Forwarded from WarFront Witness
Reuters, citing two Syrian security sources, reports a βvery high probabilityβ that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was killed in a plane crash near Homs last night. The aircraft, departing from Damascus International Airport, is believed to have been shot down.
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Explosions in Damascus a short while ago. Israeli media reports that Israeli airstrikes targeted air defense systems at Mazzeh Military Airport.
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Zelensky has updated his claims on Ukrainian losses since the beginning of the Russian invasion. He claims that 43,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed, and 370,000 have been wounded.
He also claimed that half of the wounded troops returned to the battlefield.
He also claimed that half of the wounded troops returned to the battlefield.
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The Israeli news outlet βYedioth Ahronothβ says that the military operation carried out by the IDF in northern Gaza is nearing its end.
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SNA fighters have reportedly captured the key SDF stronghold city of Manbij in northern Syria, following renewed offensive operations on multiple axes. Combing operations are apparently underway.
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A reliable Ukrainian monitoring channel reported that actions by Russia have been noted, which may indicate preparations for a possible missile attack involving Tu-95ms aircraft this night/morning.
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New high-quality satellite images of Engels-2 air base in Saratov Oblast:
As of 7/12/24 (date of the picture) at the airfield there were were:
β 12x Su-34/35.
β 4x Tu-95ms.
β 2x Tu-160.
β 1x Su-24MR.
β 2 Il-76MD.
β 1x An-12.
β 8x Su-25.
IL-76MD planes have resumed transport flights to Engels-2 air base. Additionally, An-12 planes are also making frequent landings with 5 planes since the last missile attack.
The channel that posted the imagery stated that that all the of Tu-95s and Tu-160s at this airbase are most likely equipped with Kh-101 missiles and are ready for use.
It is possible that one of the Tu-160s is under maintenance, however.
Imagery was purchased by @StrategicaviationT
As of 7/12/24 (date of the picture) at the airfield there were were:
β 12x Su-34/35.
β 4x Tu-95ms.
β 2x Tu-160.
β 1x Su-24MR.
β 2 Il-76MD.
β 1x An-12.
β 8x Su-25.
IL-76MD planes have resumed transport flights to Engels-2 air base. Additionally, An-12 planes are also making frequent landings with 5 planes since the last missile attack.
The channel that posted the imagery stated that that all the of Tu-95s and Tu-160s at this airbase are most likely equipped with Kh-101 missiles and are ready for use.
It is possible that one of the Tu-160s is under maintenance, however.
Imagery was purchased by @StrategicaviationT
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Another large scale Russian Geran-2 drone attack is underway, with dozens of drones in the airspace of Ukraine. Most of these are flying north from Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts, however there are also Gerans flying northwest through Odesa/Mykolaiv oblast, as well as reports of drones headed for Kyiv.
This comes as over the past few days, the number of Gerans launched has significantly decreased.
This comes as over the past few days, the number of Gerans launched has significantly decreased.
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AMK Mapping
A reliable Ukrainian monitoring channel reported that actions by Russia have been noted, which may indicate preparations for a possible missile attack involving Tu-95ms aircraft this night/morning.
Based on the frequency activity, the same source says that it is unlikely that anything will happen in terms of large-scale missile attacks today.
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AMK Mapping
Allegedly the first picture of Assad and his wife in Moscow. It appears that they werenβt on that plane.
Itβs an old photo
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A general curfew has been announced in HTS/FSA controlled Damascus.
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Just a reminder that the Syrian Civil war is not over. HTS and SNA have differing ideologies and interests. They are getting along for the most part, but I suspect tensions will rise between them.
Not much is known about the interests and ideologies of the new rebels in FSA, but their command structure is very scattered and they donβt coordinate very well. This could possibly lead to HTS seeing this as an opportunity to seize control in the south. The added threat of Israel, their airstrikes and ground incursion also may result in differences arising between the different factions in southern Syria. One side may view the other as incompetent in preventing a buffer zone being established and limiting the spread of Israeli influence in the region. I suspect that coordination between FSA and HTS will be limited at best, much worse than that of HTS and SNA. The one main upside for the rebels in the south is that HTS has publicly stated that fighting Israel is not a priority. They have also admitted that they do not have sufficient forces to prevent the Israeli incursion. This is likely in part due to the intense SAA-Russian airstrikes that occurred during the HTS offensive.
As for the situation with the SDF in the north and northeast of Syria, SNA is already actively fighting them, and have been doing so for years. Even before the beginning of operation deterrence of aggression, SNA had been infiltrating SDF positions and taking POWs. But now that they have launched their offensive on the key SDF stronghold city of Manbij, there is a significant risk of the SDF losing their bridgehead on the western bank of the Euphrates river. If HTS - who has agreed not to fight SDF for the time being - sees a weakened SDF, they may launch a coordinated attack with SNA, therefore decreasing the number of factions that are attempting to gain influence over a fractured Syria.
Of course, there is also a possibility that nothing happens, with the exception of SNA and SDF fighting each other. I guess only time will tell, but what I can say is that we are entering a new phase for Syria - a phase that has the possibility of being incredibly destructive for the country.
Not much is known about the interests and ideologies of the new rebels in FSA, but their command structure is very scattered and they donβt coordinate very well. This could possibly lead to HTS seeing this as an opportunity to seize control in the south. The added threat of Israel, their airstrikes and ground incursion also may result in differences arising between the different factions in southern Syria. One side may view the other as incompetent in preventing a buffer zone being established and limiting the spread of Israeli influence in the region. I suspect that coordination between FSA and HTS will be limited at best, much worse than that of HTS and SNA. The one main upside for the rebels in the south is that HTS has publicly stated that fighting Israel is not a priority. They have also admitted that they do not have sufficient forces to prevent the Israeli incursion. This is likely in part due to the intense SAA-Russian airstrikes that occurred during the HTS offensive.
As for the situation with the SDF in the north and northeast of Syria, SNA is already actively fighting them, and have been doing so for years. Even before the beginning of operation deterrence of aggression, SNA had been infiltrating SDF positions and taking POWs. But now that they have launched their offensive on the key SDF stronghold city of Manbij, there is a significant risk of the SDF losing their bridgehead on the western bank of the Euphrates river. If HTS - who has agreed not to fight SDF for the time being - sees a weakened SDF, they may launch a coordinated attack with SNA, therefore decreasing the number of factions that are attempting to gain influence over a fractured Syria.
Of course, there is also a possibility that nothing happens, with the exception of SNA and SDF fighting each other. I guess only time will tell, but what I can say is that we are entering a new phase for Syria - a phase that has the possibility of being incredibly destructive for the country.
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Recent reports from the Ukrainian source "Deepstate" suggest that Russian forces have likely advanced on two axes in the Pokrovsk direction.
Firstly, Russian forces likely reached the Solonyi river from the south, seizing the railway line and slightly expanding their control in Vidrodzhennia. They also reportedly slightly expanded their zone of control in Shevchenko.
Secondly, Russian forces likely advanced along a treeline to the northwest and are now within 1.35km of the southern outskirts of Pishchane.
Firstly, Russian forces likely reached the Solonyi river from the south, seizing the railway line and slightly expanding their control in Vidrodzhennia. They also reportedly slightly expanded their zone of control in Shevchenko.
Secondly, Russian forces likely advanced along a treeline to the northwest and are now within 1.35km of the southern outskirts of Pishchane.
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