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Стриминг твитов о российско-украинской войне в ТГ; иногда сообщения также постятся и редактируются вручную
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Necro Mancer (Twitter)

Пользуясь случаем, передаём приветы электрикам, ПВОшникам, корейцам и прочим БПЛАшникам
t.me/robert_magyar/1879 #RussianUkrainianWar
Necro Mancer (Twitter)

RT @OSINTua: Not very active nowadays. Have a lot of work.
Trying to destroy Russian IFVs and tanks in their shelters. We know that Russians planned to attack our positions with IFVs and with the help of air recon and SIGINT we have found & targeted 4 tanks and 7 IFVs.
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Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (Twitter)

The end of a Russian invader. Photo by the 92nd Brigade of Ukraine.
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Status-6 (Twitter)

The commander of the Lazar Group (Ukraine's most effective bomber drone unit), Colonel Pavlo Yelizarov, has been appointed as a deputy commander of the Ukrainian Air Force.

That was announced by Ukrainian President Zelensky in his address on Monday.
Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (Twitter)

‼️Pavlo Yelizarov, the commander of the well-known Ukrainian drone unit "Lazar’s Group" will become the new Deputy Commander of the Air Force of Ukraine, Zelenskyy announced.

In his new role, Yelizarov will oversee the full transformation of Ukraine’s ‘small’ air defense (mobile air defence groups, interceptor drones, and other short-range air defense measures) onto a new, unified system.
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Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (Twitter)

P.S: This is a very positive development. The need to transform the Air Force’s approach in this area has been evident for a long time and has been the subject of extensive debate, both in Ukrainian society and within the military. Also, Pavlo Yelizarov has proven himself to be a highly effective organizer, having built one of Ukraine’s most capable drone units, which even operated for a long time without attracting unnecessary public attention.
Necro Mancer (Twitter)

RT @bodmiruk: Йобана дурка
Не можу перевести топового ФПВшника до себе в навчальну роту фпв, попри те, що воював він як раз як фпвшник
Але ні блять, він має бути інструктором БЗВП і перевестись без згоди свого керівництва - не може. Але от якби він був далбайобом - то перевівся б будь куди
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Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (Twitter)

RT @panyiszabolcs: 💥Viktor Orbán’s FM Péter Szijjártó says Hungary is BLOCKING a joint EU statement on Greenland.

After years acting as a Trojan horse for Russia and China, Budapest now does the same for Trump.

Meanwhile, Orbán ally Andrej Babiš’s Czech government also refuses to back Denmark...
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imi (m) (Twitter)

what does federov mean by this
t.me/zedigital/6585
Necro Mancer (Twitter)

RT @solonko1648: Призначення Єлізарова в ПС цікаве. Лазарі - серйозний підрозділ. Можливо, якби не факт з біографії у вигляді фактично опозиційного телепродюсера, то міг свого часу отримати іншу знакову посаду. Що ж, успіхів.
IgorGirkin (Twitter)

ru worms tg crying

"ПВО-шникам, которые прикрывают небо над Калужской областью (а следовательно - и Москву)"
Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (Twitter)

RT @Teoyaomiquu: I want to look at what a U.S. move against Greenland would likely look like, grounded real patterns and past Trump's behavior. Trump has been unusually clear about what he considers a successful territorial seizure. He has repeatedly praised of how Crimea was taken, downplayed the use of force, argued that the population "would rather be with russia," and treated putin’s approach as effective not illegitimate. That tells us exactly what kind of operation Trump considers a success and is therefore most likely to try to run under domestic constraints.

The rhetoric surrounding Greenland already echoes this tactic. Trump and his close allies have repeatedly framed the issue in terms of self determination, suggesting that the people of Greenland should decide their own future, suggesting use of force and describing U.S. control as inevitable. This language closely mirrors how putin justified the seizure of Crimea, invoking the "will of the population" while armed force quietly shaped the outcome.

The parallel is not only rhetorical. The United States already operates a major military base in Greenland, just as russia maintained a significant military presence in Crimea before 2014. In both cases, an existing base provides leverage, proximity, and the ability to apply pressure without announcing an invasion. The combination of "self determination" language and military reality is deliberate. It establishes a narrative of legitimacy before coercion becomes visible.

But this is not only because Trump liked how the operation was conducted or because he sympathized with Putin. It is also because the Crimea model fits the structural constraints both of them face. Different constraints, but the same need to avoid open, visible bloody war.

Crimea was taken quietly not because russia lacked military strength, but because open violence would have undermined russia’s objectives in 2014. Putin needed contracts with Germany and France to keep flowing, Nord Stream to move forward, and European capital engaged before the next phase of the war. A bloody, televised invasion would have triggered sanctions and isolation too early.

Russia's internal audience was never the constraint. Domestic opinion was tightly controlled, the Duma fully subordinated, and the narrative managed. What mattered was the external audience.

Trump vulnerability is the opposite.

His weakness is internal, not external. He has to care about the domestic audience. He understands that once violence becomes visible, once helicopters are shot down, once images of dead Danish soldiers hit American screens, the operation collapses politically. Violence against a democratic European ally triggers a fundamentally different reaction inside the United States than conflicts elsewhere.

That kind of war does not play well with Republican moderates, fragile Congressional majorities, or an independent electorate where a large majority would recoil from killing allied Europeans over Greenland.

That’s why the Crimea playbook translates perfectly. Trump doesn’t need to win a war. He needs to take Greenland without firing a shot. The moment violence becomes visible, the operation collapses politically.

Later I will write how Denmark can counter this based on Ukrainian experience.