Conflict Intelligence Team (en)
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Sitrep for May 4–5:

– Prigozhin yells at Shoigu and Gerasimov due to a shell hunger in Bakhmut;
– Another Russian air-dropped bomb with UMPK was found in the Belgorod region;
– New details were revealed in the incident with drone attacks on the Kremlin.

https://notes.citeam.org/dispatch-may-4-5
Volunteer Mobilization brief, May 4–5:

Passport checks are being introduced for Russian citizens entering Belarus; soldiers are forced to raise money for the funeral of a fellow serviceman; relatives of mobilized soldiers signed a petition addressed to Putin demanding to establish limits for how long mobilized servicemen are to remain in Ukraine

https://notes.citeam.org/mobi-may-4-5
Volunteer Mobilization brief May 5–7:

Draft resolution aiming to create a common register of Russians subject to military service by the end of 2023 appeared; a volunteer fighters commander got himself a “battlefield wife"; children fainted at the Immortal Regiment school rally.

https://notes.citeam.org/mobi-may-5-7
Sitrep for May 5–8:
– Assassination attempt on Zakhar Prilepin is fleshing out;
– Prigozhin said Surovikin would be responsible for ammunition supply to the Wagner Group;
– After arguing with journalists, the Ukrainian Air Force confirmed the interception of a Kinzhal missile.

https://notes.citeam.org/dispatch-may-5-8
Volunteer Mobilization brief May 7–8:

Relatives of mobilized soldiers from the Moscow region struggle to get their loved ones transferred out of assault units; this year's parade in Perm will showcase the "latest developments" of local defense enterprises; a drunken man hid a grenade in the bushes.

https://notes.citeam.org/mobi-may-7-8
Sitrep for May 8–9:
– The yesterday's night Russian attack was accompanied by air raid throughout Ukraine;
– Defense lines 25–30 km deep are being constructed by Russian forces in the Zaporizhzhia region;
– During the RuAF strike on Odesa on the night of May 8, a warehouse of the Red Cross Regional Organization was hit.

https://notes.citeam.org/dispatch-may-8-9
Volunteer Mobilization brief May 8–9:

Authorities used the Victory Day celebration sites to advertise contract military service; the number of combat veterans in Russia grew by almost 50 thousand people since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine; border guards are forced to contribute 2–3 thousand rubles from each paycheck toward the war.

https://notes.citeam.org/mobi-may-8-9
Sitrep for May 9–10:
– Agence France-Presse reported its correspondent Arman Soldin was killed in Ukraine;
– Pentagon confirmed the interception of a Kinzhal missile by the Patriot SAM system;
– The colonel accused of war crimes during the occupation of the Kyiv region participated in the parade in Khabarovsk.

https://notes.citeam.org/dispatch-may-9-10
Volunteer Mobilization brief May 9–10:

Putin signed a decree calling up military reservists for training; over 10 draftees were wounded as a result of a drone attack; fake mobilization orders with malicious software are sent en masse by e-mail to Saint Petersburg residents.

https://notes.citeam.org/mobi-may-9-10
Sitrep for May 10–11:
– A pardoned conscript, who had participated in the war, was arrested for sending threatening messages to the judge who had sentenced him;
– Russia's Ministry of Defense is unsure if it supplied the Wagner Group with ammunition;
– Conflicts within Russian forces allow the AFU to counterattack in Bakhmut.

https://notes.citeam.org/dispatch-may-10-11
Volunteer Mobilization brief May 10–11:

Russian citizens who did not serve in the army may be called for a reserve military training; restrictions can be imposed on a citizen for non-reporting to a military commissariat after a draft notice was served; residents of Buryatia have once again started receiving mobilization draft notices since April.

https://notes.citeam.org/mobi-may-10-11
Sitrep for May 11–12:
– After local successes of the AFU near Bakhmut, war correspondents raised a panic seeing in them the counteroffensive, but soon began to take their words back;
– The Financial Times found out how Russia managed to maintain access to sanctioned goods, including components for the military and industrial complex.

https://notes.citeam.org/dispatch-may-11-12
Volunteer Mobilization brief May 11–12:

Putin signed a decree for reducing the outflow of the Russian population abroad; first sentence was issued on the charges of government defense contract fraud; a State Duma member proposed to withhold 1% from bills in restaurants and channel the proceedings to support the families of servicemen fighting in Ukraine.

https://notes.citeam.org/mobi-may-11-12
After-Parade Report: Russian V-day Vehicle Numbers Decreasing for Second Year in a Row

Last year, the CIT team, together with volunteers, had already counted military vehicles participating in regional Victory Day parades and managed to cover 20 cities. This year we have analyzed footage of 56 parades. Thus, we were able to examine almost every major parade that took place in Russia on May 9.

The main Russian parade on the Red Square was held without tracked vehicles for the first time in decades, which triggered a new wave of talks about Russia’s military vehicles issues (which certainly exist). But, as we wrote last year, the regional parades provide a more representative dataset.
As can be seen on the graphs, the downtrend in the total number of vehicles continues: in the year 2021, prior to the invasion, more than 2000 vehicles took part in the parades, but in 2022 the number plummeted to less than 1300 units, and in 2023 it barely exceeded 900. At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that the drop is largely due to the cancellation of some parades — out of a total of 56 cities, 9 opted not to hold the event in 2023. Most of these cities (6) are located in the Southern Military District where decline was the most apparent, from 336 vehicles in 2022 to 157 in 2023. In the Western Military District, the drop was also quite noticeable — more than 100 vehicles or 25% of last year’s total. This is largely due to the Moscow parade falling 52 vehicles short of the 2022 number. At the same time, in the Central and Eastern Military Districts, the decline turned out to be quite negligible.
In terms of different types of military vehicles, we will single out air defence systems — contrary to last year, the decrease was quite noticeable this time, likely due to numerous UAV attacks on infrastructure facilities inside Russia. The number of artillery pieces, both tube artillery and MLRS, was also in decline, but not as steep as in 2022. The trend for tanks and armored fighting vehicles remained the same, and even reversed for MRAPs and IMVs. The number of non-combat vehicles almost didn’t change (specifically command, control and communications equipment, radar, electronic warfare, engineering equipment and logistics vehicles). Meanwhile, the number of various missile systems and unarmored vehicles has slightly increased.