Demographics Now and Then
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πŸ‡­πŸ‡ΊπŸ‘ΆBirths in Hungary decreased by ~8% from January-April 2024 compared to the same period in 2023. TFR fell to just 1.37 on an annual basis compared to 1.48 a year earlier.

Hungary gave pro-natalism the biggest government backing it could. But due to a lack of buy in from many young couples it ultimately only raised births modestly for around a decade instead of a lot. Still Orban was elected when TFR was ~1.2 and by 2021 it was 1.6.

At least a few thousand additional Hungarian births during the 2010s are likely to be a direct result of the Orban governments policies. It was not enough and TFR may have risen to as high as 1.4-1.5 without it but it was something.
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Well Taiwan and South Korea really are done in the short and medium term. Almost impossible to fix a culture that ranks family and children as third (& with only ~15% of the population agreeing with family and children being mentionable at all) for meaning in one’s life.
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Demographics Now and Then
Well Taiwan and South Korea really are done in the short and medium term. Almost impossible to fix a culture that ranks family and children as third (& with only ~15% of the population agreeing with family and children being mentionable at all) for meaning…
However, there is hope in the long term. It is possible that (after a generation or two) most of those having children are those who put child bearing and rearing as the center of their life and how they find meaning. This could lead to a significantly higher fertility rate.
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Brunei has now been below replacement for citizens as well as residents for several years now. Citizen fertility around the same level as that of ethnic Malays in Malaysia (~1.8). Permanent and temporary residents far below replacement(similar to trend of Canadian immigrants).
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Labor market collapses are already in the midst of happening in South Korea, Italy, Taiwan, Germany, Japan and many other developed economies. They are just around the corner for Poland, Brazil, Thailand, Romania, Chile & many developing countries.
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Azerbaijan and Russia may end up with the same TFR in 2024 (~1.4) if current trends hold. Looking at how much higher Azerbaijani TFR was than Russian TFR in 1990, 2000, 2010 and even 2020 this is remarkable.
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Costs of cars, housing, & other consumer items are getting cheaper for average Chinese. This combats the notion that things have gotten too expensive in China to afford a family. The problem is that the culture has changed & most young Chinese no longer value kids as most important.

China has a window for targeted natalism & cultural change. Could easily see CCP in the near future having campaigns to reject 996 work culture and cram schools as β€œnegative and western”. They could make this argument by associating them with individualism/materialist chasing.
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Demographics Now and Then
Costs of cars, housing, & other consumer items are getting cheaper for average Chinese. This combats the notion that things have gotten too expensive in China to afford a family. The problem is that the culture has changed & most young Chinese no longer…
Obviously workism is a modern problem across all of East Asia that did not come from the West but rather the effort to become part of (& exceed within) the Western dominated global economy from 1975-2015. But CCP may use propaganda to make such concepts seem foreign\undesirable.
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Demographics Now and Then
Obviously workism is a modern problem across all of East Asia that did not come from the West but rather the effort to become part of (& exceed within) the Western dominated global economy from 1975-2015. But CCP may use propaganda to make such concepts seem…
If the CCP went culturally β€œall in” to achieve a transformation in fertility they would still not be able to get TFR back to 1.8. But it could still stop TFR from getting to South Korean or Taiwanese levels and possibly get TFR back to 1.3 or higher.
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This could be the 1st year in Thailand since records began that less than 500,000 annual births are recorded. The country is also on track for sub 1.0 TFR for 2024. This combined with potentially declining immigration from Burma by the 2030s spells disaster in the decades ahead.

However, averting immediate demographic problems for Thailand by importing Burmese means trouble for Myanmar. Burma simply cannot have 200,000 young people move to Thailand annually in 2030s without dramatic long term consequences for their own country (which is already approaching replacement TFR).
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The future is almost foretold for Eastern Europe. That fatal mixture of mass emigration and below replacement fertility is the absolute cause. But expect to see this pattern repeat across much of Latin America, developing Asia, & even places like Tunisia and Morocco.
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πŸ‡¦πŸ‡ΊπŸ‘ΆAustralia is now at ~1.50 TFR. The Lucky Country, which saw a substantial fertility clawback from 2006 to 2015 (when TFR stayed above 1.8 partly as the result of natalist benefits), is now facing the worst TFR ever recorded in its history. Around the same level as the UK.

Australia's births declined by 4.5% year on year in 2023.
The TFR in Australia declined to ~1.50 in 2023 compared to 1.63 in 2022 (and 1.70 in 2021).
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πŸ‡ͺπŸ‡¬πŸ‘ΆEgypt on track to have a TFR of less than 2.5 for the 1st time in history. TFR was 3.5 as recently as 2014 & 3.0 in 2018. Egypt is likely to fall below replacement TFR before 2030 as urban and secular couples see TFR plummet just as religious couples also have smaller families.
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In just 25 years modern human society will undergo one of the greatest changes of its entire history. Almost every continent will have aging or aged or super aged populations. Just looking at this map shows how rapid this transformation will be.
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East Asia’s largest economies will see their collective labor force drop dramatically between now->2040. These countries(China,Japan,& South Korea)have made up more than a quarter of Global GDP for years. Their labor force+young consumer spending crash will have enormous impact.
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Vietnam: good demographics, strong economic growth, overall smart people, stable leadership, sensible foreign policy. Completely understand those bullish about the country’s future. One of a very few countries that fit all those criteria.

Despite most of its neighbors fading fast, Vietnam has maintained a fertility rate above 1.95 despite fast economic growth (which usually depresses fertility). If Vietnam can keep TFR above 1.8 over the coming decade they will be in relatively excellent shape.
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While an aging Colombia will suck up young Venezuelan workers the same cannot he said for Mexico or Brazil. Mexico’s demand for cheap labor could literally take Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, & Nicaragua to the breaking point. Hollowed out & devoid of young people.

Similarly for Brazil it’s neighbors are small (think Paraguay, Bolivia) & many form there prefer to emigrate to Argentina. Brazil may opt for Angolans and Mozambicans but I honestly doubt it in large numbers.

These aging Latam giants must ultimately get to the conclusion that immigration is not the solution to demographic downturns. They will need to develop fast and use technology to help them adjust.

https://x.com/birthgauge/status/1804234762527347171
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A brief word on the sad situation in Ukraine. A huge chunk of the already small youth cohort(aged 18-34) is abroad. They also (unsurprisingly) don’t seem to be having many kids in the diaspora. There are probably only 220K Ukrainians being born each year Europe wide.

The cohort of Ukrainians aged 18-29 was already very small due to the collapse in Ukrainian births from 1995-2006. Many left in 2022 fleeing the start of the war. Most of those have stayed abroad and have no plans to return.

While the Ukrainian cohort born from 1972 to 1988 is still quite large they are already in their mid 30s to early 50s. Many of the men from this cohort have also been killed or wounded in action. The impact on Ukrainian society of these losses going forward will be significant.
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Demographics Now and Then
A brief word on the sad situation in Ukraine. A huge chunk of the already small youth cohort(aged 18-34) is abroad. They also (unsurprisingly) don’t seem to be having many kids in the diaspora. There are probably only 220K Ukrainians being born each year…
Russia has obviously taken significant losses in that cohort as well. However, their population is obviously larger & only hundreds of thousands and not millions fled Russia in 2022 to avoid mobilization. Plus most of their β€œcomeback cohort” (born 2008-2016) is home not abroad.
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