It had almost become a word of mainstream use until Abiy came and started to make speeches that seek reversal of the rights of nations, especially that of the Oromo. (He is on record criticizing Oromo nationalism more than any of the other nationalisms in the country!) Naturally, the Amhara supremacists jumped onto his bandwagon of disparaging Oromo nationalism as tribal-local.
And this is what we have now.
Contrary to what Mamdani says, the trouble with Ethiopia is not ‘ethnic fderalism’ as Ethiopia’s federalism is not ethnic in the first place. (One needs only to look up the meaning of ethnicity in a dictionary to see that it is not!). The trouble with Ethiopia is not federalism (as, absent democratic consent, federalism is impossible to practice). The trouble with Ethiopia is not even ethnicity.
The fundamental trouble with Ethiopia is the nature of its state that still operates on the basis of values that divides citizenship unevenly between the habesha core and the ‘heathen’ periphery, the ‘civilized’ semitic center and the ‘savage’ other, the imperial settlers of the garrison towns and the dispossessed and displaced indigenous groups.
The problem with Ethiopia is the explicit (in the past) and tacit (in the present) ranked relationship that operates to differentiate between Ethiopians as citizens and subjects.
Unlike Mamdani’s claim, the trouble with Ethiopia is not as much a flawed constitution as lack of democracy. The problem, in the eyes of many Ethiopians, is the failure of EPRDF to deliver on the promises of the constitution.
It is no accident that all the recent resistance against the regime in the course of the #Oromoprotests and beyond, from corner to corner, were invoking and calling for the delivery of the constitutional promises. (This was the case in the Muslim’s quest for freedom of religion; the Oromo demand for self-rule, land, and equitable share in resources, opportunities, and power; the Qemant and Walqayit demand for recognition of identity; the Sidama and Agaw quest for autonomous statehood; the Konso quest for local self-rule; the Somali quest for equality and/or self-determination in Ethiopia, etc, etc.)
Yes, there is a polarity among ethnic groups in Ethiopia today, but that is more because of the PM’s agitation to curtail and limit the rights of the nations, by wanting to reconfigure their territory, by seeking to revise the constitution which was the rallying point for their struggle so far. It is also because of his stalling of the much anticipated democratic transition by short-circuitiing it to an Amhara supremacist Ethiopian nationalism.
Mamdani was also wrong in characterizing the resistance to the Master Plan as an ethnic resistance to civic citizenship. It was a resistance against forced evictions and displacement, a resistance against a strategy designed to push out and, working under the imperative of a typical settler colonial logic, to eliminate the Oromos (along with their language, identity, and culture) from their own country.
Mamdani talks about inconsistencies of the “ethnic federal system” that created only nine states out of ninety ethnic groups. Precisely! If it was ethnic, how could this have happened? The problem is that you called it ‘ethnic’ and then failed to find it on the ground!
And by the way, the two city administrations are not ‘city states’. Not by a long shot.
Finfinnee was a city state between 1991 and 1994, but no more. Dirre-Dawa has never been a city state. In fact, constitutionally speaking, it has always been, and it still is, an Oromo city, illegally wrested from the latter by TPLF’s Abay Tsehaye who, ever since, have made a mess of the administration including through an illegal and unconstitutional Charter that projects the city as an autonomous city.
And this is what we have now.
Contrary to what Mamdani says, the trouble with Ethiopia is not ‘ethnic fderalism’ as Ethiopia’s federalism is not ethnic in the first place. (One needs only to look up the meaning of ethnicity in a dictionary to see that it is not!). The trouble with Ethiopia is not federalism (as, absent democratic consent, federalism is impossible to practice). The trouble with Ethiopia is not even ethnicity.
The fundamental trouble with Ethiopia is the nature of its state that still operates on the basis of values that divides citizenship unevenly between the habesha core and the ‘heathen’ periphery, the ‘civilized’ semitic center and the ‘savage’ other, the imperial settlers of the garrison towns and the dispossessed and displaced indigenous groups.
The problem with Ethiopia is the explicit (in the past) and tacit (in the present) ranked relationship that operates to differentiate between Ethiopians as citizens and subjects.
Unlike Mamdani’s claim, the trouble with Ethiopia is not as much a flawed constitution as lack of democracy. The problem, in the eyes of many Ethiopians, is the failure of EPRDF to deliver on the promises of the constitution.
It is no accident that all the recent resistance against the regime in the course of the #Oromoprotests and beyond, from corner to corner, were invoking and calling for the delivery of the constitutional promises. (This was the case in the Muslim’s quest for freedom of religion; the Oromo demand for self-rule, land, and equitable share in resources, opportunities, and power; the Qemant and Walqayit demand for recognition of identity; the Sidama and Agaw quest for autonomous statehood; the Konso quest for local self-rule; the Somali quest for equality and/or self-determination in Ethiopia, etc, etc.)
Yes, there is a polarity among ethnic groups in Ethiopia today, but that is more because of the PM’s agitation to curtail and limit the rights of the nations, by wanting to reconfigure their territory, by seeking to revise the constitution which was the rallying point for their struggle so far. It is also because of his stalling of the much anticipated democratic transition by short-circuitiing it to an Amhara supremacist Ethiopian nationalism.
Mamdani was also wrong in characterizing the resistance to the Master Plan as an ethnic resistance to civic citizenship. It was a resistance against forced evictions and displacement, a resistance against a strategy designed to push out and, working under the imperative of a typical settler colonial logic, to eliminate the Oromos (along with their language, identity, and culture) from their own country.
Mamdani talks about inconsistencies of the “ethnic federal system” that created only nine states out of ninety ethnic groups. Precisely! If it was ethnic, how could this have happened? The problem is that you called it ‘ethnic’ and then failed to find it on the ground!
And by the way, the two city administrations are not ‘city states’. Not by a long shot.
Finfinnee was a city state between 1991 and 1994, but no more. Dirre-Dawa has never been a city state. In fact, constitutionally speaking, it has always been, and it still is, an Oromo city, illegally wrested from the latter by TPLF’s Abay Tsehaye who, ever since, have made a mess of the administration including through an illegal and unconstitutional Charter that projects the city as an autonomous city.
What went Wrong, and where?—Making Sense of the Faltering Transition in Ethiopia
Tsegaye Ararssa
(10 January 2019)
================
(This is PART I of a piece about the transition process. It seeks to make sense of it and aspires to identify ways of making it work. Here, in PART I, I review the the current state of affairs to determine where the process is at. In PART II, I will discuss the key challenges hindering the transition, i.e., challenges of mismanagement of the change on the part of OPDO-EPRDF on the one hand, and challenges posed by broader structural factors constraining the transition on the other.)
1. Introduction
==============
Winds of change have been blowing in Ethiopia. They have been doing so since the start of the #Oromoprotests in 2014. But it began to be more evident in late 2016 when, in the wake of the the Grand Oromia Rally and the 2016#Irreecha_Massacre, the protest entered another phase, forcing the regime to declare a prolonged state of emergency before finally resulting in the resignation of Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn.
And since late 2017, political prisoners have been released. Exiled politicians have been allowed to come home. The non-governmental (“independent”) press and media have experienced a level of freedom although the restrictive laws are still not amended or repealed.
Climaxing this stride towards change, there is also a change of leadership occurred at the helm of the EPRDF power pyramid, and a new Prime Minister, Dr Abiy Ahmed, replaced Mr Hailemariam Desalegn. This being as much about the obviously positive developments so far witnessed, these winds of changes have yet to yield a genuine democratic transition.
Given the enfeebled situation of opposition political parties at home (owing to the repressive detentions and years of incarcerations) and the banishment of those in exile (owing to their being labelled and prosecuted, in absentia, as terrorists) at the time, it became clear, especially since late 2016, that if there is going to be a peaceful and orderly transition, it will have to come from within the system.
Soon enough, as OPDO’s ‘Team Lemma’ (so named after Lemma Megerssa, the President of Oromia) asserted itself for leadership in the EPRDF coalition and as they tactically outmanoeuvred TPLF to bring the ANDM to their side, ‘the hope of transformation from within’ became more and more palpable.
This, and the fact that the change was forced onto the scene primarily by the protests of the Oromo youth (aka Qeerroo) in Oromia, made it possible, perhaps for the first time in history, to consider the ‘Oromo alternative for Ethiopia’.
In late 2017, an intense internal power struggle for leadership started within the EPRDF. In 2018, OPDO’s new leader, Dr Abiy Ahmed, was elected as the Chairman of the EPRDF, thereby becoming the first ever Prime Minister of Ethiopia who identifies himself as Oromo.
On the aftermath of Abiy’s investiture as Prime Minister in April 2018, Ethiopians everywhere started to discuss, and hope for, a genuine transition to democracy. All eyes were set on the youthful prime minister. For once, the country was united in anticipation.
The Oromo youth, for their part, felt that they have prevailed (at least partially) as their protests have yielded for them an Oromo Prime Minister. This was in part because one of their demands in the course of their protest was that Oromos should have a larger share of federal political power as they are the single most numerous group in the country although they have been excluded therefrom for far too long.
People in other regions also hoped that, TPLF’s hegemonic rule having been brought to an end, they will be more included, heard, and empowered in a just, equitable, and fair democratic order. The new Prime Minister’s inaugural speech and various other gestures only reinforced this growing hope.
But, as indicated above, the winds of change in the air have yet to translate into a more substantive and genuine transition to democracy.
Tsegaye Ararssa
(10 January 2019)
================
(This is PART I of a piece about the transition process. It seeks to make sense of it and aspires to identify ways of making it work. Here, in PART I, I review the the current state of affairs to determine where the process is at. In PART II, I will discuss the key challenges hindering the transition, i.e., challenges of mismanagement of the change on the part of OPDO-EPRDF on the one hand, and challenges posed by broader structural factors constraining the transition on the other.)
1. Introduction
==============
Winds of change have been blowing in Ethiopia. They have been doing so since the start of the #Oromoprotests in 2014. But it began to be more evident in late 2016 when, in the wake of the the Grand Oromia Rally and the 2016#Irreecha_Massacre, the protest entered another phase, forcing the regime to declare a prolonged state of emergency before finally resulting in the resignation of Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn.
And since late 2017, political prisoners have been released. Exiled politicians have been allowed to come home. The non-governmental (“independent”) press and media have experienced a level of freedom although the restrictive laws are still not amended or repealed.
Climaxing this stride towards change, there is also a change of leadership occurred at the helm of the EPRDF power pyramid, and a new Prime Minister, Dr Abiy Ahmed, replaced Mr Hailemariam Desalegn. This being as much about the obviously positive developments so far witnessed, these winds of changes have yet to yield a genuine democratic transition.
Given the enfeebled situation of opposition political parties at home (owing to the repressive detentions and years of incarcerations) and the banishment of those in exile (owing to their being labelled and prosecuted, in absentia, as terrorists) at the time, it became clear, especially since late 2016, that if there is going to be a peaceful and orderly transition, it will have to come from within the system.
Soon enough, as OPDO’s ‘Team Lemma’ (so named after Lemma Megerssa, the President of Oromia) asserted itself for leadership in the EPRDF coalition and as they tactically outmanoeuvred TPLF to bring the ANDM to their side, ‘the hope of transformation from within’ became more and more palpable.
This, and the fact that the change was forced onto the scene primarily by the protests of the Oromo youth (aka Qeerroo) in Oromia, made it possible, perhaps for the first time in history, to consider the ‘Oromo alternative for Ethiopia’.
In late 2017, an intense internal power struggle for leadership started within the EPRDF. In 2018, OPDO’s new leader, Dr Abiy Ahmed, was elected as the Chairman of the EPRDF, thereby becoming the first ever Prime Minister of Ethiopia who identifies himself as Oromo.
On the aftermath of Abiy’s investiture as Prime Minister in April 2018, Ethiopians everywhere started to discuss, and hope for, a genuine transition to democracy. All eyes were set on the youthful prime minister. For once, the country was united in anticipation.
The Oromo youth, for their part, felt that they have prevailed (at least partially) as their protests have yielded for them an Oromo Prime Minister. This was in part because one of their demands in the course of their protest was that Oromos should have a larger share of federal political power as they are the single most numerous group in the country although they have been excluded therefrom for far too long.
People in other regions also hoped that, TPLF’s hegemonic rule having been brought to an end, they will be more included, heard, and empowered in a just, equitable, and fair democratic order. The new Prime Minister’s inaugural speech and various other gestures only reinforced this growing hope.
But, as indicated above, the winds of change in the air have yet to translate into a more substantive and genuine transition to democracy.
The laws on association, particularly the rules on political party registration, permission, and participation in elections (as befits an open, free, pluralistic, and democratic society) are yet to be amended (in such a way that the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association, as per art 31 is properly exercised).
Alongside this, the law on civil societies (Charities and Societies Proclamation, Procl. No. 621/2009) is yet to be relaxed in such a way that such civic organizations are free and independent enough to, among other things, observe elections, monitor human rights violations, and engage local peoples to lend voice to them and empower them at community and household levels through appropriate humanitarian and human rights interventions.
For most people who seek a fast-tracked transition to democracy, change is indeed happening, and it is a good one at that. However, it is happening at too slow a pace as, to date, it is not even clear that there will be election in 2020. This uncertainty and the not-so-fast pace at which the change is happening, if at all, is testing their patience.
3. Is the Transition Derailed?
=====================
The most disillusioned of all observers maintain that there is change but, so far, it is a change without transition, a change that is not even clear if it is for the better.
According to such observers, the transition is not only NOT happening but it is also derailed and misdirected (or redirected) by OPDO’s self-serving endeavours. More unkind observers maintain that it is actually hijacked by the Prime Minister and is going in a direction opposite to the aspirations of the protesters that sought and forced the very change we have been witnessing, including the rise of the Prime Minister himself. And they do so for a reason.
In explaining why they believe that it is derailed, they point to the current state of affairs regarding the change in Ethiopia. In particular, they point to the unmet demands of the long protesting public, namely the demands of abbaa biyyummaa (the demand for voice over the governance of their country); the demand for land and protection from eviction and displacement; the demand for the Oromo right to the city of Finfinnee (the city that is also the capital of the State of Oromia, which has a constitutionally recognized, but as yet unimplemented, ‘special interest’ as per art 49(5)); the demand for recognition of Afaan Oromo as one of the working languages of the Federal Government; the demand for restoration of peace in Oromia by pulling out the Federal military and police forces; the demand for respect for the integrity of the State borders (alias, protection from TPLF-orchestrated aggression on borders from all corners of the region); the demand for a full autonomy and self-rule in the region; and the demand for better provision of economic and social services including access to jobs, education, housing, and land.
In short, all the demands raised during the season of the #Oromoprotests remain unmet. These demands can easily be encapsulated in the age-old demands of the Oromo people for agency, autonomy, and authority to fully take part in the public affairs of the country.
Despite high popular expectation that the so-called ‘Team Lemma’ will address these demands, and despite the fact that there were promises to do so at the start, so far, the regime is at best evading them.
Too often, the regime seems to be acting only to counteract these legitimate demands by taking measures that revaluates them often to sidestep, or to delegitimize, them. For example, there has been an attempt on the part of the Prime Minister to dismiss ‘Oromo nationalism’ (and other similar nationalisms such as that of the Sidama) as dangerous to the country.
Alongside this, the law on civil societies (Charities and Societies Proclamation, Procl. No. 621/2009) is yet to be relaxed in such a way that such civic organizations are free and independent enough to, among other things, observe elections, monitor human rights violations, and engage local peoples to lend voice to them and empower them at community and household levels through appropriate humanitarian and human rights interventions.
For most people who seek a fast-tracked transition to democracy, change is indeed happening, and it is a good one at that. However, it is happening at too slow a pace as, to date, it is not even clear that there will be election in 2020. This uncertainty and the not-so-fast pace at which the change is happening, if at all, is testing their patience.
3. Is the Transition Derailed?
=====================
The most disillusioned of all observers maintain that there is change but, so far, it is a change without transition, a change that is not even clear if it is for the better.
According to such observers, the transition is not only NOT happening but it is also derailed and misdirected (or redirected) by OPDO’s self-serving endeavours. More unkind observers maintain that it is actually hijacked by the Prime Minister and is going in a direction opposite to the aspirations of the protesters that sought and forced the very change we have been witnessing, including the rise of the Prime Minister himself. And they do so for a reason.
In explaining why they believe that it is derailed, they point to the current state of affairs regarding the change in Ethiopia. In particular, they point to the unmet demands of the long protesting public, namely the demands of abbaa biyyummaa (the demand for voice over the governance of their country); the demand for land and protection from eviction and displacement; the demand for the Oromo right to the city of Finfinnee (the city that is also the capital of the State of Oromia, which has a constitutionally recognized, but as yet unimplemented, ‘special interest’ as per art 49(5)); the demand for recognition of Afaan Oromo as one of the working languages of the Federal Government; the demand for restoration of peace in Oromia by pulling out the Federal military and police forces; the demand for respect for the integrity of the State borders (alias, protection from TPLF-orchestrated aggression on borders from all corners of the region); the demand for a full autonomy and self-rule in the region; and the demand for better provision of economic and social services including access to jobs, education, housing, and land.
In short, all the demands raised during the season of the #Oromoprotests remain unmet. These demands can easily be encapsulated in the age-old demands of the Oromo people for agency, autonomy, and authority to fully take part in the public affairs of the country.
Despite high popular expectation that the so-called ‘Team Lemma’ will address these demands, and despite the fact that there were promises to do so at the start, so far, the regime is at best evading them.
Too often, the regime seems to be acting only to counteract these legitimate demands by taking measures that revaluates them often to sidestep, or to delegitimize, them. For example, there has been an attempt on the part of the Prime Minister to dismiss ‘Oromo nationalism’ (and other similar nationalisms such as that of the Sidama) as dangerous to the country.