Necro Mancer (Twitter)
Много букв сплошного копиума
t.me/razgruzka_vagnera/592 #Мали #Вагнер #груз200 #Шевченко
Много букв сплошного копиума
t.me/razgruzka_vagnera/592 #Мали #Вагнер #груз200 #Шевченко
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Necro Mancer (Twitter)
@sergej_spartak: Зачем туарегам своих убитых показывать? Они стащили вагнеров и местных в одно место и снимают
@sergej_spartak: Зачем туарегам своих убитых показывать? Они стащили вагнеров и местных в одно место и снимают
Necro Mancer (Twitter)
"Справа на переднем сиденье спит Белый GreyZone, он погиб, попав в засаду в Мали, сзади спит Романов и еще один важный для нас всех человек, теперь он уснул вечным сном, сегодня утром в зоне СВО его поразил Himars"
t.me/HealerTacMed/10167 #всрф #роа #груз200 #Вагнер #Федянин
"Справа на переднем сиденье спит Белый GreyZone, он погиб, попав в засаду в Мали, сзади спит Романов и еще один важный для нас всех человек, теперь он уснул вечным сном, сегодня утром в зоне СВО его поразил Himars"
t.me/HealerTacMed/10167 #всрф #роа #груз200 #Вагнер #Федянин
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Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (Twitter)
Germany has updated the list of aid provided to Ukraine:
-8 Leopard 1 A5 tanks;
-21,000 ammunition for GEPARD;
-10 unmanned surface vessels;
-2 Bergepanzer 2 evacuation vehicles;
-10 ground surveillance radars;
-24,810 helmets;
-1 field hospital.
https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/military-support-ukraine-2054992
Germany has updated the list of aid provided to Ukraine:
-8 Leopard 1 A5 tanks;
-21,000 ammunition for GEPARD;
-10 unmanned surface vessels;
-2 Bergepanzer 2 evacuation vehicles;
-10 ground surveillance radars;
-24,810 helmets;
-1 field hospital.
https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/military-support-ukraine-2054992
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Necro Mancer (Twitter)
RT @OSINTua: Unfortunately, that’s true.
We somehow didn’t loose only because of the people who are fighting in the trenches & officers from battalion-brigade level.
Total incompetence of our President and his decisions.
Zero strategy in all spheres. But we are fighting. And will continue.
RT @OSINTua: Unfortunately, that’s true.
We somehow didn’t loose only because of the people who are fighting in the trenches & officers from battalion-brigade level.
Total incompetence of our President and his decisions.
Zero strategy in all spheres. But we are fighting. And will continue.
vxTwitter / fixvx
Tatarigami_UA (@Tatarigami_UA)
Over a year and a half ago, I wrote multiple posts and threads about the persistence of Soviet-style command within the Ukrainian army. At that time, many dismissed my concerns, arguing that war is not the time for change, or outright attacked me for criticism.…
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Necro Mancer (Twitter)
Горловский боевичок Филькин Иван Сергеевич 1981 г.р. по кличке "Фис" боевал ещё с 2014 года и не умер, а просто сдох, как и другие рашисты, за святую обязанность защищать жопку ВэВэ
https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/38093 https://myrotvorets.center/criminal/filkin-ivan-sergeevich/ #3омсбр #роа #груз200
Горловский боевичок Филькин Иван Сергеевич 1981 г.р. по кличке "Фис" боевал ещё с 2014 года и не умер, а просто сдох, как и другие рашисты, за святую обязанность защищать жопку ВэВэ
https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/38093 https://myrotvorets.center/criminal/filkin-ivan-sergeevich/ #3омсбр #роа #груз200
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Colby Badhwar 🇨🇦🇬🇧 (Twitter)
RT @Tatarigami_UA: Over a year and a half ago, I wrote multiple posts and threads about the persistence of Soviet-style command within the Ukrainian army. At that time, many dismissed my concerns, arguing that war is not the time for change, or outright attacked me for criticism. Unfortunately, the situation has only worsened since then, and the problem remains systemic. This issue existed before General Zaluzhnyi, continued during his tenure, and has deteriorated further under General Syrskyi. Despite promises to improve the situation, Syrskyi has increased authoritative pressure on commanding officers to hold ground with the same limited resources, and the results are evident.
Earlier this year, I correctly noted with my team that the Kharkiv operation was likely a diversion and that the main focus would remain on Donbas. While our troops have been trying to retake Hlyboke and have spent months holding the Krynki foothold (despite unclear objectives given our limited resources), Russians have systematically exhausted our brigades in Donbas. The Russian approach is not particularly innovative: they send small tactical units against Ukrainian defenses daily until one position falls, then exploit the success. Senior Ukrainian commanders have attempted to adopt similar tactics, forgetting that we have far fewer people and unreliable Western support that may or may not arrive on time, if at all.
Is it better on the Russian side? Absolutely not. My team has recordings of multiple radio communications from the Russian side, revealing threats of execution or denial of medical evacuation if their troops refuse to advance. It is far worse for the Russians, but they have significant advantages in personnel, equipment, vehicles, artillery, and air force. They can afford such tactics—we cannot. Moreover, the Russian army in 2024 is much smarter and more experienced than the disorganized troops we saw in February 2022. The only way to halt their advancement is to outsmart them by being more resourceful and careful, aiming to preserve our personnel when the situation requires it.
It is still possible to break the spine of the Russian army, which has severe logistical problems, dwindling availability of preserved vehicles, reliance on unarmored transportation, unmotivated personnel, and artillery barrel replacement bottlenecks. Additionally, many internal economic problems take time to manifest.
However, the window of opportunity is getting smaller. Unless radical changes are made, we are heading toward the most unfavorable scenario of all: forced negotiations, stalemate, minimization of Western aid, re-armament of the Russian army, and a new round of the war with much more unfavorable outcomes for Ukraine, leading to occupation and forced assimilation.
RT @Tatarigami_UA: Over a year and a half ago, I wrote multiple posts and threads about the persistence of Soviet-style command within the Ukrainian army. At that time, many dismissed my concerns, arguing that war is not the time for change, or outright attacked me for criticism. Unfortunately, the situation has only worsened since then, and the problem remains systemic. This issue existed before General Zaluzhnyi, continued during his tenure, and has deteriorated further under General Syrskyi. Despite promises to improve the situation, Syrskyi has increased authoritative pressure on commanding officers to hold ground with the same limited resources, and the results are evident.
Earlier this year, I correctly noted with my team that the Kharkiv operation was likely a diversion and that the main focus would remain on Donbas. While our troops have been trying to retake Hlyboke and have spent months holding the Krynki foothold (despite unclear objectives given our limited resources), Russians have systematically exhausted our brigades in Donbas. The Russian approach is not particularly innovative: they send small tactical units against Ukrainian defenses daily until one position falls, then exploit the success. Senior Ukrainian commanders have attempted to adopt similar tactics, forgetting that we have far fewer people and unreliable Western support that may or may not arrive on time, if at all.
Is it better on the Russian side? Absolutely not. My team has recordings of multiple radio communications from the Russian side, revealing threats of execution or denial of medical evacuation if their troops refuse to advance. It is far worse for the Russians, but they have significant advantages in personnel, equipment, vehicles, artillery, and air force. They can afford such tactics—we cannot. Moreover, the Russian army in 2024 is much smarter and more experienced than the disorganized troops we saw in February 2022. The only way to halt their advancement is to outsmart them by being more resourceful and careful, aiming to preserve our personnel when the situation requires it.
It is still possible to break the spine of the Russian army, which has severe logistical problems, dwindling availability of preserved vehicles, reliance on unarmored transportation, unmotivated personnel, and artillery barrel replacement bottlenecks. Additionally, many internal economic problems take time to manifest.
However, the window of opportunity is getting smaller. Unless radical changes are made, we are heading toward the most unfavorable scenario of all: forced negotiations, stalemate, minimization of Western aid, re-armament of the Russian army, and a new round of the war with much more unfavorable outcomes for Ukraine, leading to occupation and forced assimilation.
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Colby Badhwar 🇨🇦🇬🇧 (Twitter)
RT @OSINTua: Unfortunately, that’s true.
We somehow didn’t loose only because of the people who are fighting in the trenches & officers from battalion-brigade level.
Total incompetence of our President and his decisions.
Zero strategy in all spheres. But we are fighting. And will continue.
RT @OSINTua: Unfortunately, that’s true.
We somehow didn’t loose only because of the people who are fighting in the trenches & officers from battalion-brigade level.
Total incompetence of our President and his decisions.
Zero strategy in all spheres. But we are fighting. And will continue.
vxTwitter / fixvx
Tatarigami_UA (@Tatarigami_UA)
Over a year and a half ago, I wrote multiple posts and threads about the persistence of Soviet-style command within the Ukrainian army. At that time, many dismissed my concerns, arguing that war is not the time for change, or outright attacked me for criticism.…
Colby Badhwar 🇨🇦🇬🇧 (Twitter)
@BrookingsFP Q for the Undersecretary: Is there a planned replacement for JSOW aside from JASSM-ER? Has JSOW been declared as excess to requirement or will it be in the near future? #AirSpacePower
@BrookingsFP Q for the Undersecretary: Is there a planned replacement for JSOW aside from JASSM-ER? Has JSOW been declared as excess to requirement or will it be in the near future? #AirSpacePower
Danvan (Twitter)
RT @marybezuhla: Сирський змусив Командування Десантно-штурмових військ Збройних Сил України (КДШВ) збрехати про зняття командира 80-ї бригади ДШВ Ішкулова. В офіційному коментарі КДШВ стверджується, що його начебто не звільнили через незгоду з нереалістичним завданням Сирського, а "підвищили" в КДШВ. Насправді, після розголосу та звернення колективу бригади, що правда військовому керівництву не до вподоби, і тому він знімає Ішкулова, інцидент таким способом намагаються зам'яти. На жаль, ситуація саме така, як це описали в бригаді. Для десантників вийти публічно — це вперше. Дуже допекло. Скажу більше: Сирський настільки не сприймає ДШВ і намагається їх нівелювати, що майже не спілкується зі своїм же командувачем ДШВ Скибюком. Але це ще не все. У Сирського постійно, а особливо зараз, коли стілець захитався, з'являються спроби пообіцяти якийсь новий контрнаступ, і наразі він вже так далеко від реальності, що це мож...
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RT @marybezuhla: Сирський змусив Командування Десантно-штурмових військ Збройних Сил України (КДШВ) збрехати про зняття командира 80-ї бригади ДШВ Ішкулова. В офіційному коментарі КДШВ стверджується, що його начебто не звільнили через незгоду з нереалістичним завданням Сирського, а "підвищили" в КДШВ. Насправді, після розголосу та звернення колективу бригади, що правда військовому керівництву не до вподоби, і тому він знімає Ішкулова, інцидент таким способом намагаються зам'яти. На жаль, ситуація саме така, як це описали в бригаді. Для десантників вийти публічно — це вперше. Дуже допекло. Скажу більше: Сирський настільки не сприймає ДШВ і намагається їх нівелювати, що майже не спілкується зі своїм же командувачем ДШВ Скибюком. Але це ще не все. У Сирського постійно, а особливо зараз, коли стілець захитався, з'являються спроби пообіцяти якийсь новий контрнаступ, і наразі він вже так далеко від реальності, що це мож...
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