As the Economist has pointed out, the African continent has more emigrants (20M) outside the continent than even India (despite having a smaller population). The publication views continued mass migration to Europe & the West as inevitable, this is untrue.
European countries could nearshore factories when thereโs no longer working populations to support them at home. Then a tax (the difference between a good local wage & European low wage) could be paid into the pensions system of the European country whose company near-shored.
Solutions like this are certainly within the realm of the possible. It would be difficult and require rewriting international labor agreements but it is certainly not impossible just as continued mass migration is by no means inevitable.
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2025/04/24/emigration-from-africa-will-change-the-world
European countries could nearshore factories when thereโs no longer working populations to support them at home. Then a tax (the difference between a good local wage & European low wage) could be paid into the pensions system of the European country whose company near-shored.
Solutions like this are certainly within the realm of the possible. It would be difficult and require rewriting international labor agreements but it is certainly not impossible just as continued mass migration is by no means inevitable.
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2025/04/24/emigration-from-africa-will-change-the-world
The Economist
Emigration from Africa will change the world
As other countries age, they will need African youth
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South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland have some of the lowest fertility rates in Sub Saharan Africa they also have the highest smartphone penetration rates. South Africa is barely above replacement, Botswana is on 2.5-2.7, Swaziland & Lesotho both below 2.8.
Kenya & Ghana also have high penetration rates and their TFRs have also both fallen to around 3.5 in recent years and will likely be at or below 3.0 by 2030. This compares to 6.0
in most of the Sahel with very low penetration rates.
https://prod-cms.gsmaintelligence.com/research-file-download?assetId=12080&reportId=50121
Kenya & Ghana also have high penetration rates and their TFRs have also both fallen to around 3.5 in recent years and will likely be at or below 3.0 by 2030. This compares to 6.0
in most of the Sahel with very low penetration rates.
https://prod-cms.gsmaintelligence.com/research-file-download?assetId=12080&reportId=50121
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If this South Korean demographic rebound maintained then if anything UN projections were not optimistic enough lol. Even in the below projection RoK was not forecast to hit 0.90 until the 2030s & could conceivably come close this year even if coming months are not as positive.
This is happening even as Seoul property is more unaffordable than ever. My projection for South Koreaโs TFR floor was 0.75 but it ended up being 0.72. Even this lower level is higher than floor of other places in East Asia like Taiwan (which may be sub 0.7 in 2026) & Hong Kong.
https://x.com/andyd10/status/2036714422043873703
This is happening even as Seoul property is more unaffordable than ever. My projection for South Koreaโs TFR floor was 0.75 but it ended up being 0.72. Even this lower level is higher than floor of other places in East Asia like Taiwan (which may be sub 0.7 in 2026) & Hong Kong.
https://x.com/andyd10/status/2036714422043873703
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Unlike Spain or Japan or Canada, or just about any other country, China is simply far too big to mitigate this with some mix of AI and labor policy changes. China certainly wonโt collapse anytime soon but they will try radical solutions the rest of the world hasnโt considered.
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Colombia has TFR close to 1.2 these days. Around the same level as Chile, Argentina, & Uruguay despite having far lower Per Capita GDP (in both PPP and nominal terms) & being far more ethnically diverse. The collapse is thus not tied directly to a specific race or income level.
Though it is worth noting that there is almost certainly a certain income minimum where past which point one is able to have a smartphone & engage in more non essential consumption & changing of economic & cultural priorities.
That is what we see in places as diverse as Nepal, Swaziland, Bhutan, Botswana, Sri Lanka, & Cuba.
Though it is worth noting that there is almost certainly a certain income minimum where past which point one is able to have a smartphone & engage in more non essential consumption & changing of economic & cultural priorities.
That is what we see in places as diverse as Nepal, Swaziland, Bhutan, Botswana, Sri Lanka, & Cuba.
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Italians still emigrating in huge numbers. In 2023 158,000 people emigrated from Italy, including ~114,000 Italian citizens. In 2024 this rose to 191,000, a 20.5% increase year over year. Of these, 156,000 were Italian citizens (36% emigration increase).
The annual Italian citizen emigration loss is larger than the greater metropolitan population of Salerno. On top of this Italy sees 37,000+ natural decline every year.
https://www.istat.it/en/press-release/demographic-indicators-year-2024/
The annual Italian citizen emigration loss is larger than the greater metropolitan population of Salerno. On top of this Italy sees 37,000+ natural decline every year.
https://www.istat.it/en/press-release/demographic-indicators-year-2024/
www.istat.it
Demographic Indicators โ Year 2024
The resident population at 1st January 2025 was 58,934,000, -37,000 on the previous year (provisional data)
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As of 2026, total number of Italians living abroad surpassed 7.3 million (according to AIRE), now outnumbering foreign residents within Italy by nearly two million. BUT this is all Italian citizens abroad including those in ARG & BZ who gained citizenship.
These millions of Italian citizen Argentines & Brazilians should offer a potential demographic lifeline to Italy but this is unlikely as they are often among the better off & not doing horribly at home, & as Italian citizens they have the option to immigrate anywhere in the EU.
They may even move to Norway or Switzerland on their Italian passport. Sadly for Italy if 150,000+ Italian citizens emigrate annually it is doubtful they can convince a significant chunk of the citizens diaspora to return.
https://italianismo.com.br/en/italianos-no-exterior-ja-somam-mais-de-73-milhoes-aponta-governo/
These millions of Italian citizen Argentines & Brazilians should offer a potential demographic lifeline to Italy but this is unlikely as they are often among the better off & not doing horribly at home, & as Italian citizens they have the option to immigrate anywhere in the EU.
They may even move to Norway or Switzerland on their Italian passport. Sadly for Italy if 150,000+ Italian citizens emigrate annually it is doubtful they can convince a significant chunk of the citizens diaspora to return.
https://italianismo.com.br/en/italianos-no-exterior-ja-somam-mais-de-73-milhoes-aponta-governo/
Italianismo โ Notรญcias sobre a Itรกlia
Italians abroad now number more than 7,3 million, government says
The Italian government reveals that 7,3 million citizens live abroad, according to data updated in August 2025.
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Japanese fertility rate has been higher than South Koreaโs continuously since early 2000s, & the gap had widened dramatically in recent years (with a 0.48-0.49 TFR difference from 2020-2023). The gap narrowed significantly in 2024 & 2025 & TFRs may converge at ~1.05 before 2030.
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Many lessons to draw from the below fertility map of Nigeria. Fertility can & will fall fast in smartphone penetrated, changing values societies. Ghana, Kenya,South Nigeria etc will likely be below local replacement before 2040. Muslim Sub Saharan nations maybe not until 2050.
Does not take much economic development to reach a high level of mobile internet/smart phone penetration. But once a society gets to that point & former values are displaced, many see large families as holding them back so fertility plummets in the near total majority of cases.
Does not take much economic development to reach a high level of mobile internet/smart phone penetration. But once a society gets to that point & former values are displaced, many see large families as holding them back so fertility plummets in the near total majority of cases.
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Congressional Budget Office predicts natural decline is right around the corner for the United States. ~2030 deaths expected to outpace births for the first time in American history. The population is only expected to โฌ๏ธ to ~364M by 2056 from 343M today.
This is a far cry from the estimates of almost 400 million Americans ~2050 we say just a decade ago. There are many perspectives on whether or not this is a bad thing. From my point of view the greatest concern is falling births (especially amongst the Middle Class).
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/61994
This is a far cry from the estimates of almost 400 million Americans ~2050 we say just a decade ago. There are many perspectives on whether or not this is a bad thing. From my point of view the greatest concern is falling births (especially amongst the Middle Class).
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/61994
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American monthly casualties in the First World War were 35,626. Highest monthly casualties for the U.S. Armed Forces in its history. U.S. losses paled in comparison to those of the UK, Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary, France, & Italy. WWI wreaked enormous demographic damage.
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Myanmar has lost 2.3 million emigrants to Thailand since 2021 coup ignited a Civil War (2M+additional Burmese emigrated pre 2021). Burma risks losing these assimilatable Buddhists to Thailand forever. However, Thai xenophobia may just push many back post war.
Myanmar also likely has below replacement fertility. So emigration ages the developing country faster.
https://www.economist.com/asia/2026/03/26/millions-of-burmese-struggle-to-find-safety-in-thailand
Myanmar also likely has below replacement fertility. So emigration ages the developing country faster.
https://www.economist.com/asia/2026/03/26/millions-of-burmese-struggle-to-find-safety-in-thailand
The Economist
Millions of Burmese struggle to find safety in Thailand
Many refugees are left exposed
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Thailand with its 68 million people is one of the largest countries in the world to fall below 0.85 TFR (3X Taiwan, 15M larger than South Korea). Its economy,pension scheme,& workforce are in for a wild ride.
Birth numbers for March for Thailand were just released. Despite an awful January showing a fall of almost 15% better birth figures in both February & March improved things a bit & births now down 10.8% in the first quarter of the year. TFR still on track to be sub 0.80 sadly.
Birth numbers for March for Thailand were just released. Despite an awful January showing a fall of almost 15% better birth figures in both February & March improved things a bit & births now down 10.8% in the first quarter of the year. TFR still on track to be sub 0.80 sadly.
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Of all Central Asian countries here Turkmenistan is in worst shape. Mass emigration fuels population decline, horrifically bad governance also pushes. Tajikistan also has very high emigration but a TFR to partially make up for it. KZ has huge ethnic difference in fertility.
Uzbekistan falling fast but from 3.21 so it will likely not converge with KZ until 2028-2030. UZ also has a very decent population size & should just get to 50 million before plateauing. Kyrgyzstan may make it to 10 million before doing the same.
Back to Kazakhstan & the internal fertility differential. The fertility rate of ~3.0 for ethnic Kazakhs (~70% of the population) is roughly 3 times higher than the ~1.0 for ethnic Russians (15% of the population). This is based off of 2025 information from the Bureau of National Statistics of Kazakhstan
Uzbekistan falling fast but from 3.21 so it will likely not converge with KZ until 2028-2030. UZ also has a very decent population size & should just get to 50 million before plateauing. Kyrgyzstan may make it to 10 million before doing the same.
Back to Kazakhstan & the internal fertility differential. The fertility rate of ~3.0 for ethnic Kazakhs (~70% of the population) is roughly 3 times higher than the ~1.0 for ethnic Russians (15% of the population). This is based off of 2025 information from the Bureau of National Statistics of Kazakhstan
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Due to 13 consecutive years of net outmigration & higher average annual deaths Alaska is marching towards natural decline despite having the Nationโs 3rd highest fertility rate at 1.9.
https://alaskabeacon.com/briefs/alaska-population-loss-looms-with-fewer-births-and-more-deaths-in-an-aging-population/
https://alaskabeacon.com/briefs/alaska-population-loss-looms-with-fewer-births-and-more-deaths-in-an-aging-population/
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Outdated but interesting demographic information from Iraq. In 2018 Shia Arab Iraqis has a TFR of โฌ๏ธ4.0, Kurds 3.0, & Sunni Arab Iraqis 2.9. Sunni Arab Iraqi TFR cratered during & after war to destroy ISIS in Mosul & other predominately Sunni Arab areas.
Would estimate today that if Iraqi national TFR ~3.0 then Shia Arab has fallen to no more than 3.25, Sunni Arab ~2.5, & Kurdish 2.75 (very high in rural areas & ~2.3 in more urban). Kurds also emigrate to Europe proportionally more than any other major Iraqi group.
2024 census did find Shia Arabs recorded largest average household sizes while Kurdish areas (Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, Duhok) has a significantly lower percentage of children under 5 compared to the national average indicating lower fertility & faster aging. Ditto Sunni Arab areas.
https://amwaj.media/en/article/deep-dive-inside-iraq-s-population-guessing-game
Would estimate today that if Iraqi national TFR ~3.0 then Shia Arab has fallen to no more than 3.25, Sunni Arab ~2.5, & Kurdish 2.75 (very high in rural areas & ~2.3 in more urban). Kurds also emigrate to Europe proportionally more than any other major Iraqi group.
2024 census did find Shia Arabs recorded largest average household sizes while Kurdish areas (Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, Duhok) has a significantly lower percentage of children under 5 compared to the national average indicating lower fertility & faster aging. Ditto Sunni Arab areas.
https://amwaj.media/en/article/deep-dive-inside-iraq-s-population-guessing-game
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The fertility rate of Non Hispanic White Americans is higher than that of Mexico, the UK, Sri Lanka, Australia, Tunisia, Colombia, & Brazil to name a few. In 2025 having the largest U.S. race (191 million in size) with slightly increasing fertility rates above 1.5 is pretty significant.
https://x.com/birthgauge/status/2042261192433959239
https://x.com/birthgauge/status/2042261192433959239
X (formerly Twitter)
Birth Gauge (@BirthGauge) on X
The TFR in the US declined to 1.574 children per woman in 2025, down from 1.60 in 2024. Here are the TFRs by race (2024 in brackets):
Non-hispanic White 1.54 (1.53)
Non-hispanic Black 1.44 (1.50)
Hispanic 1.86 (1.93)
Non-hispanic White 1.54 (1.53)
Non-hispanic Black 1.44 (1.50)
Hispanic 1.86 (1.93)
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The US is one of the only countries in the developed world where Gen Alpha will be larger than Gen X. Gen X cohort years saw an average of 3,431,913 births annually. So far the U.S. Gen Alpha cohort years has seen an average of 3,790,268 annual births. Politically significant.
While European Boomers & Xers will be able to impose their political will to a degree on Millennial, Zoomer, & Alpha for many more years, in the U.S. younger generations will have the numbers to push back on everything from taxes to immigration to foreign policy as soon as 2030.
While European Boomers & Xers will be able to impose their political will to a degree on Millennial, Zoomer, & Alpha for many more years, in the U.S. younger generations will have the numbers to push back on everything from taxes to immigration to foreign policy as soon as 2030.
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The Ukrainian โbirths staircaseโ highlighting the demographic collapse there is truly horrific to behold. While births were already on a very bad trajectory before the war the births & fertility collapse from 2022 has made things existential. Unless at least half of the Ukrainian female core cohort (age 18-40) diaspora returns postwar its is hard to picture a national durvival scenario even with a TFR rebound.
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