Necro Mancer (Twitter)

Кыш, пернатые
t.me/posipaki2025/90 t.me/fpvredrone/241 t.me/ssternenko/48981 t.me/Ronins_65/662 #дроноцид

Necro Mancer (Twitter)

@hochu_dodomu: Ну так и санкции всегда можно вернуть

Necro Mancer (Twitter)

Контрбатарейка
t.me/Wormbusters/243 t.me/zsu82odshbr/1563 t.me/oaembr46/1737 t.me/fpvredrone/251 #RussianUkrainianWar

Dan (Twitter)

19-20. South of Hryhorivka, 24th AUG
Two belated releases from 1st Batt,🇺🇦54th Mechanised Bde show more scenes from this failed night attack.
Mainly they finish off🇷🇺troops with drone drops and have raised claimed🇷🇺KIA to 22.
Also a closer view of a🇷🇺AFV but we still can't ID it.

‌Status-6 (Twitter)

RT @414magyarbirds: 🇵🇱🤝🇺🇦 Dowódca Magyar do narodu polskiego – in solidarity with Poland to safeguard our shared European security.

Status-6 (Twitter)

RT @Tatarigami_UA: On September 10, 2025, Ukrainian military intelligence successfully struck a MPSV07-class ship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. According to the official statement, the ship was commissioned in 2015 and is valued at around $60 million. Russia has a total of four such ships

‌Status-6 (Twitter)

RT @konrad_muzyka: And for English speakers.
The fallout from yesterday’s events provides an opportunity for a preliminary assessment. Over the past several years, Poland has pursued an accelerated procurement strategy, prioritising high-end capabilities such as Patriot air defence systems, Apache attack helicopters, F-35 fighters, MLRS launchers, and self-propelled howitzers. The underlying assumption was clear: the Polish Armed Forces needed to be prepared to repel an adversary with comparable conventional capabilities. Yet the war in Ukraine has profoundly degraded Russia’s ability to conduct large-scale operations against a technologically advanced opponent.

In response to these constraints, Russia has shifted towards the mass production of lower-end systems, pursuing quantity as a substitute for quality. This dynamic has created a paradox. The Polish Armed Forces are arguably better positioned for high-intensity conventional warfare than their principal adversary. At the same time, however, they remain underprepared to counter the large-scale employment of inexpensive unmanned systems.

The central vulnerability in current assessments of Russia lies in an incomplete understanding of the trajectory of its drone development. Russia is producing roughly 70,000 Shahed drones and variants annually, alongside decoys. At the tactical level, virtually every sub-unit will be equipped with reconnaissance-strike drone assets. At the operational level, Russia is forming unmanned vehicle regiments within military district structures, likely under the “Rubikon” programme. Frontline units will also be equipped with Shaheds for tactical strikes against enemy forward positions. Against this backdrop, the assumption that Poland and NATO would be able to impose their preferred conditions of warfare appears excessively optimistic—at least in the early stages of conflict.

The absence of a tailored procurement response to Russia’s mass drone production represents a critical gap. Yesterday’s incidents illustrate only a fraction of what could occur were such incursions to become routine. Deploying high-value assets such as F-16s or F-35s to intercept drones is strategically unsustainable, given both the financial burden—where flight hours cost hundreds of thousands of zlotys—and the depletion of expensive missile inventories. The asymmetry between Russia’s low-cost offensive systems and Poland’s costly defensive responses is increasingly pronounced.

Equally troubling is the notion that drones can be deliberately disregarded if they pose no immediate kinetic threat. Systems such as the Geran are capable of carrying either explosive payloads of up to 5 kg or reconnaissance modules. Permitting them to penetrate Polish airspace unchallenged effectively concedes the adversary the ability to conduct intelligence-gathering operations at will.

Poland’s procurement strategy must therefore be recalibrated to include layered defences against mass drone employment. This requires investment in lower-end platforms, electronic warfare systems, short-range air defence, anti-aircraft artillery, and dedicated counter-UAV effectors. Absent such measures, each subsequent Russian escalation will exacerbate Poland’s asymmetric vulnerabilities while accelerating the attrition of its most valuable combat platforms.

Status-6 (Twitter)

RT @KyivPost: The United States has lifted sanctions on the Belarusian company Belavia and plans to return its embassy to Minsk, US presidential representative John Cole said.

Status-6 (Twitter)

This is how Russian youth is raised nowadays.

"Imagine you're killing khokhols."

"Khokhol" is derogatory Russian term for Ukrainians.

Status-6 (Twitter)

(The airframe seen in the photo is only for illustration purposes and not necessarily the one that crashed)