RAJU @ UMAKANT VERSUS THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 2025
“it is very clear that in a case of gang rape under Section 376(2)(g), an act by one is enough to render all in the gang for punishment as long as they have acted in furtherance of the common intention. Further, common intention is implicit in the charge of Section 376(2)(g) itself, and all that is needed is evidence to show the existence of common intention.”
https://www.instagram.com/p/DJMlMQWvJ0l/?igsh=MWI2eDlnMzJ5dTI0cA==
“it is very clear that in a case of gang rape under Section 376(2)(g), an act by one is enough to render all in the gang for punishment as long as they have acted in furtherance of the common intention. Further, common intention is implicit in the charge of Section 376(2)(g) itself, and all that is needed is evidence to show the existence of common intention.”
https://www.instagram.com/p/DJMlMQWvJ0l/?igsh=MWI2eDlnMzJ5dTI0cA==
Aman Bhatia vs State (GNCT of Delhi)2025
https://www.instagram.com/p/DJN-7DxvPDM/?igsh=MWNocGN0aTdsOWRxcA==
https://www.instagram.com/p/DJN-7DxvPDM/?igsh=MWNocGN0aTdsOWRxcA==
PUNIT BERIWALA VERSUS THE STATE OF NCT OF DELHI AND ORS.
The Supreme Court has reiterated that the mere institution of civil proceedings does not automatically justify the quashing of a First Information Report (FIR).
The Court observed that the existence of a civil remedy for breach of contract does not preclude the initiation or continuation of criminal proceedings. "Simply because there is a remedy provided for breach of contract, that does not by itself clothe the court to conclude that civil remedy is the only remedy," the bench noted, emphasizing that criminal prosecution cannot be stifled merely on the basis of parallel civil litigation.
The judgment clarified that where allegations disclose commission of a criminal offence, particularly in the context of a commercial transaction, the matter deserves to be investigated and, if necessary, tried. The fact that the offence was committed during a commercial transaction is not, by itself, sufficient to hold that the complaint does not warrant further investigation or a trial, the Court held.
The bench comprising Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Manmohan observed :
"It is trite law that mere institution of civil proceedings is not a ground for quashing the FIR or to hold that the dispute is merely a civil dispute. This Court, in various judgments, has held that simply because there is a remedy provided for breach of contract, that does not by itself clothe the Court to conclude that civil remedy is the only remedy, and the initiation of criminal proceedings, in any manner, will be an abuse of the process of the Court. This Court is of the view that because the offence was committed during a commercial transaction, it would not be sufficient to hold that the complaint did not warrant a further investigation and, if necessary, a trial."
https://www.instagram.com/p/DJO-dGBv21l/?igsh=N3lvcGZmeGo2NDgz
The Supreme Court has reiterated that the mere institution of civil proceedings does not automatically justify the quashing of a First Information Report (FIR).
The Court observed that the existence of a civil remedy for breach of contract does not preclude the initiation or continuation of criminal proceedings. "Simply because there is a remedy provided for breach of contract, that does not by itself clothe the court to conclude that civil remedy is the only remedy," the bench noted, emphasizing that criminal prosecution cannot be stifled merely on the basis of parallel civil litigation.
The judgment clarified that where allegations disclose commission of a criminal offence, particularly in the context of a commercial transaction, the matter deserves to be investigated and, if necessary, tried. The fact that the offence was committed during a commercial transaction is not, by itself, sufficient to hold that the complaint does not warrant further investigation or a trial, the Court held.
The bench comprising Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Manmohan observed :
"It is trite law that mere institution of civil proceedings is not a ground for quashing the FIR or to hold that the dispute is merely a civil dispute. This Court, in various judgments, has held that simply because there is a remedy provided for breach of contract, that does not by itself clothe the Court to conclude that civil remedy is the only remedy, and the initiation of criminal proceedings, in any manner, will be an abuse of the process of the Court. This Court is of the view that because the offence was committed during a commercial transaction, it would not be sufficient to hold that the complaint did not warrant a further investigation and, if necessary, a trial."
https://www.instagram.com/p/DJO-dGBv21l/?igsh=N3lvcGZmeGo2NDgz
Shahjahan vs State of Uttar Pradesh(2025)
The Supreme Court reiterated that a 'Court of Kazi', 'Court of (Darul Kaja) Kajiyat','Sharia Court' etc., by whatever name styled, have no recognition in law and any direction given by them is not enforceable in law.
A bench comprising Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia and Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah referred to the 2014 judgment in Vishwa Lochan Madan v Union of India,which held that Shariat Courts and fatwas do not have legal sanction.
The bench was deciding an appeal by a woman challenging the decision of the Allahabad High Court upholding the Family Court's decision not to award her any maintenance on the ground that she was the cause for the dispute. The Family Court had relied upon a compromise deed filed before a Court of Kazi to make such findings.
Criticising the approach of the Family Court, the judgment authored by Justice Amanullah stated :
"Court of Kazi', 'Court of (Darul Kaja) Kajiyat', 'Sharia Court' etcetera by whatever name styled have no recognition in law. As noted in Vishwa Lochan Madan (supra), any declaration/decision by such bodies, by whatever name labelled, is not binding on anyone and is unenforceable by resort to any coercive measure. The only way such declaration/decision can withstand scrutiny in the eye of law could be when the affected parties accept such declaration/decision by acting thereon or accepting it and when such action does not conflict with any other law. Even then, such declaration/decision, at best, would only be valid inter-se the parties that choose to act upon/accept the same, and not a third-party."
https://www.instagram.com/p/DJPBxw1PBXv/?igsh=b2xza2Q4NDZsNDA1
The Supreme Court reiterated that a 'Court of Kazi', 'Court of (Darul Kaja) Kajiyat','Sharia Court' etc., by whatever name styled, have no recognition in law and any direction given by them is not enforceable in law.
A bench comprising Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia and Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah referred to the 2014 judgment in Vishwa Lochan Madan v Union of India,which held that Shariat Courts and fatwas do not have legal sanction.
The bench was deciding an appeal by a woman challenging the decision of the Allahabad High Court upholding the Family Court's decision not to award her any maintenance on the ground that she was the cause for the dispute. The Family Court had relied upon a compromise deed filed before a Court of Kazi to make such findings.
Criticising the approach of the Family Court, the judgment authored by Justice Amanullah stated :
"Court of Kazi', 'Court of (Darul Kaja) Kajiyat', 'Sharia Court' etcetera by whatever name styled have no recognition in law. As noted in Vishwa Lochan Madan (supra), any declaration/decision by such bodies, by whatever name labelled, is not binding on anyone and is unenforceable by resort to any coercive measure. The only way such declaration/decision can withstand scrutiny in the eye of law could be when the affected parties accept such declaration/decision by acting thereon or accepting it and when such action does not conflict with any other law. Even then, such declaration/decision, at best, would only be valid inter-se the parties that choose to act upon/accept the same, and not a third-party."
https://www.instagram.com/p/DJPBxw1PBXv/?igsh=b2xza2Q4NDZsNDA1
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ANGADI CHANDRANNA VERSUS SHANKAR & ORS.(2025)
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that following the partition of a joint family property, the individual shares allotted to each co-parcener become their self-acquired property.
"After the joint family property has been distributed in accordance with law, it ceases to be joint family properties and the shares of the respective parties become their self-acquired properties," the Court stated.
https://www.instagram.com/p/DJQMPpJB9AJ/?igsh=ZjBreHI3ZmxzaW14
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that following the partition of a joint family property, the individual shares allotted to each co-parcener become their self-acquired property.
"After the joint family property has been distributed in accordance with law, it ceases to be joint family properties and the shares of the respective parties become their self-acquired properties," the Court stated.
https://www.instagram.com/p/DJQMPpJB9AJ/?igsh=ZjBreHI3ZmxzaW14
Supreme Court Publishes Declaration Of Judges' Assets On Website
https://www.sci.gov.in/assets-of-judges/
In a significant step towards transparency and boosting public confidence in the judiciary, the Supreme Court has uploaded the assets and liabilities of the Judges on its website.
https://www.instagram.com/p/DJTAw-EPThy/?igsh=cDlpdDg4eDJ4MmVk
https://www.sci.gov.in/assets-of-judges/
In a significant step towards transparency and boosting public confidence in the judiciary, the Supreme Court has uploaded the assets and liabilities of the Judges on its website.
https://www.instagram.com/p/DJTAw-EPThy/?igsh=cDlpdDg4eDJ4MmVk
UK PCS J exam Notification.pdf
11.9 MB
UK PCS J exam Notification.pdf
The Supreme Court held that a minimum practice of three years as an advocate is necessary for a candidate to apply for entry-level posts in judicial service.
The period of practice could be reckoned from the date of provisional enrollment. The said condition will, however not apply to recruitment process already initiated by the High Courts before today. In other words, this condition will apply only to future recruitments.
A certificate by an advocate having a minimum standing of ten years, endorsed by the judicial officer of that station, will be sufficient to show the fulfilment of the condition. In case of a person practising at the Supreme Court or the High Court, a certificate by an advocate having a minimum standing of ten years, endorsed by an officer designated by the Court, will act as proof.
Experience as law clerks can also be counted towards the 3 years practice condition.
https://www.instagram.com/p/DJ3S_5CPbcp/?igsh=YXJxdGRlbm5sYWQw
The period of practice could be reckoned from the date of provisional enrollment. The said condition will, however not apply to recruitment process already initiated by the High Courts before today. In other words, this condition will apply only to future recruitments.
A certificate by an advocate having a minimum standing of ten years, endorsed by the judicial officer of that station, will be sufficient to show the fulfilment of the condition. In case of a person practising at the Supreme Court or the High Court, a certificate by an advocate having a minimum standing of ten years, endorsed by an officer designated by the Court, will act as proof.
Experience as law clerks can also be counted towards the 3 years practice condition.
https://www.instagram.com/p/DJ3S_5CPbcp/?igsh=YXJxdGRlbm5sYWQw