‌Dan (Twitter)

15. Probably Russians fitting their assessments to their propaganda again and to 2014 events. Anyone who spent any time following or talking to UAF officers could have concluded that morale and resilience was generally high. This should have been obvious.
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@MikkoLaaksonen1:
34/x #Ukraine officers were messaged in psyops "on the second day of the invasion, #Putin publicly appealed to the Ukrainian military to not resist the #Russian invasion. This failed campaign also highlights the poor assessment of the psychology of the Ukrainian military"

The Lookout (Twitter)

RT @MotolkoHelp: 15:03. The third MiG-31K of the Russian Aerospace Forces (RF-92333) flew from Machulishchy airfield to Savasleika airfield (Nizhny Novgorod oblast, Russia).

MotolkoHelp (Twitter)

15:03. The third MiG-31K of the Russian Aerospace Forces (RF-92333) flew from Machulishchy airfield to Savasleika airfield (Nizhny Novgorod oblast, Russia).

The Lookout (Twitter)

RT @GeneralStaffUA: NATO facilitates donation of ambulance buses from Norway to Ukraine -
#Norway will donate five military ambulance buses to #Ukraine, following Kyiv’s request for international assistance through the NATO Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC).

MotolkoHelp (Twitter)

⚡️All three MiG-31K, which have been deployed at Machulishchy airfield since October 16, 2022, are flying to Russia.
These are MiG-31K with reg.numbers
RF-92462, RF-92339 and RF-92333.
Destination – Savasleika airfield (Nizhny Novgorod oblast, Russia).

‌The Lookout (Twitter)

"Estonia, the Netherlands, and Norway have agreed to donate a deployable field hospital to Ukraine"

Joint Statement:
https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/jointstatementfieldhospital/id2949190/

‌Dan (Twitter)

RT @pmakela1: Russian tank identification guide updated with the latest Russian tank model.
No it's not the Armata, but the T-62M Obr 2021 instead.
https://blog.vantagepointnorth.net/2022/11/quick-guide-to-identifying-russian.html

The Lookout (Twitter)

A good analysis of the new Russian Northern Sea Route law, made on the basis of a draft proposal in October.

"For Russian lawmakers, it makes their project plainly contrary to UNCLOS",.
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@nukestrat:
@The_Lookout_N @Malfrid_BH Legal analysis here: https://t.co/07zbWkSKBM

‌Dan (Twitter)

16. Failings in Russian battle damage assessment and claimed limitations to access to satellite imagery discussed in tweet 35-37 in this thread.
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@MikkoLaaksonen1:
37/x Problems in battle damage assessment and recon allowed systematic #Ukraine deception to succeed. Destroyed sites were reused and camouflaged as damaged, not destroyed sites were reported as destroyed.

Ukraine Battle Map (Twitter)

RT @UkraineRussia2: 🇺🇦Ukrainian HIMARS overnight hit more rail infrastructure near Ilovais'k.

The Lookout (Twitter)

Historical perspective also interesting:

Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (Twitter)

Ukrainian drone drops bombs on Russian positions on the left bank of Dnipro, Kherson region

‌Dan (Twitter)

17. RuAF by passing of Sumy, Okhtyrka + Chernihiv etc were major strategic blunders. Hindered their advances on these fronts. Sumy + Okhtyrka allowed a base for eating away at the logistics/comms of the 1st Grds Tank Army, more vulnerable as most extended.
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@MikkoLaaksonen1:
42/x "#Russian units were ordered to proceed in administrative column, and to bypass UAF units. Many Russian soldiers arrived in towns without their weapons loaded. They were – for the most part – not anticipating heavy fighting"

‌Dan (Twitter)

18. To be read in conjunction with tweet 48 before it. I suggest this applies to the first week.
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@MikkoLaaksonen1:
49/x #Ukrainian forces found themselves bypassed and often confronted with columns of unprepared #Russian
troops. Even without higher instructions, the immediate task was clear to these units, and, at the tactical level, Ukrainian forces therefore retained the tactical initiative

Dan (Twitter)

@StephenShilcock Yes I think that makes sense.