GeoConfirmed (Twitter)

GeoConfirmed World.

Police body cam footage shows the arrest of a man who reportedly attempted to shoot at former president Trump.

Location of the person in minute 0:08 - 27.181809, -80.396937
5JJ3+P6G Port St. Lucie, FL, USA

GeoLocated by @kromark and @PowerPigeon2

Geolocation: https://x.com/kromark/status/1836029467296231475
https://x.com/PowerPigeon2/status/1836082188887921086

Location: https://geoconfirmed.org/world/eb459bb7-8c8d-4cdc-8e36-08dcd031742d

Sources: https://www.facebook.com/MartinCountySheriffsOffice/videos/1805385979995807
(longer version with outro) https://x.com/CanalAntigua/status/1835878401296441759 https://twitter.com/CanalAntigua/status/1835878401296441759#m

GeoConfirmed (Twitter)

@KateSullivanDC: GeoConfirmed World.

Police near the 'Trump International Golf Club'. Reportedly, a man hid there in an attempt to shoot at former president Trump.

Rough location of police - 26.666604, -80.08961
MW86+J5R Palm Springs, FL, USA

GeoLocated by @kromark and @PowerPigeon2

Geolocation: https://x.com/kromark/status/1836029472492986416
https://x.com/PowerPigeon2/status/1836090735310823578

Location: https://geoconfirmed.org/world/d84493c4-d50b-466f-8e38-08dcd031742d

Sources: https://x.com/KateSullivanDC/status/1835423168594329772
https://x.com/PowerPigeon2/status/1836091235255382105 https://twitter.com/KateSullivanDC/status/1835423168594329772#m

Necro Mancer (Twitter)

Три дятла, Аверин Валерий Васильевич 52 года, Колоколов Владимир Николаевич 46 лет и Жегин Сергей Николаевич 42 года в гостях у "Азова"
(полное видео на 12+ минут тут https://invidious.poast.org/watch?v=vtxeVqSobpQ) #всрф #потерьнет

Necro Mancer (Twitter)

Опрыскивание зелёных насаждений от вредителей
t.me/SkyFury3mb/646 #всу #дракон

Necro Mancer (Twitter)

- Ебанет?
- Не должно...
Извлечение ракеты из неисправного комплекса FGM-148 Javelin для последующей переработки и использования кумулятивной БЧ на БПЛА (без знания матчасти повторять не рекомендуется)
t.me/fatumgroup/168 #всу #очумелыеручки

Necro Mancer (Twitter)

RT @solonko1648: Ще рутинної роботи. Насправді працювати по піхоті за допомогою fpv - це вияв певного рівня майстерності. Виявлення за допомогою fpv камери без зовнішньої "підствітки", наведення на ціль в складній місцевості, коли силуети "їсти" навколишня текстура...
росіян навчають, що в таких умовах завмерти - це збільшити шанси на виживання піхоти. Адже різкі рухи допомагають операторові виявити ціль і уразити її. Тому часто доводиться стикатися з випадками, коли вони не біжать ховатися, а просто завмирають.
Значною мірою це гра нервів. Очевидно, в певних випадків тактика завмирання працює, а той, в кого здали нерви, і він починає тікати, програє. Далі вже працюють стандартні фактори. Маскувальні, якість зв'язку, вправність оператора.
Покровський напрямок складний для роботи. Можливо, найскладніший. Тому кожен виведений з гри російський загарбник - це складна робота.

Necro Mancer (Twitter)

Тогда ещё временно живой "Ричард"
t.me/ttambyl/6467 #Сармат #роа #груз200 #Царгасов

Necro Mancer (Twitter)

@Luna15521552: В приграничных районах РФ и на Донбассе так же говорят

Dan (Twitter)

RT @Tatarigami_UA: As Russian forces continue their advance in the Pokrovsk front, long-standing systemic issues within the Armed Forces of Ukraine continue to aid Russians with that. Based on numerous conversations with sergeants, as well as junior, and senior officers in command positions in the Donbas region, I am writing this post the goal of highlighting the most common and consistent problems mentioned by people on the ground, per their request. Unfortunately, the higher command remains largely unresponsive to these concerns when raised internally.

1. Disconnect in Command and Combat Readiness

There is an apparent disconnect between higher command assessment and the actual combat readiness of units. In many cases, units with limited operational capacity are tasked with responsibilities far beyond their capabilities. For example, newly formed brigades with little battlefield experience are assigned to defend critical and high-risk areas of the frontline, where Russian forces have massed sufficient strength for a potential breakthrough. At the same time, more experienced and better-equipped brigades are stationed in less dangerous sectors.

This imbalance has allowed Russian forces to pinpoint weak spots along the frontline and exploit them, especially during unit rotations - something that they can track easily due to their ISR capabilities. The Ukrainian command, in turn, often scrambles to reallocate battalions from other areas to stabilize vulnerable areas that appeared from miscalculations.
While such actions can help to stabilize the line and even prevent a breakthrough, it leaves other parts of the frontline exposed, perpetuating a cycle of vulnerability.

For context, what may appear to higher-ups as “a company with 60% of its personnel ready for deployment” may, in reality, be a fatigued unit with multiple soldiers in their 40s and 50s or people with previous injuries and chronic health problems, as well as newly arrived recruits with minimal training. The true combat readiness may be closer to 30-40%, but on paper, commanders see a combat-ready unit

2. The Lack of Truth and Realistic Reporting

The previously discussed disconnect raises the question: Why don’t officers report their unit’s inability to perform certain missions? The answer is simple: Brigade commanders and senior officers are ultimately responsible for the combat and mobilization readiness of their units per regulations. Admitting that a unit cannot perform a task is often seen as a failure of brigade leadership. As a result, the command’s solution is simple: if a commander cannot ensure the unit’s readiness, someone else will be appointed to do so. But the situation with resources or combat readiness of unit doesn't improve - you just put a person who is going to push under-resourced and under-prepared units to complete a task they are not equipped to handle, leading to failed operations, abandoned positions, failed defenses, and unnecessary casualties - something that people can witness themselves by looking at the Deep State map.

3. Systematic Problems with Recruitment and Training

The quality and quantity of new recruits continue to fall short of expectations. Although some training centers have made improvements, overall readiness remains alarmingly insufficient. Many newly arrived soldiers are not prepared for the realities of frontline combat, forcing brigades to develop and implement their own internal training programs. The situation demands systemic reforms, including the creation of a structure that leverages the expertise of veterans or those recovering from injuries to train and mentor incoming recruits.

4. Little to no Accountability

Three years into the war, Ukraine has yet to fully implement an After Action Review (AAR) process, which hasn't been implemented except in cases where individual officers took the initiative. The tactical level is the highest level where it's used.

The blame for operational failures often falls...

Перейти на оригинальный пост

‌Dan (Twitter)

RT @solonko1648: @Tatarigami_UA: Реквізити для підтримки підрозділу:

https://send.monobank.ua/jar/AFxe8AVab6

PayPal
andriy.flora@hotmail.com

Приват
4149629314150152
Флора Андрій

Rob Lee (Twitter)

Ukrainian night bomber UAVs brought down by sniper/rifle fire and a UAV dropping a munition. 26/
t.me/CatBarmaley/4396
t.me/sashakots/48984