Michael Fanone: “Anyone who sides with this administration is my enemy… They need to be destroyed.”

🄳🄾🄾🄼🄿🤖🅂🅃🄸🄽🄶

Regret is something ~100% of people NEVER feel

Timeline full of bullsh&t lying rationalizations like this as to why they’re were actually right to fumble $PENGUIN

And how they’re even more convinced that they’d happily do the exact same thing again

Idiots never feel regret

🄳🄾🄾🄼🄿🄾🅂🅃🄸🄽🄶

19 to 22

MODULE 4
Command, Control, and Autonomy

Modern lunar planning (including Artemis**) prioritizes south-polar rim sites with ~70–90% solar illumination due to grazing Sun angles and terrain.

This changes:
- average power availability
- reliance on solar during nominal operations

It does *not* change:
- Earth–Moon light-time delay
- comm outages and antenna masking
- the requirement for autonomous safety

https://t.me/AzazelNews/954468

1) Central doctrine: Earth supervises; the plant protects itself

The plant must remain safe without continuous human control, including unattended standby periods of 6–12 months before crew arrival.

From this assumption follow non-negotiable rules:

- Local protection is mandatory
- SCRAM and safing decisions are local
- Remote command must be constrained
- Telemetry must support diagnosis after outages

Even at sun-rich polar sites, Earth cannot be in the safety loop.

https://youtu.be/0vZwaMg60FM

2) Telemetry philosophy: *monitor like an industrial plant*
2.1 Scale of observability

- ~1300 monitored parameters during operation
- fewer during standby

2.2 Mode-dependent sampling (state-based telemetry)
There are three modes:

Standby (plant alone for months)
- Slow, low-power reporting
- Enough data to confirm the plant is healthy
- Designed to run unattended for long periods

Startup & Shutdown (most dangerous moments)
- Very fast reporting
- Extra attention to a few critical safety signals
- Designed to catch problems immediately during transitions

Normal Operation
- Moderate reporting
- Full visibility without wasting bandwidth
- No continuous high-speed safety channels

2.3 Single telemetry backbone
- one telemetry system
- variable sampling rates by mode

Engineering benefit:
- fewer components
- fewer failure modes
- higher reliability

https://youtu.be/BpmoJSd2vEI

3) Communications architecture: layered and survivable
3.1 Standby communications (S-band)
During standby:
- S-band command receiver always on
- periodic status transmissions (~every 100 hours)
- omnidirectional antenna

S-band (~2–4 GHz) is used for reliable deep-space command and telemetry.

Meaning: the plant remains reachable even before humans arrive.

3.2 Operational communications
- Plant → Shelter: VHF (Very High Frequency, ~30–300 MHz)
- Shelter → Earth: S-band

The shelter acts as a local operations node, not just a habitat.

3.3 Earth-side role
On Earth:
- telemetry is demultiplexed
- compared against limits
- alarms generated
- data recorded

Earth:
- monitors
- diagnoses
- plans

Earth does not directly drive actuators.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uY5gfV1wAKk

4) Command philosophy: stored sequences only
4.1 Command paths

- Primary: Earth → plant (S-band)
- Backup: Shelter → plant (VHF, limited authority)

Two independent command paths ensure survivability.

4.2 Commands invoke routines
Commands:
- do not move valves or rods directly
- invoke pre-verified stored routines
- ~200 sequences
- ~5 steps per sequence
- local interlocks enforced

This prevents unsafe command combinations.

4.3 Redundancy management

The onboard programmer:
- executes sequences
- switches to redundant hardware automatically
- can also be directed by Earth

Autonomy includes communications survivability, not just reactor safety.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LlmyVpqk7mw

5) Autonomy
- maximize reliability
- include failure-analysis capability where practical
- avoid unnecessary adaptive complexity

Operational result:
- local self-protection
- graceful degradation
- continued communication under partial failure
- post-outage diagnosability

At polar sites, autonomy expands to include energy-aware scheduling, but safety logic remains dominant.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9N1DZwP5jAU

End of Module 4

Small quizz below

Motherfucker
French Wizards Quizzes are too complex to be posted on Telegram

Question 1
In the 1963–1965 lunar nuclear power studies (WANL, CNLM, LESA, Westinghouse), which observation most strongly supports the claim that reactor physics was not the primary development risk?

A. The reactors were designed at relatively low thermal power compared to terrestrial plants.

B. The studies assumed fast-spectrum cores, which reduce moderator mass.

C. Shielding mass estimates were smaller than expected for lunar applications.

D. The presence of RTGs in parallel architectures reduced dependence on the reactor.

E. Criticality control and reactivity behavior were treated as baseline assumptions, while critiques focused on startup, corrosion, and heat rejection.

Question 2

Why does the lunar power plant design rely on stored command sequences executed locally instead of allowing Earth to directly control individual actuators?

A. Because direct actuator commands would require too much communication bandwidth.

B. Because Earth-based operators cannot see the plant’s real-time status clearly enough.

C. Because the plant must remain safe even if communications are delayed, interrupted, or unavailable.

D. Because onboard computers cannot accept direct commands.

E. Because the reactor must operate continuously without shutdown.

Question 3

At a south-polar rim site with ~70–90% solar illumination, which change most increases the importance of Module 4 autonomy features rather than reducing them?

A. The likelihood that the reactor will be cycled on and off, making reliable autonomous startup and restart logic critical.

B. Increased opportunity to run Earth-in-the-loop control.

C. Reduced need for radiators due to lower average reactor output.

D. The availability of solar power for telemetry transmission.

E. The use of RTGs as backup heat sources.