Def Mon (Twitter)
RT @Tatarigami_UA: As Russian forces continue their advance in the Pokrovsk front, long-standing systemic issues within the Armed Forces of Ukraine continue to aid Russians with that. Based on numerous conversations with sergeants, as well as junior, and senior officers in command positions in the Donbas region, I am writing this post the goal of highlighting the most common and consistent problems mentioned by people on the ground, per their request. Unfortunately, the higher command remains largely unresponsive to these concerns when raised internally.
1. Disconnect in Command and Combat Readiness
There is an apparent disconnect between higher command assessment and the actual combat readiness of units. In many cases, units with limited operational capacity are tasked with responsibilities far beyond their capabilities. For example, newly formed brigades with little battlefield experience are assigned to defend critical and high-risk areas of the frontline, where Russian forces have massed sufficient strength for a potential breakthrough. At the same time, more experienced and better-equipped brigades are stationed in less dangerous sectors.
This imbalance has allowed Russian forces to pinpoint weak spots along the frontline and exploit them, especially during unit rotations - something that they can track easily due to their ISR capabilities. The Ukrainian command, in turn, often scrambles to reallocate battalions from other areas to stabilize vulnerable areas that appeared from miscalculations.
While such actions can help to stabilize the line and even prevent a breakthrough, it leaves other parts of the frontline exposed, perpetuating a cycle of vulnerability.
For context, what may appear to higher-ups as “a company with 60% of its personnel ready for deployment” may, in reality, be a fatigued unit with multiple soldiers in their 40s and 50s or people with previous injuries and chronic health problems, as well as newly arrived recruits with minimal training. The true combat readiness may be closer to 30-40%, but on paper, commanders see a combat-ready unit
2. The Lack of Truth and Realistic Reporting
The previously discussed disconnect raises the question: Why don’t officers report their unit’s inability to perform certain missions? The answer is simple: Brigade commanders and senior officers are ultimately responsible for the combat and mobilization readiness of their units per regulations. Admitting that a unit cannot perform a task is often seen as a failure of brigade leadership. As a result, the command’s solution is simple: if a commander cannot ensure the unit’s readiness, someone else will be appointed to do so. But the situation with resources or combat readiness of unit doesn't improve - you just put a person who is going to push under-resourced and under-prepared units to complete a task they are not equipped to handle, leading to failed operations, abandoned positions, failed defenses, and unnecessary casualties - something that people can witness themselves by looking at the Deep State map.
3. Systematic Problems with Recruitment and Training
The quality and quantity of new recruits continue to fall short of expectations. Although some training centers have made improvements, overall readiness remains alarmingly insufficient. Many newly arrived soldiers are not prepared for the realities of frontline combat, forcing brigades to develop and implement their own internal training programs. The situation demands systemic reforms, including the creation of a structure that leverages the expertise of veterans or those recovering from injuries to train and mentor incoming recruits.
4. Little to no Accountability
Three years into the war, Ukraine has yet to fully implement an After Action Review (AAR) process, which hasn't been implemented except in cases where individual officers took the initiative. The tactical level is the highest level where it's used.
The blame for operational failures often f...
Перейти на оригинальный пост
RT @Tatarigami_UA: As Russian forces continue their advance in the Pokrovsk front, long-standing systemic issues within the Armed Forces of Ukraine continue to aid Russians with that. Based on numerous conversations with sergeants, as well as junior, and senior officers in command positions in the Donbas region, I am writing this post the goal of highlighting the most common and consistent problems mentioned by people on the ground, per their request. Unfortunately, the higher command remains largely unresponsive to these concerns when raised internally.
1. Disconnect in Command and Combat Readiness
There is an apparent disconnect between higher command assessment and the actual combat readiness of units. In many cases, units with limited operational capacity are tasked with responsibilities far beyond their capabilities. For example, newly formed brigades with little battlefield experience are assigned to defend critical and high-risk areas of the frontline, where Russian forces have massed sufficient strength for a potential breakthrough. At the same time, more experienced and better-equipped brigades are stationed in less dangerous sectors.
This imbalance has allowed Russian forces to pinpoint weak spots along the frontline and exploit them, especially during unit rotations - something that they can track easily due to their ISR capabilities. The Ukrainian command, in turn, often scrambles to reallocate battalions from other areas to stabilize vulnerable areas that appeared from miscalculations.
While such actions can help to stabilize the line and even prevent a breakthrough, it leaves other parts of the frontline exposed, perpetuating a cycle of vulnerability.
For context, what may appear to higher-ups as “a company with 60% of its personnel ready for deployment” may, in reality, be a fatigued unit with multiple soldiers in their 40s and 50s or people with previous injuries and chronic health problems, as well as newly arrived recruits with minimal training. The true combat readiness may be closer to 30-40%, but on paper, commanders see a combat-ready unit
2. The Lack of Truth and Realistic Reporting
The previously discussed disconnect raises the question: Why don’t officers report their unit’s inability to perform certain missions? The answer is simple: Brigade commanders and senior officers are ultimately responsible for the combat and mobilization readiness of their units per regulations. Admitting that a unit cannot perform a task is often seen as a failure of brigade leadership. As a result, the command’s solution is simple: if a commander cannot ensure the unit’s readiness, someone else will be appointed to do so. But the situation with resources or combat readiness of unit doesn't improve - you just put a person who is going to push under-resourced and under-prepared units to complete a task they are not equipped to handle, leading to failed operations, abandoned positions, failed defenses, and unnecessary casualties - something that people can witness themselves by looking at the Deep State map.
3. Systematic Problems with Recruitment and Training
The quality and quantity of new recruits continue to fall short of expectations. Although some training centers have made improvements, overall readiness remains alarmingly insufficient. Many newly arrived soldiers are not prepared for the realities of frontline combat, forcing brigades to develop and implement their own internal training programs. The situation demands systemic reforms, including the creation of a structure that leverages the expertise of veterans or those recovering from injuries to train and mentor incoming recruits.
4. Little to no Accountability
Three years into the war, Ukraine has yet to fully implement an After Action Review (AAR) process, which hasn't been implemented except in cases where individual officers took the initiative. The tactical level is the highest level where it's used.
The blame for operational failures often f...
Перейти на оригинальный пост
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Rob Lee (Twitter)
Video of a tank from Ukraine’s 95th Air Assault Brigade firing at Russian positions. 283/
t.me/in_factum/28253
Video of a tank from Ukraine’s 95th Air Assault Brigade firing at Russian positions. 283/
t.me/in_factum/28253
Ukraine Battle Map (Twitter)
@cb_doge: That’s complete nonsense, you know it too but post this anyway to spread false information and get attention from Elon
Looks like your view farming is working, 10M views in 2.5 hours because the algorithm promotes garbage content
@cb_doge: That’s complete nonsense, you know it too but post this anyway to spread false information and get attention from Elon
Looks like your view farming is working, 10M views in 2.5 hours because the algorithm promotes garbage content
👍1
Colby Badhwar 🇨🇦🇬🇧 (Twitter)
🇺🇸 The Department of Defense has awarded Lockheed Martin a $99 million contract modification for JASSM Foreign Military Sales production support and sustainment. This is for unclassified FMS to Finland, Poland, the Netherlands, Japan and Australia.
🇺🇸 The Department of Defense has awarded Lockheed Martin a $99 million contract modification for JASSM Foreign Military Sales production support and sustainment. This is for unclassified FMS to Finland, Poland, the Netherlands, Japan and Australia.
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Dan (Twitter)
11. Veseloe incursion.
East of Volfino 15-17 Sept. A🇷🇺FPV strike destroyed an overturned 🇺🇦Kozak-7 at 51.25856, 34.5002. It reportedly carried ammo.
Interestingly its come from the west (are those its tracks?) likely from the Krasnooktyabr'skiy/Volfino junction.
UAF's capture of Krasnooktyabr'skiy has not been officially announced, but was first reported on the 15th. IMO UAF likely already entered if on the 12th - 13th.
Film released 17 SEPT. t.me/RVvoenkor/77177
11. Veseloe incursion.
East of Volfino 15-17 Sept. A🇷🇺FPV strike destroyed an overturned 🇺🇦Kozak-7 at 51.25856, 34.5002. It reportedly carried ammo.
Interestingly its come from the west (are those its tracks?) likely from the Krasnooktyabr'skiy/Volfino junction.
UAF's capture of Krasnooktyabr'skiy has not been officially announced, but was first reported on the 15th. IMO UAF likely already entered if on the 12th - 13th.
Film released 17 SEPT. t.me/RVvoenkor/77177
Def Mon (Twitter)
@PuenteUribarri: The blue square shows the area from the video with the thermite drone. The orange square shows what is likely an area previously attacked with a thermite drone. https://twitter.com/99Dominik_/status/1836137043883077889#m
@PuenteUribarri: The blue square shows the area from the video with the thermite drone. The orange square shows what is likely an area previously attacked with a thermite drone. https://twitter.com/99Dominik_/status/1836137043883077889#m
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GeoConfirmed (Twitter)
GeoConfirmed World.
A helicopter and security forces in the vicinity of 'Trump International Golf Club' in Glen Ridge. Reports of a secret service agent opening fire on a suspected person.
Point of view - 26.673946, -80.087535
MWF6+HXG Glen Ridge, FL, USA
GeoLocated by @PowerPigeon2
Geolocation: https://x.com/PowerPigeon2/status/1835421124395426053
Location: https://geoconfirmed.org/world/1289fdc1-022f-4699-8dea-08dcd031742d
Sources: https://x.com/AggregateOsint/status/1835408773575307367
https://x.com/MattWallace888/status/1835397390678839634
https://x.com/realDerekUtley/status/1835391039504626072 https://twitter.com/realDerekUtley/status/1835391039504626072#m
GeoConfirmed World.
A helicopter and security forces in the vicinity of 'Trump International Golf Club' in Glen Ridge. Reports of a secret service agent opening fire on a suspected person.
Point of view - 26.673946, -80.087535
MWF6+HXG Glen Ridge, FL, USA
GeoLocated by @PowerPigeon2
Geolocation: https://x.com/PowerPigeon2/status/1835421124395426053
Location: https://geoconfirmed.org/world/1289fdc1-022f-4699-8dea-08dcd031742d
Sources: https://x.com/AggregateOsint/status/1835408773575307367
https://x.com/MattWallace888/status/1835397390678839634
https://x.com/realDerekUtley/status/1835391039504626072 https://twitter.com/realDerekUtley/status/1835391039504626072#m
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GeoConfirmed (Twitter)
GeoConfirmed World.
Police body cam footage shows the arrest of a man who reportedly attempted to shoot at former president Trump.
Location of the person in minute 0:08 - 27.181809, -80.396937
5JJ3+P6G Port St. Lucie, FL, USA
GeoLocated by @kromark and @PowerPigeon2
Geolocation: https://x.com/kromark/status/1836029467296231475
https://x.com/PowerPigeon2/status/1836082188887921086
Location: https://geoconfirmed.org/world/eb459bb7-8c8d-4cdc-8e36-08dcd031742d
Sources: https://www.facebook.com/MartinCountySheriffsOffice/videos/1805385979995807
(longer version with outro) https://x.com/CanalAntigua/status/1835878401296441759 https://twitter.com/CanalAntigua/status/1835878401296441759#m
GeoConfirmed World.
Police body cam footage shows the arrest of a man who reportedly attempted to shoot at former president Trump.
Location of the person in minute 0:08 - 27.181809, -80.396937
5JJ3+P6G Port St. Lucie, FL, USA
GeoLocated by @kromark and @PowerPigeon2
Geolocation: https://x.com/kromark/status/1836029467296231475
https://x.com/PowerPigeon2/status/1836082188887921086
Location: https://geoconfirmed.org/world/eb459bb7-8c8d-4cdc-8e36-08dcd031742d
Sources: https://www.facebook.com/MartinCountySheriffsOffice/videos/1805385979995807
(longer version with outro) https://x.com/CanalAntigua/status/1835878401296441759 https://twitter.com/CanalAntigua/status/1835878401296441759#m
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GeoConfirmed (Twitter)
@KateSullivanDC: GeoConfirmed World.
Police near the 'Trump International Golf Club'. Reportedly, a man hid there in an attempt to shoot at former president Trump.
Rough location of police - 26.666604, -80.08961
MW86+J5R Palm Springs, FL, USA
GeoLocated by @kromark and @PowerPigeon2
Geolocation: https://x.com/kromark/status/1836029472492986416
https://x.com/PowerPigeon2/status/1836090735310823578
Location: https://geoconfirmed.org/world/d84493c4-d50b-466f-8e38-08dcd031742d
Sources: https://x.com/KateSullivanDC/status/1835423168594329772
https://x.com/PowerPigeon2/status/1836091235255382105 https://twitter.com/KateSullivanDC/status/1835423168594329772#m
@KateSullivanDC: GeoConfirmed World.
Police near the 'Trump International Golf Club'. Reportedly, a man hid there in an attempt to shoot at former president Trump.
Rough location of police - 26.666604, -80.08961
MW86+J5R Palm Springs, FL, USA
GeoLocated by @kromark and @PowerPigeon2
Geolocation: https://x.com/kromark/status/1836029472492986416
https://x.com/PowerPigeon2/status/1836090735310823578
Location: https://geoconfirmed.org/world/d84493c4-d50b-466f-8e38-08dcd031742d
Sources: https://x.com/KateSullivanDC/status/1835423168594329772
https://x.com/PowerPigeon2/status/1836091235255382105 https://twitter.com/KateSullivanDC/status/1835423168594329772#m
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Necro Mancer (Twitter)
Три дятла, Аверин Валерий Васильевич 52 года, Колоколов Владимир Николаевич 46 лет и Жегин Сергей Николаевич 42 года в гостях у "Азова"
(полное видео на 12+ минут тут https://invidious.poast.org/watch?v=vtxeVqSobpQ) #всрф #потерьнет
Три дятла, Аверин Валерий Васильевич 52 года, Колоколов Владимир Николаевич 46 лет и Жегин Сергей Николаевич 42 года в гостях у "Азова"
(полное видео на 12+ минут тут https://invidious.poast.org/watch?v=vtxeVqSobpQ) #всрф #потерьнет
😁4