Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (Twitter/X)

🥖🥖AASM Hammer air strike by MiG-29 on a Russian underground base and hangar on an abandoned farm.

The Lookout (Twitter/X)

RT @BartGonnissen: Every pilot needs to learn. Here is an approach with a 400m ULCS with a 2.3kts flood tide. The conning pilot is moving up in category to be able to pilot ULCS and is performing this maneuver under the supervision of 2 senior pilots. Conning pilot is not used to the mass and inertia of a ULCS, so underestimates the effect of the current running through and pushing him to the green side, almost swiping B85A with the stern. The maneuver is always under control, but the senior pilots advise the conning pilot to increase speed to avoid hitting B85a. As usual, there will be a debriefing and analysis of the maneuver. A good learning experience.

Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (Twitter/X)

A Russian military lay down among a pile of comrades' corpses to hide from an FPV attack https://twitter.com/DPSU_ua/status/2053884931781111907#m

IgorGirkin (Twitter/X)

RT @davinci_army: Байк не їде і ніжки вже не йдуть.

1-й ББпС та 3-й штурмовий батальйон 1 ОШП імені Дмитра Коцюбайла загнали самотнього російського піхотинця на Гуляйпільському напрямку, під коментарі з командного пункту. Той, не сильно й намагався втекти.

Приречений фінал — наслідок нашої злагодженої роботи.

IgorGirkin (Twitter/X)

RT @SOF_UKR: Ukraine’s SOF Strike Enemy Arsenals, TOC, Logistics in Occupied Territories, russia
SOF drone units conducted a series of strikes against enemy sites across the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, as well as inside russia. Thread:

imi (m) (Twitter/X)

RT @SOF_UKR: Ukraine’s SOF Strike Enemy Arsenals, TOC, Logistics in Occupied Territories, russia
SOF drone units conducted a series of strikes against enemy sites across the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, as well as inside russia. Thread:

Dan (Twitter/X)

RT @NatalkaKyiv: 😁 A striking post by Z-blogger Zhivov (Telegram channel ‘Живовъ’) on why the Russian Army is weak and how it ended up this way:

“The Soviet army no longer exists, the attempt to copy the American military failed, and we are still thinking about how to build our own.

The mass Soviet army — with armored vehicles, artillery, missiles, and mobilization reserves — was created for a very specific type of war, taking into account the level of education and the concepts of the “soviet man.”

It was designed for a total defensive war involving WMDs, for simultaneous strikes with all available means, for enemy air superiority, but at the same time for the absence of mass precision-guided weapons on the enemy side.

The entire structure — armor thickness, individual soldier protection, the role of tanks and infantry — corresponded to the world of the 1980s and remained unchanged for decades.

In 1991, not only the country died, but also the school of Soviet military thought — precisely at the moment of transition to a new technological era.

I see this not as a coincidence, but as a very convenient break for someone. Had the USSR survived just five more years, the modern Russian army would look completely different.

Instead, the old philosophy and “mathematics of war” were set in stone, while reality moved far ahead.

In the 2010s, they tried to build on these ruins a small professional expeditionary army for short local conflicts.

The concept was essentially copied from the U.S. expeditionary corps in Iraq: supposedly, Russia, with its nuclear potential, would never have to fight a large-scale high-intensity war, while such an army would be convenient and cheap for “chasing insurgents.” History will still ask uncomfortable questions about that.

But even this superstructure was never properly implemented. Since 2008, full-fledged digital battlefield management systems were never been introduced into the troops.

In 2010, the BTR-90 was abandoned as unsuitable for future warfare, but neither the “Boomerang” nor heavy infantry fighting vehicles like the “Kurganets” ever reached the army.

Everyone has also heard about the “Schrödinger Coalition” artillery system. They would come in very handy now.

I think that if, in 2015, some officer in the General Staff had spoken about the urgent need to expand air defense because of the threat of mass drone raids, or proposed developing tactical UAVs, he would have been fired in disgrace.

Separately, I want to note that our expeditionary army in 2022 was good, but far too small and completely lacking in communication and command tools.

But it truly was elite — certainly at the middle and lower levels. Even the presence of quality digital communications and command systems in battalion tactical groups in 2022 would have fundamentally changed the outcome of the first weeks.

By 2023, it became completely clear: the era of large mass armies built around armor, free-fall bombs, and mass low-precision artillery is fading away.

Along with it goes the military philosophy of the 20th century, where the main tool was the assault rifle and armor thickness was considered the main answer to threats.

The mass emergence of aerial, ground, and naval drones, digital systems, and layered reconnaissance is ushering in a new era of armies in which the skills of the ordinary soldier are fundamentally different: to see, to guide, to remain unseen, to work digitally.

The Kalashnikov can still be issued, but it will look like an officer’s saber from the early 20th century.”
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