Ukraine Battle Map (Twitter)
@casualdiot @Faytuks: A ton of people do. Hezbollah uses pagers but many jobs in Lebanon use pagers.
@casualdiot @Faytuks: A ton of people do. Hezbollah uses pagers but many jobs in Lebanon use pagers.
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Ukraine Battle Map (Twitter)
@SF202017 @casualdiot @Faytuks: And you support today’s pager attacks mostly on civilians?
@SF202017 @casualdiot @Faytuks: And you support today’s pager attacks mostly on civilians?
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Ukraine Battle Map (Twitter)
@NewsWire_US: This guy does not live in reality, he has a 0.000% chance of winning New York
@NewsWire_US: This guy does not live in reality, he has a 0.000% chance of winning New York
Ukraine Battle Map (Twitter)
@NikkiHaleyHQ: That’s the “big” announcement?
Nobody is going to listen to that.
@NikkiHaleyHQ: That’s the “big” announcement?
Nobody is going to listen to that.
Ukraine Battle Map (Twitter)
@SF202017 @casualdiot @Faytuks: I know what you said. So you support them injuring thousands of civilians, but because they took out Ukraine’s ambassador, that’s a good thing?
@SF202017 @casualdiot @Faytuks: I know what you said. So you support them injuring thousands of civilians, but because they took out Ukraine’s ambassador, that’s a good thing?
Rob Lee (Twitter)
A Russian K-4386 Typhoon-VDV MRAP with a BM-30-D Spitsa turret and counter-FPV screens.
t.me/Ugolok_Sitha/22066
A Russian K-4386 Typhoon-VDV MRAP with a BM-30-D Spitsa turret and counter-FPV screens.
t.me/Ugolok_Sitha/22066
💩5👍1
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Rob Lee (Twitter)
Video of a Russian FPV targeting a Ukrainian Furia ISR UAV.
https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/185082
Video of a Russian FPV targeting a Ukrainian Furia ISR UAV.
https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/185082
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Rob Lee (Twitter)
Video of a claimed Russian FAB-3000 UMPK glide bomb strike on Myrnohrad. 5/
https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/184953
Video of a claimed Russian FAB-3000 UMPK glide bomb strike on Myrnohrad. 5/
https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/184953
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Rob Lee (Twitter)
Videos of Ukrainian FPV strikes on Russian ISR UAVs. 58/
t.me/ssternenko/33801
t.me/ssternenko/33813
t.me/ssternenko/33823
Videos of Ukrainian FPV strikes on Russian ISR UAVs. 58/
t.me/ssternenko/33801
t.me/ssternenko/33813
t.me/ssternenko/33823
Status-6 (Twitter)
RT @Tatarigami_UA: As Russian forces continue their advance in the Pokrovsk front, long-standing systemic issues within the Armed Forces of Ukraine continue to aid Russians with that. Based on numerous conversations with sergeants, as well as junior, and senior officers in command positions in the Donbas region, I am writing this post the goal of highlighting the most common and consistent problems mentioned by people on the ground, per their request. Unfortunately, the higher command remains largely unresponsive to these concerns when raised internally.
1. Disconnect in Command and Combat Readiness
There is an apparent disconnect between higher command assessment and the actual combat readiness of units. In many cases, units with limited operational capacity are tasked with responsibilities far beyond their capabilities. For example, newly formed brigades with little battlefield experience are assigned to defend critical and high-risk areas of the frontline, where Russian forces have massed sufficient strength for a potential breakthrough. At the same time, more experienced and better-equipped brigades are stationed in less dangerous sectors.
This imbalance has allowed Russian forces to pinpoint weak spots along the frontline and exploit them, especially during unit rotations - something that they can track easily due to their ISR capabilities. The Ukrainian command, in turn, often scrambles to reallocate battalions from other areas to stabilize vulnerable areas that appeared from miscalculations.
While such actions can help to stabilize the line and even prevent a breakthrough, it leaves other parts of the frontline exposed, perpetuating a cycle of vulnerability.
For context, what may appear to higher-ups as “a company with 60% of its personnel ready for deployment” may, in reality, be a fatigued unit with multiple soldiers in their 40s and 50s or people with previous injuries and chronic health problems, as well as newly arrived recruits with minimal training. The true combat readiness may be closer to 30-40%, but on paper, commanders see a combat-ready unit
2. The Lack of Truth and Realistic Reporting
The previously discussed disconnect raises the question: Why don’t officers report their unit’s inability to perform certain missions? The answer is simple: Brigade commanders and senior officers are ultimately responsible for the combat and mobilization readiness of their units per regulations. Admitting that a unit cannot perform a task is often seen as a failure of brigade leadership. As a result, the command’s solution is simple: if a commander cannot ensure the unit’s readiness, someone else will be appointed to do so. But the situation with resources or combat readiness of unit doesn't improve - you just put a person who is going to push under-resourced and under-prepared units to complete a task they are not equipped to handle, leading to failed operations, abandoned positions, failed defenses, and unnecessary casualties - something that people can witness themselves by looking at the Deep State map.
3. Systematic Problems with Recruitment and Training
The quality and quantity of new recruits continue to fall short of expectations. Although some training centers have made improvements, overall readiness remains alarmingly insufficient. Many newly arrived soldiers are not prepared for the realities of frontline combat, forcing brigades to develop and implement their own internal training programs. The situation demands systemic reforms, including the creation of a structure that leverages the expertise of veterans or those recovering from injuries to train and mentor incoming recruits.
4. Little to no Accountability
Three years into the war, Ukraine has yet to fully implement an After Action Review (AAR) process, which hasn't been implemented except in cases where individual officers took the initiative. The tactical level is the highest level where it's used.
The blame for operational failures often...
Перейти на оригинальный пост
RT @Tatarigami_UA: As Russian forces continue their advance in the Pokrovsk front, long-standing systemic issues within the Armed Forces of Ukraine continue to aid Russians with that. Based on numerous conversations with sergeants, as well as junior, and senior officers in command positions in the Donbas region, I am writing this post the goal of highlighting the most common and consistent problems mentioned by people on the ground, per their request. Unfortunately, the higher command remains largely unresponsive to these concerns when raised internally.
1. Disconnect in Command and Combat Readiness
There is an apparent disconnect between higher command assessment and the actual combat readiness of units. In many cases, units with limited operational capacity are tasked with responsibilities far beyond their capabilities. For example, newly formed brigades with little battlefield experience are assigned to defend critical and high-risk areas of the frontline, where Russian forces have massed sufficient strength for a potential breakthrough. At the same time, more experienced and better-equipped brigades are stationed in less dangerous sectors.
This imbalance has allowed Russian forces to pinpoint weak spots along the frontline and exploit them, especially during unit rotations - something that they can track easily due to their ISR capabilities. The Ukrainian command, in turn, often scrambles to reallocate battalions from other areas to stabilize vulnerable areas that appeared from miscalculations.
While such actions can help to stabilize the line and even prevent a breakthrough, it leaves other parts of the frontline exposed, perpetuating a cycle of vulnerability.
For context, what may appear to higher-ups as “a company with 60% of its personnel ready for deployment” may, in reality, be a fatigued unit with multiple soldiers in their 40s and 50s or people with previous injuries and chronic health problems, as well as newly arrived recruits with minimal training. The true combat readiness may be closer to 30-40%, but on paper, commanders see a combat-ready unit
2. The Lack of Truth and Realistic Reporting
The previously discussed disconnect raises the question: Why don’t officers report their unit’s inability to perform certain missions? The answer is simple: Brigade commanders and senior officers are ultimately responsible for the combat and mobilization readiness of their units per regulations. Admitting that a unit cannot perform a task is often seen as a failure of brigade leadership. As a result, the command’s solution is simple: if a commander cannot ensure the unit’s readiness, someone else will be appointed to do so. But the situation with resources or combat readiness of unit doesn't improve - you just put a person who is going to push under-resourced and under-prepared units to complete a task they are not equipped to handle, leading to failed operations, abandoned positions, failed defenses, and unnecessary casualties - something that people can witness themselves by looking at the Deep State map.
3. Systematic Problems with Recruitment and Training
The quality and quantity of new recruits continue to fall short of expectations. Although some training centers have made improvements, overall readiness remains alarmingly insufficient. Many newly arrived soldiers are not prepared for the realities of frontline combat, forcing brigades to develop and implement their own internal training programs. The situation demands systemic reforms, including the creation of a structure that leverages the expertise of veterans or those recovering from injuries to train and mentor incoming recruits.
4. Little to no Accountability
Three years into the war, Ukraine has yet to fully implement an After Action Review (AAR) process, which hasn't been implemented except in cases where individual officers took the initiative. The tactical level is the highest level where it's used.
The blame for operational failures often...
Перейти на оригинальный пост
Ukraine Battle Map (Twitter)
@Maks_NAFO_FELLA: WTF? Why would they arrest him? Leave Uysk alone he is the best boxer in the World, top 5 heavyweight boxers in history, and is a Ukrainian 🇺🇦 national sports hero
@Maks_NAFO_FELLA: WTF? Why would they arrest him? Leave Uysk alone he is the best boxer in the World, top 5 heavyweight boxers in history, and is a Ukrainian 🇺🇦 national sports hero