Forwarded from /CIG/ Telegram | Counter Intelligence Global (ศepeศ)
They include: a revamped maternity subsidy system, the expansion of childbirth and childcare services, expansion of maternal and paternal leave, incentives for flexible working hours and remote work arrangements, housing assistance, and the promotion of pro-marriage and family culture.
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Reuters
China looks to spur births, aid families in fight on shrinking population
China outlined steps on Monday to improve family planning and parenting measures in an effort to boost the number of births, a statement from the state council, or cabinet, showed, after two consecutive years of a shrinking population.
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Between today & 2050 Poland will age incredibly rapidly. In 2024 ~20% of Polandโs population is aged 65 or better. By 2050 that will jump to well over 30% & keep increasing until at least 2060 when it hits 36-37%. By 2060 Polandโs population is also likely to be under 30M.
Also these estimates donโt account for Polandโs current sub 1.15 TFR. May be even worse. Even a 2060 Poland of 30 million where one third is over age 65 is economically and socially untenable. Especially as this will be at a time where most countries are under similar pressure.
Also these estimates donโt account for Polandโs current sub 1.15 TFR. May be even worse. Even a 2060 Poland of 30 million where one third is over age 65 is economically and socially untenable. Especially as this will be at a time where most countries are under similar pressure.
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Iceland(~1.6 total fertility rate), Ireland(~1.5), France(higher than the U.S. at~1.64), Slovenia(just above 1.5), Moldova(~1.6), Bulgaria (~1.7), Serbia (~1.6), Montenegro (~1.8), Kosovo (~1.8), last places in Europe without awful sub 1.5 fertility. Lots of caveats to unpack though.
First Bulgaria is buoyed by a Romani population with a likely TFR of ~2.5 that makes is ~10% of births. Iceland & Montenegro both have far less than 1 million people. The relatively decent TFRs in Moldova, Serbia, & Kosovo are undermined by high emigration. Slovenia TFRโฌ๏ธfast. For France immigrant TFR provides a substantial boost but falls dramatically by the very next generation.
First Bulgaria is buoyed by a Romani population with a likely TFR of ~2.5 that makes is ~10% of births. Iceland & Montenegro both have far less than 1 million people. The relatively decent TFRs in Moldova, Serbia, & Kosovo are undermined by high emigration. Slovenia TFRโฌ๏ธfast. For France immigrant TFR provides a substantial boost but falls dramatically by the very next generation.
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More targeted natalism that provides dramatically greater incentives for third & higher order children will yield greater benefits than most nations current policy of simply handing out money for all new births (which simply provides resources to parents having children anyway).
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๐น๐ญ๐ถBirths in Thailand for the first 10 months of 2024 are in and they are down 10.7%! Looks like ~480,000 births for the year. Lowest ever recorded and less than half the 1 million plus births seen from 1963-1983. TFR to almost certainly be 0.98 or below for 2024.
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For their size Finland (Nokia, Wรคrtsilรค engines), Sweden (Volvo, IKEA, Saab), & Estonia (Skype) have delivered a lot of innovation & products for the world. Finland at lowest low TFR, Sweden at 1.45, & Estonia close to returning at lowest low. Less youth=less innovation.
Many people tend to have the very mistaken view that less people somehow means more prosperity. They are in for a rude awakening in the 2030s & 2040s as most of the advanced world becomes extremely aged. But by then it will be largely too late in many places to right the ship.
When Scandinavia, South Korea, Germany, Japan, Italy, China etc enter the more extreme stage of agemaxxing in the 2030s (for Japan, Germany, Italy) and 2040s (for South Korea, Scandinavia, China) the consumer world will see some profound changes.
Many people tend to have the very mistaken view that less people somehow means more prosperity. They are in for a rude awakening in the 2030s & 2040s as most of the advanced world becomes extremely aged. But by then it will be largely too late in many places to right the ship.
When Scandinavia, South Korea, Germany, Japan, Italy, China etc enter the more extreme stage of agemaxxing in the 2030s (for Japan, Germany, Italy) and 2040s (for South Korea, Scandinavia, China) the consumer world will see some profound changes.
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Germany, Italy, Spain, (& probably France before too long) are all staring into the demographic abyss. All may see their best & brightest youth flee as the tax burden coupled with shrinking opportunities makes staying untenable. The best years for the EU are well behind it.
& no, AI will not save them. They will be far behind East Asia in terms of using AI to mitigate the effects of aging. Why? Because of their regulatory burden (which to be fair is also meant to protect jobs). EUโs Aging societies unlikely to be regulation cutting & innovative.
France has the strongest demographics of the bunch but it is still a TFR of just ~1.62. In any case even with one of the highest TFRs in the EU by 2030 25% of the French population will be drawing a pension and by 2040 30%. This compares to figures of 20% and 22.5% in the U.S.
France also has the highest level of general government spending in the EU. There is very little scope to increase such spending. Reforms are also protested violently.
& no, AI will not save them. They will be far behind East Asia in terms of using AI to mitigate the effects of aging. Why? Because of their regulatory burden (which to be fair is also meant to protect jobs). EUโs Aging societies unlikely to be regulation cutting & innovative.
France has the strongest demographics of the bunch but it is still a TFR of just ~1.62. In any case even with one of the highest TFRs in the EU by 2030 25% of the French population will be drawing a pension and by 2040 30%. This compares to figures of 20% and 22.5% in the U.S.
France also has the highest level of general government spending in the EU. There is very little scope to increase such spending. Reforms are also protested violently.
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The phenomena of developing countries having low & very low fertility rates is really something. Itโs also a very new one. Some examples include Costa Rica (TFR ~1.2), Sri Lanka (sub 1.5), Thailand (sub 1.0), Colombia (sub 1.45), Cuba (~1.5), Ecuador (~1.6), & Brazil (~1.5).
While developed countries face many of the same challenges of low fertility rates (rising pension aged population with less young people to pay taxes and work being amongst the most notable) they also have the resources to deal with many of them. The developing world does not.
While developed countries face many of the same challenges of low fertility rates (rising pension aged population with less young people to pay taxes and work being amongst the most notable) they also have the resources to deal with many of them. The developing world does not.
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Brazil is going to struggle more than most countries with its low fertility rates. Pension costs already high, GDP Per Capita (PPP) lower than Mexico, Thailand, or Armenia, & is currently suffering from long term economic stagnation (average growth rate of 0.6% in the decade to 2022).
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Demographics Now and Then
Brazil is going to struggle more than most countries with its low fertility rates. Pension costs already high, GDP Per Capita (PPP) lower than Mexico, Thailand, or Armenia, & is currently suffering from long term economic stagnation (average growth rate ofโฆ
Brazil will probably experience natural decline from the 2040s onwards as the country has been consistently below replacement since the late 2000s.
The South of Brazil will doubtlessly continue to attract people from other parts of the country and the wider region as well. The other parts of Brazil will be at a disadvantage (particularly the Northeast).
The South of Brazil will doubtlessly continue to attract people from other parts of the country and the wider region as well. The other parts of Brazil will be at a disadvantage (particularly the Northeast).
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Vietnam+Thailand will dry up as a Japanese labor source in less than a decade. Brazilians & Peruvians are almost all ethnic Japanese from those countries & almost no more will be coming. The Koreans are a past legacy(in many cases FAR past)as well with very few moving to Japan in future.
Japan has 2 options. Accept loss of social cohesion,high trust society,& many of the other features that make Japan desirable & Japanese by opening up to mass migration outside of past sources (a VERY BAD IDEA IMHO). Or accept (& begin to mitigate against the effects of) degrowth.
Mitigation options include continued building of pronatal culture+rejecting anti natalist cultural influences & increasing societal prestige of large Japanese families. Focusing spending on improving young couples lives. Automation of jobs currently requiring low skilled migrants.
Japan has 2 options. Accept loss of social cohesion,high trust society,& many of the other features that make Japan desirable & Japanese by opening up to mass migration outside of past sources (a VERY BAD IDEA IMHO). Or accept (& begin to mitigate against the effects of) degrowth.
Mitigation options include continued building of pronatal culture+rejecting anti natalist cultural influences & increasing societal prestige of large Japanese families. Focusing spending on improving young couples lives. Automation of jobs currently requiring low skilled migrants.
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Letโs take an urgent look at Colombia. Why? Because it looks like the UN has significantly overestimated their TFR. In 2022 they estimated it at almost 1.7 when it was just 1.38 according to Colombian data. Very plausible Colombiaโs population on track to be sub 30M by 2100.
Furthermore, Colombia is very likely to be an aged country by 2050 when more than 20% of its population is age 65 & better. Hard to see Colombia continuing to develop & modernize as it loses young people and ages dramatically.
Whatโs worse is Colombia is still sending hundreds of thousands of their young abroad as emigrants annually (many permanently). The Colombian economy must grow to the point that wages are at least 55% of those of similar jobs in the U.S. and EU. Lots of work to be done.
Furthermore, Colombia is very likely to be an aged country by 2050 when more than 20% of its population is age 65 & better. Hard to see Colombia continuing to develop & modernize as it loses young people and ages dramatically.
Whatโs worse is Colombia is still sending hundreds of thousands of their young abroad as emigrants annually (many permanently). The Colombian economy must grow to the point that wages are at least 55% of those of similar jobs in the U.S. and EU. Lots of work to be done.
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๐ฐ๐ชWanted to do a quick post on Kenyan demographic predictions. Kenyaโs TFR may hit replacement as early as 2035 & UN forecasts have long overstated Kenyaโs eventual population. It wonโt ever reach 100M. In fact, Kenya will probably top out at ~80M & fall to below 70M by 2100.
Kenyan TFR is already just 3.21. Extremely low for a country at their stage of economic development. By 2030 it will likely be 2.5. By 2035 2.1.
Kenyan TFR is already just 3.21. Extremely low for a country at their stage of economic development. By 2030 it will likely be 2.5. By 2035 2.1.
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๐น๐ฟTanzania has quite a bit further to fall & is in a very different situation from Kenya but will still have a much lower population by 2100 than the 300 million predicted by many just a few years ago. Tanzania if far likelier to never hit 200M & in fact stabilize at ~175M people.
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The transformation of South Korean Society is extreme and will only become more so. in 1970 the number of children age 0 to 14 was ~14 million. Today it is less than 5.5 million. By 2072 there will be less than 2.5 million children age 0 to 14.
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South Korea is going to get dramatically older very rapidly. Today the population of South Koreans age 65 and better is approximately 10 million (~20% of the Korean population). By 2050 it will be nearly double at just under 19 million, or around 40% of the total population.
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