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Def Mon (Twitter)
UAZs role in the RU logistics chain seems to have increased significantly the last year or so. https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1788073681391849958#m
UAZs role in the RU logistics chain seems to have increased significantly the last year or so. https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1788073681391849958#m
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Necro Mancer (Twitter)
Пленный уроженец Волгоградской обл. Данилевский Андрей Михайлович 1996 г.р., "подкинули наркотики" и заставили подписать контракт (ясно, понятно), взят в плен в Работино
t.me/Tsaplienko/53240 #всрф #потерьнет
Пленный уроженец Волгоградской обл. Данилевский Андрей Михайлович 1996 г.р., "подкинули наркотики" и заставили подписать контракт (ясно, понятно), взят в плен в Работино
t.me/Tsaplienko/53240 #всрф #потерьнет
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Necro Mancer (Twitter)
@666_mancer: Локация: Новобахмутовка, Ясиноватский район, Донецкая обл. https://twitter.com/klinger66/status/1788000787714519109#m
@666_mancer: Локация: Новобахмутовка, Ясиноватский район, Донецкая обл. https://twitter.com/klinger66/status/1788000787714519109#m
Necro Mancer (Twitter)
Дополнение: закопали на томском кладбище в Воронино
t.me/tv2news1/19944 #всрф #потерьнет #груз200 #Чернышев
Дополнение: закопали на томском кладбище в Воронино
t.me/tv2news1/19944 #всрф #потерьнет #груз200 #Чернышев
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Necro Mancer (Twitter)
Кто не спрятался - я не виноват
t.me/strikedronescompany/214 #RussianUkrainianWar
Кто не спрятался - я не виноват
t.me/strikedronescompany/214 #RussianUkrainianWar
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Necro Mancer (Twitter)
Несмотря на пиздеж директора учитель физики и информатики иркутской школы №30 Легкодимов Илья Сергеевич был чмобилизован, ведь пушечное мясо фюреру нужнее. Зато дослужился до офицера-поллитрука, получил значок.И умер
vk.com/wall-154625971_2318 t.me/Baikal_People/5563 #всрф #груз200
Несмотря на пиздеж директора учитель физики и информатики иркутской школы №30 Легкодимов Илья Сергеевич был чмобилизован, ведь пушечное мясо фюреру нужнее. Зато дослужился до офицера-поллитрука, получил значок.И умер
vk.com/wall-154625971_2318 t.me/Baikal_People/5563 #всрф #груз200
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Rob Lee (Twitter)
The Ukrainian Air Force says Russia launched 21 Shahed UAVs and 55 missiles overnight including:
- 1 Kinzhal
- 2 Iskander-M
- 4 Kalibr
- 45 Kh-101 / Kh-555
- 1 Iskander-K
- 2 Kh-59 / Kh-69
t.me/kpszsu/14039
The Ukrainian Air Force says Russia launched 21 Shahed UAVs and 55 missiles overnight including:
- 1 Kinzhal
- 2 Iskander-M
- 4 Kalibr
- 45 Kh-101 / Kh-555
- 1 Iskander-K
- 2 Kh-59 / Kh-69
t.me/kpszsu/14039
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Ukraine Battle Map (Twitter)
@Marialinden301 @Heroiam_Slava: Syrskyi took over with the same bad situation as Zaluzhnyi, and within two weeks, his direct actions made it significantly worse, as I explained above.
Ammo is part of the problem; nobody said it wasn’t, but his decisions on the battlefield, paired with a drop in morale and tactical errors that occurred in places like Avdiivka and other parts of the front, are also a big part of the problem.
As many have said, it would have been an impossible task for Zaluzhnyi or any General to succeed in that counter-offensive. An offensive requires significantly more equipment and ammunition than a defense. Making tactical mistakes on defense is considerably worse than making mistakes on offense. There were, of course, mistakes made by Ukrainian command during the counter-offensive. But if Zaluzhnyi took the same strategy as Syrskyi has historically throughout his entire career, which is to throw tons of troops to storm Russian positions, then a large percentage of Ukrainian soldiers would be dead today. Ukrainian lines would have an even higher chance of collapsing. That may have worked in Kharkiv, but it is no longer an option on the current front with significantly more Russian troops and fortification.
It turns out delivering a fourth of the equipment that was requested to a country three months before Winter, with zero air power, and asking them to storm minefields and heavily fortified areas is an impossible task, then blaming the Generals for not throwing his soldiers to their deaths is not the best idea. No General, unless they completely don’t value human life, would do that.
I have just explained to you one of the most significant tactical errors that Syrskyi made immediately after becoming the Commander of the Ukrainian Armed Forces; this was consistent with his previous bad decisions on the battlefield since 2014. It resulted in significant losses of Ukrainian troops and weakened defenses, allowing Russia to advance over 15 kilometers and capture 16 villages within two months in just one direction. How you attribute these tactical errors like a terrible last minute withdrawal from Avdiivka to only a shell shortage is turning a blind eye to the problems by Syrskyi’s military command and his entire history and reputation of being a General. This has never happened under Zaluzhnyi and was foreseen to occur with Syrskyi. When you replace a General who has made historically bad decisions and expect them to be different, they continue to be the same, making the same decisions that cost the lives of hundreds of soldiers. Then you get a bunch of random people on Twitter defending him for making those terrible decisions because they agree with every political decision ever made by Ukrainian politicians. However, the vast majority of Ukrainians and Ukrainian soldiers do not think that way and have similar concerns.
The point isn’t that Zaluzhnyi is a perfect General or didn’t make mistakes because he did. The point is that Zaluzhnyi, a good General, was replaced by a historically worse General who continues to make the same mistakes he made over the years, leading to thousands of soldiers and territory being given up at a fast pace. He was replaced with someone who does what Zelensky wants and is more friendly to him. That’s the reality.
Throughout history, it has almost always turned out to be the wrong decision to have political leaders exerting more control and influencing decision-making in military leadership.
@Marialinden301 @Heroiam_Slava: Syrskyi took over with the same bad situation as Zaluzhnyi, and within two weeks, his direct actions made it significantly worse, as I explained above.
Ammo is part of the problem; nobody said it wasn’t, but his decisions on the battlefield, paired with a drop in morale and tactical errors that occurred in places like Avdiivka and other parts of the front, are also a big part of the problem.
As many have said, it would have been an impossible task for Zaluzhnyi or any General to succeed in that counter-offensive. An offensive requires significantly more equipment and ammunition than a defense. Making tactical mistakes on defense is considerably worse than making mistakes on offense. There were, of course, mistakes made by Ukrainian command during the counter-offensive. But if Zaluzhnyi took the same strategy as Syrskyi has historically throughout his entire career, which is to throw tons of troops to storm Russian positions, then a large percentage of Ukrainian soldiers would be dead today. Ukrainian lines would have an even higher chance of collapsing. That may have worked in Kharkiv, but it is no longer an option on the current front with significantly more Russian troops and fortification.
It turns out delivering a fourth of the equipment that was requested to a country three months before Winter, with zero air power, and asking them to storm minefields and heavily fortified areas is an impossible task, then blaming the Generals for not throwing his soldiers to their deaths is not the best idea. No General, unless they completely don’t value human life, would do that.
I have just explained to you one of the most significant tactical errors that Syrskyi made immediately after becoming the Commander of the Ukrainian Armed Forces; this was consistent with his previous bad decisions on the battlefield since 2014. It resulted in significant losses of Ukrainian troops and weakened defenses, allowing Russia to advance over 15 kilometers and capture 16 villages within two months in just one direction. How you attribute these tactical errors like a terrible last minute withdrawal from Avdiivka to only a shell shortage is turning a blind eye to the problems by Syrskyi’s military command and his entire history and reputation of being a General. This has never happened under Zaluzhnyi and was foreseen to occur with Syrskyi. When you replace a General who has made historically bad decisions and expect them to be different, they continue to be the same, making the same decisions that cost the lives of hundreds of soldiers. Then you get a bunch of random people on Twitter defending him for making those terrible decisions because they agree with every political decision ever made by Ukrainian politicians. However, the vast majority of Ukrainians and Ukrainian soldiers do not think that way and have similar concerns.
The point isn’t that Zaluzhnyi is a perfect General or didn’t make mistakes because he did. The point is that Zaluzhnyi, a good General, was replaced by a historically worse General who continues to make the same mistakes he made over the years, leading to thousands of soldiers and territory being given up at a fast pace. He was replaced with someone who does what Zelensky wants and is more friendly to him. That’s the reality.
Throughout history, it has almost always turned out to be the wrong decision to have political leaders exerting more control and influencing decision-making in military leadership.
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