An analysis of Ukrainian offensives, from a logistical standpoint.

We're hearing a lot about Ukrainian "pushes" and "offensives", however it is very important to stress the role that logistics play in such operations. The importance of logistics can NEVER be understated, nor underestimated. They are an often overlooked aspect of warfare, yet such an important one that whole chapters in several military treatises have been dedicated to them. "Amateurs discuss tactics; professional discuss logistics" is a maxim that should never be forgotten.

So, what is exactly needed to support a large-scale offensive operation?

To give this community an answer, we will have to start from a few basic assumptions.

We'll be starting from the assumption that the dills are intaking the mandatory 4500 kcals a day that are required for a frontline soldier in active combat duty, and I'm assuming that their MREs have the same weight of NATO-issue ones, so 650 grams per meal, three meals a day, 650 * 3 = almost two kilos for each soldier, this in rations alone. Now let us add water. Normally an average human needs at least two liters per day, but if you're in active combat in the sweltering spring or summer that is common in Ukraine, that can skyrocket to 5. But let's make it more conservative and say you need 3.5/4 liters of water per soldier.

Now, assuming we're talking of 1000 soldiers, they would already require 2 tons of cargo in MRE boxes alone, plus 4 tons of drinkable water. We're already at six tons of cargo, and this only for one third of a 3000-men battalion.

Then there is the topic of combat supplies. Determining the weight of a STANAG magazine is a bit tricky as there are versions made in either polymers, aluminum, or even steel, but let us use a conservative estimate and say that each empty STANAG magazine weighs 200 grams. Empty STANAGs by themselves don't account for much however, and assuming they're packed with 5.56 ammo, that's another 360 grams for the bullets. We are already at 500 grams per full magazine, and one soldier needs at least four of them, so 0,500 grams multiplied by 4 makes 2 kilos in ammo for a single soldier. So 1000 soldiers * 4 = 4 tons of cargo for small arms ammunition alone.

Soldiers don't have only small arms, they also carry grenades. If the Dills are equipped like NATO soldiers, they should carry at least two fragmentation grenades. A frag grenade usually weighs 600-ish grams, so 1.2 kgs worth of grenades per soldier, multiplied by 1000 soldiers = 1.2 tons worth of grenades. Then let's add in the medikits (assuming they're issued any), about two medikits for a team of five, that's 200 extra kilograms.

Do you remember the MREs and water? Those would last those 1000 soldiers only a day. You'd need at least seven amounts of both (for an entire week). Get ready because this is the point where the calculations balloons out of proportion.

6 tons between food and water to keep those soldiers going for a day, multiplied by 7, here comes a whopping 42 tons that are dedicated exclusively to keep them going as living organisms for a single week. As for the grenades and magazines, same calculation. 17 tons that go in grenades for a week's worth of combat. We're already at almost 60 tons. This for a third of a battalion, for a single week of action.

To keep an entire battalion (assuming a 3000 men one) going for one week, the AFU would need a whopping 180 tons of cargo. This is for a single battalion.

Then there's volume to keep into consideration. Crates are big, cumbersome, and often reinforced to avoid some...uncomfortable accidents in case the road gets bumpy. Now multiply everything over several transportation vehicles that are big, heavy, and quite visible by drone operators. Then add in the fuel, because those vehicles need fuel to run, rather than Aryan ubermensch blood, contrarily to what the Banderites think.

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@Slavyangrad | Comrade Commissar Baron von Munchausen 👋

To keep any meaningful offensive going, therefore, the AFU needs several supply trucks, or even more smaller vehicles capable of delivering ammunition, assuming of course they want their soldiers to stand a serious chance. Doing so within territory under the fire control of the AFR becomes however extremely difficult, as the Russians can simply destroy the trucks as they make their supply runs, or launch missile strikes on supply depots. Only smaller vehicles such as quad bikes and pickup trucks would stand a realistic chance at avoiding attention, but the amount of supplies they could carry is of course much inferior to a truck.

If you've ever wondered how some AFU strongholds could collapse so quickly, why the AFU couldn't maintain its momentum during the 2023 “Counterflop” or the Kursk Incursion, now you know why. And now you know why these "offensives" are not going anywhere.

Welcome to the beautiful hell of Logistics Lane. Population: lots of Russian FPV drones and artillery. Potential weather hazards: Iskander or Kinzhal rains.

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@Slavyangrad | Comrade Commissar Baron von Munchausen 👋

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Western double standards, donkey on donkey, quickly explained.

Donkeys are very sturdy animals, indefatigable, can carry a lot of weight, and go where tracked vehicles can't go.

So if the AFR use donkeys for transportations, clearly they're primitive, retrograde, unsophisticated, and desperate....

@Slavyangrad | Comrade Commissar Baron von Munchausen 👋

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US special forces use combat donkeys in the middle east: stunning, genius, brilliant, and brave.

Only in the fantasy world of NAFO!

@Slavyangrad | Comrade Commissar Baron von Munchausen 👋