Necro Mancer (Twitter)

СВО идёт по плану
t.me/rubaka_77/166 t.me/Wormbusters/244 t.me/ngu_3027/4429 t.me/ombr_28/2553 #RussianUkrainianWar

Dan (Twitter)

RT @konrad_muzyka: Kurz po wczorajszych wydarzeniach już opadł, dlatego warto pokusić się o pierwsze podsumowanie.
W ostatnich latach Polska obrała kurs na szybkie zakupy uzbrojenia, koncentrując się na pozyskiwaniu systemów wysokiej klasy: Patriotów, śmigłowców Apache, samolotów F-35, wyrzutni MLRS czy armatohaubic, itd. Kierunek ten miał zapewnić zdolność do odparcia przeciwnika dysponującego porównywalnym potencjałem. Tymczasem wojna w Ukrainie znacząco ograniczyła rosyjskie możliwości prowadzenia pełnoskalowych działań wobec przeciwnika o podobnym poziomie technologicznym.
W reakcji Rosjanie skoncentrowali się na produkcji systemów niższej klasy i ich masowej liczbie, zakładając, że ilość może zrekompensować braki jakościowe. Powstaje więc paradoks: Siły Zbrojne RP stają się lepiej przygotowane do konfliktu konwencjonalnego na dużą skalę niż potencjalny przeciwnik, ale równocześnie nie posiadają wystarczających środków do obrony przed masowym użyciem tanich...

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‌Rob Lee (Twitter)

RT @gregbagwell: We are about to discover that downsizing your military for wars of choice is no use when war chooses you....

‌Rob Lee (Twitter)

RT @konrad_muzyka: And for English speakers.
The fallout from yesterday’s events provides an opportunity for a preliminary assessment. Over the past several years, Poland has pursued an accelerated procurement strategy, prioritising high-end capabilities such as Patriot air defence systems, Apache attack helicopters, F-35 fighters, MLRS launchers, and self-propelled howitzers. The underlying assumption was clear: the Polish Armed Forces needed to be prepared to repel an adversary with comparable conventional capabilities. Yet the war in Ukraine has profoundly degraded Russia’s ability to conduct large-scale operations against a technologically advanced opponent.

In response to these constraints, Russia has shifted towards the mass production of lower-end systems, pursuing quantity as a substitute for quality. This dynamic has created a paradox. The Polish Armed Forces are arguably better positioned for high-intensity conventional warfare than their principal adversary. At the same time, however, they remain underprepared to counter the large-scale employment of inexpensive unmanned systems.

The central vulnerability in current assessments of Russia lies in an incomplete understanding of the trajectory of its drone development. Russia is producing roughly 70,000 Shahed drones and variants annually, alongside decoys. At the tactical level, virtually every sub-unit will be equipped with reconnaissance-strike drone assets. At the operational level, Russia is forming unmanned vehicle regiments within military district structures, likely under the “Rubikon” programme. Frontline units will also be equipped with Shaheds for tactical strikes against enemy forward positions. Against this backdrop, the assumption that Poland and NATO would be able to impose their preferred conditions of warfare appears excessively optimistic—at least in the early stages of conflict.

The absence of a tailored procurement response to Russia’s mass drone production represents a critical gap. Yesterday’s incidents illustrate only a fraction of what could occur were such incursions to become routine. Deploying high-value assets such as F-16s or F-35s to intercept drones is strategically unsustainable, given both the financial burden—where flight hours cost hundreds of thousands of zlotys—and the depletion of expensive missile inventories. The asymmetry between Russia’s low-cost offensive systems and Poland’s costly defensive responses is increasingly pronounced.

Equally troubling is the notion that drones can be deliberately disregarded if they pose no immediate kinetic threat. Systems such as the Geran are capable of carrying either explosive payloads of up to 5 kg or reconnaissance modules. Permitting them to penetrate Polish airspace unchallenged effectively concedes the adversary the ability to conduct intelligence-gathering operations at will.

Poland’s procurement strategy must therefore be recalibrated to include layered defences against mass drone employment. This requires investment in lower-end platforms, electronic warfare systems, short-range air defence, anti-aircraft artillery, and dedicated counter-UAV effectors. Absent such measures, each subsequent Russian escalation will exacerbate Poland’s asymmetric vulnerabilities while accelerating the attrition of its most valuable combat platforms.

Rob Lee (Twitter)

@JimmySecUK: Yes, but Chili and much of the actual fighters are leaving.

Rob Lee (Twitter)

RT @PlJonson: 🇸🇪🇺🇦Today Sweden presented UA support package 20, worth $836 million. It contains among other things, 18 new Archer systems, an extension of Sweden's long-term military aid to Ukraine with $3.6 billion yearly 2026-2027, and $900 million in yearly civil funding 2026-2028. (1/6)

Rob Lee (Twitter)

It is also an indication that NATO members are learning from the war in Ukraine far too slowly. Ukraine has been using cost effective mobile air defense teams, helicopters, and UAV-interceptors to counter Shaheds and other OWA UAVs for some time. NATO could easily deploy teams to its eastern border to help defend against further incursions. At a minimum, this has exposed a weakness to Russia.