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Open Source: Cryptomator for Android

We announced it last month and now we are ready… our gift to the community for the holidays: Cryptomator for Android is now fully open-source!

Check out the repository here: https://github.com/cryptomator/android

https://cryptomator.org/blog/2020/12/23/android-open-source/

#cryptomator #cloud #encryption
Rclone Remount

Remount cloud storage locally during boot via rclone & fusermount directly on your Android powered smart device.

Virtually limitless storage expansion with support for dozens of cloud providers including Dropbox, GDrive, OneDrive, SFTP & many more. Extremely useful for devices without physical storage expansion capabilities. Also great for streaming large media files without need for full caching. Binaries compiled using Termux.

Features:
Support for arm, arm64, & x86
Huge list of supported cloud storage providers
Apps with ability to specify paths can access /mnt/cloud/
Most file explorers work just fine (issue #9)
Mount points use names of remote(s) in rclone.conf
Specify custom rclone params for each remote via /sdcard/.rclone/.REMOTE.param
Access remotes via http://127.0.0.1:38762
Access remotes via ftp://127.0.0.1:38763
Mount bind to /sdcard/ (see issue #5)
Support for Work Profiles


https://github.com/Magisk-Modules-Repo/com.piyushgarg.rclone


#rclone #remount #cloud #alternatives
Internxt
Open Source, Encrypted Cloud Storage

Internxt Drive is a zero-knowledge cloud storage service based on best-in-class privacy and security.

Features :
• Multi device support
• Military grade encryption
• Zero knowledge technology
• Get upto 10GB free
• Affordable plans
• Keep your files organized
• Share your files with ease
• Synced gallery
• Backup what matters to you

Download: https://internxt.com/

https://github.com/internxt/drive-mobile

#New #Cloud #Drive

@foss_Android
YouTubeDrive

YouTubeDrive is a Wolfram Language (aka Mathematica) package that encodes/decodes arbitrary data to/from simple RGB videos which are automatically uploaded to/downloaded from YouTube. Since YouTube imposes no limits on the total number or length of videos users can upload, this provides an effectively infinite but extremely slow form of file storage.

YouTubeDrive depends externally on FFmpeg, youtube-upload, and youtube-dl. These programs must be downloaded and installed separately, and prior to first use, YouTubeDrive must be configured with their install locations.

https://github.com/dzhang314/YouTubeDrive

#yt #YouTube #drive #cloud
Fundamental flaws uncovered in Mega's encryption scheme — show the service can read your data

MEGA's system does not protect its users against a malicious server and present five distinct attacks, which together allow for a full compromise of the confidentiality of user files — the researchers wrote on a website. Additionally, the integrity of user data is damaged to the extent that an attacker can insert malicious files of their choice, which pass all authenticity checks of the client. We built proof-of-concept versions of all the attacks — showcasing their practicality and exploitability.

https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2022/06/mega-says-it-cant-decrypt-your-files-new-poc-exploit-shows-otherwise/

#mega #vulnerability #cloud #data
MEGA Security Update

https://blog.mega.io/mega-security-update

Today, MEGA has released software updates that fix a critical vulnerability reported by researchers at one of Europe’s leading universities, ETH Zurich, Switzerland. Further updates addressing less severe identified issues will follow in the near future. MEGA is not aware of any user accounts being compromised by these vulnerabilities.

Who is potentially affected?

Customers who have logged into their MEGA account at least 512 times (the more, the higher the exposure). Note that resuming an existing session does not count as a login. While all MEGA client products use permanent sessions by default, some third-party clients such as Rclone do not, so their users may be exposed.

Who could have exploited the vulnerability?

Very few: An attacker would have had to first gain control over the heart of MEGA’s server infrastructure or achieve a successful man-in-the-middle attack on the user’s TLS connection to MEGA.

What could have been the outcome?

Once a targeted account had made enough successful logins, incoming shared folders, MEGAdrop files and chats could have been decryptable. Files in the cloud drive could have been successively decrypted during subsequent logins. Furthermore, files could have been placed in the account that appear to have been uploaded by the account holder (a “framing” attack).

#mega #cloud #vulnerability