The Lookout (Twitter)
RT @Tatarigami_UA: As Russian forces continue their advance in the Pokrovsk front, long-standing systemic issues within the Armed Forces of Ukraine continue to aid Russians with that. Based on numerous conversations with sergeants, as well as junior, and senior officers in command positions in the Donbas region, I am writing this post the goal of highlighting the most common and consistent problems mentioned by people on the ground, per their request. Unfortunately, the higher command remains largely unresponsive to these concerns when raised internally.
1. Disconnect in Command and Combat Readiness
There is an apparent disconnect between higher command assessment and the actual combat readiness of units. In many cases, units with limited operational capacity are tasked with responsibilities far beyond their capabilities. For example, newly formed brigades with little battlefield experience are assigned to defend critical and high-risk areas of the frontline, where Russian forces have massed sufficient strength for a potential breakthrough. At the same time, more experienced and better-equipped brigades are stationed in less dangerous sectors.
This imbalance has allowed Russian forces to pinpoint weak spots along the frontline and exploit them, especially during unit rotations - something that they can track easily due to their ISR capabilities. The Ukrainian command, in turn, often scrambles to reallocate battalions from other areas to stabilize vulnerable areas that appeared from miscalculations.
While such actions can help to stabilize the line and even prevent a breakthrough, it leaves other parts of the frontline exposed, perpetuating a cycle of vulnerability.
For context, what may appear to higher-ups as “a company with 60% of its personnel ready for deployment” may, in reality, be a fatigued unit with multiple soldiers in their 40s and 50s or people with previous injuries and chronic health problems, as well as newly arrived recruits with minimal training. The true combat readiness may be closer to 30-40%, but on paper, commanders see a combat-ready unit
2. The Lack of Truth and Realistic Reporting
The previously discussed disconnect raises the question: Why don’t officers report their unit’s inability to perform certain missions? The answer is simple: Brigade commanders and senior officers are ultimately responsible for the combat and mobilization readiness of their units per regulations. Admitting that a unit cannot perform a task is often seen as a failure of brigade leadership. As a result, the command’s solution is simple: if a commander cannot ensure the unit’s readiness, someone else will be appointed to do so. But the situation with resources or combat readiness of unit doesn't improve - you just put a person who is going to push under-resourced and under-prepared units to complete a task they are not equipped to handle, leading to failed operations, abandoned positions, failed defenses, and unnecessary casualties - something that people can witness themselves by looking at the Deep State map.
3. Systematic Problems with Recruitment and Training
The quality and quantity of new recruits continue to fall short of expectations. Although some training centers have made improvements, overall readiness remains alarmingly insufficient. Many newly arrived soldiers are not prepared for the realities of frontline combat, forcing brigades to develop and implement their own internal training programs. The situation demands systemic reforms, including the creation of a structure that leverages the expertise of veterans or those recovering from injuries to train and mentor incoming recruits.
4. Little to no Accountability
Three years into the war, Ukraine has yet to fully implement an After Action Review (AAR) process, which hasn't been implemented except in cases where individual officers took the initiative. The tactical level is the highest level where it's used.
The blame for operational failures oft...
Перейти на оригинальный пост
RT @Tatarigami_UA: As Russian forces continue their advance in the Pokrovsk front, long-standing systemic issues within the Armed Forces of Ukraine continue to aid Russians with that. Based on numerous conversations with sergeants, as well as junior, and senior officers in command positions in the Donbas region, I am writing this post the goal of highlighting the most common and consistent problems mentioned by people on the ground, per their request. Unfortunately, the higher command remains largely unresponsive to these concerns when raised internally.
1. Disconnect in Command and Combat Readiness
There is an apparent disconnect between higher command assessment and the actual combat readiness of units. In many cases, units with limited operational capacity are tasked with responsibilities far beyond their capabilities. For example, newly formed brigades with little battlefield experience are assigned to defend critical and high-risk areas of the frontline, where Russian forces have massed sufficient strength for a potential breakthrough. At the same time, more experienced and better-equipped brigades are stationed in less dangerous sectors.
This imbalance has allowed Russian forces to pinpoint weak spots along the frontline and exploit them, especially during unit rotations - something that they can track easily due to their ISR capabilities. The Ukrainian command, in turn, often scrambles to reallocate battalions from other areas to stabilize vulnerable areas that appeared from miscalculations.
While such actions can help to stabilize the line and even prevent a breakthrough, it leaves other parts of the frontline exposed, perpetuating a cycle of vulnerability.
For context, what may appear to higher-ups as “a company with 60% of its personnel ready for deployment” may, in reality, be a fatigued unit with multiple soldiers in their 40s and 50s or people with previous injuries and chronic health problems, as well as newly arrived recruits with minimal training. The true combat readiness may be closer to 30-40%, but on paper, commanders see a combat-ready unit
2. The Lack of Truth and Realistic Reporting
The previously discussed disconnect raises the question: Why don’t officers report their unit’s inability to perform certain missions? The answer is simple: Brigade commanders and senior officers are ultimately responsible for the combat and mobilization readiness of their units per regulations. Admitting that a unit cannot perform a task is often seen as a failure of brigade leadership. As a result, the command’s solution is simple: if a commander cannot ensure the unit’s readiness, someone else will be appointed to do so. But the situation with resources or combat readiness of unit doesn't improve - you just put a person who is going to push under-resourced and under-prepared units to complete a task they are not equipped to handle, leading to failed operations, abandoned positions, failed defenses, and unnecessary casualties - something that people can witness themselves by looking at the Deep State map.
3. Systematic Problems with Recruitment and Training
The quality and quantity of new recruits continue to fall short of expectations. Although some training centers have made improvements, overall readiness remains alarmingly insufficient. Many newly arrived soldiers are not prepared for the realities of frontline combat, forcing brigades to develop and implement their own internal training programs. The situation demands systemic reforms, including the creation of a structure that leverages the expertise of veterans or those recovering from injuries to train and mentor incoming recruits.
4. Little to no Accountability
Three years into the war, Ukraine has yet to fully implement an After Action Review (AAR) process, which hasn't been implemented except in cases where individual officers took the initiative. The tactical level is the highest level where it's used.
The blame for operational failures oft...
Перейти на оригинальный пост
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Status-6 (Twitter)
North Korea fired an unidentified ballistic missile in the direction of the Sea of Japan, the South Korean military informed short time ago.
(Yonhap)
North Korea fired an unidentified ballistic missile in the direction of the Sea of Japan, the South Korean military informed short time ago.
(Yonhap)
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Rob Lee (Twitter)
RT @UAControlMap: Daily Ukraine map thread for Tuesday 17th September 2024
Highlights: Once again, a very tough day for Ukraine with very little good news.
Ukrainian HIMARS strike hits Russian training ground, killing many. It is the same training ground that has been hit numerous times before
Russian forces conquer Ukrainsk raising flags across it, as well as achieve almost total control over Hrodivka.
Russian forces advance in Kursk, showing assault on Borki as well as geolocated a few km west of Nikolaevo-Darino, confirming Ukraine withdrew from the Gordeevka area entirely
Russian forces advance another few streets into Toretsk.
Map: uacontrolmap.com
RT @UAControlMap: Daily Ukraine map thread for Tuesday 17th September 2024
Highlights: Once again, a very tough day for Ukraine with very little good news.
Ukrainian HIMARS strike hits Russian training ground, killing many. It is the same training ground that has been hit numerous times before
Russian forces conquer Ukrainsk raising flags across it, as well as achieve almost total control over Hrodivka.
Russian forces advance in Kursk, showing assault on Borki as well as geolocated a few km west of Nikolaevo-Darino, confirming Ukraine withdrew from the Gordeevka area entirely
Russian forces advance another few streets into Toretsk.
Map: uacontrolmap.com
Dan (Twitter)
RT @VolodyaTretyak: "There’s something called karma. I believe I’ll meet many of them again. Maybe I’ll go there after the war and look them in the eyes. I’d like for these people to work off their guilt, so their descendants won’t want to do the same. I have a plan for how to make that happen." /46
RT @VolodyaTretyak: "There’s something called karma. I believe I’ll meet many of them again. Maybe I’ll go there after the war and look them in the eyes. I’d like for these people to work off their guilt, so their descendants won’t want to do the same. I have a plan for how to make that happen." /46
Dan (Twitter)
RT @VolodyaTretyak: Ukrainian defender, 30-year-old kickboxer Oleksiy Anulya from Chernihiv, who spent 10 months in Russian captivity, shared his experiences of the abuse and torture he endured in the captivity. Please share.
WARNING: This story contains descriptions of torture and violence.
RT @VolodyaTretyak: Ukrainian defender, 30-year-old kickboxer Oleksiy Anulya from Chernihiv, who spent 10 months in Russian captivity, shared his experiences of the abuse and torture he endured in the captivity. Please share.
WARNING: This story contains descriptions of torture and violence.
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Status-6 (Twitter)
According to updated information, North Korea launched "multiple" short-range ballistic missiles in the northeastern direction early on Wednesday.
https://m-en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240702003651315?input=tw
According to updated information, North Korea launched "multiple" short-range ballistic missiles in the northeastern direction early on Wednesday.
https://m-en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240702003651315?input=tw
Yonhap News Agency
(LEAD) N. Korea fires multiple short-range ballistic missiles: JCS | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: RECASTS headline, lead; UPDATES throughout with more details) SEOUL, Sept. 18 (Yo...
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Colby Badhwar 🇨🇦🇬🇧 (Twitter)
@khersonraccoon: Obviously not. JASSM-XR doesn't exist yet. It's an internal R&D project that has not delivered working prototypes.
@khersonraccoon: Obviously not. JASSM-XR doesn't exist yet. It's an internal R&D project that has not delivered working prototypes.
Rob Lee (Twitter)
RT @kromark: 1/3 To wrap up the day, I present to you two 'Pantsir-S1' systems on towers in Kaluga Oblast, installed just 10 km from the command center of the early warning system in Kurilovo ('Serpukhov-15'). @planet image taken on Sep. 15. h/t @NLwartracker.
RT @kromark: 1/3 To wrap up the day, I present to you two 'Pantsir-S1' systems on towers in Kaluga Oblast, installed just 10 km from the command center of the early warning system in Kurilovo ('Serpukhov-15'). @planet image taken on Sep. 15. h/t @NLwartracker.
Rob Lee (Twitter)
Madyar says he has almost 400 servicemen in his regiment, including both pilots and support personnel, and is training another 600.
https://invidious.poast.org/watch?v=aOzLRul3o3A
Madyar says he has almost 400 servicemen in his regiment, including both pilots and support personnel, and is training another 600.
https://invidious.poast.org/watch?v=aOzLRul3o3A
Rob Lee (Twitter)
Updated map showing Russian advances in Hrodivka and Ukrainsk on the Pokrovsk front.
t.me/DeepStateUA/20365
https://deepstatemap.live/en#13/49.5109435/37.8393173 https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1835775038902935764#m
Updated map showing Russian advances in Hrodivka and Ukrainsk on the Pokrovsk front.
t.me/DeepStateUA/20365
https://deepstatemap.live/en#13/49.5109435/37.8393173 https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1835775038902935764#m
Media is too big
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
Rob Lee (Twitter)
Long video showing Russian turtle tanks at a workshop, including one with its turret removed to make space for dismounts. 76/
t.me/z4lpr/788
Long video showing Russian turtle tanks at a workshop, including one with its turret removed to make space for dismounts. 76/
t.me/z4lpr/788
Rob Lee (Twitter)
Screenshots of the tanks with a slide for dismounts, smoke dispensers, cameras, and video monitors for the driver and dismounts. 77/
Screenshots of the tanks with a slide for dismounts, smoke dispensers, cameras, and video monitors for the driver and dismounts. 77/