of calculation, let's assume that the expansion matches our estimate, so total force recruited vs lost+expanded are very similar.

Recruitment needed (estimation)

So, adding up our totals for lost+expanded:
2022: 65k+? = 40k+? lost + 25k expanded
2023: 150-157k+? = 70k+? lost + 80-87k expanded
2024: 184-189k+? = 107k+? lost + 77-82k expanded
2025: 172-179k+? = 105k+? lost + 67-74k expanded

TOTAL 2022-2025:
561-580k+? = 227k KIA + 85k age + ? injury + 249-268k expanded

Real recruitment
This section will break down the estimates of how many soldiers Russia recruited using various sources and analizing them.

The first type of data are the claims from Russian officials, which include yearly totals of how many contracts were signed between:
- Ministry of Defense contracts ("MOD contracts" signed voluntarily, with automatic length extension [info not in RU page, but is in EN page] and receiving "one-time payment" from federal+regional authorities [fixed vs regional value] after signing as a economic bonus)
- "Volunteer contracts" are contracts signed with volunteer units (same salary as MOD and contract is not auto-extended, but one-time payment depends on the unit and is smaller)

The second type of data are the number of "financed" contracts. Since late 2022, all contract lengths are 12 months minimum, so all MOD contracts since received federal+regional "one-time payments".

By checking the amount paid, the real number of signed contracts can be estimated (source 1, source 2).

MOD contracts+volunteer contracts claimed by Russia & MOD contracts financed by Russia:
- 2023: 500k MOD claimed/345k financed (69%) + 40k volunteers
- 2024: 450k MOD claimed/≈385k financed (86%) + 40k volunteers
- 2025: 422k MOD claimed/≈340k* financed (81%) + 36k volunteers
- Total: 1372k MOD claimed/1070k* financed + 116k volunteers
* includes realistic assumptions for 2025 Q4

MOD figures are unreliable by constantly claiming more than the number financed (unless some contracts are paid below the legal minimum or don' receive one-time payments [the case for prisoners in 2025, but they are very few, just 2% of 2025 KIA]).

So we will use the financed MOD contracts + claimed volunteer contracts (1070k financed + 116k volunteers).

Additionally, both regular (MOD regular soldiers with "career contracts") and mobilized soldiers (reservists mobilized in 2022) can sign "volunteer contracts" to change their status (oficially, but listed in mediazona with their initial status) to receive one-time payments and higher salary (theoretically losing bargaining power regarding their unit and role, but generally remaining in their previous unit and role).
This benefits make this option particularly interesting, with many of these types of soldiers likely having signed them, but with the precise amount being impossible to determine using public data.

So, if these soldier types represented 600k soldiers in 2022, the total number of real soldiers who have fought in this war could be anywhere from 1186k (if all signed volunteer contracts) [600k "second contract"+470k "first contract"+116k volunteers] to 1786k [600k regular/mobilized + 1070k financed + 116k volunteers].

This leads to a massive variation in the real number of new recruits as well: 586k-1186k (600k "second contracts" vs no "second contracts").
In the next part we will try to determine this number by estimating the number of injured.

3.4 Russian organization changes - Part 10

3.4.5 RU problems - Part 4 (Recruitment comparison & Analysis)

Recruitment needed (estimation) vs Real recruitment

"Real recruitment" (first contracts only): 586-1186k
Recruitment needed: 561-580k + ? injured discharges

If our expansion numbers are precise, the difference is the number of injured discharged:
- Lowest real: 6-25k more recruited = injured discharges (unrealistically few for 227k KIA [1 WIA loss : 9 KIA loss])
- Highest real: 606-625k more recruited = injured discharges (unrealistically high for 227k KIA [2.7 WIA loss : 1 KIA loss])

These extreme estimates of "real recruitment" are both wrong (too many/few first contracts = unrealistically too many/few injured discharges), but provide upper-lower bounds.

So we will estimate the number of wounded using this report about the wounded processed by russian hospitals (also used to track losses of mobilized soldiers from Tomsk region, 1 KIA:1.15 WIA).

A. 166k wounded soldiers were processed between 2022 and mid 2024 [data is only complete up to April 2024]).
If we compare to our estimate of KIA in the period up to April 2024 (99k KIA [2022 KIA+2023 KIA+1/3*2025 KIA]), we get this rate:
1 KIA:1.67 WIA

Extrapolating this value to our estimated number of KIA for 2022-2025 (240k KIA from normalized+evenly distributed mediazona scraping), there were 401k WIA (assuming a constant injury rate, may be unrealistic).

Counting all WIA as losses by assuming none of the wounded processed by hospitals returned to the front (terrible assumption, see the next data point), we can again compare recruitment needed-total to estimate how many second contracts were signed:

- Total recruitment (contracts signed) = 1186k
- Real recruitment ("first contracts" only) = Recruitment needed = 962-981k soldiers (KIA+injured+age+expansion)
Of these, 846-865k are financed first contracts [80% of 1070k financed] and 116k are contracts with volunteer units.
- False recruitment ("second contracts") is Total-Real difference:
205-224k (realistic number of "second contracts" for 600k soldiers with an already existing contract)
- Total force deployed ("first contracts"+600k): 1562-1581k

B. Wound severity is known in 141k of 166k cases (85%), divided as 2200 heavy injuries, 58600 moderate injuries and 80200 light injuries.
Furthermore, on 2024 the pattern changed to 5000-5200 moderate injuries and 2200-2300 light injuries per month (as Russia began intense offensive operations across the front), and remained stable at 100 heavy injuries per month.
We can assume lightly injured patients overwhelmingly returned to service, while moderately and heavily injured ones were most likely discharged by health issues.

If the pattern for types of injuries was constant in 2024-2025, total "recorded" injuries by type in 2022-2025 would be:
light injuries = 123k = 76k + (9*2250) + (12*2250)
moderate injuries = 159k = 54k + (9*5000) + (12*5000)
heavy injuries = 4.1k = 2.2k + (7*100) + (12*100)
Total injury discharged (moderate+heavy) = 163k (1 KIA:0.68 WIA)

We now need to correct for injuries not recorded.
We will assume the unrecorded rate is constant across time.
We can either assume that unrecorded injuries are mostly light injuries, or that they are proportionally distributed by type.
If the unrecorded injuries are proportionally distributed across all types (recorded / 85%):
light injuries = 145k
moderate injuries = 187k
heavy injuries = 4.8k
Total injury discharged (moderate+heavy) = 192k (1 KIA:0.80 WIA)

Adding this corrected total to our losses:
- Total recruitment (contracts signed) = 1186k
- Real recruitment ("first contracts" only) = Recruitment needed = 753-772k soldiers (KIA+injured+age+expansion)
Of these, 637-656k are financed first contracts [60% of 1070k financed] and 116k are contracts with volunteer units.
- False recruitment ("second contracts") is Total-Real difference:
414-433k (realistic number of "second contracts" for 600k soldiers with an already existing contract)
- Total force deployed (first contracts+600k): 1353-1372k

3.4 Russian organization changes - Part 11

3.4.5 RU problems - Part 5 (2026 problems)

Recruitment planned
Russian MOD recruitment plans for 2026 (409k) and 2025 (403k) are similar.
Regardless, we must remember that the Russian MOD usually surpasses these recruitment targets by a slim margin by:
A. Claiming higher recruitment than the number actually financed ("one-time payments for contract signing"), in 2025 they financed only 81% of what they claimed.
B. Signing many "double contracts" with already serving soldiers (regular soldiers with "career path contracts" or mobilized soldiers with "reservist contracts", signing "volunteer contracts" to receive one-time payment and better salary), in 2025 these may have been 40% of the financed contracts.

Additionally, Russia also recruits about 35k soldiers a year by volunteer contracts (which unlike the Ministry of Defense contracts are not auto-renewed and rarely have a large "one-time payment").

Assuming they repeat 2025 numbers (the plans are similar), they would claim 422k MOD recruits and 36k volunteers, which would turn out to be 203k real MOD recruits (60% "first contracts" out of 342k financed) + 36k volunteers, or 239k real new recruits.

Recruitment needed (estimated losses+expansion)

- Replacing permanent losses = 160-205k losses
— Replacing KIA (80-100k killed, if 2025 fight intensity or higher)
— Replacing WIA discharges (55-80k, assuming 1 KIA:0.68-0.80 WIA)
— Replacing age discharges (aprox 25k a year)
- Armed Forces expansion = 112-120k soldiers
— Unmanned System Forces expansion (78k planned)
— Division expansion (4 brigade expansions = 20k soldiers)
— Support unit standardization (14 brigades = 14-21k soldiers).

Overall, in 2026 they would need at least 272-325k new soldiers if they maintain combat intensity/losses alike those of 2025, without accounting for anywhere from 0-35k volunteers contractors every year that may not renew their contracts or may sign a double contract.

Summary (Recruitment claimed-achieved vs Replenishment needed)

There is a clear gap between our estimate of 272-325k new soldiers needed, and the 239k real new recruits if Russian recruitment trends continue.

Other cases have been conducted using this method to estimate real recruitment numbers for every year depending on different WIA estimates, but ultimately all of them assume that Russian losses+recruitment in 2026 remain the same as 2025, so the only difference in 2026 is the expansion requiring 45k soldiers more (115k planned for 2026, 70k conducted over 2025).
All the data is provided in an excel sheet linked in the comments (in most cases, the number of real recruits was estimated by assuming that all the estimates are correct and trying to reduce the difference between real and needed recruitment to zero).

Summarizing, only a few options are realistic for 2026:
- Increase recruitment to expand (unrealistic, decreasing trend).
- Decrease losses (reduce the number of attacks) to be able to direct more manpower for expansion instead of loss-replacement.
- Reduce expansion plans (2025 default was replacing losses first).
- Reduce loss replacement (not fully replenish units suffering losses, causing a reduction of offensive actions as force depletes).

Of these, the best ones for Russia long-term are to complete expansion plans without reducing their forces, and the easiest option to achieve that is the second one, reducing their losses by limiting their offensive objectives this year.

So far, Russia may have taken that direction over the start of this year, since it has been relatively slow in terms of offensive action and Russia has suffered relatively low losses YoY and compared to late 2025, but they might restart offensive actions soon as the warm season has began.

Their expected drone recruitment numbers over three months has been almost 67% of the montly average expected for the year (a good number, since the recruitment is relatively new and numbers should be expected to grow over the year): https://t.me/franfran2424_chat/7624

3.5 Ukrainian organization changes - Part 1

This subsection will cover the organization changes of the Ukrainian Armed Forces during 2025: the main structural changes conducted, the objectives of these changes, and their degree of success and problems.
Additionally, it will summarize their problems at the start of 2026.

The organization of the manpower available into well-structured units able to effectively and efficiently conduct combat operations is as important as having the manpower at all.
That is why this subsection is dedicated to cover the most important structural changes of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as was done for the Russian Armed Forces for the same reason.

The changes will be grouped by branches, with the exception of the Army Corps reform.

Due to the detail, the topic has a notable length, causing it to be divided into several posts:

3.5.1 UA Army Corps reform - link 1 & link 2
3.5.2 UA Assault Forces - link
3.5.3 UA Air Assault Forces - link
3.5.4 UA TD Brigades - link
3.5.5 UA Mechanized Brigades - link
3.5.6 UA 2026 plans & problems - link

3.5 Ukrainian organization changes - Part 2

3.5.1 UA Army Corps reform - Part 1

The main change undergone during 2025 was the Ukrainian reform of their higher echelon combat units from previous "Groups" (Tactical Group [TG], Operational-Tactical Group [OTU], Operational-Strategic Group of Forces [OSUV]) into Army Corps and new Groups of Forces (GrV), a structure similar to Russian ones.

Prior to the change, Tactical Groups of all kinds controlled Brigades (Ukraine's standard medium echelon combat unit) or lower level Tactical Groups located in the area around a large settlement, and were subordinated to Operational-Strategic Groups which covered large fronts (see here) and responded to the General Staff.
This "group system" had been in place since the start of the war in 2014, and was best fit for conflicts with quickly changing frontlines where units often changed command and where groups could be easily formed/reformed/disbanded by not commanding many dependent support units.

The higher level changes over 2025 were these:
- TG/OTU were directly replaced with Army Corps since they both commanded Brigades (the Army Corps often inherited the previous TG/OTU command staff and slowly changed it, see here what Group was replaced by each Army Corps here). In this way, the Army Corps are made responsible for the defense of a relatively small sector of the front (usually the area around a large settlement).
- x3 OSUV were removed or reformed into x4 Group of Forces (Угруповання військ/UV) which act as intermediaries between the General Staff and the Army Corps, serving a similar role to Russian Group of Forces (details here, updated list of the groups here):
Північ/Север/North [Kharkov region],
Схід/Восток/East [Donetsk region];
Захід/Запад/West [Sumy-Chernigov regions];
Південь/Юг/South [Zaporozhye-Kherson regions, facing RU Dnieper Group of Forces]).

But the change had more ambitious objectives than improving command efficiency.
Primarily, it aimed to reduce problems from the previous system, like the ineffective defense by some groups, caused by negligent command not being held responsible-accountable for losses of subordinate units, or by the lack of support/reserve units at the tactical group level.
This problem, alongside the effects of the 2024 kursk offensive, caused a constant shuffling of mechanized units from some groups to more troubled ones ("firefighting"), in turn weakening the previously less troubled ones. This played right into the russian strategy of manpower superiority and pressure shifting, where Russia maintained pressure all over the front and achieved breaches wherever Ukrainian defense was weaker.

1. Rigid structure
First, they tried to reduce the "Brigade shuffling" problem by assigning a rigid set of Brigades to each Army Corps, as opposed to Tactical Groups and their flexible structure (by design) that assumed that Brigades might change groups often.
So, for most of 2025, Army Corps had a "theoretical" structure (rigid set of Brigades) and a real one composed of whatever Brigades were inherited from the tactical group or moved into their sector.
In late 2025 and early 2026, they slowly rearranged Brigades to make the real structure match the theoretical structure, but in many cases this rearragement has not been completed, since initially these two structures differed extremely for reasons unknown (a problematic decision when the structures were selected, that is still unresolved).
From here onwards, this type of decision where Army Corps were allocated Brigades from other locations instead of the ones already in their area of responsibility will be refered to as "uncohesive allocation".