We sell'
1. Bank transfer, Revolut, Sepa
2. cash by mail and in person and etc
DM admin @BuyCoinFastEu
Here is the list of Monero wallets we recommend to use:
Mymonero.com
cakewallet.com for XMR and BTC
n'buy Mondeo1. Bank transfer, Revolut, Sepa
2. cash by mail and in person and etc
DM admin @BuyCoinFastEu
Here is the list of Monero wallets we recommend to use:
Mymonero.com
cakewallet.com for XMR and BTC
Staying Safe With Cash by Mail(Cash by mail tips)
1. If you're buying...
If you stick to high reputation sellers it's very unlikely that you'll encounter any issues while buying with cash by mail, however the following tips will help you prove your payment in a dispute should it arise. The most important thing to do is to make a video recording of your payment. Here are the guidelines:
1.1 Your video should be filmed within a single take, without cuts
You can put the cash in the envelope at home or in the car, and you can put your phone with the video turned on in your front shirt pocket and it'll record the whole process without much extra work from you apart from making sure that you do everything in front of where the camera's pointing. If you have something like a GoPro or the latest iPhone which has a camera with a wider viewing angle it's going to be even easier. Keep the footage in case of a dispute for 180 days.
1.2 Put custom markings inside the envelope
Use some sort of a custom chop/stamp/seal, or a signature or just random movements with a sharpie inside the envelope, covering all surfaces. This will help establish whether the seller is actually opening the envelope you've sent or a fake one. Make sure the mark is visible on the video.
1.3 Try to disguise the cash
To mitigate a (potential, but very rare) case of postal theft en route, try to conceal the fact that the package contains cash. You may put the cash in a magazine, mylar bag or some other container. Vacuum sealing the cash also works.
Place envelopes inside of envelopes
Instead of simply placing the cash into the envelope, use multiple nested envelopes for your package. Place the cash into the smallest envelope (or simply fold a bigger envelope as necessary), seal it, and place it into another envelope. Repeat this process until you have at least 3 nested envelopes. This helps ensure that if the receiving party tries to tamper with your package they will have a much harder time resealing it all in a way that would be undetectable when inspected by the dispute mediator.
1.4. Send with tracking
Packages sent without tracking may get lost with and without tracking it could be all but impossible to locate it. Having tracking also allows the receiving end to have peace of mind that the package is en route in case it's taking longer than expected.
1.5 Conclusion
As we've mentioned before, with established traders the risk for a buyer is very low. Very low doesn't mean zero though, so make sure to follow these rules to be prepared for a dispute situation.
2. If you're selling crypto...
2.1 Make a video of receiving and opening the package
Record yourself receiving the package from the postal worker, the postal worker weighing it, record the label, all the outer sides of the package; open the package while filming with the camera pointed into it, run the cash through a counter and counterfeit scanner. Make sure everything is filmed in one take. Always keep the package in view of the camera. Keep the footage in case of a dispute for 180 days.
2.2 Under no circumstances release early
The key thing to remember (and we put disclaimers about this on every step of the way) is to NEVER release the escrow UNTIL you have the money and you are absolutely confident that everything is in order. A legitimate buyer won't pressure you into early release.
2.3 Have a buyer put a note with their username and trade ID
This will help you distinguish packages coming from different buyers and avoid confusion. This also will help in preventing man-in-the-middle attacks, where a scammer interposes themselves in-between the buyer and the seller, pretending to be the seller when talking to the buyer and pretending to be the buyer when talking to the seller.
1. If you're buying...
If you stick to high reputation sellers it's very unlikely that you'll encounter any issues while buying with cash by mail, however the following tips will help you prove your payment in a dispute should it arise. The most important thing to do is to make a video recording of your payment. Here are the guidelines:
1.1 Your video should be filmed within a single take, without cuts
You can put the cash in the envelope at home or in the car, and you can put your phone with the video turned on in your front shirt pocket and it'll record the whole process without much extra work from you apart from making sure that you do everything in front of where the camera's pointing. If you have something like a GoPro or the latest iPhone which has a camera with a wider viewing angle it's going to be even easier. Keep the footage in case of a dispute for 180 days.
1.2 Put custom markings inside the envelope
Use some sort of a custom chop/stamp/seal, or a signature or just random movements with a sharpie inside the envelope, covering all surfaces. This will help establish whether the seller is actually opening the envelope you've sent or a fake one. Make sure the mark is visible on the video.
1.3 Try to disguise the cash
To mitigate a (potential, but very rare) case of postal theft en route, try to conceal the fact that the package contains cash. You may put the cash in a magazine, mylar bag or some other container. Vacuum sealing the cash also works.
Place envelopes inside of envelopes
Instead of simply placing the cash into the envelope, use multiple nested envelopes for your package. Place the cash into the smallest envelope (or simply fold a bigger envelope as necessary), seal it, and place it into another envelope. Repeat this process until you have at least 3 nested envelopes. This helps ensure that if the receiving party tries to tamper with your package they will have a much harder time resealing it all in a way that would be undetectable when inspected by the dispute mediator.
1.4. Send with tracking
Packages sent without tracking may get lost with and without tracking it could be all but impossible to locate it. Having tracking also allows the receiving end to have peace of mind that the package is en route in case it's taking longer than expected.
1.5 Conclusion
As we've mentioned before, with established traders the risk for a buyer is very low. Very low doesn't mean zero though, so make sure to follow these rules to be prepared for a dispute situation.
2. If you're selling crypto...
2.1 Make a video of receiving and opening the package
Record yourself receiving the package from the postal worker, the postal worker weighing it, record the label, all the outer sides of the package; open the package while filming with the camera pointed into it, run the cash through a counter and counterfeit scanner. Make sure everything is filmed in one take. Always keep the package in view of the camera. Keep the footage in case of a dispute for 180 days.
2.2 Under no circumstances release early
The key thing to remember (and we put disclaimers about this on every step of the way) is to NEVER release the escrow UNTIL you have the money and you are absolutely confident that everything is in order. A legitimate buyer won't pressure you into early release.
2.3 Have a buyer put a note with their username and trade ID
This will help you distinguish packages coming from different buyers and avoid confusion. This also will help in preventing man-in-the-middle attacks, where a scammer interposes themselves in-between the buyer and the seller, pretending to be the seller when talking to the buyer and pretending to be the buyer when talking to the seller.
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Introduction to Monero
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Monero - The Essentials
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Monero Stealth Addresses
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Monero Ring Signatures
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Monero Ring Confidential Transactions
If Monero is so private how do we know they're not being created out of thin air?
In Monero, every transaction output is uniquely associated with a key image that can only be generated by the holder of that output. Key images that are used more than once are rejected by the miners as double-spends and cannot be added to a valid block. When a new transaction is received, miners verify that the key image does not already exist for a previous transaction to ensure it's not a double-spend.
We can also know that transaction amounts are valid even though the value of the inputs that you are spending and the value of the outputs you are sending are encrypted (these are hidden to everyone except the recipient). Because the amounts are encrypted using Pedersen commitments what this means is that no observers can tell the amounts of the inputs and outputs, but they can do math on the Pedersen commitments to determine that no Monero was created out of thin air.
As long as the encrypted output amounts you create is equal to the sum of the inputs that are being spent (which include an output for the recipient and a change output back to yourself and the unencrypted transaction fee), then you have a legitimate transaction and know no Monero is being created out of thin air. Pedersen commitments mean that the sums can be verified as being equal, but the Monero value of each of the sums and the Monero value of the inputs and outputs individually are undeterminable.
In Monero, every transaction output is uniquely associated with a key image that can only be generated by the holder of that output. Key images that are used more than once are rejected by the miners as double-spends and cannot be added to a valid block. When a new transaction is received, miners verify that the key image does not already exist for a previous transaction to ensure it's not a double-spend.
We can also know that transaction amounts are valid even though the value of the inputs that you are spending and the value of the outputs you are sending are encrypted (these are hidden to everyone except the recipient). Because the amounts are encrypted using Pedersen commitments what this means is that no observers can tell the amounts of the inputs and outputs, but they can do math on the Pedersen commitments to determine that no Monero was created out of thin air.
As long as the encrypted output amounts you create is equal to the sum of the inputs that are being spent (which include an output for the recipient and a change output back to yourself and the unencrypted transaction fee), then you have a legitimate transaction and know no Monero is being created out of thin air. Pedersen commitments mean that the sums can be verified as being equal, but the Monero value of each of the sums and the Monero value of the inputs and outputs individually are undeterminable.
About Monero supply auditability(Part 1)
We often hear questions and concerns about the topic of supply auditing, and how it applies to different projects. This post is intended to briefly and informally discuss the practical tradeoffs that projects make in their designs as they apply to the soundness of supply. It intentionally glosses over some technical details that, while important and subtle, may serve to muddy the waters for many readers.
Let's define what we might mean by supply auditing and soundness. When the term is used, it is often undefined in a way that doesn't help the discussion. For some people, it might mean that in any particular transaction, you can see the amounts being used and do simple arithmetic to convince yourself that no new assets were created in an attempt to game the supply. Transparent assets like Bitcoin or Ethereum do this; look at any transaction in a block explorer, and you'll see the amounts consumed and generated. For others, it might mean that whatever more complex mathematics is used for balance assertion is unlikely in practice to lead to problems that could allow unwanted inflation.
The transparent approach to supply is a design choice, and it has tradeoffs. As has been debated endlessly in blog posts and academic papers and conferences, you might not want the amounts involved in your transactions to be visible to the entire world. This could lead to personal risk, but also reduces the fungibility of the asset and can lead to all sorts of adversarial heuristics or shenanigans involving transaction acceptance. Transparent amounts, even when denominated, can be detrimental for privacy and fair use.
Other projects make different design choices intentionally, using different mathematics. In assets that focus more heavily on fungibility, amounts are typically not presented in the clear. Take popular projects like Monero or (shielded) Zcash, for example. In these projects, amounts are hidden using cryptographic structures called Pedersen commitments. To show that a transaction balances, the sender generates a signature or proof that uses clever (but well-understood) arithmetic on these hidden amounts to demonstrate to the network that no new assets were created. This helps with indistinguishability, which is beneficial for fungibility, security, and privacy.
To examine the different kinds of risk between transparent and "opaque" design choices, let's consider three (intentionally) broad types of problems that could arise:
1. Cryptographic hardness assumption breaks
2. Implementation flaws leading to detectable inflation
3. Implementation flaws leading to undetectable inflation
The first class is a break of a fundamental cryptographic hardness assumption. Modern digital security relies heavily on assumptions that certain mathematical problems (like the discrete logarithm problem) are computationally difficult. It is not possible to prove that these problems are hard, but decades of research and use implies this. If an adversary were able to efficiently solve the discrete logarithm problem, for example, they could recover Bitcoin, Ethereum, Zcash, or Monero private keys and steal funds. But relating to supply, solving related hardness problems would allow an adversary to represent a different amount in a Pedersen commitment than was originally intended, fooling the network and inflating supply in an opaque asset. In short, breaking soundness is not a practical risk. The computational complexity required to pull off such a stunt (barring an arguably far-off-in-the-distance breakthrough that breaks the entire internet's security) is absurdly, time-scale-of-the-universe high.
The second class is implementation flaws leading to detectable inflation. These can come in all shapes and sizes, and have affected transparent assets (like Bitcoin in two separate incidents) and opaque assets (like Monero). In the case of one Bitcoin incident, inflation did occur, but nodes chose to fork the blockchain to revert inflated funds.
We often hear questions and concerns about the topic of supply auditing, and how it applies to different projects. This post is intended to briefly and informally discuss the practical tradeoffs that projects make in their designs as they apply to the soundness of supply. It intentionally glosses over some technical details that, while important and subtle, may serve to muddy the waters for many readers.
Let's define what we might mean by supply auditing and soundness. When the term is used, it is often undefined in a way that doesn't help the discussion. For some people, it might mean that in any particular transaction, you can see the amounts being used and do simple arithmetic to convince yourself that no new assets were created in an attempt to game the supply. Transparent assets like Bitcoin or Ethereum do this; look at any transaction in a block explorer, and you'll see the amounts consumed and generated. For others, it might mean that whatever more complex mathematics is used for balance assertion is unlikely in practice to lead to problems that could allow unwanted inflation.
The transparent approach to supply is a design choice, and it has tradeoffs. As has been debated endlessly in blog posts and academic papers and conferences, you might not want the amounts involved in your transactions to be visible to the entire world. This could lead to personal risk, but also reduces the fungibility of the asset and can lead to all sorts of adversarial heuristics or shenanigans involving transaction acceptance. Transparent amounts, even when denominated, can be detrimental for privacy and fair use.
Other projects make different design choices intentionally, using different mathematics. In assets that focus more heavily on fungibility, amounts are typically not presented in the clear. Take popular projects like Monero or (shielded) Zcash, for example. In these projects, amounts are hidden using cryptographic structures called Pedersen commitments. To show that a transaction balances, the sender generates a signature or proof that uses clever (but well-understood) arithmetic on these hidden amounts to demonstrate to the network that no new assets were created. This helps with indistinguishability, which is beneficial for fungibility, security, and privacy.
To examine the different kinds of risk between transparent and "opaque" design choices, let's consider three (intentionally) broad types of problems that could arise:
1. Cryptographic hardness assumption breaks
2. Implementation flaws leading to detectable inflation
3. Implementation flaws leading to undetectable inflation
The first class is a break of a fundamental cryptographic hardness assumption. Modern digital security relies heavily on assumptions that certain mathematical problems (like the discrete logarithm problem) are computationally difficult. It is not possible to prove that these problems are hard, but decades of research and use implies this. If an adversary were able to efficiently solve the discrete logarithm problem, for example, they could recover Bitcoin, Ethereum, Zcash, or Monero private keys and steal funds. But relating to supply, solving related hardness problems would allow an adversary to represent a different amount in a Pedersen commitment than was originally intended, fooling the network and inflating supply in an opaque asset. In short, breaking soundness is not a practical risk. The computational complexity required to pull off such a stunt (barring an arguably far-off-in-the-distance breakthrough that breaks the entire internet's security) is absurdly, time-scale-of-the-universe high.
The second class is implementation flaws leading to detectable inflation. These can come in all shapes and sizes, and have affected transparent assets (like Bitcoin in two separate incidents) and opaque assets (like Monero). In the case of one Bitcoin incident, inflation did occur, but nodes chose to fork the blockchain to revert inflated funds.
About Monero supply auditability(Part 2)
In the other linked Bitcoin incident and Monero incident, it was verified that no inflation occurred.
The third class is implementation flaws leading to undetectable inflation. Such flaws could arise in many ways, but are limited to opaque assets (like Monero or shielded Zcash) where it is not possible to simply count the currently-available supply. Such a flaw affected Zcash. In this case, it is worth noting that the use of transparent fund migration means that an attempt to move enough exploited funds through the transparent Zcash pool could be detected and would result in any remaining funds (including those of honest users) being permanently frozen. It could be possible to modify the Monero protocol to produce similar supply detection, but this introduces additional risks, reduces privacy and fungibility, and would still require a decision relating to fund freezing; there are no plans to do this.
So what's the takeaway? It's very important to note that not all inflation-related problems are created equally. It's safe to say that the practical risk of an implementation flaw is far greater than that of a common computational hardness assumption break.
Notably, the use of a transparent asset is not sufficient to guarantee safety of funds. It is true that supply transparency means that inflation can in theory be detected by an appropriate implementation, but the remediation of supply inflation could mean that transactions are reverted and honest funds are affected. Further, transparent assets would not be immune from a (very unlikely) break of a cryptographic hardness assumption that results in key recovery and theft of funds.
In contrast, the use of an opaque asset introduces the risk of implementation flaws that may or may not be detectable because of the underlying mathematics of commitments and more complex proving systems. The use of mitigating approaches like transparent migrations can assert eventual available supply consistency, but this comes with the risk of losing honest funds too. Reviews and external audits of code and new mathematical constructions becomes especially important as a way to mitigate, but certainly not eliminate, these risks.
At the end of the day, there are tradeoffs inherent in supply-audit design choices. You can choose to represent amounts in the clear, like Bitcoin does; you can be sure that the supply is what you expect it to be (or fork to ensure this in case of exploited inflation), but you sacrifice fungibility and could expose users to personal risk. Or you can choose to hide amounts like (shielded) Zcash or Monero do; you improve privacy and fungibility, but at the cost of offloading supply soundness guarantees to the correctness of proof and signature constructions.
If your personal use case requires an absolute, 100%, no-holds-barred guarantee of supply, and you understand the risks inherent with this, then you need a transparent asset. But if you want to mitigate the risks associated with visible amounts, and are willing to accept the shift in risk onto proof system implementation correctness, then choose an asset focused on privacy and fungibility. There's no silver bullet here, but a necessary and careful analysis of your priorities and the tradeoffs you're willing to make for them.
In the other linked Bitcoin incident and Monero incident, it was verified that no inflation occurred.
The third class is implementation flaws leading to undetectable inflation. Such flaws could arise in many ways, but are limited to opaque assets (like Monero or shielded Zcash) where it is not possible to simply count the currently-available supply. Such a flaw affected Zcash. In this case, it is worth noting that the use of transparent fund migration means that an attempt to move enough exploited funds through the transparent Zcash pool could be detected and would result in any remaining funds (including those of honest users) being permanently frozen. It could be possible to modify the Monero protocol to produce similar supply detection, but this introduces additional risks, reduces privacy and fungibility, and would still require a decision relating to fund freezing; there are no plans to do this.
So what's the takeaway? It's very important to note that not all inflation-related problems are created equally. It's safe to say that the practical risk of an implementation flaw is far greater than that of a common computational hardness assumption break.
Notably, the use of a transparent asset is not sufficient to guarantee safety of funds. It is true that supply transparency means that inflation can in theory be detected by an appropriate implementation, but the remediation of supply inflation could mean that transactions are reverted and honest funds are affected. Further, transparent assets would not be immune from a (very unlikely) break of a cryptographic hardness assumption that results in key recovery and theft of funds.
In contrast, the use of an opaque asset introduces the risk of implementation flaws that may or may not be detectable because of the underlying mathematics of commitments and more complex proving systems. The use of mitigating approaches like transparent migrations can assert eventual available supply consistency, but this comes with the risk of losing honest funds too. Reviews and external audits of code and new mathematical constructions becomes especially important as a way to mitigate, but certainly not eliminate, these risks.
At the end of the day, there are tradeoffs inherent in supply-audit design choices. You can choose to represent amounts in the clear, like Bitcoin does; you can be sure that the supply is what you expect it to be (or fork to ensure this in case of exploited inflation), but you sacrifice fungibility and could expose users to personal risk. Or you can choose to hide amounts like (shielded) Zcash or Monero do; you improve privacy and fungibility, but at the cost of offloading supply soundness guarantees to the correctness of proof and signature constructions.
If your personal use case requires an absolute, 100%, no-holds-barred guarantee of supply, and you understand the risks inherent with this, then you need a transparent asset. But if you want to mitigate the risks associated with visible amounts, and are willing to accept the shift in risk onto proof system implementation correctness, then choose an asset focused on privacy and fungibility. There's no silver bullet here, but a necessary and careful analysis of your priorities and the tradeoffs you're willing to make for them.
List of Monero Geo chat discussion groups:
@MoneroUK
@MoneroUSA
@MoneroAustralia
@MoneroGermany
@MoneroEurope
@MoneroSweden
@MoneroRu
@MoneroUkraine
@Monero_China
@MoneroIndia
@MoneroUK
@MoneroUSA
@MoneroAustralia
@MoneroGermany
@MoneroEurope
@MoneroSweden
@MoneroRu
@MoneroUkraine
@Monero_China
@MoneroIndia
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Monero Means Money: Cryptocurrency 101, Live from Leipzig is a Documentary Feature Film that explains the origins and purpose of Monero, a fungible cryptocurrency.
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Zeitgeist: The Movie (Part 1)
film by Peter Joseph presenting a number of conspiracy theories.
The film's introduction features animations, footage of war, explosions, and the 9/11 attacks.
It claims that the Christian religion is derived from other religions, astronomical assertions, astrological myths, and other traditions. In furtherance of the Jesus myth hypothesis, this part disputes the historicity of Jesus, who, it claims, is a literary and astrological hybrid, nurtured by political forces and opportunists.
It alleges that the 9/11 attacks were either orchestrated or allowed to happen by elements within the US government in order to generate mass fear, justify the War on Terror, provide a pretext for the curtailment of civil liberties, and produce economic gain. It asserts that the U.S. government had advance knowledge of the attacks, that the military deliberately allowed the planes to reach their targets, and that World Trade Center buildings 1, 2, and 7 underwent a controlled demolition.
film by Peter Joseph presenting a number of conspiracy theories.
The film's introduction features animations, footage of war, explosions, and the 9/11 attacks.
It claims that the Christian religion is derived from other religions, astronomical assertions, astrological myths, and other traditions. In furtherance of the Jesus myth hypothesis, this part disputes the historicity of Jesus, who, it claims, is a literary and astrological hybrid, nurtured by political forces and opportunists.
It alleges that the 9/11 attacks were either orchestrated or allowed to happen by elements within the US government in order to generate mass fear, justify the War on Terror, provide a pretext for the curtailment of civil liberties, and produce economic gain. It asserts that the U.S. government had advance knowledge of the attacks, that the military deliberately allowed the planes to reach their targets, and that World Trade Center buildings 1, 2, and 7 underwent a controlled demolition.
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Zeitgeist The Movie (Part 2)
The Federal Reserve System is controlled by a small cabal of international bankers who conspire to create global calamities to enrich themselves. Three wars involving the United States during the twentieth century are highlighted as part of this alleged agenda, started by specifically engineered events, including the sinking of the RMS Lusitania, the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. The film asserts that such wars serve to sustain conflict in general and force the U.S. government to borrow money, thereby increasing the profits of the international bankers. The film also claims that the Federal Income Tax is illegal.
It's also alleges a secret agreement to merge the United States, Canada and Mexico into a North American Union as a step toward the creation of a single world government. The film speculates that under such a government, every human could be implanted with an RFID chip to monitor individual activity and suppress dissent.
The Federal Reserve System is controlled by a small cabal of international bankers who conspire to create global calamities to enrich themselves. Three wars involving the United States during the twentieth century are highlighted as part of this alleged agenda, started by specifically engineered events, including the sinking of the RMS Lusitania, the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. The film asserts that such wars serve to sustain conflict in general and force the U.S. government to borrow money, thereby increasing the profits of the international bankers. The film also claims that the Federal Income Tax is illegal.
It's also alleges a secret agreement to merge the United States, Canada and Mexico into a North American Union as a step toward the creation of a single world government. The film speculates that under such a government, every human could be implanted with an RFID chip to monitor individual activity and suppress dissent.
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Zeitgeist: Addendum
It covers the process of fractional-reserve banking as illustrated in Modern Money Mechanics, by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. The film suggests that society is manipulated into economic slavery through debt-based monetary policies by requiring individuals to submit for employment in order to pay off their debt.
It covers the process of fractional-reserve banking as illustrated in Modern Money Mechanics, by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. The film suggests that society is manipulated into economic slavery through debt-based monetary policies by requiring individuals to submit for employment in order to pay off their debt.
List of Monero Geo chat discussion groups:
@MoneroUK
@MoneroUSA
@MoneroAustralia
@MoneroGermany
@MoneroEurope
@MoneroSweden
@MoneroRu
@MoneroUkraine
@Monero_China
@MoneroIndia
@MoneroUK
@MoneroUSA
@MoneroAustralia
@MoneroGermany
@MoneroEurope
@MoneroSweden
@MoneroRu
@MoneroUkraine
@Monero_China
@MoneroIndia
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Zeitgeist: Moving Forward
It is the third installment in Peter Joseph's Zeitgeist film series
It is the third installment in Peter Joseph's Zeitgeist film series
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Cryptopia: Bitcoin, Blockchains and the Future of the Internet