Here's an interesting fact about Russia's jet-drone usage.

Currently, at the time of writing, there are only Geran-4/5 jet-drones detected in Ukrainian airspace. Not a single Geran-2 drone is in the air right now.

The USS Theodore Roosevelt aircraft carrier will arrive in the Middle East by the end of October, and the midterms will be over by November 3.

After that, the regional war will likely resume.

So, what is the current status of the axis of resistance?

While the axis has been severely degraded from the last three years of on-and-off regional war, Iran and Ansarallah have become very emboldened by their recent successes, and it appears that the informal alliance is beginning to make a comeback.

- Iran likely has satellite intelligence being provided by Russia in response to American intelligence being provided to Ukraine, so the accuracy of their strikes and the value of their targets hit will be much higher. This, coupled with the critical U.S. interceptor missile shortages, is how Iran has established strong deterrence, and is why they are able to consistently strike ships in the Strait of Hormuz without any American retaliation, and even target U.S. bases without retaliation as we saw earlier this year.

- Ansarallah maintains a high capacity to launch ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones at Saudi Arabia, even while actively fighting a large-scale ground war against the Saudi-backed PLC, which obviously takes up a lot of resources. They remain by far Iran's strongest ally in the region, and will be very useful to their war effort. Therefore, it's likely that Israel and the U.S. will resume strike operations against them, especially amid the major frontline advances being achieved by Ansarallah against the PLC in Yemen. I also think there will probably be a new PLC counteroffensive soon with Saudi air support in order to salvage the situation, potentially even pre-emptively due to a possible future threat to Aden by the Houthis. Such as operation could also involve American and Israeli air support if they don't suffer munition shortages from their strikes on Iran.

- Hezbollah is weakened, but has been able to consolidate control over the remaining parts of southern Lebanon in recent months following the end of the most recent phase of the war with Israel. They maintain the majority of their drone operators and FPV drone capacity, and still have a lot of long-range rockets in the Bekaa Valley. It's estimated that at least 2,000 elite Hezbollah Radwan operatives are still entrenched between the Israeli positions and the Litani River. Thousands more fighters are present throughout the Bekaa Valley and north of the Litani River. They will be weakened further if another war breaks out, but will remain largely a capable fighting force, unlike their various Palestinian militia allies in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

- With the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Iraqi territory, Iranian-backed militias are also emboldened, and retain significant capabilities to target Saudi Arabia, especially as they no longer have to focus much on targeting U.S. forces in Iraqi Kurdistan. As such, we will probably see a new wave of U.S. strikes on them if the war restarts

- Hamas, the PIJ, and other allied Palestinian groups will not take part in the next phase of the war, as they no longer remain a capable fighting force. Only some small decentralised Hamas and PIJ cells retain the neccesary combat capabilities, and with the complete dismantling of the post-war Hamas command structure by Israel in the last several months, and ongoing processes to replace Hamas' governance with a new Palestinian government friendly to Israel, it's unlikely that they will pose any major threat. It seems that after nearly 80 years, Palestinian armed resistance within Israel and the Palestinian territories can soon be considered dead.

As for the American-Israeli alliance, I believe there's a solid chance we will see the UAE get directly involved in striking Iran (if they haven't already in the most recent phase of the war), at least in some limited capacity. Saudi Arabia likely wont be, as they will be tied up in Yemen dealing with the Houthis. But, interceptor missiles remain a very big issue for this alliance, and with Iran and Ansarallah maintaining their strong missile capabilities, they will lose a lot more valuable infrastructure and will probably suffer additional casualties among personnel.

Israel will most likely be spared the majority of the damage, due to its long distance from Iran meaning only a small portion of Iranian missiles can reach them; their small size making air defence a lot easier to fully cover their airspace; and because they have one of the strongest air defence networks in the world. As we saw in the most recent phases of the war, in my opinion, Iran will once again likely not focus on targeting Israel, as it is less cost-effective, and will not result in much significant damage to their military infrastructure. The Gulf States will again bear the brunt of the attacks, along with U.S. forces stationed in the region, providing Israel with ample opportunity for a new intensified war against Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Well, well, well.

Russian Geran-4 jet-drone strikes on a warehouse, a fuel and lubricants plant, and two industrial enterprises.

Russian Geran-4 jet-drones struck three more dry cargo vessels in the western Black Sea, as well as a ship claimed to be used by Ukraine to launch drone-boats.

Explosions in Zaporizhzhia City. Russian KAB glide-bomb attack.

At least 3 strikes so far.

The city of Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast, has come under very heavy Russian attacks in the last 12 hours.

Overnight, at least 16 KAB glide-bombs struck the vicinity of the city centre. Another 11+ strong explosions were also heard in the city centre and surrounding suburbs throughout the early morning hours, although its unclear if this was from KABs or MLRS strikes.

The outskirts of Kramatorsk from both the eastern and southern directions also came under heavy shelling throughout the night.

Ukraine's SkyFall defence company has been developing a new drone for evacuating injured soldiers from the frontline.

This hexa-copter drone is capable of carrying loads of up to 150 kg with a range of 15 km, and can reach speeds of 105 km/h. The drone is guided by an integrated AI system as a backup if communications are lost, and contains Starlink modules as well. Frontline testing has already begun this month.

The Ukrainian General Staff claims that overnight mid-range drone strikes struck a Russian "Nebo-U" radar system in Krasnodar Krai.

The current condition of the Kramatorsk-Druzhkivka highway in Donetsk Oblast.

The Washington Post reports that Ukraine is down to their last couple of Patriot PAC-3 interceptor missiles.

Ukraine reportedly had around 10 on October 7, and used most of these during the most recent Russian large-scale missile attack on Kyiv.

Today marks exactly three years since the beginning of the disastrous Ukrainian river crossing operation in the village of Krynky, Kherson Oblast.

The operation dragged on for nearly 9 months and resulted in the deaths of over 1,000 Ukrainian marines.

Reuters reports that the order to limit Starshield for Ukraine came from inside the White House, but not from President Trump himself.

Regarding the so-called "Vovchansk Pocket".

There has been a lot of discourse recently about the status of this salient, with many repeating claims about Russia encircling and clearing the entire area.

As always, the truth lies somewhere in the middle. Neither the Russian nor Ukrainian maps are in any way accurate in this sector.

This salient is more and more resembling a no-mans-land, with large grey-zones slowly merging into infiltration zones, while each side holds "islands" of control and intermingled positions throughout this vast area. There are numerous villages, treelines, gullies, and forested areas that can be used as infiltration routes for both sides.

Russia has not encircled this area, let along cleared it, but it would also be incorrect to say Ukraine holds a stable defence here. In fact, there are likely no more than 150 Ukrainian soldiers present throughout this entire 500 km² area. Most of the defence is being held with drones, and with soldiers on the immediate flanks just south of the salient. Some small Ukrainian assault groups remain present within the salient to conduct clearing operations against small Russian infiltrators.

The Russian zone of infiltration is increasing, and so is the grey-zone, which can be characterised as a zone of repeated infiltration. The areas marked as an infiltration zone on my map are very approximate, and only cover areas where Russian soldiers have been confirmed to have operated. The infiltration and grey-zones are likely larger than what is shown here, but I will not extend these zones until I am able to identify where they have been enlarged.

Logistics into this salient is very difficult for Ukraine due to the wide infiltration zone, and it will be difficult for them to hold it, but its not ruled out that the Russian offensive will eventually stall.

Btw, this new chat rule also extends to fanatics from the pro-Iranian and pro-Palestinian spaces (resistards, as I call them) as well.

As for Zionists, well, they’re basically all fanatics anyway so most of them are banned one way or another 😁