Rob Lee (Twitter)
Russia's problem was that it was using a mix of amalgamated and volunteer/reserve/mobilized LDNR units for much of the fighting after sustaining heavy losses in Feb-March. So its advances were slow and depended heavily on having a significant advantage in fires to compensate. 9/
Russia's problem was that it was using a mix of amalgamated and volunteer/reserve/mobilized LDNR units for much of the fighting after sustaining heavy losses in Feb-March. So its advances were slow and depended heavily on having a significant advantage in fires to compensate. 9/
Rob Lee (Twitter)
Some Russian sources have said the pace of Russia's advance depended on the presence of Orlan-30 UAVs, which, unlike Orlan-10, can laze targets for Krasnopol PGM artillery rounds. The use of commercial UAVs also became critical for both sides for ISR and artillery targeting. 10/
Some Russian sources have said the pace of Russia's advance depended on the presence of Orlan-30 UAVs, which, unlike Orlan-10, can laze targets for Krasnopol PGM artillery rounds. The use of commercial UAVs also became critical for both sides for ISR and artillery targeting. 10/
Rob Lee (Twitter)
The capture of Severodonetsk/Lysychansk are victories for Russia. They are important for domestic support (which would be far lower if the offensive stalled), a sense of momentum, and likely for recruiting efforts, but their loss isn't that strategically significant for Kyiv. 11/
The capture of Severodonetsk/Lysychansk are victories for Russia. They are important for domestic support (which would be far lower if the offensive stalled), a sense of momentum, and likely for recruiting efforts, but their loss isn't that strategically significant for Kyiv. 11/
Rob Lee (Twitter)
Because their loss doesn't affect Ukraine's ability to fight this war. My view was that relative losses was the more strategically important metric to use for the battle for the Donbas. It seems Russia took heavier losses in April-May, but that may have changed in May-June. 12/
Because their loss doesn't affect Ukraine's ability to fight this war. My view was that relative losses was the more strategically important metric to use for the battle for the Donbas. It seems Russia took heavier losses in April-May, but that may have changed in May-June. 12/
Rob Lee (Twitter)
I'm not sure about Siversk, but Ukraine should have better prospects for holding its lines around Slovyansk/Kramatorsk. Ukraine can provide better air defense and artillery coverage in that area, and Ukraine now has greater experience operating new NATO artillery and MLRS. 13/
I'm not sure about Siversk, but Ukraine should have better prospects for holding its lines around Slovyansk/Kramatorsk. Ukraine can provide better air defense and artillery coverage in that area, and Ukraine now has greater experience operating new NATO artillery and MLRS. 13/
Rob Lee (Twitter)
Ukraine now has a decent number of self-propelled PzH 2000, Caesar, M109A3GN, and AHS Krab howitzers as well as M777 in service and enough ammunition to not have to be overly conservative, which reduces Russia's artillery advantage. They are also receiving more PGM rounds. 14/
Ukraine now has a decent number of self-propelled PzH 2000, Caesar, M109A3GN, and AHS Krab howitzers as well as M777 in service and enough ammunition to not have to be overly conservative, which reduces Russia's artillery advantage. They are also receiving more PGM rounds. 14/
Rob Lee (Twitter)
HIMARS are already playing a critical role by targeting Russian ammo depots (along with Tochka-U) and command posts, which are both Russian military vulnerabilities due to its centralized decision-making and anachronistic supply. And Ukraine is using them judiciously. 15/
HIMARS are already playing a critical role by targeting Russian ammo depots (along with Tochka-U) and command posts, which are both Russian military vulnerabilities due to its centralized decision-making and anachronistic supply. And Ukraine is using them judiciously. 15/
This media is not supported in your browser
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
Rob Lee (Twitter)
Because of HIMARS' range/accuracy, Kyiv only has to fire a small # of munitions a day to achieve significant effects. GPS-guided GMLRS can be launched at night when Russian UAVs are less able to detect them, and they can drive away before being engaged.16/
-----------
@RALee85:
Another video of Ukrainian HIMARS firing on Russian positions at night.
https://t.co/nxM3m59jqn https://t.co/zzeOzoyVtY
Because of HIMARS' range/accuracy, Kyiv only has to fire a small # of munitions a day to achieve significant effects. GPS-guided GMLRS can be launched at night when Russian UAVs are less able to detect them, and they can drive away before being engaged.16/
-----------
@RALee85:
Another video of Ukrainian HIMARS firing on Russian positions at night.
https://t.co/nxM3m59jqn https://t.co/zzeOzoyVtY
Rob Lee (Twitter)
HIMARS will help disrupt future Russian offensives by reducing its critical artillery/MLRS advantage, but they won't retake terrain. Also, the limiting factor for HIMARS isn't the number of launchers, but the number of GMLRS and other munitions, which aren't in large supply. 17/
HIMARS will help disrupt future Russian offensives by reducing its critical artillery/MLRS advantage, but they won't retake terrain. Also, the limiting factor for HIMARS isn't the number of launchers, but the number of GMLRS and other munitions, which aren't in large supply. 17/