Forwarded from falcon
๐บ๐ต Route of the jet drone that entered Moldova and Romania.
Timeline
12:30 UTC - Drone detected by Ukrainian radars
13:00 UTC - Drone enters Ukrainian airspace
13:20 UTC - Drone enters Moldovan airspace
13:30 UTC - Drone flies over the Moldovan capital, Chisinau.
13:40 UTC - Drone enters Romania, crossing from Moldova.
13:52 UTC - Drone does a sudden U-turn and turns back to Moldova
14:15 UTC - Drone's speed suddenly decreased from 450km/h to less than 150km/h, then disappears from radar
๐ Approximate coordinates where it disappeared:
Timeline
12:30 UTC - Drone detected by Ukrainian radars
13:00 UTC - Drone enters Ukrainian airspace
13:20 UTC - Drone enters Moldovan airspace
13:30 UTC - Drone flies over the Moldovan capital, Chisinau.
13:40 UTC - Drone enters Romania, crossing from Moldova.
13:52 UTC - Drone does a sudden U-turn and turns back to Moldova
14:15 UTC - Drone's speed suddenly decreased from 450km/h to less than 150km/h, then disappears from radar
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Last night and this morning, Russia has been carrying out a large-scale, combined missile and drone attack on Mykolaiv City.
At least 2 Iskander-M ballistic missiles, 12 KAB glide-bombs, 11 S8000 Banderol cruise missiles, and several Geran-4 jet-drones were used, targeting Mykolaiv Port, logistics centres, a 330 kV electrical substation in the town of Trykhatky, and the nearby town of Halytsynove.
Multiple large fires were seen burning after the strikes.
At least 2 Iskander-M ballistic missiles, 12 KAB glide-bombs, 11 S8000 Banderol cruise missiles, and several Geran-4 jet-drones were used, targeting Mykolaiv Port, logistics centres, a 330 kV electrical substation in the town of Trykhatky, and the nearby town of Halytsynove.
Multiple large fires were seen burning after the strikes.
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Unconfirmed reports of an Iranian drone strike on an oil tanker docked off the coast of Dubai, UAE.
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Forwarded from WillyOAM
Seeing 'mappers' trying to justify themselves for not showing Ukrainian gains north of Lyman over the past ~3 months is honestly hilarious.
Especially when their excuse is 'I knew about it, but I didn't show it due to OpSec... AMK showed the Ukrainian gains, therefore he is a Russian propagandist'
Bro, just say you didn't know and your map is fantasy ๐
Also, basic map specific 'OpSec' against a power with satellites, a vast intelligence network, a crazy thing called a radio.... and units dedicated to frontline location and situations.... Give me a break ๐คฃ
Especially when their excuse is 'I knew about it, but I didn't show it due to OpSec... AMK showed the Ukrainian gains, therefore he is a Russian propagandist'
Bro, just say you didn't know and your map is fantasy ๐
Also, basic map specific 'OpSec' against a power with satellites, a vast intelligence network, a crazy thing called a radio.... and units dedicated to frontline location and situations.... Give me a break ๐คฃ
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WillyOAM
Seeing 'mappers' trying to justify themselves for not showing Ukrainian gains north of Lyman over the past ~3 months is honestly hilarious. Especially when their excuse is 'I knew about it, but I didn't show it due to OpSec... AMK showed the Ukrainian gainsโฆ
The whole OPSEC thing is real at the beginning of these operations, as it can create some delays in Russian responses, but beyond that the main "OPSEC" consideration is not showing individual positions Ukraine captured to keep the soldiers safe. Anyone who is mapping these counteroffensives without using their own information from the ground is not putting anyone at risk.
I covered the counteroffensive from the day after it was launched on May 22, and made regular updates on it throughout the next 3.5 months up to now. While the chronology is likely not perfect due to a lack of information, and the frontline will never be 100% accurate, I was still one of the only people in the world who did this. And the thing is, I probably only put around 80-100 hours of work into these Lyman posts during the 3.5-month period. Sure, I had to dig deeper due to the OPSEC regime in place, but it was absolutely doable. Technically anyone else could have done this, but it was only really me and a couple other people (Suriyak and Thorkill).
There's a fine balance with this sort of stuff. Yes, OPSEC is very real in today's war - far more so than in 2022, 2023, 2024, or even 2025. When very few soldiers are actually on the "line of contact", mapping a position as controlled based on your info from the ground can actually endanger them. But after the higher Russian command is aware of the counteroffensive, pretending it's not happening is useless, and only mapping precise control zones is the dangerous part. So I do understand why such an influential mapping project like Deepstate didn't post any updates on it as even if they were to purposefully show a very simplified or incorrect frontline, it could still be used by some lower command for targeting positions, potentially putting Ukrainian soldiers at risk. But ordinary OSINTers aren't going to change anything as long as they are purely using open sources for their mapping, like me.
In my opinion, there is another reason for this beyond the very real issues surrounding OPSEC. If you map a 4-month-long counteroffensive in a single update, even if you specify that it took place over 4 months, it still creates a subconscious illusion for some that it was a lightning counteroffensive. It also means that the heavy casualties taken are largely ignored.
I covered the counteroffensive from the day after it was launched on May 22, and made regular updates on it throughout the next 3.5 months up to now. While the chronology is likely not perfect due to a lack of information, and the frontline will never be 100% accurate, I was still one of the only people in the world who did this. And the thing is, I probably only put around 80-100 hours of work into these Lyman posts during the 3.5-month period. Sure, I had to dig deeper due to the OPSEC regime in place, but it was absolutely doable. Technically anyone else could have done this, but it was only really me and a couple other people (Suriyak and Thorkill).
There's a fine balance with this sort of stuff. Yes, OPSEC is very real in today's war - far more so than in 2022, 2023, 2024, or even 2025. When very few soldiers are actually on the "line of contact", mapping a position as controlled based on your info from the ground can actually endanger them. But after the higher Russian command is aware of the counteroffensive, pretending it's not happening is useless, and only mapping precise control zones is the dangerous part. So I do understand why such an influential mapping project like Deepstate didn't post any updates on it as even if they were to purposefully show a very simplified or incorrect frontline, it could still be used by some lower command for targeting positions, potentially putting Ukrainian soldiers at risk. But ordinary OSINTers aren't going to change anything as long as they are purely using open sources for their mapping, like me.
In my opinion, there is another reason for this beyond the very real issues surrounding OPSEC. If you map a 4-month-long counteroffensive in a single update, even if you specify that it took place over 4 months, it still creates a subconscious illusion for some that it was a lightning counteroffensive. It also means that the heavy casualties taken are largely ignored.
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I wonder if the U.S. will respond to today's massive Iranian ballistic missile attack, or if they will prove once again that Iranian deterrence is extremely effective.
The interceptor missile stockpiles keep getting lower and lower, and production rates are nowhere near being able to keep up.
The interceptor missile stockpiles keep getting lower and lower, and production rates are nowhere near being able to keep up.
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It's crazy to think that the U.S. burned through over 2 months worth of Patriot PAC-3 interceptors during today's massive Iranian ballistic missile attack.
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A Russian Geran-4 jet-drone destroyed a Ukrainian MiG-29 fighter jet at Vasylkiv Airbase, Kyiv Oblast.
The same aircraft was seen flying past the drone prior to the strike.
The same aircraft was seen flying past the drone prior to the strike.
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A Russian Geran-4 jet-drone targeted a Ukrainian UH-60 โBlack Hawkโ helicopter of the GUR at Zhulanyi Airport in Kyiv on September 4.
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