Magisk root and modules
Opensource Root, better than SuperSu, with modules xposed style. Mark the 'HIDE' option in its configuration to pass safetynet test
https://forum.xda-developers.com/apps/magisk/official-magisk-v7-universal-systemless-t3473445
Magisk zip (flash with twrp)
http://tiny.cc/latestmagisk
Magisk app
http://tiny.cc/latestmanager
Magisk uninstaller (flash with twrp)
http://tiny.cc/latestuninstaller
- Modules
In Magisk app-> downloads
Also here:
https://forum.xda-developers.com/apps/magisk
π‘ t.me/NoGoolag
#magisk #root
Opensource Root, better than SuperSu, with modules xposed style. Mark the 'HIDE' option in its configuration to pass safetynet test
https://forum.xda-developers.com/apps/magisk/official-magisk-v7-universal-systemless-t3473445
Magisk zip (flash with twrp)
http://tiny.cc/latestmagisk
Magisk app
http://tiny.cc/latestmanager
Magisk uninstaller (flash with twrp)
http://tiny.cc/latestuninstaller
- Modules
In Magisk app-> downloads
Also here:
https://forum.xda-developers.com/apps/magisk
π‘ t.me/NoGoolag
#magisk #root
XDA Forums
Magisk - The Magic Mask for Android
Welcome to the Magisk Release / Announcement thread!
For all up-to-date info and links, please directly check Magisk's GitHub Page
Installation
Download count of previously XDA hosted files...
For all up-to-date info and links, please directly check Magisk's GitHub Page
Installation
Download count of previously XDA hosted files...
Magisk root and modules
XDA
https://forum.xda-developers.com/apps/magisk/official-magisk-v7-universal-systemless-t3473445
XDA magisk modules
https://forum.xda-developers.com/apps/magisk
β¬οΈ Download Magisk Github Release page:
https://github.com/topjohnwu/Magisk/releases
π Magisk Documentation
https://topjohnwu.github.io/Magisk/
π Magisk and MagiskHide Installation and Troubleshooting guide
https://www.didgeridoohan.com/magisk/HomePage#
β’ Canary builds download:
https://github.com/topjohnwu/magisk_files/tree/master/canary_builds
Canary builds notes:
https://github.com/topjohnwu/magisk_files/blob/master/canary_builds/notes.md
Canary Release Channel:
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/topjohnwu/magisk_files/master/canary_builds/release.json`
π‘ @Libreware
#magisk #root
XDA
https://forum.xda-developers.com/apps/magisk/official-magisk-v7-universal-systemless-t3473445
XDA magisk modules
https://forum.xda-developers.com/apps/magisk
β¬οΈ Download Magisk Github Release page:
https://github.com/topjohnwu/Magisk/releases
π Magisk Documentation
https://topjohnwu.github.io/Magisk/
π Magisk and MagiskHide Installation and Troubleshooting guide
https://www.didgeridoohan.com/magisk/HomePage#
β’ Canary builds download:
https://github.com/topjohnwu/magisk_files/tree/master/canary_builds
Canary builds notes:
https://github.com/topjohnwu/magisk_files/blob/master/canary_builds/notes.md
Canary Release Channel:
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/topjohnwu/magisk_files/master/canary_builds/release.json`
π‘ @Libreware
#magisk #root
John Wu @topjohnwu
Magisk Developer
https://mobile.twitter.com/topjohnwu/status/1105947979679191041
Bad news: Android Q root won't come anytime soon. Android Q has switched to logical partitions for the system block, which means there is no easy way to mount the block by any means. I'm currently thinking of what tricks can I do other than implement everything from scratch....
Things are not looking good π , even if I could, I might have to create a complete new Magisk just for Android Q. Android Q switched to this stupidly complicated logical device (device-mapper) + overlayfs madness just to support "Previewing GSIs" from data partition.
It will take me an extreme amount of time to figure out how to workaround all this mess. I won't expect Magisk to be even able to boot on Q in months.
After stepping back and taking a breath, I think I'll just have to figure out how to mount logical partitions and things should work. With normal EXT4 Android Q system images, things works just fine as previously demonstrated. Time to read some device-mapper documents...
#magisk #root #android #q
Magisk Developer
https://mobile.twitter.com/topjohnwu/status/1105947979679191041
Bad news: Android Q root won't come anytime soon. Android Q has switched to logical partitions for the system block, which means there is no easy way to mount the block by any means. I'm currently thinking of what tricks can I do other than implement everything from scratch....
Things are not looking good π , even if I could, I might have to create a complete new Magisk just for Android Q. Android Q switched to this stupidly complicated logical device (device-mapper) + overlayfs madness just to support "Previewing GSIs" from data partition.
It will take me an extreme amount of time to figure out how to workaround all this mess. I won't expect Magisk to be even able to boot on Q in months.
After stepping back and taking a breath, I think I'll just have to figure out how to mount logical partitions and things should work. With normal EXT4 Android Q system images, things works just fine as previously demonstrated. Time to read some device-mapper documents...
#magisk #root #android #q
SafetyNetβs dreaded hardware attestation is rolling out, making it much harder for Magisk to hide root
https://www.xda-developers.com/safetynet-hardware-attestation-hide-root-magisk
#safetynet #root #magisk #android
https://www.xda-developers.com/safetynet-hardware-attestation-hide-root-magisk
#safetynet #root #magisk #android
XDA
SafetyNet's dreaded hardware attestation is rolling out, making it much harder for Magisk to hide root
Hiding root access in Magisk is about to become a whole lot harder to do thanks to a recent change in SafetyNet bringing hardware attestation.
Forwarded from BlackBox (Security) Archiv
How to turn off the ANDROID TRACKING SERVICES [ROOT required]
Let's start:
ππΌ Download Termux from Google Playstore and install and open it.
Install Packages:
https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1_G6-M8ToF0PsjY0HIrZIAVrTHT6nbptE
π‘ (Please always use the latest version)
ππΌ Unpack to ππΌ /sdcard and then enter the following command...:
ππΌ Then enter:
tsu
After that, just reboot your device and the job is done.
#root #android #tracking #services #guide
π‘@cRyPtHoN_INFOSEC_FR
π‘@cRyPtHoN_INFOSEC_EN
π‘@cRyPtHoN_INFOSEC_DE
π‘@BlackBox_Archiv
π‘@NoGoolag
Let's start:
ππΌ Download Termux from Google Playstore and install and open it.
Install Packages:
pkg install aapt jq tsu curl -y( Asks for root privileges, allow this βοΈππ½)
cd /data/data/com.termux/files/usr/binππΌ Download the script from here:
cp -R aapt /system/xbin/aapt
cp -R jq /system/xbin/jq
cp -R curl /system/xbin/curl
chmod +x /system/xbin/aapt
chmod +x /system/xbin/jq
chmod +x /system/xbin/curl
https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1_G6-M8ToF0PsjY0HIrZIAVrTHT6nbptE
π‘ (Please always use the latest version)
ππΌ Unpack to ππΌ /sdcard and then enter the following command...:
termux-setup-storage
(grant permission)ππΌ Then enter:
cd /sdcard(with root) ππ½
tsu
bash DisableTrackers.sh sys
(Add βοΈ)After that, just reboot your device and the job is done.
#root #android #tracking #services #guide
π‘@cRyPtHoN_INFOSEC_FR
π‘@cRyPtHoN_INFOSEC_EN
π‘@cRyPtHoN_INFOSEC_DE
π‘@BlackBox_Archiv
π‘@NoGoolag
Forwarded from BlackBox (Security) Archiv
Beware of Applications Misusing Root Stores
We have been alerted about applications that use the root store provided by Mozilla for purposes other than what Mozillaβs root store is curated for. We provide a root store to be used for server authentication (TLS) and for digitally signed and encrypted email (S/MIME). Applications that use Mozillaβs root store for a purpose other than that have a critical security vulnerability. With the goal of improving the security ecosystem on the internet, below we clarify the correct and incorrect use of Mozillaβs root store, and provide tools for correct use.
....(....)
Misuse of Root Stores: We have been alerted that some applications are using root stores provided by Mozilla or an operating system (e.g. Linux) for purposes other than what the root store is curated for. An application that uses a root store for a purpose other than what the store was created for has a critical security vulnerability. This is no different than failing to validate a certificate at all.
https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2021/05/10/beware-of-applications-misusing-root-stores/
#mozilla #root #store #applications
π‘ @nogoolag π‘ @blackbox_archiv
We have been alerted about applications that use the root store provided by Mozilla for purposes other than what Mozillaβs root store is curated for. We provide a root store to be used for server authentication (TLS) and for digitally signed and encrypted email (S/MIME). Applications that use Mozillaβs root store for a purpose other than that have a critical security vulnerability. With the goal of improving the security ecosystem on the internet, below we clarify the correct and incorrect use of Mozillaβs root store, and provide tools for correct use.
....(....)
Misuse of Root Stores: We have been alerted that some applications are using root stores provided by Mozilla or an operating system (e.g. Linux) for purposes other than what the root store is curated for. An application that uses a root store for a purpose other than what the store was created for has a critical security vulnerability. This is no different than failing to validate a certificate at all.
https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2021/05/10/beware-of-applications-misusing-root-stores/
#mozilla #root #store #applications
π‘ @nogoolag π‘ @blackbox_archiv
Mozilla Security Blog
Beware of Applications Misusing Root Stores
We have been alerted about applications that use the root store provided by Mozilla for purposes other than what Mozillaβs root store is curated for. We provide a root store ...
hsu
Magisk module for hiding Magisk and root by entirely disabling and hiding them
https://github.com/rmnscnce/hsu
#hsu #hide #magisk #root
Magisk module for hiding Magisk and root by entirely disabling and hiding them
https://github.com/rmnscnce/hsu
#hsu #hide #magisk #root
GitHub
GitHub - rmnscnce/hsu: Hide Magisk and root system-wide to prevent any kinds of detection
Hide Magisk and root system-wide to prevent any kinds of detection - rmnscnce/hsu
New Linux bug gives root on all major distros, exploit released.
A new Linux vulnerability known as 'Dirty Pipe' allows local users to gain root privileges through publicly available exploits.
Today, security researcher Max Kellermann responsibly disclosed the 'Dirty Pipe' vulnerability and stated that it affects Linux Kernel 5.8 and later versions, even on Android devices.
The vulnerability is tracked as CVE-2022-0847 and allows a non-privileged user to inject and overwrite data in read-only files, including SUID processes that run as root.
Kellerman discovered the bug after tracking down a bug that was corrupting web server access logs for one of his customers.
Kellerman states that the vulnerability is similar to the Dirty COW vulnerability (CVE-2016-5195) fixed in 2016.
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-linux-bug-gives-root-on-all-major-distros-exploit-released/
https://dirtypipe.cm4all.com/
π‘@cRyPtHoN_INFOSEC_EN
#linux #root #vulnerability
A new Linux vulnerability known as 'Dirty Pipe' allows local users to gain root privileges through publicly available exploits.
Today, security researcher Max Kellermann responsibly disclosed the 'Dirty Pipe' vulnerability and stated that it affects Linux Kernel 5.8 and later versions, even on Android devices.
The vulnerability is tracked as CVE-2022-0847 and allows a non-privileged user to inject and overwrite data in read-only files, including SUID processes that run as root.
Kellerman discovered the bug after tracking down a bug that was corrupting web server access logs for one of his customers.
Kellerman states that the vulnerability is similar to the Dirty COW vulnerability (CVE-2016-5195) fixed in 2016.
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-linux-bug-gives-root-on-all-major-distros-exploit-released/
https://dirtypipe.cm4all.com/
π‘@cRyPtHoN_INFOSEC_EN
#linux #root #vulnerability
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Physical Attacks Against Smartphones
Android devices are constantly improving their security to protect against attackers with physical access, with new protection techniques being added year-by-year. This talk aims to demonstrate vulnerabilities in modern Android smartphones that are still viable, despite the mitigations in place.
In the first phase of this talk, we will discuss the analysis and exploitation of vendor-customized versions of Android's Recovery mode, demonstrating weaknesses that allow for privilege escalation to root, and traversal from Recovery to Android, without Bootloader access....
By: Christopher Wade
Full Abstract and Presentation Materials:https://www.blackhat.com/us-23/briefings/schedule/#physical-attacks-against-smartphones-32485
#Android #Vulnerabilities #RecoveryMode #Exploit #PrivilegdeEscalation #Root
Android devices are constantly improving their security to protect against attackers with physical access, with new protection techniques being added year-by-year. This talk aims to demonstrate vulnerabilities in modern Android smartphones that are still viable, despite the mitigations in place.
In the first phase of this talk, we will discuss the analysis and exploitation of vendor-customized versions of Android's Recovery mode, demonstrating weaknesses that allow for privilege escalation to root, and traversal from Recovery to Android, without Bootloader access....
By: Christopher Wade
Full Abstract and Presentation Materials:https://www.blackhat.com/us-23/briefings/schedule/#physical-attacks-against-smartphones-32485
#Android #Vulnerabilities #RecoveryMode #Exploit #PrivilegdeEscalation #Root