Baltic Focus — Weekly Energy Theme
Baltic electricity system: capacity, demand, and domestic generation
EU context.
The European Commission links high electricity prices and system inefficiencies to insufficient cross-border grid capacity. According to the Commission, improved coordination and grid development could reduce curtailment and system losses, with potential savings of up to €500bn by mid-century.
At the same time, policy debate increasingly focuses on cost allocation and system resilience, rather than market access alone.
Cross-border interconnections: physical capacity (MW)
• EstLink 1 (EE–FI): 350 MW
• EstLink 2 (EE–FI): 650 MW
Estonia–Finland total: 1,000 MW
• NordBalt (LT–SE): 700 MW
• LitPol Link (LT–PL): 500 MW
Total nominal cross-border capacity serving the Baltics: ~2.2 GW
This figure represents a technical ceiling, not guaranteed availability.
Actual usable capacity may be lower due to maintenance, outages, or system security constraints.
Electricity consumption: demand scale (2024, approx., TWh)
• Estonia: ~8–9 TWh
• Latvia: ~6.5–7.5 TWh
• Lithuania: ~11–12 TWh
Baltic total: ~26–28 TWh per year
With EU energy-efficiency standards broadly harmonised, these differences primarily reflect current demand scale and economic structure, not efficiency gaps.
Domestic generation and system support
Latvia — hydropower as a balancing asset
• Installed hydropower capacity: ~1,560 MW
(Pļaviņas ~900 MW, Rīga ~400 MW, Ķegums ~260 MW)
• Annual generation (2024, approx.): ~3.0–3.8 TWh
Hydropower covers ~45–55% of Latvia’s annual electricity consumption, but only ~11–14% of total Baltic demand.
System role:
Latvian hydropower is dispatched primarily for balancing, peak coverage, and frequency support. It does not operate as continuous baseload, and its annual output is constrained by hydrological conditions.
Electricity exports therefore reflect system needs and market conditions, rather than sustained energy surplus, and do not structurally lower domestic electricity costs.
Estonia — oil shale as controllable generation
• Installed oil-shale-based capacity (Narva complex): ~1,000–1,300 MW
• Annual electricity generation (2024, approx.): ~4–5 TWh
Despite declining utilisation due to cost and climate policy, oil shale remains a dispatchable domestic resource, available for system security and peak demand coverage. This reduces Estonia’s reliance on imports during stress periods.
Lithuania — deficit market and gateway
Lithuania concentrates the region’s external entry points:
• NordBalt connects the Baltics to the Nordic hydro-based system.
• LitPol Link provides the only physical land connection to continental Europe.
This role is driven by geography, not market choice.
At the same time, Lithuania is the largest electricity-deficit market in the Baltics, making these interconnections essential for covering domestic demand as well as for transit.
Gas — methodological note
Gas is excluded from the core electricity balance. As an imported fuel, it does not currently constitute a structural element of the Baltic power system.
Its impact would become material only if gas-fired capacity were deployed explicitly as domestic reserve or peaking generation (for example, through a dedicated reserve plant).
As of now, gas affects the electricity system marginally and indirectly, not as a core balancing asset.
Capacity vs demand: the structural constraint
The Baltic electricity system operates with:
• hundreds of megawatts of cross-border capacity, versus
• tens of terawatt-hours of annual demand.
This asymmetry highlights a key vulnerability:
a single major cable outage can remove a material share of import capacity, which cannot be rapidly replaced due to physical limits of remaining interconnections.
Baltic electricity system: capacity, demand, and domestic generation
EU context.
The European Commission links high electricity prices and system inefficiencies to insufficient cross-border grid capacity. According to the Commission, improved coordination and grid development could reduce curtailment and system losses, with potential savings of up to €500bn by mid-century.
At the same time, policy debate increasingly focuses on cost allocation and system resilience, rather than market access alone.
Cross-border interconnections: physical capacity (MW)
• EstLink 1 (EE–FI): 350 MW
• EstLink 2 (EE–FI): 650 MW
Estonia–Finland total: 1,000 MW
• NordBalt (LT–SE): 700 MW
• LitPol Link (LT–PL): 500 MW
Total nominal cross-border capacity serving the Baltics: ~2.2 GW
This figure represents a technical ceiling, not guaranteed availability.
Actual usable capacity may be lower due to maintenance, outages, or system security constraints.
Electricity consumption: demand scale (2024, approx., TWh)
• Estonia: ~8–9 TWh
• Latvia: ~6.5–7.5 TWh
• Lithuania: ~11–12 TWh
Baltic total: ~26–28 TWh per year
With EU energy-efficiency standards broadly harmonised, these differences primarily reflect current demand scale and economic structure, not efficiency gaps.
Domestic generation and system support
Latvia — hydropower as a balancing asset
• Installed hydropower capacity: ~1,560 MW
(Pļaviņas ~900 MW, Rīga ~400 MW, Ķegums ~260 MW)
• Annual generation (2024, approx.): ~3.0–3.8 TWh
Hydropower covers ~45–55% of Latvia’s annual electricity consumption, but only ~11–14% of total Baltic demand.
System role:
Latvian hydropower is dispatched primarily for balancing, peak coverage, and frequency support. It does not operate as continuous baseload, and its annual output is constrained by hydrological conditions.
Electricity exports therefore reflect system needs and market conditions, rather than sustained energy surplus, and do not structurally lower domestic electricity costs.
Estonia — oil shale as controllable generation
• Installed oil-shale-based capacity (Narva complex): ~1,000–1,300 MW
• Annual electricity generation (2024, approx.): ~4–5 TWh
Despite declining utilisation due to cost and climate policy, oil shale remains a dispatchable domestic resource, available for system security and peak demand coverage. This reduces Estonia’s reliance on imports during stress periods.
Lithuania — deficit market and gateway
Lithuania concentrates the region’s external entry points:
• NordBalt connects the Baltics to the Nordic hydro-based system.
• LitPol Link provides the only physical land connection to continental Europe.
This role is driven by geography, not market choice.
At the same time, Lithuania is the largest electricity-deficit market in the Baltics, making these interconnections essential for covering domestic demand as well as for transit.
Gas — methodological note
Gas is excluded from the core electricity balance. As an imported fuel, it does not currently constitute a structural element of the Baltic power system.
Its impact would become material only if gas-fired capacity were deployed explicitly as domestic reserve or peaking generation (for example, through a dedicated reserve plant).
As of now, gas affects the electricity system marginally and indirectly, not as a core balancing asset.
Capacity vs demand: the structural constraint
The Baltic electricity system operates with:
• hundreds of megawatts of cross-border capacity, versus
• tens of terawatt-hours of annual demand.
This asymmetry highlights a key vulnerability:
a single major cable outage can remove a material share of import capacity, which cannot be rapidly replaced due to physical limits of remaining interconnections.
Analytical takeaway
• Cross-border interconnections improve flexibility and reduce curtailment risks.
• Domestic generation in Latvia and Estonia strengthens system stability, not energy abundance.
• Physical capacity limits and uneven demand remain binding constraints.
The Baltic region already illustrates a broader EU challenge:
electricity market integration advances faster than convergence in demand scale and system cost allocation.
BSM © 2025 balticfocus.org
#balticfocus #BalticEnergy #ElectricityMarkets #PowerGrid #EnergySecurity #NordicBaltic #EUenergy
• Cross-border interconnections improve flexibility and reduce curtailment risks.
• Domestic generation in Latvia and Estonia strengthens system stability, not energy abundance.
• Physical capacity limits and uneven demand remain binding constraints.
The Baltic region already illustrates a broader EU challenge:
electricity market integration advances faster than convergence in demand scale and system cost allocation.
BSM © 2025 balticfocus.org
#balticfocus #BalticEnergy #ElectricityMarkets #PowerGrid #EnergySecurity #NordicBaltic #EUenergy
Wind Energy in the Baltic States: Year-End Snapshot
At the end of 2025, wind energy development across the Baltic States shows a clearly differentiated landscape, shaped primarily by market maturity, ownership structure, and project pipelines rather than short-term sentiment indicators.
Public support for wind energy in Latvia broadly corresponds to the current stage of sector development in the Baltic region.
Latvia: Early-stage market with projects under development
By the end of 2025, Latvia’s installed onshore wind capacity stands at approximately 136 MW, making it the smallest wind market among the three Baltic States. The country has two major operational wind parks, both owned by the Estonian private energy company Utilitas, which is also active in wind energy development across the Baltic region.
The Latvian state-owned energy company Latvenergo does not own operational wind farms domestically, but holds several projects at the development stage. The most advanced of these is the Kaigu project (around 109 MW), with commissioning expected in 2026. Other large-scale projects remain on a later timeline.
Estonia: A mature, diversified wind market
Estonia has reached close to 700 MW of installed wind capacity. The market is characterised by several major players rather than a single dominant owner.
Key participants include state-linked Enefit Green and private energy company Utilitas, alongside additional developers. Estonia has largely transitioned from individual pilot projects to a stable portfolio of operating wind assets, and Estonian companies are active investors beyond national borders.
Lithuania: Scale, national leadership, and international capital
Lithuania is the clear regional leader, with installed wind capacity of approximately 2.3 GW by the end of 2025. The sector is anchored by Ignitis Group, the national energy company, which develops and operates the largest wind projects in the Baltic States, including the Kelmė onshore wind farm (314 MW).
Lithuania also attracts significant international investment. Latvenergo participates in two large Lithuanian wind projects through direct equity ownership in project companies, acting as a capital investor rather than a contractor or service provider. This underlines Lithuania’s role as a regional platform for scaling wind energy investments.
Regional picture at year-end
By the close of 2025, the Baltic wind energy map shows three distinct models:
• Latvia remains at an early development stage, with limited operational capacity and a pipeline concentrated in future projects.
• Estonia represents a mature, diversified market with multiple established owners and outward investment activity.
• Lithuania has reached systemic scale, combining national leadership with sustained inflows of international capital.
Together, these differences define the current balance of wind energy development in the Baltic region as the sector moves into the next investment cycle.
BSM © 2025 #BalticEnergy #WindEnergy #Renewables #EnergyTransition #Baltics #Latvia #Lithuania #Estonia #EnergyMarkets #Infrastructure
At the end of 2025, wind energy development across the Baltic States shows a clearly differentiated landscape, shaped primarily by market maturity, ownership structure, and project pipelines rather than short-term sentiment indicators.
Public support for wind energy in Latvia broadly corresponds to the current stage of sector development in the Baltic region.
Latvia: Early-stage market with projects under development
By the end of 2025, Latvia’s installed onshore wind capacity stands at approximately 136 MW, making it the smallest wind market among the three Baltic States. The country has two major operational wind parks, both owned by the Estonian private energy company Utilitas, which is also active in wind energy development across the Baltic region.
The Latvian state-owned energy company Latvenergo does not own operational wind farms domestically, but holds several projects at the development stage. The most advanced of these is the Kaigu project (around 109 MW), with commissioning expected in 2026. Other large-scale projects remain on a later timeline.
Estonia: A mature, diversified wind market
Estonia has reached close to 700 MW of installed wind capacity. The market is characterised by several major players rather than a single dominant owner.
Key participants include state-linked Enefit Green and private energy company Utilitas, alongside additional developers. Estonia has largely transitioned from individual pilot projects to a stable portfolio of operating wind assets, and Estonian companies are active investors beyond national borders.
Lithuania: Scale, national leadership, and international capital
Lithuania is the clear regional leader, with installed wind capacity of approximately 2.3 GW by the end of 2025. The sector is anchored by Ignitis Group, the national energy company, which develops and operates the largest wind projects in the Baltic States, including the Kelmė onshore wind farm (314 MW).
Lithuania also attracts significant international investment. Latvenergo participates in two large Lithuanian wind projects through direct equity ownership in project companies, acting as a capital investor rather than a contractor or service provider. This underlines Lithuania’s role as a regional platform for scaling wind energy investments.
Regional picture at year-end
By the close of 2025, the Baltic wind energy map shows three distinct models:
• Latvia remains at an early development stage, with limited operational capacity and a pipeline concentrated in future projects.
• Estonia represents a mature, diversified market with multiple established owners and outward investment activity.
• Lithuania has reached systemic scale, combining national leadership with sustained inflows of international capital.
Together, these differences define the current balance of wind energy development in the Baltic region as the sector moves into the next investment cycle.
BSM © 2025 #BalticEnergy #WindEnergy #Renewables #EnergyTransition #Baltics #Latvia #Lithuania #Estonia #EnergyMarkets #Infrastructure
PRFoods sells Saaremaa fish processing unit to Latvia’s Brīvais Vilnis
PRFoods has approved the sale of its Estonian subsidiary Saare Kala Tootmine OÜ to Latvian fish processor Brīvais Vilnis, following a shareholder vote conducted without convening a general meeting. The transaction forms part of PRFoods’ ongoing balance-sheet restructuring process launched in 2024.
Core facts
• The deal covers 100% of the shares in Saare Kala Tootmine OÜ.
• The agreed transaction price is EUR 2 million for the shares and related shareholder loan claims.
• Claims arising from an inventory loan are transferred separately at nominal value.
• As part of the transaction, Saare Kala Tootmine is removed from PRFoods’ senior loan agreement, simplifying the group’s financing structure.
• The sale was approved by shareholders with 64.72% of votes in favour.
Financial and corporate impact
PRFoods has disclosed that the transaction will result in a one-off positive effect at the consolidated group level, while the parent company’s standalone financial statements will reflect a loss related to the revaluation of the disposed asset. No dividends were declared, as the company has allocated its latest annual profit to covering losses from previous periods.
The shareholder vote also approved:
• the company’s annual report for the 2024/2025 financial year,
• the appointment of KPMG Baltics as auditor for 2025/2026,
• and the extension of the mandates of Supervisory Board members.
Why PRFoods is selling assets
PRFoods expanded internationally in the late 2010s through debt-financed acquisitions, a growth model that was widely used in the sector at the time. The COVID-19 pandemic subsequently led to a sharp decline in cash flows in premium food and HoReCa markets, while fixed debt obligations remained in place. This was followed by a period of elevated energy and input costs in Europe, which weakened the economics of energy-intensive fish processing in the Baltic region.
In response, PRFoods initiated a structured debt restructuring process in 2024, shifting its focus from expansion to balance-sheet stabilisation and simplification of the group structure. Within this framework, asset disposals are used as financial instruments rather than strategic exits. The sale of Saare Kala Tootmine allows PRFoods to reduce liabilities, streamline its corporate structure, and concentrate on managing its remaining operations during the restructuring phase.
Baltic context
For the Baltic fish processing sector, the transaction reflects an ongoing reallocation of assets within the region, with Latvian producers strengthening their industrial base while some Estonian groups reassess production footprints amid changing cost conditions. The deal underscores how financial restructuring decisions at group level can directly reshape the regional industrial map, even without broader consolidation waves or market exits.
BDW © 2025 | balticfocus.org #balticfocus
#BalticEconomy #FoodIndustry #FishProcessing #CorporateRestructuring #Latvia #Estonia #NasdaqTallinn
PRFoods has approved the sale of its Estonian subsidiary Saare Kala Tootmine OÜ to Latvian fish processor Brīvais Vilnis, following a shareholder vote conducted without convening a general meeting. The transaction forms part of PRFoods’ ongoing balance-sheet restructuring process launched in 2024.
Core facts
• The deal covers 100% of the shares in Saare Kala Tootmine OÜ.
• The agreed transaction price is EUR 2 million for the shares and related shareholder loan claims.
• Claims arising from an inventory loan are transferred separately at nominal value.
• As part of the transaction, Saare Kala Tootmine is removed from PRFoods’ senior loan agreement, simplifying the group’s financing structure.
• The sale was approved by shareholders with 64.72% of votes in favour.
Financial and corporate impact
PRFoods has disclosed that the transaction will result in a one-off positive effect at the consolidated group level, while the parent company’s standalone financial statements will reflect a loss related to the revaluation of the disposed asset. No dividends were declared, as the company has allocated its latest annual profit to covering losses from previous periods.
The shareholder vote also approved:
• the company’s annual report for the 2024/2025 financial year,
• the appointment of KPMG Baltics as auditor for 2025/2026,
• and the extension of the mandates of Supervisory Board members.
Why PRFoods is selling assets
PRFoods expanded internationally in the late 2010s through debt-financed acquisitions, a growth model that was widely used in the sector at the time. The COVID-19 pandemic subsequently led to a sharp decline in cash flows in premium food and HoReCa markets, while fixed debt obligations remained in place. This was followed by a period of elevated energy and input costs in Europe, which weakened the economics of energy-intensive fish processing in the Baltic region.
In response, PRFoods initiated a structured debt restructuring process in 2024, shifting its focus from expansion to balance-sheet stabilisation and simplification of the group structure. Within this framework, asset disposals are used as financial instruments rather than strategic exits. The sale of Saare Kala Tootmine allows PRFoods to reduce liabilities, streamline its corporate structure, and concentrate on managing its remaining operations during the restructuring phase.
Baltic context
For the Baltic fish processing sector, the transaction reflects an ongoing reallocation of assets within the region, with Latvian producers strengthening their industrial base while some Estonian groups reassess production footprints amid changing cost conditions. The deal underscores how financial restructuring decisions at group level can directly reshape the regional industrial map, even without broader consolidation waves or market exits.
BDW © 2025 | balticfocus.org #balticfocus
#BalticEconomy #FoodIndustry #FishProcessing #CorporateRestructuring #Latvia #Estonia #NasdaqTallinn
🇪🇪 Estonia: Dwelling Price Index edged down in Q3
Statistics Estonia reports that the dwelling price index fell by 0.8% in the third quarter of 2025 compared with Q2.
At the same time, prices were still 5.2% higher year-on-year (Q3 2025 vs Q3 2024).
Core figures
Apartments: +5.5% year-on-year
Houses: +4.7% year-on-year
Quarter-on-quarter:
Apartments: +0.3%
Houses: −2.9%
According to Märt Umbleja, this was the first quarterly decline since Q4 2024. Apartment prices in Tallinn rose by 1.7%, while prices fell elsewhere in Estonia.
Market structure
More transactions in existing dwellings
Fewer purchases of new developments
The monetary volume of transactions:
higher than in Q3 2024;
roughly unchanged compared with Q2 2025.
In practical terms, households showed a preference for already-occupied apartments and houses, rather than new builds.
Additional indicator
Owner-occupied housing price index:
+0.6% quarter-on-quarter;
+3.1% year-on-year.
This index covers not only dwelling acquisition but also related services, major repairs, maintenance, and housing insurance.
Context (Baltic Focus)
This release reflects a short-term price adjustment within a still positive annual trend.
It provides a numerical snapshot of housing market conditions, used by the Ministry of Finance for macroeconomic monitoring.
No signals of disruption — just parameters for understanding how the market is moving. BSM © 2025 #Estonia #HousingMarket #DwellingPriceIndex #RealEstate #Statistics #BalticFocus
Statistics Estonia reports that the dwelling price index fell by 0.8% in the third quarter of 2025 compared with Q2.
At the same time, prices were still 5.2% higher year-on-year (Q3 2025 vs Q3 2024).
Core figures
Apartments: +5.5% year-on-year
Houses: +4.7% year-on-year
Quarter-on-quarter:
Apartments: +0.3%
Houses: −2.9%
According to Märt Umbleja, this was the first quarterly decline since Q4 2024. Apartment prices in Tallinn rose by 1.7%, while prices fell elsewhere in Estonia.
Market structure
More transactions in existing dwellings
Fewer purchases of new developments
The monetary volume of transactions:
higher than in Q3 2024;
roughly unchanged compared with Q2 2025.
In practical terms, households showed a preference for already-occupied apartments and houses, rather than new builds.
Additional indicator
Owner-occupied housing price index:
+0.6% quarter-on-quarter;
+3.1% year-on-year.
This index covers not only dwelling acquisition but also related services, major repairs, maintenance, and housing insurance.
Context (Baltic Focus)
This release reflects a short-term price adjustment within a still positive annual trend.
It provides a numerical snapshot of housing market conditions, used by the Ministry of Finance for macroeconomic monitoring.
No signals of disruption — just parameters for understanding how the market is moving. BSM © 2025 #Estonia #HousingMarket #DwellingPriceIndex #RealEstate #Statistics #BalticFocus
BalticFocus.org
BSM © 2025
Latvia: Household Income and Inequality — Key Statistics (CSP)
In 2024, Latvia recorded continued growth in household disposable income, while income distribution remained highly uneven. According to official statistics, only one fifth of households reached income levels above €2,000 per person per month, while the lowest-income quintile lived on amounts far below the nationally defined poverty risk threshold.
1. Disposable household income (net)
• Average disposable income:
€950 per person per month
(+12.0% or +€102 compared to 2023)
• Income range:
◦ Lowest-income households: €317
◦ Highest-income households: €2,084
2. Income distribution by quintiles (€/person/month)
• 1st quintile (lowest 20%): €317
• 2nd quintile: €569
• 3rd quintile: €781
• 4th quintile: €1,094
• 5th quintile (highest 20%): €2,084
• Quintile ratio (S80/S20): 6.7
(2023: 6.3)
3. Share of households by income level
• 80% of households have disposable income below €2,084 per person per month
• 20% of households are below €317 per person per month
4. Poverty risk threshold
• Single-person household: €699 per month
• Two adults + two children (<14): €1,468 per month
➡️ Income of the lowest quintile (€317) is less than half of the poverty risk threshold for a single person.
5. Population at risk of poverty
• Total population at risk: 404,000 persons
• Share of population: 22.0%
6. Regional disposable income levels (€/person/month)
• Rīga region: €1,135
◦ City of Rīga: €1,090
• Zemgale: €866
• Kurzeme: €816
• Vidzeme: €800
• Latgale: €673
Source: Centrālā statistikas pārvalde (CSP)
BSM © 2025 #Latvia #HouseholdIncome #IncomeDistribution #IncomeInequality
In 2024, Latvia recorded continued growth in household disposable income, while income distribution remained highly uneven. According to official statistics, only one fifth of households reached income levels above €2,000 per person per month, while the lowest-income quintile lived on amounts far below the nationally defined poverty risk threshold.
1. Disposable household income (net)
• Average disposable income:
€950 per person per month
(+12.0% or +€102 compared to 2023)
• Income range:
◦ Lowest-income households: €317
◦ Highest-income households: €2,084
2. Income distribution by quintiles (€/person/month)
• 1st quintile (lowest 20%): €317
• 2nd quintile: €569
• 3rd quintile: €781
• 4th quintile: €1,094
• 5th quintile (highest 20%): €2,084
• Quintile ratio (S80/S20): 6.7
(2023: 6.3)
3. Share of households by income level
• 80% of households have disposable income below €2,084 per person per month
• 20% of households are below €317 per person per month
4. Poverty risk threshold
• Single-person household: €699 per month
• Two adults + two children (<14): €1,468 per month
➡️ Income of the lowest quintile (€317) is less than half of the poverty risk threshold for a single person.
5. Population at risk of poverty
• Total population at risk: 404,000 persons
• Share of population: 22.0%
6. Regional disposable income levels (€/person/month)
• Rīga region: €1,135
◦ City of Rīga: €1,090
• Zemgale: €866
• Kurzeme: €816
• Vidzeme: €800
• Latgale: €673
Source: Centrālā statistikas pārvalde (CSP)
BSM © 2025 #Latvia #HouseholdIncome #IncomeDistribution #IncomeInequality
🇪🇪 Estonia in 2025
A country that quietly impresses — in numbers
Based on official data published by Statistics Estonia
1️⃣ A nation that doesn’t shout — it measures
In 2025, Statistics Estonia managed and updated more than 3,500 statistical indicators.
That means daily life was tracked not in slogans, but in facts — from mobility and work to reading habits and digital behaviour.
There is something genuinely impressive about a country that chooses measurement over noise.
2️⃣ Small population, big statistical clarity
At the beginning of 2025, Estonia’s population stood at about 1.37 million people.
In a country this size:
one percentage point equals around 13,700 people;
trends are visible fast;
numbers rarely lie.
Statistics here feel personal — because they are.
3️⃣ Reading is not symbolic — it is measurable
Library data show millions of book loans per year, with some of the most active readers living outside Tallinn.
In several regions, borrowing rates per capita exceed those of the capital.
A quiet but powerful signal: reading in Estonia is a habit, not a campaign.
4️⃣ A small country constantly on the move
Tallinn Airport handled nearly 3.5 million passengers, marking a double-digit annual increase.
For a country of 1.37 million people, that number says a lot:
Estonians travel;
visitors arrive;
borders feel open, not distant.
Mobility is part of everyday life.
5️⃣ Artificial intelligence, adopted calmly and early
Official surveys show that around 45–50% of residents have already used AI tools — for work, studies, searching for information or creating content.
No panic.
No hype cycle.
Just quiet, practical adoption — exactly how Estonia embraced e-banking and e-government years ago.
6️⃣ Demography, seen without illusions
In 2025:
fewer children were born than a decade ago;
life expectancy approached 80 years;
the median age continued to rise.
The numbers don’t dramatise this.
They simply confirm a society that looks at its future without denial.
7️⃣ Even names tell a statistical story
Population data show tens of thousands of residents now have double or compound first names.
It’s a small detail — but a revealing one.
Estonia is increasingly comfortable with complexity and individuality, even in something as personal as names.
8️⃣ An economy without fireworks — but with discipline
In 2025:
average wages grew by around 5–6%;
the number of job vacancies declined by more than 5% year-on-year;
inflation remained noticeable, but far from chaotic.
No miracle growth.
No collapse either.
Just an economy adjusting to reality.
9️⃣ Migration as a normal process
Statistics record both emigration and immigration — tens of thousands of movements per year in total.
There is no single dramatic wave.
Migration appears as a structural feature, not a crisis headline.
🔟 What all these numbers say together
If statistics could speak, they might say:
“I am small, digital, mobile, reading, ageing — and unusually honest about who I am.”
Estonia in 2025 doesn’t try to impress.
And somehow, that’s exactly what it does. BSM © 2026 #Estonia
#BalticRegion #Statistics #Data #Facts
A country that quietly impresses — in numbers
Based on official data published by Statistics Estonia
1️⃣ A nation that doesn’t shout — it measures
In 2025, Statistics Estonia managed and updated more than 3,500 statistical indicators.
That means daily life was tracked not in slogans, but in facts — from mobility and work to reading habits and digital behaviour.
There is something genuinely impressive about a country that chooses measurement over noise.
2️⃣ Small population, big statistical clarity
At the beginning of 2025, Estonia’s population stood at about 1.37 million people.
In a country this size:
one percentage point equals around 13,700 people;
trends are visible fast;
numbers rarely lie.
Statistics here feel personal — because they are.
3️⃣ Reading is not symbolic — it is measurable
Library data show millions of book loans per year, with some of the most active readers living outside Tallinn.
In several regions, borrowing rates per capita exceed those of the capital.
A quiet but powerful signal: reading in Estonia is a habit, not a campaign.
4️⃣ A small country constantly on the move
Tallinn Airport handled nearly 3.5 million passengers, marking a double-digit annual increase.
For a country of 1.37 million people, that number says a lot:
Estonians travel;
visitors arrive;
borders feel open, not distant.
Mobility is part of everyday life.
5️⃣ Artificial intelligence, adopted calmly and early
Official surveys show that around 45–50% of residents have already used AI tools — for work, studies, searching for information or creating content.
No panic.
No hype cycle.
Just quiet, practical adoption — exactly how Estonia embraced e-banking and e-government years ago.
6️⃣ Demography, seen without illusions
In 2025:
fewer children were born than a decade ago;
life expectancy approached 80 years;
the median age continued to rise.
The numbers don’t dramatise this.
They simply confirm a society that looks at its future without denial.
7️⃣ Even names tell a statistical story
Population data show tens of thousands of residents now have double or compound first names.
It’s a small detail — but a revealing one.
Estonia is increasingly comfortable with complexity and individuality, even in something as personal as names.
8️⃣ An economy without fireworks — but with discipline
In 2025:
average wages grew by around 5–6%;
the number of job vacancies declined by more than 5% year-on-year;
inflation remained noticeable, but far from chaotic.
No miracle growth.
No collapse either.
Just an economy adjusting to reality.
9️⃣ Migration as a normal process
Statistics record both emigration and immigration — tens of thousands of movements per year in total.
There is no single dramatic wave.
Migration appears as a structural feature, not a crisis headline.
🔟 What all these numbers say together
If statistics could speak, they might say:
“I am small, digital, mobile, reading, ageing — and unusually honest about who I am.”
Estonia in 2025 doesn’t try to impress.
And somehow, that’s exactly what it does. BSM © 2026 #Estonia
#BalticRegion #Statistics #Data #Facts
🇪🇪🇱🇻🇱🇹Baltic aviation 2025: when the balance finally shifted
2025 became the year when Baltic aviation changed its hierarchy — quietly, structurally, and irreversibly.
Not because one airport collapsed or another exploded overnight, but because different models were stress-tested under real demand — and delivered different outcomes.
Final passenger traffic, 2025 (official)
🇱🇹Lithuania (system view)
Vilnius Airport: 5.11M, +7% y-o-y
Kaunas Airport: 1.60M, +12%
Palanga Airport: 446K, +20%
➡️ Lithuanian Airports total: 7.15M passengers, +8.5% y-o-y
🇱🇻Latvia
Riga Airport: 7.11M, 0%
Estonia
Tallinn Airport: 3.49M, 0%
➡️ Estonia total: 3.58M, +1%
For the Baltic region, a gap of 40–45 thousand passengers is not marginal.
It equals:
several full European routes per year,
a decisive argument in airline negotiations,
and, most importantly, a shift in perceived market leadership.
For the first time in two decades, Lithuania closed the year as the largest aviation market in the Baltics.
December was not noise — it was a stress test
December is the peak-load month. It exposes structural limits.
What happened in December 2025:
Lithuania: +13% y-o-y, strong acceleration in Vilnius
Riga: –5% y-o-y, despite being a traditional holiday gateway
Tallinn: +9.4% y-o-y, already operating near annual record levels
This matters because:
Lithuania absorbed peak demand without visible friction,
Riga showed signs of pricing and structural saturation,
Tallinn confirmed it can grow independently, not as a feeder.
December did not create the shift.
It revealed it.
The Lithuanian factor everyone keeps missing
Funding connectivity, not a carrier
What truly differentiates Lithuania from its neighbours is not airport size or geography, but the financing philosophy.
Lithuania does not subsidise an airline.
Lithuania subsidises connectivity.
Instead of channeling public funds into sustaining a single national carrier, the state uses its instruments to:
co-finance routes, not companies,
share market-entry risk, not corporate losses,
remain carrier-neutral by design.
Low-cost airlines, legacy carriers, and regional operators all compete on the same field, with support tied to connectivity outcomes, not to political loyalty or ownership.
The guiding question is not
“How do we protect our airline?”
but
“Which routes does the economy need — and who is ready to operate them?”
Why this model scaled in 2025
Lithuania: shared risk, shared upside
Early-stage route risk is partially socialised.
Successful routes remain market-driven.
Airlines can enter, test, expand — or exit — without political escalation.
This produces:
competitive density,
constant network experimentation,
downward pressure on fares,
resilience when one carrier adjusts capacity.
Latvia: concentration risk by design
Latvia’s model remains structurally different:
public resources are effectively tied to one dominant carrier,
connectivity depends on the health of that carrier’s balance sheet,
market entry for competitors is more constrained.
The system is stable — but rigid.
Estonia: stability that no longer feeds the hub
Tallinn’s 2025 result is often misread.
Passenger traffic finished within 0.1% of the all-time record.
Growth is concentrated on point-to-point routes.
The expanding presence of Wizz Air reinforces a low-cost, frequency-driven logic.
The key point:
Tallinn’s stability no longer translates into support for Riga’s hub role.
It stabilises itself, not the region.
Why 2026 will be different — even without shocks
2025 did not yet produce a mass behavioural shift.
But it created the economic preconditions.
If current price structures and route competition persist into summer 2026:
tour operators will begin testing alternative departure geographies,
airline capacity will follow consolidated demand,
hub loyalty will matter less than total package economics.
This is not disruption.
It is rational adaptation.
2025 became the year when Baltic aviation changed its hierarchy — quietly, structurally, and irreversibly.
Not because one airport collapsed or another exploded overnight, but because different models were stress-tested under real demand — and delivered different outcomes.
Final passenger traffic, 2025 (official)
🇱🇹Lithuania (system view)
Vilnius Airport: 5.11M, +7% y-o-y
Kaunas Airport: 1.60M, +12%
Palanga Airport: 446K, +20%
➡️ Lithuanian Airports total: 7.15M passengers, +8.5% y-o-y
🇱🇻Latvia
Riga Airport: 7.11M, 0%
Estonia
Tallinn Airport: 3.49M, 0%
➡️ Estonia total: 3.58M, +1%
For the Baltic region, a gap of 40–45 thousand passengers is not marginal.
It equals:
several full European routes per year,
a decisive argument in airline negotiations,
and, most importantly, a shift in perceived market leadership.
For the first time in two decades, Lithuania closed the year as the largest aviation market in the Baltics.
December was not noise — it was a stress test
December is the peak-load month. It exposes structural limits.
What happened in December 2025:
Lithuania: +13% y-o-y, strong acceleration in Vilnius
Riga: –5% y-o-y, despite being a traditional holiday gateway
Tallinn: +9.4% y-o-y, already operating near annual record levels
This matters because:
Lithuania absorbed peak demand without visible friction,
Riga showed signs of pricing and structural saturation,
Tallinn confirmed it can grow independently, not as a feeder.
December did not create the shift.
It revealed it.
The Lithuanian factor everyone keeps missing
Funding connectivity, not a carrier
What truly differentiates Lithuania from its neighbours is not airport size or geography, but the financing philosophy.
Lithuania does not subsidise an airline.
Lithuania subsidises connectivity.
Instead of channeling public funds into sustaining a single national carrier, the state uses its instruments to:
co-finance routes, not companies,
share market-entry risk, not corporate losses,
remain carrier-neutral by design.
Low-cost airlines, legacy carriers, and regional operators all compete on the same field, with support tied to connectivity outcomes, not to political loyalty or ownership.
The guiding question is not
“How do we protect our airline?”
but
“Which routes does the economy need — and who is ready to operate them?”
Why this model scaled in 2025
Lithuania: shared risk, shared upside
Early-stage route risk is partially socialised.
Successful routes remain market-driven.
Airlines can enter, test, expand — or exit — without political escalation.
This produces:
competitive density,
constant network experimentation,
downward pressure on fares,
resilience when one carrier adjusts capacity.
Latvia: concentration risk by design
Latvia’s model remains structurally different:
public resources are effectively tied to one dominant carrier,
connectivity depends on the health of that carrier’s balance sheet,
market entry for competitors is more constrained.
The system is stable — but rigid.
Estonia: stability that no longer feeds the hub
Tallinn’s 2025 result is often misread.
Passenger traffic finished within 0.1% of the all-time record.
Growth is concentrated on point-to-point routes.
The expanding presence of Wizz Air reinforces a low-cost, frequency-driven logic.
The key point:
Tallinn’s stability no longer translates into support for Riga’s hub role.
It stabilises itself, not the region.
Why 2026 will be different — even without shocks
2025 did not yet produce a mass behavioural shift.
But it created the economic preconditions.
If current price structures and route competition persist into summer 2026:
tour operators will begin testing alternative departure geographies,
airline capacity will follow consolidated demand,
hub loyalty will matter less than total package economics.
This is not disruption.
It is rational adaptation.
Lithuania did not win 2025 by accident.
It won by replacing airline-centric policy with connectivity-centric financing.
Riga did not lose relevance — but it lost inevitability.
And once inevitability disappears, the aviation map stops being static.
2026 will not be about drama.
It will be about which model adapts faster.BSM © 2026 #BalticAviation #AviationMarket #Transport #2026Outlook
It won by replacing airline-centric policy with connectivity-centric financing.
Riga did not lose relevance — but it lost inevitability.
And once inevitability disappears, the aviation map stops being static.
2026 will not be about drama.
It will be about which model adapts faster.BSM © 2026 #BalticAviation #AviationMarket #Transport #2026Outlook
Baltic States: Retail Trade Turnover, January–November 2025
🇱🇻 Latvia
Retail trade turnover: growth of around 3–4% year on year.
Structure:
Food retail – marginal growth.
Non-food retail – main contributor to overall increase.
Automotive fuel retail – positive year-on-year growth, supporting the aggregate.
Summary: Latvia shows balanced growth, with no single segment dominating excessively.
🇱🇹 Lithuania
Retail trade turnover: +3.6% year on year.
Retail trade excluding automotive fuel: +6.8% year on year.
Structure:
Non-food retail – strong, double-digit growth over 11 months.
E-commerce – fastest growing segment.
Automotive fuel retail – −7.1% year on year (January–November).
Summary: Overall growth is driven outside the fuel segment, which continues to weigh on the aggregate.
🇪🇪 Estonia
Retail trade turnover: +2% year on year (January–November).
November year on year: 0% (no change).
Structure:
Grocery stores – decline.
Manufactured goods – weak performance.
Automotive fuel retail – +13% year on year, the strongest segment.
Summary: Aggregate growth is the weakest in the Baltics and is largely supported by fuel sales amid pressure in most other categories.
Baltic snapshot (11 months, constant prices)
Overall performance:
Lithuania – fastest growth,
Latvia – steady mid-range growth,
Estonia – slowest growth, close to stagnation.
Automotive fuel:
Latvia – growth,
Lithuania – decline,
Estonia – strong growth.
Non-food retail:
Lithuania – key growth engine,
Latvia – supportive,
Estonia – under pressure.
Methodological note
Differences in the treatment of e-commerce and enterprise classification apply across countries.
Comparisons reflect direction and structure of change, not absolute levels. BSM © 2026 #BalticFocus #Baltics #RetailTrade #BusinessStatistics #EconomicData
🇱🇻 Latvia
Retail trade turnover: growth of around 3–4% year on year.
Structure:
Food retail – marginal growth.
Non-food retail – main contributor to overall increase.
Automotive fuel retail – positive year-on-year growth, supporting the aggregate.
Summary: Latvia shows balanced growth, with no single segment dominating excessively.
🇱🇹 Lithuania
Retail trade turnover: +3.6% year on year.
Retail trade excluding automotive fuel: +6.8% year on year.
Structure:
Non-food retail – strong, double-digit growth over 11 months.
E-commerce – fastest growing segment.
Automotive fuel retail – −7.1% year on year (January–November).
Summary: Overall growth is driven outside the fuel segment, which continues to weigh on the aggregate.
🇪🇪 Estonia
Retail trade turnover: +2% year on year (January–November).
November year on year: 0% (no change).
Structure:
Grocery stores – decline.
Manufactured goods – weak performance.
Automotive fuel retail – +13% year on year, the strongest segment.
Summary: Aggregate growth is the weakest in the Baltics and is largely supported by fuel sales amid pressure in most other categories.
Baltic snapshot (11 months, constant prices)
Overall performance:
Lithuania – fastest growth,
Latvia – steady mid-range growth,
Estonia – slowest growth, close to stagnation.
Automotive fuel:
Latvia – growth,
Lithuania – decline,
Estonia – strong growth.
Non-food retail:
Lithuania – key growth engine,
Latvia – supportive,
Estonia – under pressure.
Methodological note
Differences in the treatment of e-commerce and enterprise classification apply across countries.
Comparisons reflect direction and structure of change, not absolute levels. BSM © 2026 #BalticFocus #Baltics #RetailTrade #BusinessStatistics #EconomicData
Latvia updates its regulatory model for direct power lines
As of 1 January 2026, permits for direct electricity lines (private lines connecting a generator directly to a consumer) are issued by Valsts vides dienests (VVD). Previously, this function was handled by the public utilities regulator.
The change follows the new Energy Market Law and an institutional reform under which the Energy and Environment Agency was integrated into VVD in late 2025. As a result, environmental, permitting and selected energy-related functions are now consolidated within one authority.
For investors, direct power lines are a key instrument for energy-intensive projects such as industry, data centres and renewable energy developments, offering more predictable pricing and reduced reliance on congested grids. Centralisation may streamline administrative procedures and simplify project coordination.
At the same time, the new model raises practical questions that will be clarified through implementation, including how system-level grid impacts are assessed, how cooperation with transmission and distribution operators is organised, and how responsibility is allocated in non-standard or emergency situations.
The first permits issued under the new framework in 2026 will be an important indicator of how these questions are addressed in practice. BSM © 2026 #Latvia
#Energy #PowerGrid #Electricity #EnergyPolicy
As of 1 January 2026, permits for direct electricity lines (private lines connecting a generator directly to a consumer) are issued by Valsts vides dienests (VVD). Previously, this function was handled by the public utilities regulator.
The change follows the new Energy Market Law and an institutional reform under which the Energy and Environment Agency was integrated into VVD in late 2025. As a result, environmental, permitting and selected energy-related functions are now consolidated within one authority.
For investors, direct power lines are a key instrument for energy-intensive projects such as industry, data centres and renewable energy developments, offering more predictable pricing and reduced reliance on congested grids. Centralisation may streamline administrative procedures and simplify project coordination.
At the same time, the new model raises practical questions that will be clarified through implementation, including how system-level grid impacts are assessed, how cooperation with transmission and distribution operators is organised, and how responsibility is allocated in non-standard or emergency situations.
The first permits issued under the new framework in 2026 will be an important indicator of how these questions are addressed in practice. BSM © 2026 #Latvia
#Energy #PowerGrid #Electricity #EnergyPolicy
Lithuania Enters 2026 With a Storage-First Power Strategy
Lithuania’s transmission system operator Litgrid has preliminarily reserved almost 1.2 GW of grid capacity for energy storage projects over the past three months, marking one of the largest short-term storage allocations in the Baltic region.
Between September 7 and December 6, Litgrid approved 19 connection requests in full or in part, reserving 1,187 MW of permitted capacity for renewable and storage projects. Of this volume, 1,159 MW and 3,067 MWh were allocated to battery energy storage systems, while wind power accounted for 28 MW.
According to Litgrid, Lithuania’s total installed renewable capacity has already reached 5.7 GW, with intention protocols signed for more than 10 GW of additional wind and solar capacity to be developed over the next five years. The operator notes that most new applications now focus on storage projects with longer discharge durations — two, four, or more hours at full capacity.
The new grid capacity reservation cycle will remain open until March 6, 2026, with developers encouraged to submit applications by early February.
Why this matters for 2026 — and beyond
From renewable growth to system control
The decision to prioritise large-scale storage signals a structural shift. The Baltic power system is no longer constrained by a lack of renewable generation, but by the ability to balance variable output and maintain grid stability. Storage is becoming a system requirement, not an optional add-on.
Post-BRELL realities
As the Baltic states operate synchronously with continental Europe, system stability and frequency control increasingly depend on domestic balancing resources. Large-scale storage reduces reliance on emergency measures, forced curtailment of renewables, and extreme price volatility.
Regional price and risk effects
Lithuania’s storage build-up will have cross-border effects. Operating within the shared Baltic electricity market, new storage capacity can:
dampen extreme price spikes,
reduce negative price hours,
improve predictability for industrial consumers across Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.
A market signal for investors
Reserving grid capacity at this scale indicates that:
transmission infrastructure is ready for storage,
regulatory procedures are functioning,
energy storage is treated as core infrastructure.
For investors, this lowers regulatory uncertainty and clarifies where future balancing and flexibility markets in the Baltics are heading. BSM © 2026 #Lithuania #EnergyStorage
#GridStability #BalticEnergy
Lithuania’s transmission system operator Litgrid has preliminarily reserved almost 1.2 GW of grid capacity for energy storage projects over the past three months, marking one of the largest short-term storage allocations in the Baltic region.
Between September 7 and December 6, Litgrid approved 19 connection requests in full or in part, reserving 1,187 MW of permitted capacity for renewable and storage projects. Of this volume, 1,159 MW and 3,067 MWh were allocated to battery energy storage systems, while wind power accounted for 28 MW.
According to Litgrid, Lithuania’s total installed renewable capacity has already reached 5.7 GW, with intention protocols signed for more than 10 GW of additional wind and solar capacity to be developed over the next five years. The operator notes that most new applications now focus on storage projects with longer discharge durations — two, four, or more hours at full capacity.
The new grid capacity reservation cycle will remain open until March 6, 2026, with developers encouraged to submit applications by early February.
Why this matters for 2026 — and beyond
From renewable growth to system control
The decision to prioritise large-scale storage signals a structural shift. The Baltic power system is no longer constrained by a lack of renewable generation, but by the ability to balance variable output and maintain grid stability. Storage is becoming a system requirement, not an optional add-on.
Post-BRELL realities
As the Baltic states operate synchronously with continental Europe, system stability and frequency control increasingly depend on domestic balancing resources. Large-scale storage reduces reliance on emergency measures, forced curtailment of renewables, and extreme price volatility.
Regional price and risk effects
Lithuania’s storage build-up will have cross-border effects. Operating within the shared Baltic electricity market, new storage capacity can:
dampen extreme price spikes,
reduce negative price hours,
improve predictability for industrial consumers across Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.
A market signal for investors
Reserving grid capacity at this scale indicates that:
transmission infrastructure is ready for storage,
regulatory procedures are functioning,
energy storage is treated as core infrastructure.
For investors, this lowers regulatory uncertainty and clarifies where future balancing and flexibility markets in the Baltics are heading. BSM © 2026 #Lithuania #EnergyStorage
#GridStability #BalticEnergy
Baltic Electricity Prices Fell by 24% in December
In December 2025, the average electricity price in the Baltic states declined by around 24% compared with November, reaching the lowest level since August 2025, according to the monthly power market review prepared by Latvia’s transmission system operator Augstsprieguma tīkls.
In Latvia, the average price fell to €83.85/MWh, down 24% month-on-month and 7% lower than in December 2024. Lithuania recorded the same average price and monthly decline, while in Estonia prices dropped by 23% to €73.58/MWh. Across the Baltic region as a whole, the average price stood at €80.43/MWh, 9% below the level of December 2024.
The price decrease was driven primarily by stronger wind conditions, which significantly increased wind power generation, particularly during the final third of the month. Lower electricity consumption during the holiday period further contributed to price pressure, while consistently high electricity imports into the Baltic region helped keep prices at a lower level.
Electricity imports into the Baltics remained broadly unchanged compared with November but were 18.2% higher year-on-year. Imports from Poland fell sharply, while slightly lower flows from Sweden were offset by increased imports from Finland.
Price differences between Estonia and Latvia–Lithuania continue to be influenced by grid maintenance works in Estonia, which limit the transmission of cheaper electricity imported from Finland. These works are scheduled to be completed in early 2027.
Why this matters
A reminder of weather-driven volatility
The December price drop highlights how strongly Baltic electricity prices remain tied to weather conditions, particularly wind generation. High renewable output can quickly push prices down, but the reverse remains equally possible during low-wind periods.
Imports still play a stabilising role
Despite growing renewable capacity, the Baltics continue to rely heavily on cross-border imports, especially from Finland. This underscores the ongoing importance of interconnections and regional market integration.
Infrastructure constraints still shape prices
Persistent price gaps between Estonia and the southern Baltics show that grid bottlenecks and maintenance works can have a direct and lasting impact on market outcomes — sometimes outweighing generation fundamentals.
Limited impact for many consumers
The price decline directly affects only those consumers on spot-price–linked contracts. For households and businesses on fixed tariffs, the effect is indirect and delayed, if felt at all.
One-line takeaway
December’s price drop shows that the Baltic power market can deliver low prices under favourable conditions — but structural dependence on weather, imports, and grid constraints remains. BSM © 2026 #EnergyMarkets #Baltics #PowerGrid
In December 2025, the average electricity price in the Baltic states declined by around 24% compared with November, reaching the lowest level since August 2025, according to the monthly power market review prepared by Latvia’s transmission system operator Augstsprieguma tīkls.
In Latvia, the average price fell to €83.85/MWh, down 24% month-on-month and 7% lower than in December 2024. Lithuania recorded the same average price and monthly decline, while in Estonia prices dropped by 23% to €73.58/MWh. Across the Baltic region as a whole, the average price stood at €80.43/MWh, 9% below the level of December 2024.
The price decrease was driven primarily by stronger wind conditions, which significantly increased wind power generation, particularly during the final third of the month. Lower electricity consumption during the holiday period further contributed to price pressure, while consistently high electricity imports into the Baltic region helped keep prices at a lower level.
Electricity imports into the Baltics remained broadly unchanged compared with November but were 18.2% higher year-on-year. Imports from Poland fell sharply, while slightly lower flows from Sweden were offset by increased imports from Finland.
Price differences between Estonia and Latvia–Lithuania continue to be influenced by grid maintenance works in Estonia, which limit the transmission of cheaper electricity imported from Finland. These works are scheduled to be completed in early 2027.
Why this matters
A reminder of weather-driven volatility
The December price drop highlights how strongly Baltic electricity prices remain tied to weather conditions, particularly wind generation. High renewable output can quickly push prices down, but the reverse remains equally possible during low-wind periods.
Imports still play a stabilising role
Despite growing renewable capacity, the Baltics continue to rely heavily on cross-border imports, especially from Finland. This underscores the ongoing importance of interconnections and regional market integration.
Infrastructure constraints still shape prices
Persistent price gaps between Estonia and the southern Baltics show that grid bottlenecks and maintenance works can have a direct and lasting impact on market outcomes — sometimes outweighing generation fundamentals.
Limited impact for many consumers
The price decline directly affects only those consumers on spot-price–linked contracts. For households and businesses on fixed tariffs, the effect is indirect and delayed, if felt at all.
One-line takeaway
December’s price drop shows that the Baltic power market can deliver low prices under favourable conditions — but structural dependence on weather, imports, and grid constraints remains. BSM © 2026 #EnergyMarkets #Baltics #PowerGrid
🔥1
Rimi’s Acquisition of HAVI Logistics: What Is Known and Why It Matters for the Baltic Market
Rimi Baltic has signed a share purchase agreement (SPA) to acquire 100% of the shares of HAVI Logistics in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. The transaction is subject to approval by the competition authorities in all three countries.
Ownership context: why this deal matters now
It is important to recall that Rimi Baltic itself changed ownership in June 2025, when Sweden’s ICA Gruppen sold the business to Denmark’s Salling Group for €1.3 billion. That transaction was widely described as the largest retail M&A deal of the decade in the Baltics.
Against this backdrop, the acquisition of HAVI Logistics represents the first major operational step by the new owners. It aligns with Salling Group’s efficiency-driven strategy, including its ASPIRE ’28 framework, which aims to bring the Baltic operations closer to the performance standards of its Danish retail formats such as Netto and føtex.
What exactly is being acquired
The deal covers a fully operational Baltic logistics platform, including warehousing and distribution operations across three legal entities:
HAVI Logistics SIA (Latvia)
HAVI Logistics UAB (Lithuania)
HAVI Logistics OÜ (Estonia)
HAVI provides a full range of logistics services, including goods handling, picking and packing, labelling, sorting and returns management. The acquisition includes approximately 800 employees across the three Baltic states, all of whom are expected to continue working within the Rimi Baltic Group structure, with integration planned on a gradual basis following regulatory approval.
Transaction value: what is disclosed and what can be used as context
The purchase price has not been disclosed.
For scale and context only — and not as a valuation proxy — two reference points are relevant:
A single Rimi logistics property in Riga, previously sold to an investment fund under a sale-and-leaseback arrangement, was valued at approximately €80+ million, reflecting a real estate transaction rather than an operating business.
Based on available business registry data for 2023–2024, HAVI Logistics’ annual turnover in Latvia is estimated at approximately €15–20 million, indicating an active logistics operation rather than a standalone asset.
These figures illustrate that Rimi is acquiring an operating business with personnel and customers, not merely physical infrastructure.
What HAVI Group is — and why it exited the Baltics
HAVI Group is a privately owned international logistics and supply-chain company, best known for managing complex, multi-temperature food logistics for large restaurant and retail chains worldwide. Over several decades, HAVI has built long-term partnerships with major global brands across North America, Europe and Asia.
Globally, HAVI operates a multi-client logistics model and is best known as a long-standing logistics partner of McDonald’s, while also providing supply-chain services to other international restaurant chains, including Subway, KFC and Vapiano, across various markets.
The decision to sell the Baltic logistics business should be viewed as a portfolio optimisation move, not a withdrawal driven by operational failure. The Baltics represent a relatively small and operationally intensive market compared to HAVI’s core regions. Divesting a mature regional platform allows HAVI Group to redeploy capital and management focus toward larger markets and global contracts.
For Rimi and Salling Group, the same asset represents the opposite: a ready-made logistics backbone that strengthens regional control and operational efficiency.
Implications for agriculture and food supply chains
From a supply-chain perspective, the transaction marks a structural shift:
logistics moves from an external contractor to an in-house retail function;
the independent intermediary between producers and the retail network disappears;
Rimi gains tighter control over volumes, delivery timing, operational standards and cost structures across all three Baltic states.
Rimi Baltic has signed a share purchase agreement (SPA) to acquire 100% of the shares of HAVI Logistics in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. The transaction is subject to approval by the competition authorities in all three countries.
Ownership context: why this deal matters now
It is important to recall that Rimi Baltic itself changed ownership in June 2025, when Sweden’s ICA Gruppen sold the business to Denmark’s Salling Group for €1.3 billion. That transaction was widely described as the largest retail M&A deal of the decade in the Baltics.
Against this backdrop, the acquisition of HAVI Logistics represents the first major operational step by the new owners. It aligns with Salling Group’s efficiency-driven strategy, including its ASPIRE ’28 framework, which aims to bring the Baltic operations closer to the performance standards of its Danish retail formats such as Netto and føtex.
What exactly is being acquired
The deal covers a fully operational Baltic logistics platform, including warehousing and distribution operations across three legal entities:
HAVI Logistics SIA (Latvia)
HAVI Logistics UAB (Lithuania)
HAVI Logistics OÜ (Estonia)
HAVI provides a full range of logistics services, including goods handling, picking and packing, labelling, sorting and returns management. The acquisition includes approximately 800 employees across the three Baltic states, all of whom are expected to continue working within the Rimi Baltic Group structure, with integration planned on a gradual basis following regulatory approval.
Transaction value: what is disclosed and what can be used as context
The purchase price has not been disclosed.
For scale and context only — and not as a valuation proxy — two reference points are relevant:
A single Rimi logistics property in Riga, previously sold to an investment fund under a sale-and-leaseback arrangement, was valued at approximately €80+ million, reflecting a real estate transaction rather than an operating business.
Based on available business registry data for 2023–2024, HAVI Logistics’ annual turnover in Latvia is estimated at approximately €15–20 million, indicating an active logistics operation rather than a standalone asset.
These figures illustrate that Rimi is acquiring an operating business with personnel and customers, not merely physical infrastructure.
What HAVI Group is — and why it exited the Baltics
HAVI Group is a privately owned international logistics and supply-chain company, best known for managing complex, multi-temperature food logistics for large restaurant and retail chains worldwide. Over several decades, HAVI has built long-term partnerships with major global brands across North America, Europe and Asia.
Globally, HAVI operates a multi-client logistics model and is best known as a long-standing logistics partner of McDonald’s, while also providing supply-chain services to other international restaurant chains, including Subway, KFC and Vapiano, across various markets.
The decision to sell the Baltic logistics business should be viewed as a portfolio optimisation move, not a withdrawal driven by operational failure. The Baltics represent a relatively small and operationally intensive market compared to HAVI’s core regions. Divesting a mature regional platform allows HAVI Group to redeploy capital and management focus toward larger markets and global contracts.
For Rimi and Salling Group, the same asset represents the opposite: a ready-made logistics backbone that strengthens regional control and operational efficiency.
Implications for agriculture and food supply chains
From a supply-chain perspective, the transaction marks a structural shift:
logistics moves from an external contractor to an in-house retail function;
the independent intermediary between producers and the retail network disappears;
Rimi gains tighter control over volumes, delivery timing, operational standards and cost structures across all three Baltic states.
For farmers and food processors, this implies more centralised decision-making and potentially stricter, but also more predictable, delivery and compliance requirements.
Only then: what this may mean for consumers
The acquisition does not automatically imply lower retail prices. However, it changes the framework in which prices, availability and quality are formed.
With logistics internalised:
responsibility for product availability and condition at store level is fully concentrated within the retail group;
differences in pricing, assortment and quality between Baltic countries become more transparent;
for non-perishable staple products such as rice, grains or pasta, logistics can no longer credibly explain persistent cross-border price differences.
In effect, Rimi gains operational efficiency and strategic control — while simultaneously assuming full accountability for outcomes at shelf level. BSM © 2026 #Rimi #RimiBaltic #SallingGroup #HAVI #HAVILogistics #Baltics #Latvia #Lithuania #Estonia #Retail #GroceryRetail #SupplyChain #Logistics #Warehousing #FoodSupply #AgriFood #FoodMarket #CompetitionPolicy
Only then: what this may mean for consumers
The acquisition does not automatically imply lower retail prices. However, it changes the framework in which prices, availability and quality are formed.
With logistics internalised:
responsibility for product availability and condition at store level is fully concentrated within the retail group;
differences in pricing, assortment and quality between Baltic countries become more transparent;
for non-perishable staple products such as rice, grains or pasta, logistics can no longer credibly explain persistent cross-border price differences.
In effect, Rimi gains operational efficiency and strategic control — while simultaneously assuming full accountability for outcomes at shelf level. BSM © 2026 #Rimi #RimiBaltic #SallingGroup #HAVI #HAVILogistics #Baltics #Latvia #Lithuania #Estonia #Retail #GroceryRetail #SupplyChain #Logistics #Warehousing #FoodSupply #AgriFood #FoodMarket #CompetitionPolicy
🇱🇻🇱🇹🇪🇪 Baltics: Industry output rose in November, led by manufacturing (Latvia strongest YoY)
Core facts (Nov 2025):
Latvia: industrial output +6.9% YoY (calendar-adjusted), -0.6% MoM (seasonally adjusted). Manufacturing +8.9% YoY; energy & gas supply +3.5% YoY; mining/quarries -25.9% YoY. Jan–Nov: +4.3%.
Lithuania: industrial production +3.0% YoY (working-day adjusted), +5.8% MoM (season & working-day adjusted). Jan–Nov: +3.2%.
Estonia: industrial output +3.4% YoY. By sector: mining +10%, manufacturing +4.5%, energy -8.7%. Seasonally adjusted: industry +6% MoM, manufacturing +7.5% MoM.
What moved the needle:
The vehicles / trailers segment is a visible growth driver across the region (Latvia +32.8% YoY; Lithuania +11% MoM; Estonia +57.7% YoY, with Statistics Estonia linking the jump largely to defence-industry demand).
Energy is the main weak spot (Estonia down YoY; Latvia down MoM; Lithuania’s electricity/gas/steam block down MoM and YoY).
Context (why it matters):
After a softer patch in parts of 2025, November looks like a manufacturing-led rebound across all three Baltics, with export-oriented industry still carrying most of the load (Estonia reports about two-thirds of manufacturing output sold abroad). The mix also hints at a defence-related industrial uplift (especially in Estonia), while energy output remains volatile.
Sources: Latvia CSP (Centrālā statistikas pārvalde); Statistics Lithuania; Statistics Estonia (Statistikaamet).
#balticfocus #Baltics #Latvia #Lithuania #Estonia #Industry #Manufacturing
BSM © 2026 | balticfocus.org #balticfocus
Core facts (Nov 2025):
Latvia: industrial output +6.9% YoY (calendar-adjusted), -0.6% MoM (seasonally adjusted). Manufacturing +8.9% YoY; energy & gas supply +3.5% YoY; mining/quarries -25.9% YoY. Jan–Nov: +4.3%.
Lithuania: industrial production +3.0% YoY (working-day adjusted), +5.8% MoM (season & working-day adjusted). Jan–Nov: +3.2%.
Estonia: industrial output +3.4% YoY. By sector: mining +10%, manufacturing +4.5%, energy -8.7%. Seasonally adjusted: industry +6% MoM, manufacturing +7.5% MoM.
What moved the needle:
The vehicles / trailers segment is a visible growth driver across the region (Latvia +32.8% YoY; Lithuania +11% MoM; Estonia +57.7% YoY, with Statistics Estonia linking the jump largely to defence-industry demand).
Energy is the main weak spot (Estonia down YoY; Latvia down MoM; Lithuania’s electricity/gas/steam block down MoM and YoY).
Context (why it matters):
After a softer patch in parts of 2025, November looks like a manufacturing-led rebound across all three Baltics, with export-oriented industry still carrying most of the load (Estonia reports about two-thirds of manufacturing output sold abroad). The mix also hints at a defence-related industrial uplift (especially in Estonia), while energy output remains volatile.
Sources: Latvia CSP (Centrālā statistikas pārvalde); Statistics Lithuania; Statistics Estonia (Statistikaamet).
#balticfocus #Baltics #Latvia #Lithuania #Estonia #Industry #Manufacturing
BSM © 2026 | balticfocus.org #balticfocus
🇱🇻🇱🇹🇪🇪 Baltics shift from procurement to production — with money on the table
🇱🇻Latvia (Iecavas pagasts): Construction has started on a facility to assemble modular propellant charges for artillery. Planned capacity is ~50,000 charges/year and the core team is expected to be ~20–25 specialists. The project “Rollo” is financed by €26m national funding, plus EU funding within a €41m consortium envelope (Latvia’s direct share is not fully disclosed publicly). Output is intended for Latvia’s armed forces first, with remaining volumes aimed for exports to NATO partners; the operator has said it plans to work with turnover and profit.
🇱🇹Lithuania (Baisogala area): A Rheinmetall 155mm artillery ammunition plant is under construction. Lithuania has announced direct investment up to €300m and at least 150 jobs, with operations expected to start as early as 2026.
🇪🇪Estonia (Ermistu, Pärnu County): Estonia is building a defence-industry base via designated parks. The state has announced €50m+ for base infrastructure (including Ermistu and Põhja-Kiviõli), while production in Ermistu is planned to begin from 2027 with companies focusing on mines/charges, explosives, air-defence missiles and ammunition components.
Context:
Together, these projects map a distributed munitions chain in the Baltics — propellant modules (LV), finished 155mm ammunition (LT), and explosives/components capacity (EE) — shifting the region from primarily buying to building domestic production capacity with measurable capex and job creation.
Source(s): LSM; Rheinmetall; Lithuanian Government; Estonian Ministry of Defence; RKIK; ERR.
BSM © 2026 | balticfocus.org #balticfocus
🇱🇻Latvia (Iecavas pagasts): Construction has started on a facility to assemble modular propellant charges for artillery. Planned capacity is ~50,000 charges/year and the core team is expected to be ~20–25 specialists. The project “Rollo” is financed by €26m national funding, plus EU funding within a €41m consortium envelope (Latvia’s direct share is not fully disclosed publicly). Output is intended for Latvia’s armed forces first, with remaining volumes aimed for exports to NATO partners; the operator has said it plans to work with turnover and profit.
🇱🇹Lithuania (Baisogala area): A Rheinmetall 155mm artillery ammunition plant is under construction. Lithuania has announced direct investment up to €300m and at least 150 jobs, with operations expected to start as early as 2026.
🇪🇪Estonia (Ermistu, Pärnu County): Estonia is building a defence-industry base via designated parks. The state has announced €50m+ for base infrastructure (including Ermistu and Põhja-Kiviõli), while production in Ermistu is planned to begin from 2027 with companies focusing on mines/charges, explosives, air-defence missiles and ammunition components.
Context:
Together, these projects map a distributed munitions chain in the Baltics — propellant modules (LV), finished 155mm ammunition (LT), and explosives/components capacity (EE) — shifting the region from primarily buying to building domestic production capacity with measurable capex and job creation.
Source(s): LSM; Rheinmetall; Lithuanian Government; Estonian Ministry of Defence; RKIK; ERR.
BSM © 2026 | balticfocus.org #balticfocus
Baltic trade in November 2025: imports outpace exports across the region
November 2025 data from national statistical offices show a common pattern across the Baltics: imports are growing faster than exports in all three countries.
Latvia recorded a decline in exports alongside rising imports, Lithuania maintained modest export growth but widened its trade deficit, while Estonia showed headline export growth driven largely by energy-related flows rather than domestic-origin goods.
Despite differences in scale and structure, the region shares several key signals: pressure on trade balances, weakening agricultural and food exports, and a growing role of energy and industrial inputs in shaping monthly trade dynamics.
🇱🇻 Latvia — foreign trade, November 2025
Core facts
• Exports: €1.55 bn (-5.6% YoY)
• Imports: €1.88 bn (+7.4% YoY)
• Trade balance: about -€0.33 bn
• Export share in total trade fell from 48.5% → 45.2%
What drove the numbers
• Export growth concentrated in energy-related items:
◦ mineral products +25.7% YoY
◦ electricity and natural gas were the key drivers
• Traditional pillars weakened:
◦ wood and wood products -12%
◦ plant products -19.9%
◦ grain exports hit especially hard (wheat -52.9%)
Imports
• Broad-based growth across almost all major groups:
◦ machinery & electrical equipment +14.9%
◦ mineral products +9.7%
◦ transport equipment +9.3%
• Consumption signal inside imports: rise in electronics and alcoholic beverages.
Partners
• Exports: Lithuania, Estonia, Germany, Sweden
• Imports: Lithuania, Germany, Poland, Estonia
Latvia takeaway
Latvia shows the sharpest imbalance in November: falling exports combined with strong import growth. Export support came mainly from energy flows, while agriculture and wood — structurally important sectors — weakened.
🇱🇹 Lithuania — international trade in goods, November 2025
Core facts
• Exports: €3.12 bn (+1.4% YoY)
• Imports: €3.63 bn (+3.1% YoY)
• Trade deficit: -€510.4 m
• Over the month: both exports and imports declined vs October
Structure
• Exports supported by:
◦ mineral fuels and oils (+20% YoY)
◦ fertilizers (+31.3% YoY)
• Imports driven by:
◦ mineral products
◦ machinery and mechanical appliances
Longer view (Jan–Nov 2025)
• Exports: -0.8% YoY
• Imports: +4.4% YoY
• Deficit widened significantly compared with 2024.
Partners
• Exports: Latvia, Poland, Germany
• Imports: Poland, Germany, Latvia
• High share of goods of Lithuanian origin (≈69%) — still a structural strength.
Lithuania takeaway
Lithuania remains the largest trading economy in the Baltics, but the gap between imports and exports continues to widen. Growth is industry- and energy-linked, not consumption-driven alone.
🇪🇪 Estonia — foreign trade, November 2025
Core facts
• Exports: €1.61 bn (+3% YoY)
• Imports: €1.91 bn (+7% YoY)
• Trade deficit: -€298 m (wider by €72 m YoY)
Exports
• Strongest growth:
◦ mineral products (incl. shale oil and gas) +68% YoY
• Declines:
◦ agricultural products and food preparations -13%
• Goods of Estonian origin:
◦ -1% YoY
◦ share fell to 63% (seasonality + structure)
Imports
• Biggest increase:
◦ mineral products (+57% YoY, incl. electricity and gas)
• Transport equipment imports fell sharply due to high base in 2024.
Partners
• Exports: Finland, Latvia, Sweden
• Imports: Finland, Latvia, Germany, Lithuania
Estonia takeaway
Estonia shows export growth on paper, but driven largely by energy and re-exports, while domestic-origin exports softened.
November 2025 data from national statistical offices show a common pattern across the Baltics: imports are growing faster than exports in all three countries.
Latvia recorded a decline in exports alongside rising imports, Lithuania maintained modest export growth but widened its trade deficit, while Estonia showed headline export growth driven largely by energy-related flows rather than domestic-origin goods.
Despite differences in scale and structure, the region shares several key signals: pressure on trade balances, weakening agricultural and food exports, and a growing role of energy and industrial inputs in shaping monthly trade dynamics.
🇱🇻 Latvia — foreign trade, November 2025
Core facts
• Exports: €1.55 bn (-5.6% YoY)
• Imports: €1.88 bn (+7.4% YoY)
• Trade balance: about -€0.33 bn
• Export share in total trade fell from 48.5% → 45.2%
What drove the numbers
• Export growth concentrated in energy-related items:
◦ mineral products +25.7% YoY
◦ electricity and natural gas were the key drivers
• Traditional pillars weakened:
◦ wood and wood products -12%
◦ plant products -19.9%
◦ grain exports hit especially hard (wheat -52.9%)
Imports
• Broad-based growth across almost all major groups:
◦ machinery & electrical equipment +14.9%
◦ mineral products +9.7%
◦ transport equipment +9.3%
• Consumption signal inside imports: rise in electronics and alcoholic beverages.
Partners
• Exports: Lithuania, Estonia, Germany, Sweden
• Imports: Lithuania, Germany, Poland, Estonia
Latvia takeaway
Latvia shows the sharpest imbalance in November: falling exports combined with strong import growth. Export support came mainly from energy flows, while agriculture and wood — structurally important sectors — weakened.
🇱🇹 Lithuania — international trade in goods, November 2025
Core facts
• Exports: €3.12 bn (+1.4% YoY)
• Imports: €3.63 bn (+3.1% YoY)
• Trade deficit: -€510.4 m
• Over the month: both exports and imports declined vs October
Structure
• Exports supported by:
◦ mineral fuels and oils (+20% YoY)
◦ fertilizers (+31.3% YoY)
• Imports driven by:
◦ mineral products
◦ machinery and mechanical appliances
Longer view (Jan–Nov 2025)
• Exports: -0.8% YoY
• Imports: +4.4% YoY
• Deficit widened significantly compared with 2024.
Partners
• Exports: Latvia, Poland, Germany
• Imports: Poland, Germany, Latvia
• High share of goods of Lithuanian origin (≈69%) — still a structural strength.
Lithuania takeaway
Lithuania remains the largest trading economy in the Baltics, but the gap between imports and exports continues to widen. Growth is industry- and energy-linked, not consumption-driven alone.
🇪🇪 Estonia — foreign trade, November 2025
Core facts
• Exports: €1.61 bn (+3% YoY)
• Imports: €1.91 bn (+7% YoY)
• Trade deficit: -€298 m (wider by €72 m YoY)
Exports
• Strongest growth:
◦ mineral products (incl. shale oil and gas) +68% YoY
• Declines:
◦ agricultural products and food preparations -13%
• Goods of Estonian origin:
◦ -1% YoY
◦ share fell to 63% (seasonality + structure)
Imports
• Biggest increase:
◦ mineral products (+57% YoY, incl. electricity and gas)
• Transport equipment imports fell sharply due to high base in 2024.
Partners
• Exports: Finland, Latvia, Sweden
• Imports: Finland, Latvia, Germany, Lithuania
Estonia takeaway
Estonia shows export growth on paper, but driven largely by energy and re-exports, while domestic-origin exports softened.
🌍 Baltic region — what is common, what is different
What is common
1. Imports grow faster than exports in all three countries.
2. Energy-related products (electricity, gas, mineral fuels) are the main positive driver across the region.
3. Agriculture and food-related exports weaken everywhere in November.
4. Trade balances deteriorate simultaneously, signalling regional rather than country-specific pressure.
Key differences
• Latvia: weakest export performance; strongest pressure from declining traditional sectors (wood, grains).
• Lithuania: largest scale, more industrial structure, but structural deficit widening over the year.
• Estonia: export growth headline-positive, but domestic-origin exports stagnate, energy dominates dynamics.
Context (why this matters)
November data confirms a broader Baltic trend:
the region is importing growth faster than it is exporting value.
Energy flows and industrial inputs support short-term trade volumes, but do not compensate for weakening agricultural, wood and food exports. If this pattern persists into winter and early 2026, trade balances will remain under pressure despite stable or even growing nominal turnover.
Source: (CSP Latvia; Statistics Lithuania; Statistics Estonia)
BSM © 2026 | #BalticFocus #BalticEconomy #ForeignTrade #TradeBalance #Latvia #Lithuania #Estonia #EUtrade balticfocus.org
What is common
1. Imports grow faster than exports in all three countries.
2. Energy-related products (electricity, gas, mineral fuels) are the main positive driver across the region.
3. Agriculture and food-related exports weaken everywhere in November.
4. Trade balances deteriorate simultaneously, signalling regional rather than country-specific pressure.
Key differences
• Latvia: weakest export performance; strongest pressure from declining traditional sectors (wood, grains).
• Lithuania: largest scale, more industrial structure, but structural deficit widening over the year.
• Estonia: export growth headline-positive, but domestic-origin exports stagnate, energy dominates dynamics.
Context (why this matters)
November data confirms a broader Baltic trend:
the region is importing growth faster than it is exporting value.
Energy flows and industrial inputs support short-term trade volumes, but do not compensate for weakening agricultural, wood and food exports. If this pattern persists into winter and early 2026, trade balances will remain under pressure despite stable or even growing nominal turnover.
Source: (CSP Latvia; Statistics Lithuania; Statistics Estonia)
BSM © 2026 | #BalticFocus #BalticEconomy #ForeignTrade #TradeBalance #Latvia #Lithuania #Estonia #EUtrade balticfocus.org
Despite post-holiday assortment gaps, Latvia remains the highest-priced grocery market in the Baltics.
Using the pre-holiday reference point (week ending 26 December), baseline prices for core everyday staples in Latvia remain consistently above those in Lithuania and Estonia. The early January snapshot shows no meaningful downward adjustment in Latvia, while neighboring markets absorb the post-holiday period through stronger competitive pressure—either via promotions (Lithuania) or structurally lower everyday pricing (Estonia).
🇱🇻🇱🇹🇪🇪 Baltic Grocery Index — post-holiday snapshot (online retail)
Reference: week ending 26 December 2025
Current: week ending 9 January 2026
Baseline (non-promotional) prices
📌 Data source: online listings from Rimi and Maxima / Barbora platforms.
📌 Promotional prices excluded. Availability gaps explicitly noted.
🇱🇻 Latvia
Key prices (9 Jan):
Milk 1L — n/a (cheapest option temporarily unavailable)
Bread 300g — 0.39
Eggs (10) — 1.99
Chicken fillet 1kg — 7.99
Potatoes 1kg — 0.59
Carrots 1kg — 0.65
Sunflower oil 1L — 1.99
Rice 800g — 1.19
Sugar 1kg — 0.75
Pork (boneless shoulder) — n/a (temporarily unavailable)
Compared to 26 December:
• Prices: broadly unchanged where available
• Availability: noticeably worse across both Rimi and Barbora
• Missing simultaneously: cheapest milk, boneless pork shoulder, carrots (Barbora), chicken fillet (Barbora)
📌 The pattern does not resemble a typical end-of-week sell-out and points to delayed post-holiday replenishment, rather than demand spikes.
🇱🇹 Lithuania
Key prices (9 Jan, baseline):
Milk 1L — 0.62–0.65
Bread 300g — 0.34
Eggs (10) — 2.15
Chicken fillet 1kg — 7.29–8.79
Potatoes 1kg — 0.49–0.50
Carrots 1kg — 0.58–0.65
Sunflower oil 1L — 1.54
Rice 800g — 0.95
Sugar 1kg — 0.68–0.89
Pork (boneless shoulder) — 5.49–5.59
Compared to 26 December:
• Baseline prices: stable
• Key change: aggressive post-holiday promotions, especially in vegetables and staples
• Baseline levels remain visible and intact beneath promo layers
📌 This reflects active competitive pressure, not supply stress.
🇪🇪 Estonia
Key prices (9 Jan):
Milk 1L — 0.59
Bread 300g — 0.43–0.48
Eggs (10) — 1.69–1.99
Chicken (pre-packed / functional equivalent) — ~8.99
Potatoes 1kg — 0.39
Carrots 1kg — 0.45
Sunflower oil 1L — 1.59–1.79
Rice 800g — 0.39–0.49
Sugar 1kg — 0.59–0.73
Pork (functional equivalent) — ~7.59
Compared to 26 December:
• Prices: equal or lower in several staples (rice, sugar, vegetables)
• Availability: full shelf, no post-holiday gaps
• Competition expressed via stable EDLP, not promotions
🧺 What the comparison shows (26 Dec → 9 Jan)
• No generalized price increase after the holidays across the Baltics
• Divergence appears in how markets absorb the post-holiday period, not in inflation
⚠️ Structural differences
Latvia
→ Pricing stable, but assortment fragile
→ Low-price anchors temporarily missing
→ Competition shifts from price to availability
Lithuania
→ Full shelf + aggressive post-holiday promos
→ Clear price pressure between chains
→ Baseline constrained by competition
Estonia
→ Full shelf + lowest baseline levels
→ Competition via everyday pricing, not promotions
🧠 Interpretation
Changes observed in early January are best explained by retail competition models and logistics timing, not by harvest conditions or short-term inflation.
Using 26 December as the reference point allows post-holiday effects (promotions, replenishment lags) to be separated from structural pricing dynamics.
📌 Promotional prices excluded from the index.BSM © 2026
#BalticGroceryIndex #FoodPrices #Latvia #Lithuania #Estonia
Using the pre-holiday reference point (week ending 26 December), baseline prices for core everyday staples in Latvia remain consistently above those in Lithuania and Estonia. The early January snapshot shows no meaningful downward adjustment in Latvia, while neighboring markets absorb the post-holiday period through stronger competitive pressure—either via promotions (Lithuania) or structurally lower everyday pricing (Estonia).
🇱🇻🇱🇹🇪🇪 Baltic Grocery Index — post-holiday snapshot (online retail)
Reference: week ending 26 December 2025
Current: week ending 9 January 2026
Baseline (non-promotional) prices
📌 Data source: online listings from Rimi and Maxima / Barbora platforms.
📌 Promotional prices excluded. Availability gaps explicitly noted.
🇱🇻 Latvia
Key prices (9 Jan):
Milk 1L — n/a (cheapest option temporarily unavailable)
Bread 300g — 0.39
Eggs (10) — 1.99
Chicken fillet 1kg — 7.99
Potatoes 1kg — 0.59
Carrots 1kg — 0.65
Sunflower oil 1L — 1.99
Rice 800g — 1.19
Sugar 1kg — 0.75
Pork (boneless shoulder) — n/a (temporarily unavailable)
Compared to 26 December:
• Prices: broadly unchanged where available
• Availability: noticeably worse across both Rimi and Barbora
• Missing simultaneously: cheapest milk, boneless pork shoulder, carrots (Barbora), chicken fillet (Barbora)
📌 The pattern does not resemble a typical end-of-week sell-out and points to delayed post-holiday replenishment, rather than demand spikes.
🇱🇹 Lithuania
Key prices (9 Jan, baseline):
Milk 1L — 0.62–0.65
Bread 300g — 0.34
Eggs (10) — 2.15
Chicken fillet 1kg — 7.29–8.79
Potatoes 1kg — 0.49–0.50
Carrots 1kg — 0.58–0.65
Sunflower oil 1L — 1.54
Rice 800g — 0.95
Sugar 1kg — 0.68–0.89
Pork (boneless shoulder) — 5.49–5.59
Compared to 26 December:
• Baseline prices: stable
• Key change: aggressive post-holiday promotions, especially in vegetables and staples
• Baseline levels remain visible and intact beneath promo layers
📌 This reflects active competitive pressure, not supply stress.
🇪🇪 Estonia
Key prices (9 Jan):
Milk 1L — 0.59
Bread 300g — 0.43–0.48
Eggs (10) — 1.69–1.99
Chicken (pre-packed / functional equivalent) — ~8.99
Potatoes 1kg — 0.39
Carrots 1kg — 0.45
Sunflower oil 1L — 1.59–1.79
Rice 800g — 0.39–0.49
Sugar 1kg — 0.59–0.73
Pork (functional equivalent) — ~7.59
Compared to 26 December:
• Prices: equal or lower in several staples (rice, sugar, vegetables)
• Availability: full shelf, no post-holiday gaps
• Competition expressed via stable EDLP, not promotions
🧺 What the comparison shows (26 Dec → 9 Jan)
• No generalized price increase after the holidays across the Baltics
• Divergence appears in how markets absorb the post-holiday period, not in inflation
⚠️ Structural differences
Latvia
→ Pricing stable, but assortment fragile
→ Low-price anchors temporarily missing
→ Competition shifts from price to availability
Lithuania
→ Full shelf + aggressive post-holiday promos
→ Clear price pressure between chains
→ Baseline constrained by competition
Estonia
→ Full shelf + lowest baseline levels
→ Competition via everyday pricing, not promotions
🧠 Interpretation
Changes observed in early January are best explained by retail competition models and logistics timing, not by harvest conditions or short-term inflation.
Using 26 December as the reference point allows post-holiday effects (promotions, replenishment lags) to be separated from structural pricing dynamics.
📌 Promotional prices excluded from the index.BSM © 2026
#BalticGroceryIndex #FoodPrices #Latvia #Lithuania #Estonia