Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (Twitter/X)

A Russian military lay down among a pile of comrades' corpses to hide from an FPV attack https://twitter.com/DPSU_ua/status/2053884931781111907#m

IgorGirkin (Twitter/X)

RT @davinci_army: Байк не їде і ніжки вже не йдуть.

1-й ББпС та 3-й штурмовий батальйон 1 ОШП імені Дмитра Коцюбайла загнали самотнього російського піхотинця на Гуляйпільському напрямку, під коментарі з командного пункту. Той, не сильно й намагався втекти.

Приречений фінал — наслідок нашої злагодженої роботи.

IgorGirkin (Twitter/X)

RT @SOF_UKR: Ukraine’s SOF Strike Enemy Arsenals, TOC, Logistics in Occupied Territories, russia
SOF drone units conducted a series of strikes against enemy sites across the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, as well as inside russia. Thread:

imi (m) (Twitter/X)

RT @SOF_UKR: Ukraine’s SOF Strike Enemy Arsenals, TOC, Logistics in Occupied Territories, russia
SOF drone units conducted a series of strikes against enemy sites across the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, as well as inside russia. Thread:

Dan (Twitter/X)

RT @NatalkaKyiv: 😁 A striking post by Z-blogger Zhivov (Telegram channel ‘Живовъ’) on why the Russian Army is weak and how it ended up this way:

“The Soviet army no longer exists, the attempt to copy the American military failed, and we are still thinking about how to build our own.

The mass Soviet army — with armored vehicles, artillery, missiles, and mobilization reserves — was created for a very specific type of war, taking into account the level of education and the concepts of the “soviet man.”

It was designed for a total defensive war involving WMDs, for simultaneous strikes with all available means, for enemy air superiority, but at the same time for the absence of mass precision-guided weapons on the enemy side.

The entire structure — armor thickness, individual soldier protection, the role of tanks and infantry — corresponded to the world of the 1980s and remained unchanged for decades.

In 1991, not only the country died, but also the school of Soviet military thought — precisely at the moment of transition to a new technological era.

I see this not as a coincidence, but as a very convenient break for someone. Had the USSR survived just five more years, the modern Russian army would look completely different.

Instead, the old philosophy and “mathematics of war” were set in stone, while reality moved far ahead.

In the 2010s, they tried to build on these ruins a small professional expeditionary army for short local conflicts.

The concept was essentially copied from the U.S. expeditionary corps in Iraq: supposedly, Russia, with its nuclear potential, would never have to fight a large-scale high-intensity war, while such an army would be convenient and cheap for “chasing insurgents.” History will still ask uncomfortable questions about that.

But even this superstructure was never properly implemented. Since 2008, full-fledged digital battlefield management systems were never been introduced into the troops.

In 2010, the BTR-90 was abandoned as unsuitable for future warfare, but neither the “Boomerang” nor heavy infantry fighting vehicles like the “Kurganets” ever reached the army.

Everyone has also heard about the “Schrödinger Coalition” artillery system. They would come in very handy now.

I think that if, in 2015, some officer in the General Staff had spoken about the urgent need to expand air defense because of the threat of mass drone raids, or proposed developing tactical UAVs, he would have been fired in disgrace.

Separately, I want to note that our expeditionary army in 2022 was good, but far too small and completely lacking in communication and command tools.

But it truly was elite — certainly at the middle and lower levels. Even the presence of quality digital communications and command systems in battalion tactical groups in 2022 would have fundamentally changed the outcome of the first weeks.

By 2023, it became completely clear: the era of large mass armies built around armor, free-fall bombs, and mass low-precision artillery is fading away.

Along with it goes the military philosophy of the 20th century, where the main tool was the assault rifle and armor thickness was considered the main answer to threats.

The mass emergence of aerial, ground, and naval drones, digital systems, and layered reconnaissance is ushering in a new era of armies in which the skills of the ordinary soldier are fundamentally different: to see, to guide, to remain unseen, to work digitally.

The Kalashnikov can still be issued, but it will look like an officer’s saber from the early 20th century.”
🔽🔽🔽

Dan (Twitter/X)

RT @414magyarbirds: ⚡️Standard-10: Magyar Proposes a Formula for Winning the Attrition War

Commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces Robert “Magyar” Brovdi has proposed the “Standard-10” formula – a target efficiency benchmark for strike crews across Ukraine’s Defense Forces.

The concept calls for every strike crew in Ukraine’s Defense Forces to achieve 10 confirmed enemy personnel hits per month.

According to Magyar, the current average across all strike crews in the Defense Forces stands at 3.14 confirmed enemy personnel hits per crew per month.
At the same time, there is enormous room for growth: comparable USF crews demonstrate an average of 15.2 hits per crew, the State Border Guard Service unit “Phoenix” averages 22.3, while the 414th Separate Unmanned Systems Brigade “Magyar’s Birds” reaches an average of 30.6 enemy personnel hits per crew per month.

Magyar emphasizes that if all strike crews across Ukraine’s Defense Forces reach the “Standard-10” benchmark, enemy losses caused by drones alone could exceed russia’s average monthly replenishment rate by twofold.

According to available calculations, during December–April, the average monthly replenishment of russian forces at the front stood at 29,500 troops, while the average monthly pace of enemy losses from drones reached 31,500 personnel.

In March and April, confirmed enemy losses verified in the Delta battlefield awareness system and inflicted specifically by drones amounted to 33,989 and 33,961 personnel, respectively. Of those:

• Birds of the USF: 10,513 + 10,581 – 31.2% of the total;
• SBU drone pilots: 6,453 + 6,285 – 18.8%;
• Pilots from the seventeen Army Corps of Ukraine’s Defense Forces: 16,464 + 17,367 – 49.9%.

“Standard-10” is built around a clear combat logic: for bomber crews, FPV teams, and other strike systems, the monthly target is 10 confirmed enemy personnel hits.
According to Magyar, this is a fully realistic benchmark: with rotational combat duty covering 15–20 combat days per month, it translates into roughly one confirmed strike every 2–3 days.
“Every controller, every crew, every drone – this is pure mathematics entering the fight. The solution is not attracting new forces and assets, but increasing the efficiency of the existing ones,” Magyar stresses.

According to him, reaching this benchmark would create a sustained negative manpower balance for the enemy and make the exhaustion of the russian military irreversible. Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense has set a strategic goal of reaching 50,000 enemy personnel losses per month. If strike crew efficiency reaches the level of 10 enemy personnel hits per crew, this goal becomes realistically achievable and could exceed the scale of russian mobilization by twofold.

“Since December last year, we have achieved and maintained a negative balance between mobilized and destroyed enemy personnel. With the implementation of ‘Standard-10,’ this imbalance will become critical for the occupier and lead to a turning point in the war.

It is important to emphasize: there will be enough drones for everyone. For 2026, we already have more than enough planned production to cover these needs. The drones are waiting, the crews already exist — all that remains is increasing their efficiency,” Magyar concludes.

IgorGirkin (Twitter/X)

All targets were destroyed using No.1 interceptors equipped with the Hornet Vision 360 digital video system — no need to adjust the antenna

👀 https://twitter.com/wilendhornets/status/2054127159833215330#m