1/3
Let me finally explain the bit that everyone keeps missing. I'm presenting this in Cambridge this month. Bitcoin is a game. It is not a Nash game, but a Stackelberg dynamic game.
What this means is that you cannot treat the second round as being analogous to the first. If you have a 40% selfish miner, and they start hiding blocks, you end up with orphan blocks. Also, chains of unseen blocks.
The argument is that on the difficulty change that the miner hiding blocks will gain an advantage. There is one part missing but I been hinting at for two years. It's not a static game. Miners do not throw 100% of the hash rate that they control to mining at any time. They turn machines on or off based on the current difficulty and reward. That is they act on incentives and profitability. A selfish miner at 40% will be acting at 100% of their hash rate. The reason to explain this a simple, if the selfish miner had 50% of the hash rate already, they would not need to do selfish mining as the process of controlling the network with 50% is more cost-effective. That is, it is more profitable to add hash where it is available and thus the selfish miner will be acting at the complete hash rate they control.
Alternatively, other hash will be idle. This is simple to explain. At any point in bitcoin's history, the total hash rate available has always been more than double the hash rate deployed. It would include older machines as well as machines that are turned off for reasons including maintenance or simply lower profitability. All of these machines would be re-enabled in the event of a drop in hash rate where the price remains stable.
During the attack, the hash rate will vary.
For a 40% selfish miner, the selfish miner now earns 51.52 blocks of the original 144. The problem is that this assumes a stable hash rate. The reality is that 44% of the hash rate has been turned into orphans. To an external miner not paying attention this would appear to be simply a massive opportunity. Where we before had 100 units of hash power, these are now turning out 56 units. As such, it would be expected that the remaining units start to come online to their profitability level. If these disabled units are profitable at 80% of the machines that are turned on for the main pool of non-selfish miners, we will have lower overall hash rate that is creating blocks but still increase overall. In this case, 0.80x44 units will come online. This now creates a scenario for the follower group where they are profitable with an additional 35.2 mining units for a total act of hash rate of 132.2 mining units.
The overall hash power of the selfish miner now drops to under 30% of the total network.
The argument made on the selfish mining attack is that the attacker will recoup lost profit after the difficulty change. Unfortunately, the non-static nature of bitcoin leads to a follower reaction. That is, the leader has a choice of acting profitably in a Stackelberg game or defecting and losing their advantage. If the leader decides to act outside the rules, the system reacts as the follower miners are sequential. That is, the total hash power is deployed publicly in round one and in round two all other miners act. If hash power is hidden, the follower miners act as if the hash power has been turned off or removed in some other way.
As such, we can show that mining is not profitable with in the difficulty change period and is also restrained following this. More importantly, the cost of attacking the network is far greater in a dynamic network than a static one. In a static network, the selfish miner can only start to recover after a difficulty adjustment. However, miners will quickly see the difference in orphans and lost hash rate and react to this. The reaction would occur in as little as 1 to 2 hours which is a small fraction of the two-week difficulty period.
CSW
May 6, 2019
https://metanet-icu.slack.com/archives/C5131HKFX/p1557132490418500?thread_ts=1557132490.418500&cid=C5131HKFX
1/3
https://t.me/CSW_Slack/2398
Let me finally explain the bit that everyone keeps missing. I'm presenting this in Cambridge this month. Bitcoin is a game. It is not a Nash game, but a Stackelberg dynamic game.
What this means is that you cannot treat the second round as being analogous to the first. If you have a 40% selfish miner, and they start hiding blocks, you end up with orphan blocks. Also, chains of unseen blocks.
The argument is that on the difficulty change that the miner hiding blocks will gain an advantage. There is one part missing but I been hinting at for two years. It's not a static game. Miners do not throw 100% of the hash rate that they control to mining at any time. They turn machines on or off based on the current difficulty and reward. That is they act on incentives and profitability. A selfish miner at 40% will be acting at 100% of their hash rate. The reason to explain this a simple, if the selfish miner had 50% of the hash rate already, they would not need to do selfish mining as the process of controlling the network with 50% is more cost-effective. That is, it is more profitable to add hash where it is available and thus the selfish miner will be acting at the complete hash rate they control.
Alternatively, other hash will be idle. This is simple to explain. At any point in bitcoin's history, the total hash rate available has always been more than double the hash rate deployed. It would include older machines as well as machines that are turned off for reasons including maintenance or simply lower profitability. All of these machines would be re-enabled in the event of a drop in hash rate where the price remains stable.
During the attack, the hash rate will vary.
For a 40% selfish miner, the selfish miner now earns 51.52 blocks of the original 144. The problem is that this assumes a stable hash rate. The reality is that 44% of the hash rate has been turned into orphans. To an external miner not paying attention this would appear to be simply a massive opportunity. Where we before had 100 units of hash power, these are now turning out 56 units. As such, it would be expected that the remaining units start to come online to their profitability level. If these disabled units are profitable at 80% of the machines that are turned on for the main pool of non-selfish miners, we will have lower overall hash rate that is creating blocks but still increase overall. In this case, 0.80x44 units will come online. This now creates a scenario for the follower group where they are profitable with an additional 35.2 mining units for a total act of hash rate of 132.2 mining units.
The overall hash power of the selfish miner now drops to under 30% of the total network.
The argument made on the selfish mining attack is that the attacker will recoup lost profit after the difficulty change. Unfortunately, the non-static nature of bitcoin leads to a follower reaction. That is, the leader has a choice of acting profitably in a Stackelberg game or defecting and losing their advantage. If the leader decides to act outside the rules, the system reacts as the follower miners are sequential. That is, the total hash power is deployed publicly in round one and in round two all other miners act. If hash power is hidden, the follower miners act as if the hash power has been turned off or removed in some other way.
As such, we can show that mining is not profitable with in the difficulty change period and is also restrained following this. More importantly, the cost of attacking the network is far greater in a dynamic network than a static one. In a static network, the selfish miner can only start to recover after a difficulty adjustment. However, miners will quickly see the difference in orphans and lost hash rate and react to this. The reaction would occur in as little as 1 to 2 hours which is a small fraction of the two-week difficulty period.
CSW
May 6, 2019
https://metanet-icu.slack.com/archives/C5131HKFX/p1557132490418500?thread_ts=1557132490.418500&cid=C5131HKFX
1/3
https://t.me/CSW_Slack/2398
Telegram
CSW - Slack Channel
CSW
May 6, 2019
https://metanet-icu.slack.com/archives/C5131HKFX/p1557132490418500?thread_ts=1557132490.418500&cid=C5131HKFX
https://t.me/CSW_Slack/2398
May 6, 2019
https://metanet-icu.slack.com/archives/C5131HKFX/p1557132490418500?thread_ts=1557132490.418500&cid=C5131HKFX
https://t.me/CSW_Slack/2398
2/3
So, the network is self resilient. As miners move hash, other miners react. This creates an efficient market within bitcoin. It is not possible to have pseudonymous mining groups act in full collusion and remain secret doing this. As with other attacks, a selfish mining scenario can be modelled as a simple Stackelberg duopoly. In this, the selfish miner acts as the leader and all others who are mining or potentially mining act as the follower group.
https://econpapers.repec.org/article/aeaaecrev/v_3a80_3ay_3a1990_3ai_3a5_3ap_3a1231-37.htm
This is important to note, as with Daughety (1990), we can show that asymmetry and concentration affect the results and can lead to beneficial societal consequences. These consequences come from noncooperative firm interactions. In reacting, the Stackelberg followers ensure that a leader acts within a socially and individually optimal range. Focusing on concentration is misguided. The actions within the system that reduce and increase concentration based on profitability are welfare enhancing for the overall bitcoin system. Nodes within the bitcoin system increase and reduce the amount of investment and the amount of hash power deployed dynamically.
The difference with a Stackelberg market from a Cournot is the increase in aggregate output. Daughety (1990) demonstrated that in an and firm Stackelberg oligopoly with (m<=n) Stackelberg leaders and (n-m) Stackelberg followers that the market will compensate in a way that can be shown to create an overall loss of profitability but again in customer surplus. In bitcoin mining, an action such as selfish mining increases losses to the Stackelberg leader who seeks to alter the consensus process by hiding blocks. The reaction of the followers in increasing the total hash power delivers the followers more profit while reducing the profitability of the leader or selfish miner even further.
The perceived Nash equilibrium that would result in a static system that acts more like a Cournot market does not exist due to the dynamic nature of bitcoin mining. As soon as the leader sets a strategy, the followers will react. The reason selfish mining does not exist in the real world comes from the strategic process. The selfish miner will take the strategy of the follower into account. The leader back propagates its actions based on the expected action of the follower. The selfish miner as leader understands that if they hide blocks and increase the often rate they will simultaneously make mining more blocks at a higher hash rate more attractive to the followers and thus the result is an increased total hash rate. This increase in hash rate significantly reduces the profitability of the selfish miner even as they start to try and orphan other blocks. This increase in hash rate also decreases the benefit of hiding blocks. As the 40% miner drops to under 30% of the total hash power, the selfish mining strategy changes from one that produces more blocks to one that becomes increasingly less profitable. The breakeven point for a selfish miner is 33% of the resulting network. To achieve this the selfish miner needs to have 50% of the original network in which case, there is no benefit from selfish mining.
The problem that has been common when analysing bitcoin as a system is to treat it as a static and not dynamic game. Bitcoin is nonstatic. As the profitability increases and discovery rate drops, other miners enter and start to compete. As the profitability decreases, miners leave.
I tried to help others to see all this...
I have hinted for years now
I have stated, it is a STACKELBERG Game over and over
That means - a NON STATIC game
Starting to get it now?
CSW
May 6, 2019
https://metanet-icu.slack.com/archives/C5131HKFX/p1557132490418500?thread_ts=1557132490.418500&cid=C5131HKFX
2/3
https://t.me/CSW_Slack/2398
So, the network is self resilient. As miners move hash, other miners react. This creates an efficient market within bitcoin. It is not possible to have pseudonymous mining groups act in full collusion and remain secret doing this. As with other attacks, a selfish mining scenario can be modelled as a simple Stackelberg duopoly. In this, the selfish miner acts as the leader and all others who are mining or potentially mining act as the follower group.
https://econpapers.repec.org/article/aeaaecrev/v_3a80_3ay_3a1990_3ai_3a5_3ap_3a1231-37.htm
This is important to note, as with Daughety (1990), we can show that asymmetry and concentration affect the results and can lead to beneficial societal consequences. These consequences come from noncooperative firm interactions. In reacting, the Stackelberg followers ensure that a leader acts within a socially and individually optimal range. Focusing on concentration is misguided. The actions within the system that reduce and increase concentration based on profitability are welfare enhancing for the overall bitcoin system. Nodes within the bitcoin system increase and reduce the amount of investment and the amount of hash power deployed dynamically.
The difference with a Stackelberg market from a Cournot is the increase in aggregate output. Daughety (1990) demonstrated that in an and firm Stackelberg oligopoly with (m<=n) Stackelberg leaders and (n-m) Stackelberg followers that the market will compensate in a way that can be shown to create an overall loss of profitability but again in customer surplus. In bitcoin mining, an action such as selfish mining increases losses to the Stackelberg leader who seeks to alter the consensus process by hiding blocks. The reaction of the followers in increasing the total hash power delivers the followers more profit while reducing the profitability of the leader or selfish miner even further.
The perceived Nash equilibrium that would result in a static system that acts more like a Cournot market does not exist due to the dynamic nature of bitcoin mining. As soon as the leader sets a strategy, the followers will react. The reason selfish mining does not exist in the real world comes from the strategic process. The selfish miner will take the strategy of the follower into account. The leader back propagates its actions based on the expected action of the follower. The selfish miner as leader understands that if they hide blocks and increase the often rate they will simultaneously make mining more blocks at a higher hash rate more attractive to the followers and thus the result is an increased total hash rate. This increase in hash rate significantly reduces the profitability of the selfish miner even as they start to try and orphan other blocks. This increase in hash rate also decreases the benefit of hiding blocks. As the 40% miner drops to under 30% of the total hash power, the selfish mining strategy changes from one that produces more blocks to one that becomes increasingly less profitable. The breakeven point for a selfish miner is 33% of the resulting network. To achieve this the selfish miner needs to have 50% of the original network in which case, there is no benefit from selfish mining.
The problem that has been common when analysing bitcoin as a system is to treat it as a static and not dynamic game. Bitcoin is nonstatic. As the profitability increases and discovery rate drops, other miners enter and start to compete. As the profitability decreases, miners leave.
I tried to help others to see all this...
I have hinted for years now
I have stated, it is a STACKELBERG Game over and over
That means - a NON STATIC game
Starting to get it now?
CSW
May 6, 2019
https://metanet-icu.slack.com/archives/C5131HKFX/p1557132490418500?thread_ts=1557132490.418500&cid=C5131HKFX
2/3
https://t.me/CSW_Slack/2398
econpapers.repec.org
EconPapers: Beneficial Concentration
By Andrew Daughety; Beneficial Concentration
3/3
So basically, when I started this people believed it was instantly profitable to selfish mine. I then demonstrated that it is not instantly profitable because the often rate makes everyone lose. We then moved to the difficulty adjustment saying that everyone is going to be static and that in two weeks the huge and I mean massive losses suffered by the selfish miner will start to be recouped.
The problem is, it is a Stackelberg or dynamic game. It is not a Caurnot game and does not have a single static Nash equilibrium. Bitcoin is far more complex in nature than any Nash game. There are no equilibrium is outside of the initial rules. The equilibrium is honest mining. Every other state is a loss.
The assumption that keeps being made is static hash power. At any point there are additional mining systems that are not profitable with the current hash rate. These might be older S7s or even new machines that are on higher-up power cost-based facilities. It could even be that these miners have differential pricing based on the amount of power used. That is, if they use 10 units they pay a profitable rate but if they need more power and use 12 units the incremental power costs for the additional two units would be at a higher cost.
The result of this is that where the total hash power is perceived to drop, and remember if you are hiding blocks you are lowering the perceived hash rate, then other miners will add hash rate.
The result of this is that where the total hash power is perceived to drop, and remember if you are hiding blocks you are lowering the perceived hash rate, then other I'll miners will add hash rate. The consequence is that you lose any perceived game. Strategically, a miner is acting based on the fact propagated results of the follower. The selfish miner always signals. In hiding hash rate, the leader or selfish miner in this instance has signalled that they are reducing hash rate. The reaction to a follower miner for a profitable scenario where the hash rate has dropped significantly is to react by increasing hash rate. These miners will likely overshoot. The initial additional hash rate will exceed the amount lost through orphan and hidden blocks but will then start to come to an equilibrium as the isolation process of over and under shooting based on a probabilistic and not known true hash rate starts to be found.
This is a Bayesian process.
The simple result is that reacting to hide blocks is not seen as a selfish mining attack until it has been countered through the reaction of the follower miners who expect higher profits. The reaction of the leader in this instance delivers those profits. The leader miner who acts to reduce their lead through dishonest processes in effect stops their own leadership by reducing their overall hash rate on an ongoing basis.
CSW
May 6, 2019
https://metanet-icu.slack.com/archives/C5131HKFX/p1557132490418500?thread_ts=1557132490.418500&cid=C5131HKFX
3/3
https://t.me/CSW_Slack/2398
So basically, when I started this people believed it was instantly profitable to selfish mine. I then demonstrated that it is not instantly profitable because the often rate makes everyone lose. We then moved to the difficulty adjustment saying that everyone is going to be static and that in two weeks the huge and I mean massive losses suffered by the selfish miner will start to be recouped.
The problem is, it is a Stackelberg or dynamic game. It is not a Caurnot game and does not have a single static Nash equilibrium. Bitcoin is far more complex in nature than any Nash game. There are no equilibrium is outside of the initial rules. The equilibrium is honest mining. Every other state is a loss.
The assumption that keeps being made is static hash power. At any point there are additional mining systems that are not profitable with the current hash rate. These might be older S7s or even new machines that are on higher-up power cost-based facilities. It could even be that these miners have differential pricing based on the amount of power used. That is, if they use 10 units they pay a profitable rate but if they need more power and use 12 units the incremental power costs for the additional two units would be at a higher cost.
The result of this is that where the total hash power is perceived to drop, and remember if you are hiding blocks you are lowering the perceived hash rate, then other miners will add hash rate.
The result of this is that where the total hash power is perceived to drop, and remember if you are hiding blocks you are lowering the perceived hash rate, then other I'll miners will add hash rate. The consequence is that you lose any perceived game. Strategically, a miner is acting based on the fact propagated results of the follower. The selfish miner always signals. In hiding hash rate, the leader or selfish miner in this instance has signalled that they are reducing hash rate. The reaction to a follower miner for a profitable scenario where the hash rate has dropped significantly is to react by increasing hash rate. These miners will likely overshoot. The initial additional hash rate will exceed the amount lost through orphan and hidden blocks but will then start to come to an equilibrium as the isolation process of over and under shooting based on a probabilistic and not known true hash rate starts to be found.
This is a Bayesian process.
The simple result is that reacting to hide blocks is not seen as a selfish mining attack until it has been countered through the reaction of the follower miners who expect higher profits. The reaction of the leader in this instance delivers those profits. The leader miner who acts to reduce their lead through dishonest processes in effect stops their own leadership by reducing their overall hash rate on an ongoing basis.
CSW
May 6, 2019
https://metanet-icu.slack.com/archives/C5131HKFX/p1557132490418500?thread_ts=1557132490.418500&cid=C5131HKFX
3/3
https://t.me/CSW_Slack/2398
Telegram
CSW - Slack Channel
CSW
May 6, 2019
https://metanet-icu.slack.com/archives/C5131HKFX/p1557132490418500?thread_ts=1557132490.418500&cid=C5131HKFX
https://t.me/CSW_Slack/2398
May 6, 2019
https://metanet-icu.slack.com/archives/C5131HKFX/p1557132490418500?thread_ts=1557132490.418500&cid=C5131HKFX
https://t.me/CSW_Slack/2398
You can't really answer this. When talking about how long is a piece of string. A central bank project will be able to do the basic transfer for fractions of a fraction of a cent but this is not the issue. The issue has their own internal structures.
You can print as many tokens as you want. The central bank loses no control, they gain the ability to trace money. If anything, it allows them to determine how much of their cash is overseas and how much is being used and moved. It enables them to recover lost funds and much more.
Bitcoin doesn't impact fractional reserve lending at all. I said this.
Bitcoin itself acts analogously to gold. Remember however that the US dollar or British pound also acted on the gold standard with fractional reserve banking.
Capital requirements are already monitored. This is a part of the existing banking system. The problem isn't bitcoin. Capital reserves are often held in volatile assets such as shares. If the share price goes down, the capitalisation of the bank also goes down.
This is the fallacy with bitcoin banking that people don't get. Bitcoin can be used as a currency, but it doesn't stop fractional reserve. For instance, if you're in a US dollar bank, you couldn't even have bitcoin as a reserve like some people think. The problem again is volatility. A bank cannot have a volatile asset as fluctuations are leveraged. Bitcoin is volatile, but bitcoin leveraged is many times more volatile.
Imagine, there is a 10 to 1 leverage which is not that unusual. If bitcoin exhibits a price volatility of 10%, the leveraged now makes this variation over 100% of the value. Banks can't operate that way.
Tokenised fiat on top of bitcoin can be issued exactly as it is now but we will not see corporate investment of bitcoin until the volatility is next to nothing.
without use, BTC will never achieve this
the only way to gain use is to increase the block size
yes, nobody really knows how much gold there is compared to the amount that is sold
Bitcoin is cash - it is not a replacement for money as a whole
@Ric
All these things come down to economies of scale and profit considerations.
the central bank of a country could do this for fractions of a cent per transaction but it comes down to a question of how many transactions and how much currency the bank is issuing and how much monitoring they want to implement.
CSW
Oct 13, 2020
https://metanet-icu.slack.com/archives/C5131HKFX/p1602586584308500?thread_ts=1602586584.308500&cid=C5131HKFX
https://t.me/CSW_Slack/2400
You can print as many tokens as you want. The central bank loses no control, they gain the ability to trace money. If anything, it allows them to determine how much of their cash is overseas and how much is being used and moved. It enables them to recover lost funds and much more.
Bitcoin doesn't impact fractional reserve lending at all. I said this.
Bitcoin itself acts analogously to gold. Remember however that the US dollar or British pound also acted on the gold standard with fractional reserve banking.
Capital requirements are already monitored. This is a part of the existing banking system. The problem isn't bitcoin. Capital reserves are often held in volatile assets such as shares. If the share price goes down, the capitalisation of the bank also goes down.
This is the fallacy with bitcoin banking that people don't get. Bitcoin can be used as a currency, but it doesn't stop fractional reserve. For instance, if you're in a US dollar bank, you couldn't even have bitcoin as a reserve like some people think. The problem again is volatility. A bank cannot have a volatile asset as fluctuations are leveraged. Bitcoin is volatile, but bitcoin leveraged is many times more volatile.
Imagine, there is a 10 to 1 leverage which is not that unusual. If bitcoin exhibits a price volatility of 10%, the leveraged now makes this variation over 100% of the value. Banks can't operate that way.
Tokenised fiat on top of bitcoin can be issued exactly as it is now but we will not see corporate investment of bitcoin until the volatility is next to nothing.
without use, BTC will never achieve this
the only way to gain use is to increase the block size
yes, nobody really knows how much gold there is compared to the amount that is sold
Bitcoin is cash - it is not a replacement for money as a whole
@Ric
All these things come down to economies of scale and profit considerations.
the central bank of a country could do this for fractions of a cent per transaction but it comes down to a question of how many transactions and how much currency the bank is issuing and how much monitoring they want to implement.
CSW
Oct 13, 2020
https://metanet-icu.slack.com/archives/C5131HKFX/p1602586584308500?thread_ts=1602586584.308500&cid=C5131HKFX
https://t.me/CSW_Slack/2400
Telegram
CSW - Slack Channel
CSW
Oct 13, 2020
https://metanet-icu.slack.com/archives/C5131HKFX/p1602586584308500?thread_ts=1602586584.308500&cid=C5131HKFX
https://t.me/CSW_Slack/2400
Oct 13, 2020
https://metanet-icu.slack.com/archives/C5131HKFX/p1602586584308500?thread_ts=1602586584.308500&cid=C5131HKFX
https://t.me/CSW_Slack/2400
The end will be the Japanese government filing criminal charges for false misrepresentation and fraud
Yes
BTC IS an investment contract
Started in 2017 with no use other than coin go up.
Not cash. Not a commodity and controlled by a small group of developers
CSW
Dic 23,. 2030
https://metanet-icu.slack.com/archives/C5131HKFX/p1608710744302500?thread_ts=1608710744.302500&cid=C5131HKFX
https://t.me/CSW_Slack/2402
Yes
BTC IS an investment contract
Started in 2017 with no use other than coin go up.
Not cash. Not a commodity and controlled by a small group of developers
CSW
Dic 23,. 2030
https://metanet-icu.slack.com/archives/C5131HKFX/p1608710744302500?thread_ts=1608710744.302500&cid=C5131HKFX
https://t.me/CSW_Slack/2402
Telegram
CSW - Slack Channel
CSW
Dic 23,. 2030
https://metanet-icu.slack.com/archives/C5131HKFX/p1608710744302500?thread_ts=1608710744.302500&cid=C5131HKFX
https://t.me/CSW_Slack/2402
Dic 23,. 2030
https://metanet-icu.slack.com/archives/C5131HKFX/p1608710744302500?thread_ts=1608710744.302500&cid=C5131HKFX
https://t.me/CSW_Slack/2402
There is no encryption in Bitcoin.
So, there is no way to stop coin being seized by Government, eg under a proceeds of crime order.
Exchanges and miners are companies
They are NOT decentralized
BTC is the SIMPLEST asset to be seized using a proceeds of crime order in human history
No blockchain operates outside law. It is a cash system and it can be hidden in SMALL amounts and that is it.
Bitcoin does not solve politics, if this is what you want, you are mislead
CSW
Dic 29, 2020
https://metanet-icu.slack.com/archives/C5131HKFX/p1609193907097000?thread_ts=1609193907.097000&cid=C5131HKFX
https://t.me/CSW_Slack/2404
So, there is no way to stop coin being seized by Government, eg under a proceeds of crime order.
Exchanges and miners are companies
They are NOT decentralized
BTC is the SIMPLEST asset to be seized using a proceeds of crime order in human history
No blockchain operates outside law. It is a cash system and it can be hidden in SMALL amounts and that is it.
Bitcoin does not solve politics, if this is what you want, you are mislead
CSW
Dic 29, 2020
https://metanet-icu.slack.com/archives/C5131HKFX/p1609193907097000?thread_ts=1609193907.097000&cid=C5131HKFX
https://t.me/CSW_Slack/2404
Telegram
CSW - Slack Channel
CSW
Dic 29, 2020
https://metanet-icu.slack.com/archives/C5131HKFX/p1609193907097000?thread_ts=1609193907.097000&cid=C5131HKFX
https://t.me/CSW_Slack/2404
Dic 29, 2020
https://metanet-icu.slack.com/archives/C5131HKFX/p1609193907097000?thread_ts=1609193907.097000&cid=C5131HKFX
https://t.me/CSW_Slack/2404
Ray Dillinger posted this comment on Bitcoin today
Dic 29, 2020
https://twitter.com/wakgill/status/1343946053205307394
Dic 29, 2020
https://twitter.com/wakgill/status/1343946053205307394
Twitter
Deryk Makgill ⛩
Wow! Ray Dillinger (one of first people to reply to Satoshi/comment on Bitcoin code) wrote an email declaring it a "failure" today. 'The scarcity of block chain space has led people to re-invent every last feature of the banks they thought they were going…
no, it isn't a failure. The problem is Ray and Hal did not want what I want
it works perfectly
it was never meant to be set up otherwise. I stated that it ends in data centres in 2008. This is the problem, everybody I've got with an inkling of wanting to work on this also has wacky ideas about what should be
it is not designed to take down governments
it is not designed to replace banking
in fact, you can't be your own bank because banks are not about giving out cash or holding it. Banks are about loans
Banks take long-term risk and balance it was short-term risk.. Cryptocurrency doesn't do this. Cash doesn't do this.
Wei - Ray wanted b-money idea 1
I wanted 2
I always stated - IT ENDS IN DATACENTRES
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=532.msg6306#msg6306
Those few nodes will be big server farms.
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=149668.msg1596879#msg1596879
And honestly
It is now too late, my version will win, and no anon coin will ever be allowed
CSW
Dic 29, 2020
https://metanet-icu.slack.com/archives/C5131HKFX/p1609258023162900?thread_ts=1609258023.162900&cid=C5131HKFX
it works perfectly
it was never meant to be set up otherwise. I stated that it ends in data centres in 2008. This is the problem, everybody I've got with an inkling of wanting to work on this also has wacky ideas about what should be
it is not designed to take down governments
it is not designed to replace banking
in fact, you can't be your own bank because banks are not about giving out cash or holding it. Banks are about loans
Banks take long-term risk and balance it was short-term risk.. Cryptocurrency doesn't do this. Cash doesn't do this.
Wei - Ray wanted b-money idea 1
I wanted 2
I always stated - IT ENDS IN DATACENTRES
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=532.msg6306#msg6306
Those few nodes will be big server farms.
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=149668.msg1596879#msg1596879
And honestly
It is now too late, my version will win, and no anon coin will ever be allowed
CSW
Dic 29, 2020
https://metanet-icu.slack.com/archives/C5131HKFX/p1609258023162900?thread_ts=1609258023.162900&cid=C5131HKFX
Vitelik is not educated in any manner either as a computer scientist or generally in life. So, why people think that he has a concept of how this all works is beyond me. The fact of the matter is that more systems are good. More access points are good. But this is not a function of one node one IP address as he seems to think. The reality is there will only ever be less than 100 nodes on bitcoin. While that may not seem much to some people, and the reality is that the majority of hash power will be held by less than five nodes at any time, the major nodes in the future as it scales will be bigger and more widely distributed.
Bitcoin scales horizontally. So, one of those five nodes will have tens of access points. In his cursory analysis of how the Internet works but doesn’t even really address much of that he has neglected to understand how commercial systems scale when they are able to scale horizontally. The ability to determine a node based on addressing doesn’t give him his concept of an attack as he seems to think. It is not the same as an IP address or a DNS address, nodes can watch the network across multiple access points and can have system set up that attackers don’t know about.
Basically, this is the sort of comment that someone who has never had any real training and information security would say. It is the sort of comment that movie hackers who haven’t formally done any risk training state all the time. It is the typical comment of the uneducated.
CSW
May 24, 2021
https://metanet-icu.slack.com/archives/C5131HKFX/p1621836360004000?thread_ts=1621818511.492300&cid=C5131HKFX
https://t.me/CSW_Slack/2409
Bitcoin scales horizontally. So, one of those five nodes will have tens of access points. In his cursory analysis of how the Internet works but doesn’t even really address much of that he has neglected to understand how commercial systems scale when they are able to scale horizontally. The ability to determine a node based on addressing doesn’t give him his concept of an attack as he seems to think. It is not the same as an IP address or a DNS address, nodes can watch the network across multiple access points and can have system set up that attackers don’t know about.
Basically, this is the sort of comment that someone who has never had any real training and information security would say. It is the sort of comment that movie hackers who haven’t formally done any risk training state all the time. It is the typical comment of the uneducated.
CSW
May 24, 2021
https://metanet-icu.slack.com/archives/C5131HKFX/p1621836360004000?thread_ts=1621818511.492300&cid=C5131HKFX
https://t.me/CSW_Slack/2409
Telegram
CSW - Slack Channel
CSW
May 24, 2021
https://metanet-icu.slack.com/archives/C5131HKFX/p1621836360004000?thread_ts=1621818511.492300&cid=C5131HKFX
https://t.me/CSW_Slack/2409
May 24, 2021
https://metanet-icu.slack.com/archives/C5131HKFX/p1621836360004000?thread_ts=1621818511.492300&cid=C5131HKFX
https://t.me/CSW_Slack/2409
yes, this was in one of the other threads and yes it ignores everything I set about bitcoin
Basically, there were two versions of b-money and the concept of CryptoCredits
CryptoCredits was the internal currency of the proposed blacknet system.
people like Tim and Wei wanted the first version
http://www.weidai.com/bmoney.txt
if you read this, you will see that there is a first and the second protocol
these are not compatible
The first protocol was designed for untraceable money. The second was discarded and never followed up because it allows for traceability, this is what was added into bitcoin to make it bitcoin.
Bitcoin was never designed to be the first protocol
I never intended it to be the first
others including Bear want to system for crypto anarchy, I do not.
and, the thing they don't seem to get is there is a dialectic between bitcoin and they are complete opposites. You cannot modify bitcoin, it only works in the format of the second protocol and this is all that I worked on to make work
the bit that was always missing was the economics of the system
the reality was they were not interested
I don't need to punish people as Wei and others believed, I simply have them as commercial entities.
they want crypto anarchy
I just created a system that uses competing companies
if you read the second protocol you'll see that it's bitcoin minus the economic incentives
https://ia600208.us.archive.org/10/items/cyphernomicon/cyphernomicon.txt
Both Hal and Bear.
And, As usual I missed this
Both of them wanted b-money protocol 1.
Both wanted, not-Bitcoin.
But, I thought Hal knew what he was doing and telling me and I listened, and was foolish enough not to trust myself.
I believed people when they told me Bitcoin was flawed
The truth, it was fine. The flaw was my willingness to listen and not to dogmatically hold onto my original concept tighter.
CSW
Dic 29, 2020
https://metanet-icu.slack.com/archives/C5131HKFX/p1609266408180200
https://t.me/CSW_Slack/2412
Basically, there were two versions of b-money and the concept of CryptoCredits
CryptoCredits was the internal currency of the proposed blacknet system.
people like Tim and Wei wanted the first version
http://www.weidai.com/bmoney.txt
if you read this, you will see that there is a first and the second protocol
these are not compatible
The first protocol was designed for untraceable money. The second was discarded and never followed up because it allows for traceability, this is what was added into bitcoin to make it bitcoin.
Bitcoin was never designed to be the first protocol
I never intended it to be the first
others including Bear want to system for crypto anarchy, I do not.
and, the thing they don't seem to get is there is a dialectic between bitcoin and they are complete opposites. You cannot modify bitcoin, it only works in the format of the second protocol and this is all that I worked on to make work
the bit that was always missing was the economics of the system
the reality was they were not interested
I don't need to punish people as Wei and others believed, I simply have them as commercial entities.
they want crypto anarchy
I just created a system that uses competing companies
if you read the second protocol you'll see that it's bitcoin minus the economic incentives
https://ia600208.us.archive.org/10/items/cyphernomicon/cyphernomicon.txt
Both Hal and Bear.
And, As usual I missed this
Both of them wanted b-money protocol 1.
Both wanted, not-Bitcoin.
But, I thought Hal knew what he was doing and telling me and I listened, and was foolish enough not to trust myself.
I believed people when they told me Bitcoin was flawed
The truth, it was fine. The flaw was my willingness to listen and not to dogmatically hold onto my original concept tighter.
CSW
Dic 29, 2020
https://metanet-icu.slack.com/archives/C5131HKFX/p1609266408180200
https://t.me/CSW_Slack/2412
Telegram
CSW - Slack Channel
CSW
Dic 29, 2020
https://metanet-icu.slack.com/archives/C5131HKFX/p1609266408180200
https://t.me/CSW_Slack/2412
Dic 29, 2020
https://metanet-icu.slack.com/archives/C5131HKFX/p1609266408180200
https://t.me/CSW_Slack/2412