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I think physically and socially, in bodies and in communities, people are starting to get to grips with the fact that we can face the inconvenience of bothering with healthy behaviours now or face a disaster later. I'd be interested to hear your take on that
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Epistemic violence: reflections between the invisible and the ignorable
https://www.aacademica.org/moira.perez/84.pdf
"Among the forms of violence that affect socially marginalized identities, epistemic violence is probably one of the least addressed, in favor of more direct or spectacular ones.
However, it is a political, ethical and epistemic phenomenon that affects everything from day-to-day relationships to professional practice, from grassroots activism to international law.
Epistemic violence threatens the integrity of individuals and communities and plays a key role
in power systems such as sexism, colonialism, ableism, among others. This work offers a characterization of the phenomenon as a type of "slow violence", and an analysis of some of the ways in which it is presented. Subsequently, it analyzes the link between epistemic violence and identity, and considers the possibility of a violence-free epistemic system.
The paper seeks to offer tools to understand this form of violence more deeply and comprehensively, and to address it in the different spaces in which it is expressed."
https://www.aacademica.org/moira.perez/84.pdf
"Among the forms of violence that affect socially marginalized identities, epistemic violence is probably one of the least addressed, in favor of more direct or spectacular ones.
However, it is a political, ethical and epistemic phenomenon that affects everything from day-to-day relationships to professional practice, from grassroots activism to international law.
Epistemic violence threatens the integrity of individuals and communities and plays a key role
in power systems such as sexism, colonialism, ableism, among others. This work offers a characterization of the phenomenon as a type of "slow violence", and an analysis of some of the ways in which it is presented. Subsequently, it analyzes the link between epistemic violence and identity, and considers the possibility of a violence-free epistemic system.
The paper seeks to offer tools to understand this form of violence more deeply and comprehensively, and to address it in the different spaces in which it is expressed."
Forwarded from Brendan
"We know from a recent body of research on social responses that there are major barriers to healing in the aftermath of violence [and a range of other traumas.] One such barrier is the response of others upon disclosing violence.
Many individuals have reported receiving a negative or unsupportive response from family, friends and professionals. These responses range from a victim-blaming tone (“What were you doing in that part of town anyway?”), to mitigating the responsibility of the perpetrator (“he is trapped in a cycle, he was a victim himself ”,“he has alcohol issues”), to being disbelieved (“she is a good person and would never do that to you”).
Language use plays an important part in casting the position and responsibility of the victim and perpetrator. Research conducted by Coates and Wade (2007) demonstrated four operations of language used to 1) conceal violence, 2) conceal resistance, 3) mitigate the responsibility of the perpetrator and 4) to shift the blame onto the victim.
These four operations are often found together in legal and human service settings and exert a profound influence
on social responses and victims’ recovery. "
Many individuals have reported receiving a negative or unsupportive response from family, friends and professionals. These responses range from a victim-blaming tone (“What were you doing in that part of town anyway?”), to mitigating the responsibility of the perpetrator (“he is trapped in a cycle, he was a victim himself ”,“he has alcohol issues”), to being disbelieved (“she is a good person and would never do that to you”).
Language use plays an important part in casting the position and responsibility of the victim and perpetrator. Research conducted by Coates and Wade (2007) demonstrated four operations of language used to 1) conceal violence, 2) conceal resistance, 3) mitigate the responsibility of the perpetrator and 4) to shift the blame onto the victim.
These four operations are often found together in legal and human service settings and exert a profound influence
on social responses and victims’ recovery. "
Forwarded from Brendan
"When violence [and a variety of traumas, including epistemic trauma] has never been properly acknowledged, redressed and safety restored, the suffering of the victim is perpetuated and enhanced (Andrews & Brewin, 1990; Brewin & Brewin, ; Andrews, Brewin & Rose, 2003).
Alternatively, language can be used to clarify responsibility and bring into the light the ways that the person responded to the violence, while never consenting to what was being done to them, even if overt demonstrations of resistance were not possible due to the danger.
Making clear what has happened and what is necessary to repair or make whole what was once whole, is part of an orchestrated positive social response to the victim of violence.
Islands of Safety aims to create safety by orchestrating positive responses to children and to adults at risk in the context
of their families, including concrete and workable safety plans."
Alternatively, language can be used to clarify responsibility and bring into the light the ways that the person responded to the violence, while never consenting to what was being done to them, even if overt demonstrations of resistance were not possible due to the danger.
Making clear what has happened and what is necessary to repair or make whole what was once whole, is part of an orchestrated positive social response to the victim of violence.
Islands of Safety aims to create safety by orchestrating positive responses to children and to adults at risk in the context
of their families, including concrete and workable safety plans."
Trauma and the Credibility Economy: An Analysis of Epistemic Violence and its Traumatic Functions (Gina Stinnett, 2018)
https://ir.library.illinoisstate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1922&context=etd
" I argue that epistemic injustice has its own power to traumatize. I refer to this as “epistemic trauma,” or a trauma to one’s ability to know their experience and to make a claim based on this knowledge.
Research on epistemic injustice states that when one encounters repeated epistemic injustice, they become less likely to share their experiences at all—they fall into a coerced self-silencing. In the context of trauma, epistemic injustice can take away one’s ability to make sense of their traumatic experience. If they cannot “know” their experience, they cannot speak it.
I differentiate among physical trauma, psychological trauma, and epistemic trauma, which I believe all function in different ways—sometimes in the same traumatic experience.
If physical trauma is the literal trauma to one’s body, and psychological trauma is the damage to one’s psyche as a result of this trauma, then epistemic trauma would be the damage to one’s sense that they are able to know and make sense of their experiences, and make a claim based on this experience."
https://ir.library.illinoisstate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1922&context=etd
" I argue that epistemic injustice has its own power to traumatize. I refer to this as “epistemic trauma,” or a trauma to one’s ability to know their experience and to make a claim based on this knowledge.
Research on epistemic injustice states that when one encounters repeated epistemic injustice, they become less likely to share their experiences at all—they fall into a coerced self-silencing. In the context of trauma, epistemic injustice can take away one’s ability to make sense of their traumatic experience. If they cannot “know” their experience, they cannot speak it.
I differentiate among physical trauma, psychological trauma, and epistemic trauma, which I believe all function in different ways—sometimes in the same traumatic experience.
If physical trauma is the literal trauma to one’s body, and psychological trauma is the damage to one’s psyche as a result of this trauma, then epistemic trauma would be the damage to one’s sense that they are able to know and make sense of their experiences, and make a claim based on this experience."
Forwarded from Brendan
The Powers of Individual and Collective Intellectual Self-Trust in Dealing with Epistemic Injustice by Nadja El Kassar
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1wKEGtagMU86AHuVbWZlVL_ihII98nUD8/view?usp=sharing
"I have argued elsewhere that disadvantaged subjects must have intellectual self-trust in order to be able to avail themselves of epistemic advantages that they may have because of their particular marginalized position in unjust communities (El Kassar 2020).
This is because intellectual self-trust enables them to fend off the effects of epistemic injustice. The marginalized or oppressed subject must know when she can trust her beliefs, her senses, her conclusions despite contrary evidence from members of the dominant group. She must know when to accept criticism and challenges, when to reject them, and when ‘to put the brakes on reflection’ (Jones 2012, 244).
This is what intellectual self-trust enables her to do and this is one of the key features of intellectual self-trust that make it a defense mechanism against the effects of epistemic injustice. Epistemic injustice induces doubt in those subject to epistemic injustice, keeps them from participating in knowledge production and in the epistemic practices, it harms their epistemic agency. And intellectual self-trust can block the destructive effects of epistemic injustice, such as inducing self-doubt."
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1wKEGtagMU86AHuVbWZlVL_ihII98nUD8/view?usp=sharing
"I have argued elsewhere that disadvantaged subjects must have intellectual self-trust in order to be able to avail themselves of epistemic advantages that they may have because of their particular marginalized position in unjust communities (El Kassar 2020).
This is because intellectual self-trust enables them to fend off the effects of epistemic injustice. The marginalized or oppressed subject must know when she can trust her beliefs, her senses, her conclusions despite contrary evidence from members of the dominant group. She must know when to accept criticism and challenges, when to reject them, and when ‘to put the brakes on reflection’ (Jones 2012, 244).
This is what intellectual self-trust enables her to do and this is one of the key features of intellectual self-trust that make it a defense mechanism against the effects of epistemic injustice. Epistemic injustice induces doubt in those subject to epistemic injustice, keeps them from participating in knowledge production and in the epistemic practices, it harms their epistemic agency. And intellectual self-trust can block the destructive effects of epistemic injustice, such as inducing self-doubt."
Google Docs
The_Powers_of_Individual_and_Collective_Intellectual_Self_Trust_2020.pdf
Forwarded from Brendan
"And so, what are the special powers of intellectual self-trust with regard to epistemic injustice?
Individual intellectual self-trust can inhibit the effects of epistemic injustice on the epistemic agency of an individual because it can stop the cascade from experiencing epistemic injustice to being affected and being harmed by epistemic injustice.
It can also, in some instances, work against epistemic injustice itself, namely by enabling resistance against epistemic injustice. But to explain the resistance-related powers, we also need the role of the collective and the concept of collective intellectual self-trust in place, so I turn to this power later.
The obstructing powers of intellectual self-trust can stop the effects of epistemic injustice. Intellectual self-trust works both against epistemic and psychological effects because the self-trusting subject can stop the effects on her intellectual self-trust, and it can thereby also stop the effects on herself. For example, she is not thrown into doubt by testimonial injustice, since she trusts her cognitive capacities, her experiences, her beliefs, her thoughts.
Consequently, she is also not kept from making sense of herself and her hopes and desires."
Individual intellectual self-trust can inhibit the effects of epistemic injustice on the epistemic agency of an individual because it can stop the cascade from experiencing epistemic injustice to being affected and being harmed by epistemic injustice.
It can also, in some instances, work against epistemic injustice itself, namely by enabling resistance against epistemic injustice. But to explain the resistance-related powers, we also need the role of the collective and the concept of collective intellectual self-trust in place, so I turn to this power later.
The obstructing powers of intellectual self-trust can stop the effects of epistemic injustice. Intellectual self-trust works both against epistemic and psychological effects because the self-trusting subject can stop the effects on her intellectual self-trust, and it can thereby also stop the effects on herself. For example, she is not thrown into doubt by testimonial injustice, since she trusts her cognitive capacities, her experiences, her beliefs, her thoughts.
Consequently, she is also not kept from making sense of herself and her hopes and desires."
Forwarded from Brendan
"Let me emphasize that a subject who has intellectual self-trust may well experience self-doubt, question herself, be unsettled by criticism rooted in epistemic injustice.
Intellectual self-trust cannot obstruct all effects of epistemic injustice. The intellectually self-trusting subject is still a vulnerable subject, but she is able to stop some questions and some criticism, and she is able to trust and develop her beliefs and conclusions based on her intellectual self-trust and the support of other subjects."
Intellectual self-trust cannot obstruct all effects of epistemic injustice. The intellectually self-trusting subject is still a vulnerable subject, but she is able to stop some questions and some criticism, and she is able to trust and develop her beliefs and conclusions based on her intellectual self-trust and the support of other subjects."
Forwarded from Brendan
The Community and Intellectual Self-Trust
"Other people, particularly those who are close to an individual, and communities are crucial for acquiring and maintaining intellectual self-trust with its powers. It is plausible that we start off with intellectual self-trust (cf. Zagzebski 2014) and then our environment – including ‘trusted figures, whether parents, teachers, or peers’ (Jones 2012, 245)– either supports us in sustaining and developing our self-trust or it does not.
This supportive environment can be either individuals or small, medium, large communities or a mix of both. Even within oppressive, unjust societies, disadvantaged subjects can meet other subjects and groups that support them and give them ‘honest and respectful feedback’ (McLeod 2002, 74) that the subject can take up to sustain their intellectual self-trust.
In fact, disadvantaged minorities may be particularly well-suited for providing such feedback and countering the harmful effects of oppressive stereotypes. For example, Patricia Hill Collins relates that Black women support other Black women by ‘affirm[ing] one another’s humanity, specialness, and right to exist’ (Collins 2009, 113)."
— 'The Powers of Individual and Collective Intellectual Self-Trust in Dealing with Epistemic Injustice' by Nadja El Kassar
(See also, 'Vices of the privileged and virtues of the oppressed in epistemic group dynamics' by Jose Medina — https://drive.google.com/file/d/1FEIobshBigKrsq0aqpOakUDxBZNUNfPk/view?usp=sharing )
"Other people, particularly those who are close to an individual, and communities are crucial for acquiring and maintaining intellectual self-trust with its powers. It is plausible that we start off with intellectual self-trust (cf. Zagzebski 2014) and then our environment – including ‘trusted figures, whether parents, teachers, or peers’ (Jones 2012, 245)– either supports us in sustaining and developing our self-trust or it does not.
This supportive environment can be either individuals or small, medium, large communities or a mix of both. Even within oppressive, unjust societies, disadvantaged subjects can meet other subjects and groups that support them and give them ‘honest and respectful feedback’ (McLeod 2002, 74) that the subject can take up to sustain their intellectual self-trust.
In fact, disadvantaged minorities may be particularly well-suited for providing such feedback and countering the harmful effects of oppressive stereotypes. For example, Patricia Hill Collins relates that Black women support other Black women by ‘affirm[ing] one another’s humanity, specialness, and right to exist’ (Collins 2009, 113)."
— 'The Powers of Individual and Collective Intellectual Self-Trust in Dealing with Epistemic Injustice' by Nadja El Kassar
(See also, 'Vices of the privileged and virtues of the oppressed in epistemic group dynamics' by Jose Medina — https://drive.google.com/file/d/1FEIobshBigKrsq0aqpOakUDxBZNUNfPk/view?usp=sharing )
Google Docs
Medina_Vices of the privileged and virtues of the oppressed in epistemic group dynamics.pdf
Apologies for so much text but these seemed especially relevant
Basically there are ways to counter epistemic violence, through collaborative sensemaking for example