Births in Belarus fell to just 73,906 in 2022. A huge fall from 2021’s 79,732 births. The TFR of Belarus could be as low as 1.25.

👶🐉🇰🇷 It’s incredible to me that even if 2024’s Year of the Dragon lifts South Korean births by 25% (it won’t come even close but bear with me) national TFR would still be ⬇️1.0 children per woman. It’s hard to see a way back for the ROK. Japan, Thailand (even the PRC) are in far better shape.

The graph below shows plummeting Mormon TFR in Utah by county:
Utah County: ~90% Mormon Cache County: 82% Mormon Davis County: 75% Mormon Washington County: 68% Mormon
Weber County: 53% Mormon
Salt Lake County: <50% Mormon

🇺🇸🇲🇽✝️ The secularization of American Latinos has been incredibly swift. In 2010 67% of US Latinos identified as Catholic & at least 84% as Christian. By 2022 only 43% identified as Catholics & only around 2/3rds identified as Christian.

⚫️ Among young American Latinos/Hispanics irreligiously is even more pronounced. Half (49%) of Latinos aged 18-29 are religiously unaffiliated. English dominant Latinos are also far more likely to be unaffiliated than those who are Spanish dominant. Not huge partisan difference though.

⚫️ This will have an obvious & continuing impact on American Hispanic fertility in the decades to come. US born Hispanics will see TFR fall to current Non Hispanic White levels of around 1.5-1.57. Foreign born Hispanic TFR will move to between 1.8-2.2

📎 Aaronal16

✝️ 🇺🇸 🐣 The impact of religion on fertility is amazing | Louise Perry

⬛️ Something I learnt today:

🔶️ American Catholics in general have a total fertility rate of 2.3.

🔶️ But American Catholics who attend Latin Mass have a TFR of 3.6! More than TWICE the national average!

📎 Louise Perry

High rates of childlessness does not necessarily equal lower fertility rates. Eastern Europe had much lower rates of childlessness than Western Europe yet places like Ireland (with one of the highest rates of childlessness in Europe)have some of Europe’s highest fertility rates.

Unlike most of Europe (where some countries did not even enjoy any true postwar baby boom at all) the United States was blessed with not 1 but 2 baby boom sized cohorts. The 1st from 1946-1964. The 2nd Gen Z from 1997-2012 (lower TFR but huge # of births). There will almost certainly not be a third. While births may very well rebound to the 3.7-3.9 million range it is highly doubtful that America will have any more near decade long stretches of 4M plus births. If very lucky the US will keep TFR above 1.5. This is said not out of pessimism but rather out of recognition of the data.

Czechia births: The drop, which started in 2022,continues. Only 69,219 births were recorded from January to September 2023 against the same period last year. A stunning 11% year on year fall. After hitting just 101,299 in 2022, births in 2024 will be ⬇️100K for the 1st time since 2004. TFR is likely to fall below 1.45.

Many publications (such as The Economist) argue that mass immigration will fix such a population pyramid. I would argue that it does not “fix” anything. It just prolongs the (likely) inevitable. What it will do is eliminate the one thing making Japan unique. Being modern without being western.

Belarus has a double threat of high emigration since 2020 (up to 200K have emigrated over the past three years) & very low births (only 73,906 recorded in 2022). Recent policies to restrict emigration are thus seen as essential to the govt to avoid collapse. https://t.co/e1TvvsFixh

Kurdish total fertility rate by country is interesting. In Iran it's below replacement. In Iraq, Kurdish areas have lower TFR than the Arab majority (& have for some time) but are way above replacement. In Turkey it's higher than ethnic Turk TFR & in Syria their TFR is unclear.

If 50-60% of the 4,238,010 Ukrainians living in the EU as of October 2023 never return to Ukraine the latter will be demographically devastated. The gender imbalance of having up to a million and a half women not return would simply be too large to overcome in all likelihood.