AMK Mapping
Further to Poltava Oblast
Both disappeared in eastern Poltava Oblast.
AMK Mapping
Almost 1 year after its creation, this channel has reached 10,000 Subscribers. Thank you all so much for the immense support! It means so much to me.
Hitting 30k on twitter and 10k on Telegram on the same day is insane. Thank you so much!
1 Russian Tu-95MS Strategic bomber departed from Engels-2 Airbase in Saratov Oblast. Possibly related to the Ukrainian UAVs flying towards the airbase.
AMK Mapping
It flew to Shchigry, Kursk Oblast before suddenly descending.
The Su-57 is returning to Kubinka Airbase in Moscow Oblast.
AMK Mapping
1 Russian Tu-95MS Strategic bomber departed from Engels-2 Airbase in Saratov Oblast. Possibly related to the Ukrainian UAVs flying towards the airbase.
2 Tu-95MS are confirmed to be airborne. They are likely redeploying to Belaya Airbase in Irkutsk Oblast.
AMK Mapping
2 Tu-95MS are confirmed to be airborne. They are likely redeploying to Belaya Airbase in Irkutsk Oblast.
1 Su-35 is covering the bombers, likely due to recent events.
AMK Mapping
1 Su-35 is covering the bombers, likely due to recent events.
They may land at Ukrainsk Airbase in Amur Oblast due to the attacks on Belaya Airbase.
I think a lot of people are significantly exaggerating the effects these new attacks will have on Russia's missile strike capabilities and the war in general. The vast majority of munitions used on Ukraine are Iskander-M ballistic missiles and Geran-2 drones. In fact, Geran-2 drones on their own do more damage to Ukraine than all Tu-95s Russia uses.
Anywhere between 20 and 400 Gerans are launched practically every single day from as many as 9 launch points. The majority get shot down, but when they swarm one target, most of them make successful impacts. They are also very cheap - much cheaper than any missile.
Iskanders are practically impossible to shoot down, with only 2 confirmed cases of interceptions being recorded so far. They have a larger payload, are much faster and therefore do much more damage. They are also much easier to prepare, compared to the Tu-95s.
The Tu-95s (and Tu-160s) launch Kh-101 cruise missiles. This is usually done in coordination with Kalibrs launched from the Black Sea Fleet and Iskanders launched from ground-based OTRK systems. The Kh-101s are arguably the second least effective missile used, ahead of the Kh-59/69 launched from Su-34/57s.
In order to conduct these large-scale missile strikes on Ukraine, Russia must conduct extensive preparations, including flying the missiles to Engels-2 Airbase in Saratov Oblast and Belaya Airbase in Irkutsk Oblast in multiple flights via IL-76MD military transport aircraft, fly the Tu-95s and Tu-160s to these airbases, equip them with those missiles, and then fly them back to Olenya Airbase in Murmansk Oblast which is generally used as the departure base for these attacks. These preparations can take anywhere from 5 days to over a month, depending on various factors, however this also means that the Kh-101s are only ever used against static ground targets, not mobile targets such as air defence systems, radar systems or even training camps and temporary deployment points.
This is where the Iskanders come into play. They are used not only on static ground targets such as defence enterprises, energy infrastructure and Airbases, but also mobile targets such as air defence, radar systems, Long-range UAV launch and control points, and temporary deployment points.
So, in reality, the Tu-95s don't actually play as major of a role in attacking rear targets in Ukraine as many would expect. In fact, even Kalibr cruise missiles are used more these days. Cruise missiles are generally easier to shoot down, and fly slower, but their maneuverability is what is useful for these attacks as it not only prolongs them and wastes Ukrainian air defence, but it also makes it more difficult to determine the target which they are flying to. That's why you always see the continuous changes in trajectories on my live missile tracking maps.
The main reason why these attacks are such a major blow to Russia is how expensive the bombers are, and the fact that these types aren't produced anymore. It also takes a very long time to repair damaged Tu-95s or Tu-160s, meaning that all of the ones that you saw getting hit or burning that weren't destroyed probably won't be seen again for this war.
However, these attacks will likely be a wake-up call for many in Russia. It will make it clear to many Russians that the war is not just in Ukraine but being brought back home to the safety of their own cities and homes. It will increase the popular support for Russia's invasion and domestic approval for Putin and his government in some respects.
Anywhere between 20 and 400 Gerans are launched practically every single day from as many as 9 launch points. The majority get shot down, but when they swarm one target, most of them make successful impacts. They are also very cheap - much cheaper than any missile.
Iskanders are practically impossible to shoot down, with only 2 confirmed cases of interceptions being recorded so far. They have a larger payload, are much faster and therefore do much more damage. They are also much easier to prepare, compared to the Tu-95s.
The Tu-95s (and Tu-160s) launch Kh-101 cruise missiles. This is usually done in coordination with Kalibrs launched from the Black Sea Fleet and Iskanders launched from ground-based OTRK systems. The Kh-101s are arguably the second least effective missile used, ahead of the Kh-59/69 launched from Su-34/57s.
In order to conduct these large-scale missile strikes on Ukraine, Russia must conduct extensive preparations, including flying the missiles to Engels-2 Airbase in Saratov Oblast and Belaya Airbase in Irkutsk Oblast in multiple flights via IL-76MD military transport aircraft, fly the Tu-95s and Tu-160s to these airbases, equip them with those missiles, and then fly them back to Olenya Airbase in Murmansk Oblast which is generally used as the departure base for these attacks. These preparations can take anywhere from 5 days to over a month, depending on various factors, however this also means that the Kh-101s are only ever used against static ground targets, not mobile targets such as air defence systems, radar systems or even training camps and temporary deployment points.
This is where the Iskanders come into play. They are used not only on static ground targets such as defence enterprises, energy infrastructure and Airbases, but also mobile targets such as air defence, radar systems, Long-range UAV launch and control points, and temporary deployment points.
So, in reality, the Tu-95s don't actually play as major of a role in attacking rear targets in Ukraine as many would expect. In fact, even Kalibr cruise missiles are used more these days. Cruise missiles are generally easier to shoot down, and fly slower, but their maneuverability is what is useful for these attacks as it not only prolongs them and wastes Ukrainian air defence, but it also makes it more difficult to determine the target which they are flying to. That's why you always see the continuous changes in trajectories on my live missile tracking maps.
The main reason why these attacks are such a major blow to Russia is how expensive the bombers are, and the fact that these types aren't produced anymore. It also takes a very long time to repair damaged Tu-95s or Tu-160s, meaning that all of the ones that you saw getting hit or burning that weren't destroyed probably won't be seen again for this war.
However, these attacks will likely be a wake-up call for many in Russia. It will make it clear to many Russians that the war is not just in Ukraine but being brought back home to the safety of their own cities and homes. It will increase the popular support for Russia's invasion and domestic approval for Putin and his government in some respects.
One of the sections of the frontline which is incredibly underreported considering its significance to the Kostyantynivka direction is the stretch from Chasiv Yar to Toretsk.
While everyone is focused on the wedge being formed between Myrnohrad and Kostyantynivka, this section is still very far east and plays a critical role in defending the eastern buffer-zone of Kostyantynivka. Russia has been working on this line for months and it seems that it is finally cracking under the pressure.
To outline this sector, the main obstacle for Russia is the Siversky Donets Canal which runs through eastern Chasiv yar down to Horlivka in the rear. Following the reversal of the Ukrainian counteroffensive on the southern flank of Bakhmut in 2023-2024, Ukrainian forces fell back to a pre-prepared line along the western bank of this canal. This line is a continuous stretch of fortified trench strongpoints, firing positions and dugouts, situated along the summit of the tactical heights.
The Russian command knew that taking this line would be difficult and costly to do head on, especially considering the attacks would be largely uphill. So instead, they pulled the classic outflanking technique. With this sector, Russia already had the base of two pincers in the form of two bridgeheads over the canal to the north and south of this line. To the north they were already storming the main part of Chasiv Yar. This had to be done anyway so it served multiple purposes now. In the south Russia always controlled the western bank of the canal northeast of Toretsk and with the storming of the city, they were able to increasingly concentrate large numbers of personnel in the villages of Druzhba and Pivnichne and use them staging grounds for these attacks.
Assault operations started slow and continued like that for some time. They weren't continuous and regrouping was constantly conducted due to how strong this sector is. Over time the offensive was developed, and Russia began working their way up the western bank of the canal, hitting the Ukrainian fortifications from behind making resistance more difficult for Ukraine. Small-scale crossings also took place in the weaker spots, including southwest and northwest of Ozaryanivka. This further stretched Ukrainian lines and applied further pressure on already struggling forces.
Just recently, Russian forces managed to achieve a localised breakthrough, capturing most of Dyliivka (the northern one) and forming a dangerous salient for Ukrainian forces to the east. This completely undermines that section of the defensive line along the western bank of the canal and will soon force Ukrainian forces to withdraw to the last section further north.
Meanwhile on the northern pincer, Russian forces primarily focused on taking Chasiv Yar under their control, waiting for the forces to the south to make enough progress. Efforts were also focused on the stronghold village of Stupochky and the surrounding fortifications. The irregular landscape and geography of this area complicated Russian assault operations, however eventually they were able to dislodge Ukrainian forces from their positions and enter the village.
As of now, most of Stupochky is under Russian control. The southern houses are in the grey zone with Ukrainian soldiers constantly being brought in under heavy cover of FPV drones and mortars. However, Russia's continuous campaign of targeting FPV launch points has degraded Ukraine's ability to bring in reinforcements and hold a cohesive defence. Once Stupochky is secured and positions consolidated, Russia will likely begin to attack south/southwest in order to create one final cauldron west of the canal and finally collapse the line westwards towards the eastern approaches of Kostyantynivka.
While everyone is focused on the wedge being formed between Myrnohrad and Kostyantynivka, this section is still very far east and plays a critical role in defending the eastern buffer-zone of Kostyantynivka. Russia has been working on this line for months and it seems that it is finally cracking under the pressure.
To outline this sector, the main obstacle for Russia is the Siversky Donets Canal which runs through eastern Chasiv yar down to Horlivka in the rear. Following the reversal of the Ukrainian counteroffensive on the southern flank of Bakhmut in 2023-2024, Ukrainian forces fell back to a pre-prepared line along the western bank of this canal. This line is a continuous stretch of fortified trench strongpoints, firing positions and dugouts, situated along the summit of the tactical heights.
The Russian command knew that taking this line would be difficult and costly to do head on, especially considering the attacks would be largely uphill. So instead, they pulled the classic outflanking technique. With this sector, Russia already had the base of two pincers in the form of two bridgeheads over the canal to the north and south of this line. To the north they were already storming the main part of Chasiv Yar. This had to be done anyway so it served multiple purposes now. In the south Russia always controlled the western bank of the canal northeast of Toretsk and with the storming of the city, they were able to increasingly concentrate large numbers of personnel in the villages of Druzhba and Pivnichne and use them staging grounds for these attacks.
Assault operations started slow and continued like that for some time. They weren't continuous and regrouping was constantly conducted due to how strong this sector is. Over time the offensive was developed, and Russia began working their way up the western bank of the canal, hitting the Ukrainian fortifications from behind making resistance more difficult for Ukraine. Small-scale crossings also took place in the weaker spots, including southwest and northwest of Ozaryanivka. This further stretched Ukrainian lines and applied further pressure on already struggling forces.
Just recently, Russian forces managed to achieve a localised breakthrough, capturing most of Dyliivka (the northern one) and forming a dangerous salient for Ukrainian forces to the east. This completely undermines that section of the defensive line along the western bank of the canal and will soon force Ukrainian forces to withdraw to the last section further north.
Meanwhile on the northern pincer, Russian forces primarily focused on taking Chasiv Yar under their control, waiting for the forces to the south to make enough progress. Efforts were also focused on the stronghold village of Stupochky and the surrounding fortifications. The irregular landscape and geography of this area complicated Russian assault operations, however eventually they were able to dislodge Ukrainian forces from their positions and enter the village.
As of now, most of Stupochky is under Russian control. The southern houses are in the grey zone with Ukrainian soldiers constantly being brought in under heavy cover of FPV drones and mortars. However, Russia's continuous campaign of targeting FPV launch points has degraded Ukraine's ability to bring in reinforcements and hold a cohesive defence. Once Stupochky is secured and positions consolidated, Russia will likely begin to attack south/southwest in order to create one final cauldron west of the canal and finally collapse the line westwards towards the eastern approaches of Kostyantynivka.
AMK Mapping
Explosion in Sumy. Iskander-M ballistic missile strike.
Correction: This was a single MLRS rocket landing just outside the city.
Btw guys, I will have my monthly update on advances out today. I just have to do some other stuff first.
A Russian An-12 cargo plane landed at Shaykovka Airbase in Kaluga Oblast. The cargo likely consists of Kh-22 cruise missiles for the Tu-22M3 bombers stationed there.