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Стриминг твитов о российско-украинской войне в ТГ; иногда сообщения также постятся и редактируются вручную
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Necro Mancer (Twitter)

Участник телешоу "4 жены" и "4 свадьбы", отзывчивый оренбуржец Бикметов Марсель Ильмирович 2000 г.р. из Сорочинска от службы на вертолёте начал терять слух, так что перевёлся в арту (там слух не нужен), а теперь и вовсе демилитаризовался
vk.com/wall-143789327_16061 #всрф #груз200
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Colby Badhwar 🇨🇦🇬🇧 (Twitter)

@FRHoffmann1: 🇺🇦🇷🇺 Personally, I have in fact made the opposite argument. The impact of deep strikes diminishes with every passing day because Russia has more and more time to prepare for them. If Ukraine received a significant quantity of ATACMS with their first HIMARS, Russian logistics would have been severely impacted.

Deep strikes remain essential for Ukraine to have any prospects of victory, but they will be significantly less impactful than they would have 2 years ago. https://twitter.com/FRHoffmann1/status/1829265468747813010#m
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Rob Lee (Twitter)

"Speaking on condition of anonymity, the official said that various lines of inquiry are being considered, including "friendly fire" from Ukrainian air defences, a technical malfunction and pilot error.

'But the exact reasons will be known only after the completion of the investigation,' he said."
https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/08/29/7472566/
Dan (Twitter)

RT @GeoConfirmed: GeoConfirmed UKR.

We were examining one of @blinzka's impressive geolocations and decided to utilize satellite imagery for further analysis. Our little investigation in that area revealed over 50 destroyed Russian vehicles along a 3 x 1 km stretch of road near #Ocheretyne, documented between May and August. [Due to copyright we can't share the sat imagery]

Based on the geolocated footage and the discrepancy between the losses visible in the footage and the reality observed in the satellite imagery, it is clear that the Russian losses in this area are higher than known by geolocated footage:

Based on geolocated footage and satellite imagery, purchased and provided by volunteers, we identified hundreds of destroyed Russian vehicles over a 20 km advance, that is 15 km wide, between March and August.

Conclusion:
The Russian forces are making advances in this area, but they are experiencing significant losses.

More information about GeoLocated footage: ...
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Dan (Twitter)

RT @DefMon3: Posted by deepstate today, initially posted by Roman Ponomarenko.

👤 A rather interesting publication (t.me/RomPonomarenko/1066) about the analysis of the state of affairs in the east came from Roman Ponomarenko, an officer of the Azov NSU brigade

⚔️ About the loss of control over the situation in Donbas:
For a long time, the situation in Donbas was quite appropriately characterized as "difficult, but controlled." However, now it is out of control. Currently, it seems that our front in Donbas has collapsed. The defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is disorganized, the troops are tired, weakened, and many units are demoralized. The replenishment that is received is mostly busified, and does not help, but on the contrary - complicates the combat work of the units.

😓 About the fatigue of both sides, which does not allow the enemy to go far into the depths:
The only reason the Russians do not break through deeply is because their troops are as exhausted as ours. However, they retain a significant numerical advantage, and have unlimited supplies of ammunition. Therefore, their offensive continues, we cannot stop it at the moment. And that is not the reason for the operation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in Kurshchyna.

🤔 About the search for solutions based on the experience of the armies during the Second World War:
What to do? There are several scenarios. Former head of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Zaluzhnyi loved to read Soviet military textbooks from the Second World War (t.me/RomPonomarenko/911) , deepening his military knowledge. Our current command should study the German experience of 1944, when the Wehrmacht constantly faced large-scale crises at the front, and somehow managed to get out of them. In particular, after the defeat of Army Group "Center" in Belarus during the Soviet operation "Bagration". Unfortunately, the problem is that narrow military solutions have a short-term effect, and only postpone the general defeat, as shown by the Second World War.

🇷🇺 The officer doubts that the katsaps will run out quickly even at this rate:
There are also widespread hopes that the Russians have put everything on this offensive, and as a result they will run out of reserves. However, we have been hearing about this for 2 years, but those reserves are somehow not running out.

📋 Summing up everything written above, you need to make changes before it's too late:
From the mundane: it would be worthwhile to introduce more effective measures to improve discipline in the army. Because now the situation is already on the edge, and forcibly mobilized replenishment only deepens it.
t.me/DeepStateUA/20228
Dan (Twitter)

RT @J_JHelin: Contrary to Zelenskyi's statements, the Russian advance in Pokrovsk has not slowed down in the past few weeks. Instead, it has increased significantly.

The way that Zelenskyi is attempting to spin the deteriorating situation in the east does not instil any confidence.
Colby Badhwar 🇨🇦🇬🇧 (Twitter)

RT @Tatarigami_UA: I wanted to share a few thoughts, offering a snapshot of the current situation in general, and discuss a few key points.

- The situation in Pokrovsk is indeed severe but far from hopeless. Ukrainian command has the resources needed for stabilization, though this will require difficult and potentially unpopular decisions.

- Resource shortages stem from both internal and external factors. Internally, issues include delayed mobilization, an ineffective recruitment process, an awful commanding culture, and the government's struggle to balance public opinion with necessary measures. Externally, delays in Western aid, persistent restrictions on weapon use, insufficient military production ramp-up, and slow aid delivery contribute to the problem.

- The issues in Pokrovsk are not new. Delayed aid from the U.S., hindered by an isolationist faction in the US Congress, made the fall of Avdiivka easier for Russian forces. This was exacerbated by inadequate defenses behind Avdiivka, which Ukrainian leadership chose to overlook, shifting responsibility to already overstretched and undermanned brigades.

- The situation in Pokrovsk worsened with the Kursk offensive operation, which diverted experienced and motivated brigades, stripping stabilization reserves and allowing Russian forces to advance rapidly. This also echoes back to Bakhmut, where the decision to reinforce the semi-encircled city with experienced troops, instead of opting for a timely withdrawal, resulted in the loss of many skilled soldiers and officers, weakening the backbone of several effective units

- Western sanctions on Russia were never fully enforced, enabling Russia to maintain and even expand its pre-war military production. This leniency suggests that some Western countries left a "backdoor" open for a post-war return, allowing Russia to significantly increase military recruitment payouts without the anticipated economic collapse

- Russia is more formidable than many pro-Ukrainian analysts suggest but weaker than the pro-Russian camp portrays. Russia does not have unlimited resources: whether in terms of personnel, budget, or societal support. While it can be defeated, this will not happen if Ukraine and its Western partners continue to make the same mistakes.

- Mistakes can be mitigated by an abundance of resources. Russia's ability to sustain the war despite its failures is largely due to its resource advantages. Unfortunately, Ukraine lacks similar resources, and the West is less inclined to bear the cost of these mistakes by Ukraine, even if this will become more costly for the West in the future.

- Despite the propaganda, Ukraine faces one of the most capable militaries in the world. Historical comparisons to the Russian army of the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries reveal striking similarities, yet these armies won numerous large-scale wars. The achievements of Ukrainian soldiers on the ground should not be belittled

- Russia has failed to achieve its strategic objective thus far - overthrowing the government in Kyiv and turning Ukraine into a pro-Russian state. The war has been far less favorable for Russia than anticipated, and despite all its efforts, anything short of a complete occupation will not bring Ukraine back into its sphere of influence.

- Sooner or later, discussions about negotiations and a "frozen conflict" will resurface in the media again, suggesting that a post-war Ukraine with minimal foreign military aid and no security guarantees is preferable to the current situation. In reality, this will give Russia a significant advantage, allowing it to prepare for a potentially more successful invasion.

- If the West genuinely wants this war to end soon, now is the best time to provide Ukraine with the support it needs to gain a strong negotiating position. Forcing Ukraine into negotiations without such an advantage won't succeed, just as Minsk I and Minsk II ultimately failed

After all, Ukraine has rep...

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Colby Badhwar 🇨🇦🇬🇧 (Twitter)

@SpockNC: I think JLTV would be too small, at least for the full magazine of 20. I assume it will still be trailer based but I don't know if they came away from the prototyping earlier this year wanting to go in a different direction. Maybe @AirPowerNEW1 knows.
Colby Badhwar 🇨🇦🇬🇧 (Twitter)

@jacob_mowat: 5,000 last I heard. At the outset we were producing 20-25% of what they were, no reason why we couldn't still be doing that.
Colby Badhwar 🇨🇦🇬🇧 (Twitter)

@ShawJPa: A lot of it is because Congress doesn't pass Defense Appropriations on time.
Colby Badhwar 🇨🇦🇬🇧 (Twitter)

RT @Doha104p3: Raytheon was awarded a $1.045 Billion fixed price contract for F-22's sensor enhancements program.
IgorGirkin (Twitter)

RT @sinicynr: Доброго вечора панове суджанці
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Danvan (Twitter)

RT @marybezuhla: У мережі з'явилася інформація про призначення начальником штабу Командування сил безпілотних систем ЗСУ Романа Гладкого, який не лише не має жодного досвіду роботи з БПЛА, але й був підозрюваний у державній зраді, шпигунстві та корупції, а також має дружину з російським паспортом, дочка виступала на змаганнях за росію.

Підтверджую призначення. Незрозуміло, як він пройшов перевірку Служби безпеки України та досі обіймає найвищі посади. Вихідець із Криму, капітан військово-морських сил з такою репутацією і ніколи не мав відношення до дронів!

Що знаю, призначення саме цієї людини начальником штабу — свідоме рішення Сирського. Він був відправлений туди як "соглядатай" попри протести Вадима Сухаревського та його команди. Це типовий підхід, який було використано багато разів. Зокрема, така ж ситуація у Гнатова, якого Президент призначив на керівництво фронтом замість Содоля. У Гнатова начальник штабу...

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