Russia continued their large-scale strike campaign against the Zatoka Bridge tonight.
At least 6 KAB glide-bombs (launched from 3 Su-34s) and 2 Geran-4 jet-drones were used. This brings the total to 12 KAB glide-bombs in the last 48 hours alone, although there were many more strikes in the days, weeks, and months prior.
The Zatoka bridge connects the only route entirely in Ukraine that connects southern Odesa Oblast with the rest of the country. It has suffered heavy bombardments numerous times throughout this war, but was never destroyed.
At least 6 KAB glide-bombs (launched from 3 Su-34s) and 2 Geran-4 jet-drones were used. This brings the total to 12 KAB glide-bombs in the last 48 hours alone, although there were many more strikes in the days, weeks, and months prior.
The Zatoka bridge connects the only route entirely in Ukraine that connects southern Odesa Oblast with the rest of the country. It has suffered heavy bombardments numerous times throughout this war, but was never destroyed.
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To reflect the ongoing change in tactics in the war, I have adjusted the layout of my "infiltration zone" layer on my interactive map.
While I have had this layer for some time now, the layer has now been changed to look more like a "shadow" laid across the frontline rather than a "second grey-zone". As before, it covers the grey-zone, as well as the Russian and Ukrainian control zones. With both sides increasingly infiltrating the other's lines with small groups of soldiers, and with the quantities of soldiers concentrated along the "line of contact" decreasing further due to such heavy drone usage, the maps must continue to evolve in order to accurately reflect the frontline situation.
This is why I, and others, call this ongoing phenomenon in Ukraine the "death of the conventional frontline".
For those wonder what the difference between the "infiltration zone" and the "grey zone" on my map is, I will explain it here:
The "infiltration zone" (the "shadow" overlaid on the map) represents the maximum area where soldiers of both sides can be present at any one time. For example, in Kostyantynivka, some isolated groups of Ukrainian soldiers remain trapped south of the city near Ivanopillya, while Russian DRGs are actively infiltrating up to the outskirts of Druzhkivka, nearly 18 km away. This 18 km-wide area can't be considered a "grey-zone", as large parts of it are still technically "controlled" by one side (e.g. eastern/southern Kostyantynivka by Russia, and most of Oleksijevo-Druzhkivka by Ukraine), but the lack of soldiers concentrated along the frontline allows for these infiltrations to take place at depth. This increasingly large infiltration zone is a result of how tactics in this war are evolving, and is typically not caused by a lack of control by each side over their "lines".
The "grey-zone" (the empty area between the red and blue polygons) represents the area of active fighting, where both sides remain present in mixed and overlapping positions (some call this a "layered pie"). Both sides infiltrate this area and engage in periodic clashes, however for it to be considered a "grey-zone", the attacking side must be infiltrating it repeatedly and somewhat regularly. The so-called one-time infiltrations, which may occur once every couple of weeks, are part of the larger infiltration zone.
The "control zone" (the areas of red and blue on the map) includes parts of the infiltration zone. As I said before, one side could be conducting irregular infiltrations into the other's lines (whether that be with DRGs or small assault groups), but are never able to maintain a presence or a regular level of infiltration, and it still be considered "controlled" by the other side. A good example of this is west of Druzhkivka, in the villages of Novoandriivka and Novohryhorivka.
For something to be "controlled" by one side, it doesn't necessarily have to be fully "consolidated". Consolidation refers to the process of securing, organising, and stabilising newly captured territory to later use it to develop additional successes on the tactical or strategic level. This process can involve setting up observation posts, organising logistics, establishing command centres or temporary deployment points, among other actions.
Generally, a "consolidation zone" of the attacking side will be outside the "infiltration zone", although in this modern type of infiltration war, the attacking side does sometimes enter the defending side's consolidation zone, resulting in occasional overlaps of the hypothetical consolidation zone (which doesn't have a separate layer on my map) with the infiltration zone. An example of this right now is the Novotroitske area northeast of Dobropillya, where Russia DRGs were recently active within Ukraine's zone of consolidation behind the multi-layered "New Donbas" defensive lines.
(Post continues below) โฌ๏ธ
While I have had this layer for some time now, the layer has now been changed to look more like a "shadow" laid across the frontline rather than a "second grey-zone". As before, it covers the grey-zone, as well as the Russian and Ukrainian control zones. With both sides increasingly infiltrating the other's lines with small groups of soldiers, and with the quantities of soldiers concentrated along the "line of contact" decreasing further due to such heavy drone usage, the maps must continue to evolve in order to accurately reflect the frontline situation.
This is why I, and others, call this ongoing phenomenon in Ukraine the "death of the conventional frontline".
For those wonder what the difference between the "infiltration zone" and the "grey zone" on my map is, I will explain it here:
The "infiltration zone" (the "shadow" overlaid on the map) represents the maximum area where soldiers of both sides can be present at any one time. For example, in Kostyantynivka, some isolated groups of Ukrainian soldiers remain trapped south of the city near Ivanopillya, while Russian DRGs are actively infiltrating up to the outskirts of Druzhkivka, nearly 18 km away. This 18 km-wide area can't be considered a "grey-zone", as large parts of it are still technically "controlled" by one side (e.g. eastern/southern Kostyantynivka by Russia, and most of Oleksijevo-Druzhkivka by Ukraine), but the lack of soldiers concentrated along the frontline allows for these infiltrations to take place at depth. This increasingly large infiltration zone is a result of how tactics in this war are evolving, and is typically not caused by a lack of control by each side over their "lines".
The "grey-zone" (the empty area between the red and blue polygons) represents the area of active fighting, where both sides remain present in mixed and overlapping positions (some call this a "layered pie"). Both sides infiltrate this area and engage in periodic clashes, however for it to be considered a "grey-zone", the attacking side must be infiltrating it repeatedly and somewhat regularly. The so-called one-time infiltrations, which may occur once every couple of weeks, are part of the larger infiltration zone.
The "control zone" (the areas of red and blue on the map) includes parts of the infiltration zone. As I said before, one side could be conducting irregular infiltrations into the other's lines (whether that be with DRGs or small assault groups), but are never able to maintain a presence or a regular level of infiltration, and it still be considered "controlled" by the other side. A good example of this is west of Druzhkivka, in the villages of Novoandriivka and Novohryhorivka.
For something to be "controlled" by one side, it doesn't necessarily have to be fully "consolidated". Consolidation refers to the process of securing, organising, and stabilising newly captured territory to later use it to develop additional successes on the tactical or strategic level. This process can involve setting up observation posts, organising logistics, establishing command centres or temporary deployment points, among other actions.
Generally, a "consolidation zone" of the attacking side will be outside the "infiltration zone", although in this modern type of infiltration war, the attacking side does sometimes enter the defending side's consolidation zone, resulting in occasional overlaps of the hypothetical consolidation zone (which doesn't have a separate layer on my map) with the infiltration zone. An example of this right now is the Novotroitske area northeast of Dobropillya, where Russia DRGs were recently active within Ukraine's zone of consolidation behind the multi-layered "New Donbas" defensive lines.
(Post continues below) โฌ๏ธ
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AMK Mapping
To reflect the ongoing change in tactics in the war, I have adjusted the layout of my "infiltration zone" layer on my interactive map. While I have had this layer for some time now, the layer has now been changed to look more like a "shadow" laid across theโฆ
(...)
For my map (and this will differ with other mappers), control and consolidation are two separate things. Mapping an advance and an expansion of the control zone (yellow or light blue polygons), rather than an expansion of the grey-zone of infiltration zone, can be done if there is active accumulation of attacking forces in one area, ongoing airstrikes by one side on another side's position, or a clear numerical soldier majority within a given area where the defending side's positions are no longer of military significance.
I've also seen some people propose a sort of "gradient", merging from solid blue to solid red, although this is a large generalisation and it varies significantly from sector to sector, especially areas with disparities in the number of soldiers from each side are present. But this could be a good way of imagining the general situation of how this war is currently fought.
Hopefully this post clears some things up. You can refer back to this post if you are curious about what criteria I use to map changes on the frontline. I've used this general criteria for pretty much the entire time I've mapped this war, but in the last year I have been actively developing this idea of an "infiltration zone", separate to the grey-zone, to help better interpret the often very confusing frontline situation, especially amid such conflicting claims by each side.
Remember: the truth almost always lies somewhere in the middle!
If you wish to view my interactive map, you can access it via http://amkmapping.com
For my map (and this will differ with other mappers), control and consolidation are two separate things. Mapping an advance and an expansion of the control zone (yellow or light blue polygons), rather than an expansion of the grey-zone of infiltration zone, can be done if there is active accumulation of attacking forces in one area, ongoing airstrikes by one side on another side's position, or a clear numerical soldier majority within a given area where the defending side's positions are no longer of military significance.
I've also seen some people propose a sort of "gradient", merging from solid blue to solid red, although this is a large generalisation and it varies significantly from sector to sector, especially areas with disparities in the number of soldiers from each side are present. But this could be a good way of imagining the general situation of how this war is currently fought.
Hopefully this post clears some things up. You can refer back to this post if you are curious about what criteria I use to map changes on the frontline. I've used this general criteria for pretty much the entire time I've mapped this war, but in the last year I have been actively developing this idea of an "infiltration zone", separate to the grey-zone, to help better interpret the often very confusing frontline situation, especially amid such conflicting claims by each side.
Remember: the truth almost always lies somewhere in the middle!
If you wish to view my interactive map, you can access it via http://amkmapping.com
Google My Maps
Russian invasion of Ukraine Control Map - Google My Maps
Map showing the areas of control from each side.
My Twitter: https://x.com/AMK_Mapping_
My Telegram: t.me/AMK_Mapping
My Twitter: https://x.com/AMK_Mapping_
My Telegram: t.me/AMK_Mapping
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According to figures published by @CIT_shellings citing Russian and Ukrainian regional official reports, at least 43 civilians were killed and 407 others injured as a result of Russian and Ukrainian attacks in the last 72 hours.
Russian strikes killed 32 civilians and injured 250 others.
Ukrainian strikes killed 11 civilians and injured 157 others.
Russian strikes killed 32 civilians and injured 250 others.
Ukrainian strikes killed 11 civilians and injured 157 others.
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Another petrol station in Kyiv has been struck by a Russian Geran-4 jet-drone, this time in the southern part of the city.
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Ansarallah is once again attacking King Khalid Airbase in southwestern Saudi Arabia with ballistic missiles/drones.
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Mykolaiv City is once again under attack from Russian Geran-4 jet-drones.
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None of these OSINT accounts would care if it was an Iranian or Russian pilot who had their identity revealed.
A lot would actively support it.
They only care because heโs American. OSINT is open source, but these people try restrict open source reporting for informational purposes.
It reminds me of people who refused to publish open source reports about the Ukrainian Lyman counteroffensive. It removes any form of impartiality from your reporting.
A lot would actively support it.
They only care because heโs American. OSINT is open source, but these people try restrict open source reporting for informational purposes.
It reminds me of people who refused to publish open source reports about the Ukrainian Lyman counteroffensive. It removes any form of impartiality from your reporting.
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Thereโs been an increase in bot accounts impersonating me and messaging my followers recently.
Please know that I will not DM you in this manner. My account I had telegram premium and a tick next to the username. My account is also based in New Zealand.
If an account like this messages you, please donโt engage with it or respond trying to troll it, just block and report. The more people who respond to it, the more the bots message people.
Please know that I will not DM you in this manner. My account I had telegram premium and a tick next to the username. My account is also based in New Zealand.
If an account like this messages you, please donโt engage with it or respond trying to troll it, just block and report. The more people who respond to it, the more the bots message people.
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Over the last couple of weeks, in continued violation of the ceasefire agreement, the IDF has been intensifying their targeted assassination strikes against high-ranking Hamas figures, aimed at dismantling their new chain of command.
While Hamas' original general staff has been completely wiped out, with the last pre-war member of their leadership being killed in May 2026, the IDF has now been trying to dismantle their replacement figures, and replacements for replacements, who are now commanding the remnants of Hamas' heavily-degraded military wing.
In the last three days, Israeli airstrikes killed 2 out of 5 of Hamas' brigade commanders - the commanders of their Rafah and Khan Younis Brigades. Both were killed in targeted strikes on the city of Khan Younis, where the remnants of the Rafah Brigade are currently based due to the IDF occupation of most of Rafah Governorate. The commander of the Rafah Brigade Nael Abu Obeid previously served as deputy commander of the Rafah Brigade, and commander of the Tel al-Sultan and Yibna Battalions (Subordinated to the Rafah Brigade).
Additionally, the IDF has been targeting Hamas' battalion and company commanders. Hamas has 24 battalions spread across 5 brigades, all of which are heavily degraded and are no longer a capable fighting force. A targeted assassination strike on Northern Gaza on Monday killed the commander of the Jabaliya Battalion, which is subordinated to Hamas' Northern Brigade. Additional strikes on Monday on Khan Younis allegedly killed a company commander in the Hamas operations headquarters.
While these attacks have primarily been limited to the remnants of Hamas' military wing (Al-Qassam Brigades), some further strikes have been carried out on forces from the second largest Gaza-based armed group: the Palestinian Islamic Jihad's military wing (Saraya al-Quds Brigades), where they targeted a rocket launcher cell commander in Khan Younis and a reconnaissance platoon commander in western Gaza City.
While Hamas' original general staff has been completely wiped out, with the last pre-war member of their leadership being killed in May 2026, the IDF has now been trying to dismantle their replacement figures, and replacements for replacements, who are now commanding the remnants of Hamas' heavily-degraded military wing.
In the last three days, Israeli airstrikes killed 2 out of 5 of Hamas' brigade commanders - the commanders of their Rafah and Khan Younis Brigades. Both were killed in targeted strikes on the city of Khan Younis, where the remnants of the Rafah Brigade are currently based due to the IDF occupation of most of Rafah Governorate. The commander of the Rafah Brigade Nael Abu Obeid previously served as deputy commander of the Rafah Brigade, and commander of the Tel al-Sultan and Yibna Battalions (Subordinated to the Rafah Brigade).
Additionally, the IDF has been targeting Hamas' battalion and company commanders. Hamas has 24 battalions spread across 5 brigades, all of which are heavily degraded and are no longer a capable fighting force. A targeted assassination strike on Northern Gaza on Monday killed the commander of the Jabaliya Battalion, which is subordinated to Hamas' Northern Brigade. Additional strikes on Monday on Khan Younis allegedly killed a company commander in the Hamas operations headquarters.
While these attacks have primarily been limited to the remnants of Hamas' military wing (Al-Qassam Brigades), some further strikes have been carried out on forces from the second largest Gaza-based armed group: the Palestinian Islamic Jihad's military wing (Saraya al-Quds Brigades), where they targeted a rocket launcher cell commander in Khan Younis and a reconnaissance platoon commander in western Gaza City.
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Videos are slowly starting to be released visually confirming Ukrainian advances north of Lyman.
Remember, the Ukrainian and Russian commands (and even some geolocaters) have been purposefully not posting videos from this area for both OPSEC and informational purposes.
The Ukrainian command is also starting to acknowledge these advances, but has only mentioned the former Russian bridgehead west of the Nitrius River as being cleared.
Keep in mind, this counteroffensive will soon enter it's 5th month. I have been one of the only people in the world reporting on it since day 1. While OPSEC remains in place, open source methods are still available to determine the advances, and that's what I intend to keep doing.
Remember, the Ukrainian and Russian commands (and even some geolocaters) have been purposefully not posting videos from this area for both OPSEC and informational purposes.
The Ukrainian command is also starting to acknowledge these advances, but has only mentioned the former Russian bridgehead west of the Nitrius River as being cleared.
Keep in mind, this counteroffensive will soon enter it's 5th month. I have been one of the only people in the world reporting on it since day 1. While OPSEC remains in place, open source methods are still available to determine the advances, and that's what I intend to keep doing.
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Explosions have been periodically heard from the Strait of Hormuz for the last couple of hours, likely due to ongoing Iranian attacks against violating vessels.
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AMK Mapping
Videos are slowly starting to be released visually confirming Ukrainian advances north of Lyman. Remember, the Ukrainian and Russian commands (and even some geolocaters) have been purposefully not posting videos from this area for both OPSEC and informationalโฆ
The Russian 144th Motor Rifle Division, responsible for this sector of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, has also, for the first time, acknowledged the ongoing Ukrainian operation.
While they deny Ukraine has made any advances, in this video they posted they happen to show strikes on Ukrainian forces in the village of Kolodyazi - over 13 km behind their claimed frontline, and 26 km west of Svyatohirsk, which Putin claims is under Russian control.
While they deny Ukraine has made any advances, in this video they posted they happen to show strikes on Ukrainian forces in the village of Kolodyazi - over 13 km behind their claimed frontline, and 26 km west of Svyatohirsk, which Putin claims is under Russian control.
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New photos leaked by CBS show the aftermath of previous Iranian ballistic missile and drone strikes on U.S. bases in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
The images show damage to U.S. infrastructure at Prince Sultan Airbase in Saudi Arabia, as well as Camp Buehring Base and Camp Arifjan Base in Kuwait
The images show damage to U.S. infrastructure at Prince Sultan Airbase in Saudi Arabia, as well as Camp Buehring Base and Camp Arifjan Base in Kuwait
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