Forwarded from BlackBox (Security) Archiv
A_Day_in_the_Life_of_Your_Data.pdf
1.2 MB
Apple is sharing ‘A Day in the Life of Your Data’
28 January is Privacy Day and Apple is marking this occasion by sharing a study called ‘A Day in the Life of Your Data’, which walks users through a scenario of a father and daughter’s day at the playground and how their data is tracked by various websites and apps throughout.
https://www.apple.com/privacy/docs/A_Day_in_the_Life_of_Your_Data.pdf
https://www.ithinkdiff.com/apple-privacy-day-in-the-life-of-your-data/
#apple #yourdata #DeleteApple #thinkabout #pdf
📡@cRyPtHoN_INFOSEC_DE
📡@cRyPtHoN_INFOSEC_EN
📡@BlackBox_Archiv
📡@NoGoolag
28 January is Privacy Day and Apple is marking this occasion by sharing a study called ‘A Day in the Life of Your Data’, which walks users through a scenario of a father and daughter’s day at the playground and how their data is tracked by various websites and apps throughout.
https://www.apple.com/privacy/docs/A_Day_in_the_Life_of_Your_Data.pdf
https://www.ithinkdiff.com/apple-privacy-day-in-the-life-of-your-data/
#apple #yourdata #DeleteApple #thinkabout #pdf
📡@cRyPtHoN_INFOSEC_DE
📡@cRyPtHoN_INFOSEC_EN
📡@BlackBox_Archiv
📡@NoGoolag
Forwarded from BlackBox (Security) Archiv
pentest-report_mullvad_2021_v1.pdf
242.2 KB
Pentest-Report Mullvad VPN & Servers 11.-12.2020
“Mullvad VPN AB is owned by parent company Amagicom AB. The name Amagicom isderived from the Sumerian word ama-gi – the oldest word for “freedom“ or, literally,“back to mother” in the context of slavery – and the abbreviation for communication.Amagicom stands for “free communication”.”
This document is dedicated to a presentation of a security-centered project carried outby Cure53 for Mullvad. More specifically, the report describes the results of a thoroughand comprehensive penetration test and source code audit against the Mullvad VPNservers, infrastructure and related web applications and other exposed services. Theproject was completed in late 2020
https://cure53.de/pentest-report_mullvad_2021_v1.pdf
#pentest #mullvad #vpn #report #pdf
📡@cRyPtHoN_INFOSEC_DE
📡@cRyPtHoN_INFOSEC_EN
📡@BlackBox_Archiv
📡@NoGoolag
“Mullvad VPN AB is owned by parent company Amagicom AB. The name Amagicom isderived from the Sumerian word ama-gi – the oldest word for “freedom“ or, literally,“back to mother” in the context of slavery – and the abbreviation for communication.Amagicom stands for “free communication”.”
This document is dedicated to a presentation of a security-centered project carried outby Cure53 for Mullvad. More specifically, the report describes the results of a thoroughand comprehensive penetration test and source code audit against the Mullvad VPNservers, infrastructure and related web applications and other exposed services. Theproject was completed in late 2020
https://cure53.de/pentest-report_mullvad_2021_v1.pdf
#pentest #mullvad #vpn #report #pdf
📡@cRyPtHoN_INFOSEC_DE
📡@cRyPtHoN_INFOSEC_EN
📡@BlackBox_Archiv
📡@NoGoolag
Forwarded from BlackBox (Security) Archiv
pgpp-arxiv20.pdf
7.1 MB
Pretty Good Phone Privacy
To receive service in today’s cellular architecture, phones uniquely identify themselves to towers and thus to operators. This is now a cause of major privacy violations, as operators sell and leak identity and location data of hundreds of millionsof mobile users.
In this paper, we take an end-to-end perspective on thecellular architecture and find key points of decoupling that enable us to protect user identity and location privacy with no changes to physical infrastructure, no added latency, and no requirement of direct cooperation from existing operators.
https://raghavan.usc.edu/papers/pgpp-arxiv20.pdf
#phone #privacy #study #pdf
📡@cRyPtHoN_INFOSEC_FR
📡@cRyPtHoN_INFOSEC_EN
📡@cRyPtHoN_INFOSEC_DE
📡@BlackBox_Archiv
📡@NoGoolag
To receive service in today’s cellular architecture, phones uniquely identify themselves to towers and thus to operators. This is now a cause of major privacy violations, as operators sell and leak identity and location data of hundreds of millionsof mobile users.
In this paper, we take an end-to-end perspective on thecellular architecture and find key points of decoupling that enable us to protect user identity and location privacy with no changes to physical infrastructure, no added latency, and no requirement of direct cooperation from existing operators.
https://raghavan.usc.edu/papers/pgpp-arxiv20.pdf
#phone #privacy #study #pdf
📡@cRyPtHoN_INFOSEC_FR
📡@cRyPtHoN_INFOSEC_EN
📡@cRyPtHoN_INFOSEC_DE
📡@BlackBox_Archiv
📡@NoGoolag
Forwarded from BlackBox (Security) Archiv
EPRS_STU(2021)656336_EN.pdf
3.6 MB
Online platforms: Economic and societal effects
Online platforms such as #Google, #Amazon, and #Facebook play an increasingly central role in the economy and society. They operate as digital intermediaries across interconnected sectors and markets subject to network effects. These firms have grown to an unprecedented scale, propelled by data-driven business models. Online platforms have a massive impact on individual users and businesses, and are recasting the relationships between customers, advertisers, workers and employers.
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/656336/EPRS_STU(2021)656336_EN.pdf
#online #platforms #study #pdf
📡@cRyPtHoN_INFOSEC_FR
📡@cRyPtHoN_INFOSEC_EN
📡@cRyPtHoN_INFOSEC_DE
📡@BlackBox_Archiv
📡@NoGoolag
Online platforms such as #Google, #Amazon, and #Facebook play an increasingly central role in the economy and society. They operate as digital intermediaries across interconnected sectors and markets subject to network effects. These firms have grown to an unprecedented scale, propelled by data-driven business models. Online platforms have a massive impact on individual users and businesses, and are recasting the relationships between customers, advertisers, workers and employers.
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/656336/EPRS_STU(2021)656336_EN.pdf
#online #platforms #study #pdf
📡@cRyPtHoN_INFOSEC_FR
📡@cRyPtHoN_INFOSEC_EN
📡@cRyPtHoN_INFOSEC_DE
📡@BlackBox_Archiv
📡@NoGoolag
Forwarded from BlackBox (Security) Archiv
apple_google.pdf
1.4 MB
Mobile Handset Privacy: Measuring The Data iOS and Android Send to Apple And Google
We find that even when minimally configured and the handset is idle both iOS and Google Android share data with Apple/Google on average every 4.5 mins.
‼️ The phone IMEI, hardware serial number, SIM serial number and IMSI, handsetphone number etc are shared with Apple and Google. Both iOS and Google Android transmit telemetry, despite the user explicitly opting out of this.
💡 When a SIM is inserted both iOS and Google Android send details to Apple/Google. iOS sends the MAC addresses of nearby devices, e.g. other handsets and the home gateway, to Apple together with their GPS location. Currently there are few, if any, realistic options for preventing this data sharing.
https://www.scss.tcd.ie/doug.leith/apple_google.pdf
#apple #google #study #telemetry #data #mobilephones #pdf
📡 @nogoolag @blackbox_archiv
We find that even when minimally configured and the handset is idle both iOS and Google Android share data with Apple/Google on average every 4.5 mins.
‼️ The phone IMEI, hardware serial number, SIM serial number and IMSI, handsetphone number etc are shared with Apple and Google. Both iOS and Google Android transmit telemetry, despite the user explicitly opting out of this.
💡 When a SIM is inserted both iOS and Google Android send details to Apple/Google. iOS sends the MAC addresses of nearby devices, e.g. other handsets and the home gateway, to Apple together with their GPS location. Currently there are few, if any, realistic options for preventing this data sharing.
https://www.scss.tcd.ie/doug.leith/apple_google.pdf
#apple #google #study #telemetry #data #mobilephones #pdf
📡 @nogoolag @blackbox_archiv
Forwarded from BlackBox (Security) Archiv
Netradyne_Presentation.pdf
2.4 MB
How workplace surveillance is entering our homes and driving through our streets
The home is not the only space where workplace surveillance outside the office or factory is becoming more common. For many, work means driving a vehicle, and so installing cameras that monitor behavior there is an obvious step. Once more, AI is being applied to take such surveillance to the next level. One of the biggest rollouts of this approach is by Amazon to its 75,000 delivery vehicles
https://www.privateinternetaccess.com/blog/how-workplace-surveillance-is-entering-our-homes-and-driving-through-our-streets/
💡 http://www.itechgps.com/sites/itechbus/uploads/documents/Netradyne_Presentation.pdf
#workplace #surveillance #ai #amazon #DeleteAmazon #DickPunchBezos #netradyne #pdf #thinkabout
📡 @nogoolag 📡 @blackbox_archiv
The home is not the only space where workplace surveillance outside the office or factory is becoming more common. For many, work means driving a vehicle, and so installing cameras that monitor behavior there is an obvious step. Once more, AI is being applied to take such surveillance to the next level. One of the biggest rollouts of this approach is by Amazon to its 75,000 delivery vehicles
https://www.privateinternetaccess.com/blog/how-workplace-surveillance-is-entering-our-homes-and-driving-through-our-streets/
💡 http://www.itechgps.com/sites/itechbus/uploads/documents/Netradyne_Presentation.pdf
#workplace #surveillance #ai #amazon #DeleteAmazon #DickPunchBezos #netradyne #pdf #thinkabout
📡 @nogoolag 📡 @blackbox_archiv
Forwarded from BlackBox (Security) Archiv
requests-2020-H1-en.pdf
802.6 KB
Apple Transparency Report: Government and Private Party Requests
Apple has released more iCloud content to authorities, end-to-end encryption is still missing.
User data was mainly sent to authorities in the U.S. and Brazil. In France, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, Apple only transmitted iCloud data for one account request each, as the report lists. It remains unclear which of the partly sensitive data was transferred in detail and for what reason. In the new transparency report, Apple has confirmed for the first time that iCloud content may also be passed on in emergency requests from authorities - for example, to search for missing persons.
https://www.apple.com/legal/transparency/pdf/requests-2020-H1-en.pdf
#icloud #apple #requests #transparency #report #pdf
📡 @nogoolag 📡 @blackbox_archiv
Apple has released more iCloud content to authorities, end-to-end encryption is still missing.
User data was mainly sent to authorities in the U.S. and Brazil. In France, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, Apple only transmitted iCloud data for one account request each, as the report lists. It remains unclear which of the partly sensitive data was transferred in detail and for what reason. In the new transparency report, Apple has confirmed for the first time that iCloud content may also be passed on in emergency requests from authorities - for example, to search for missing persons.
https://www.apple.com/legal/transparency/pdf/requests-2020-H1-en.pdf
#icloud #apple #requests #transparency #report #pdf
📡 @nogoolag 📡 @blackbox_archiv
Forwarded from BlackBox (Security) Archiv
ndss2021_1C-3_23159_paper.pdf
430.5 KB
All the Numbers are US: Large-scale Abuse of Contact Discovery in Mobile Messengers
Contact discovery allows users of mobile messengers to conveniently connect with people in their address book.
In this work, we demonstrate that severe privacy issues exist in currently deployed contact discovery methods.
Our study of three popular mobile messengers (WhatsApp, Signal, and Telegram) shows that, contrary to expectations, largescale crawling attacks are (still) possible. Using an accurate database of mobile phone number prefixes and very few resources, we have queried 10 % of US mobile phone numbers for WhatsApp and 100 % for Signal. For Telegram we find that its API exposes a wide range of sensitive information, even about numbers not registered with the service.
https://www.ndss-symposium.org/wp-content/uploads/ndss2021_1C-3_23159_paper.pdf
#contact #messenger #telegram #whatsapp #signal #crawling #attacks #study #pdf
📡 @nogoolag 📡 @blackbox_archiv
Contact discovery allows users of mobile messengers to conveniently connect with people in their address book.
In this work, we demonstrate that severe privacy issues exist in currently deployed contact discovery methods.
Our study of three popular mobile messengers (WhatsApp, Signal, and Telegram) shows that, contrary to expectations, largescale crawling attacks are (still) possible. Using an accurate database of mobile phone number prefixes and very few resources, we have queried 10 % of US mobile phone numbers for WhatsApp and 100 % for Signal. For Telegram we find that its API exposes a wide range of sensitive information, even about numbers not registered with the service.
https://www.ndss-symposium.org/wp-content/uploads/ndss2021_1C-3_23159_paper.pdf
#contact #messenger #telegram #whatsapp #signal #crawling #attacks #study #pdf
📡 @nogoolag 📡 @blackbox_archiv
Forwarded from BlackBox (Security) Archiv
recycled-numbers-latest.pdf
347.8 KB
Security and Privacy Risks of Number Recycling at Mobile Carriers in the United States
35 million phone numbers are disconnected in the U.S. every year. Standard industry practice is to reassign those numbers to other subscribers. But this leads to many types of security and privacy risks, which our study analyzes rigorously.
https://recyclednumbers.cs.princeton.edu/assets/recycled-numbers-latest.pdf
https://recyclednumbers.cs.princeton.edu/
#security #privacy #phone #number #recycling #usa #mobile #carriers #pdf
📡 @nogoolag 📡 @blackbox_archiv
35 million phone numbers are disconnected in the U.S. every year. Standard industry practice is to reassign those numbers to other subscribers. But this leads to many types of security and privacy risks, which our study analyzes rigorously.
https://recyclednumbers.cs.princeton.edu/assets/recycled-numbers-latest.pdf
https://recyclednumbers.cs.princeton.edu/
#security #privacy #phone #number #recycling #usa #mobile #carriers #pdf
📡 @nogoolag 📡 @blackbox_archiv
OSS Document Scanner
Open Source app to #scan all your #documents. You either scan using your camera or by importing an image. The app will automatically detect you document within the photo and will crop the image.
Once the document is created you can detect text within the document using #OCR.
You can also share your document as a #PDF. If you want you can synchronize the app data with a webdav server (like nextloud) to never loose anything!
https://github.com/Akylas/com.akylas.documentscanner
https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/index/apk/com.akylas.documentscanner
Open Source app to #scan all your #documents. You either scan using your camera or by importing an image. The app will automatically detect you document within the photo and will crop the image.
Once the document is created you can detect text within the document using #OCR.
You can also share your document as a #PDF. If you want you can synchronize the app data with a webdav server (like nextloud) to never loose anything!
https://github.com/Akylas/com.akylas.documentscanner
https://apt.izzysoft.de/fdroid/index/apk/com.akylas.documentscanner
IzzyOnDroid App Repo
„OSS Document Scanner“ – IzzyOnDroid F-Droid Repository
scan all your documents