Another Iskander-M on Kyiv via Nizhyn, Chernihiv Oblast

2 missiles. Flying to Boryspil again, from the east

They disappeared near Baryshivka, Kyiv Oblast.

All clear now.

Iskander-M threat from Bryansk again

Edit: no missiles detected

After making this post about the increase in forced mobilisation in Kyiv, several more Ukrainians reached out to me with additional details, which I am allowed to share. So, I thought I would make a part two to this post to help emphasise the rapidly changing situation for residents of Kyiv.

In Kyiv, the TCC (territorial recruitment) has been very active in recent months, even in busier areas, which they previously largely avoided due to the risk of facing resistance from the public. More checkpoints are being installed at main streets, arterial roads, and bridges, which block all traffic going both ways, preventing people from moving from the eastern bank to the western bank. Mobile checkpoints are installed for short periods of time (between tens of minutes to several hours) before changing locations to throw off online maps tracking their activity. The domains of these online maps are also periodically blacklisted to support the TCC's operations.

When men try to escape checkpoints, the TCC sometimes throws spikes under their wheels, or begin car chases. Those who try to escape also have their driver's licences revoked and receive large fines. Police collaborate with the TCC, and require those stopped at checkpoints to scan a" Reserv+" QR code to find their mobilisation status in the TCC's database, if they refuse to provide driver's licences or insurance. If they have problems with military enrolment, police are required to forcibly bring them to their local TCC office. Sometimes they even break the windows of cars if the men refuse to get out. As a result, every day there are dozens of empty cars abandoned near checkpoints, until relatives or friends pick up the car or it gets towed.

Checkpoints are installed randomly, even violating road rules. Police assist with this. Some more dangerous areas are well known and avoided by the TCC. In some cases, all men on public transport are checked. If the police refuse to collaborate, they are often fired, lose deferment from military service, and risk being immediately mobilised themselves. Calls to emergency services regarding traffic violations by the TCC are typically ignored by law enforcement. TCC members also wear balaclavas to hide their faces, in order to avoid being identified.

Previously in Kyiv, men could usually safely go to out parks or play sports. Now the TCC uses these recreational areas to catch sportsmen or bicyclists in any area where they can quickly move in and out of by cars and minibuses. Essentially, every single public area carries a high risk for mobilisation-aged men, except for some busier public spaces such as central streets or shopping centres.

The number of bribes the TCC takes has decreased substantially to an insignificant number, as it becomes very heavily controlled by the SBU. You only sometimes would have a chance to leave a minibus by paying a bribe in cash, typically between $5,000 and $15,000 USD, but these cases are very rare and often just rumours.

Some people have attributed this increase in mobilisation activity to the new minister of defence Yevhenii Khmara. Similar changes have also been observed in other major Ukrainian cities. According to one source, citing the online maps of TCC activity, in Dnipro, eyewitnesses record an average of 120 events per day. In Zaporizhzhia City, which is smaller than Dnipro, an average of 150 per day are recorded. Odesa and other cities (especially in western Ukraine) have also witnessed similar increases. Although, its worth noting that not all recorded events result in mobilisation into the army, and a portion of mobilised personnel are able to escape training grounds and medical screening sessions. However, some TCC groups may mobilise multiple people at once.

Ukrainian authorities and special services are struggling to identify and shut down Telegram channels and online maps tracking TCC movement. Sometimes they are able to identify the owners and shut down the channels, but the main ones for each major city remain up.

(Post continues below) ⬇️

As for volunteer fighters, one source told me that he doesn't know anyone who would agree to go fight on the frontline for money. He specified that this is only among people he personally knows, and that there are some people, usually with debts, or those who need quick money (e.g. to save a loved one with a medical issue), who would volunteer. There was also a category of people who were afraid that they would be mobilised from the streets, so would instead register at the TCC office themselves after receiving their summons, and choose one of the branches of the army or units to be deployed to. However, this category has been largely exhausted, and is now a small percentage of those who are mobilised.

The source specifies that the largest percentage of mobilised people are taken from the street by mobile groups of the TCC, who kidnap them and sometimes fight off passer-by groups attempting to resist. Often, the TCC drive through the streets of villages, towns, and cities in buses (this is the most common method for smaller settlements). When they identify a potential victim, several men jump out to catch him. If the victim is able to escape, the remaining men in the bus immediately drive to intercept him. This source also mentions the possibility of using bribes, anywhere between $3,000 and $7,000 USD, which is a lot considering the average monthly salary in Ukraine is between $570 and $680 USD. Sometimes you can attempt to buy someone off once then reach the training centre, but by then they increase the amount of money required.

Those who do not have the money to bribe the TCC have the hope of escaping from training centres, or sometimes even as they are being transported there. In some cases, there is an order from the training centre to kill an escapee. The TCC then kidnaps them, takes them out somewhere, records them in their database as a deserter (as if they left the army, and no one knows anything about them), before killing them.

As for resistance to the TCC, this is increasing day by day, as hatred for them grows. One source estimated that 50% of mobilisation attempts result in interventions from bystanders, with most of these interventions involving force. Cars containing 1-2 members of the TCC sometimes patrol alongside police officers, with the police providing protection against members of the public who intervene. Not all mobilisation attempts are violent, as some men don't even try to resist. There are also some groups of teenagers and young adults who support (and may even actively help) the TCC, which include members and affiliates of Azov and other military units.

Note: while I can confirm the authenticity of the people sending me this information, I cannot independently confirm every single detail of their accounts. This post is not designed to be a 100% accurate depiction of current events, but is instead aimed at illustrating the general situation in Kyiv, and how it is changing.

Iskander-M on Bashtanka, Mykolaiv Oblast.

Edit: Likely a Tornado-S rocket.

About Dobropillya ^

Meanwhile on Deepstate, they have only just admitted to the fall of Rodynske, and the closest Russian-controlled territory is over 9 km from Dobropillya.

A Ukrainian drone operator stationed in the Dobropillya direction made this post about Deepstate, outlining how he believes that they have become politicised and map for informational purposes.

I feel like this has been a well-established fact since around 2024, when Deepstate admins were threatened with mobilisation by the SBU if they did not map certain changes. Additional threats occurred when Deepstate mapped changes such as the encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Makarivka, near Velyka Novosilka.

I have criticised Deepstate for years, and as this war progressed, the Ukrainian information space has become more and more centralised around Deepstate. It has got to the point where it is seemingly only acceptable for your map to align largely with Deepstate. And if it doesn't, you're a Russian propagandist.

Situation on the Stepnohirsk direction, Zaporizhzhia Oblast:

Over the last week, heavy fighting has persisted on the Stepnohirsk direction, as Russian and Ukrainian forces both continue their assault operations.

In the west, Russian forces resumed infiltrations into the southern-most part of Prymorske, using the houses and forested areas in Plavni as cover. Additionally, after repelling earlier Ukrainian attacks, they are now attempting to advance from the southern high-rise microdistrict of Stepnohirsk to cut off Ukrainian forces in the Plavni area by attacking west along Ahrarna Street, while Ukrainian forces continue attempts at entering Kamyanske from the north.

To the east, the Russians cleared the remaining Ukrainian positions in the forested gulley northeast of Kamyanske and recaptured a number of adjacent treeline positions. From here, they are attempting to clear the Ukrainian strongpoints west of Stepove with a multi-vector attack, and infiltrate the area of the solar farm east of Stepnohirsk to form a right flank to the town.

To the northeast, Russian forces captured additional positions north of Mali Shcherbaky, entrenching along the southern side of the gulley, and continued crossing it, moving north up treelines into Pavlivka and surrounding areas. Attacks are also being carried out northwest towards Lukyanivske.

To the southeast, Russian forces cleared the salient west of Novoandriivka from Ukrainian holdouts and expanded their zone of control along the highway east of Shcherbaky. Heavy fighting is now underway for the western approaches to Novoandriivka, where Russian forces are attempting to gain a foothold in the forests there. They were also able to improve their positions slightly in the treelines northeast of Shcherbaky.

Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces launched a series of counterattacks, attempting to clear the grey-zone and push further south to Shcherbaky. They also cleared the southern part of Novoandriivka from earlier Russian infiltrations.

+ ~15.56 km² in favour of Russia.
+ ~1.88 km² in favour of Ukraine.

Interactive map: amkmapping.com

Situation on the Orikhiv & Omelnyk directions, Zaporizhzhia Oblast:

Over the last week, Russian forces have continued their storming operations on Orikhiv, while making additional advances from the east.

In the southwest, Russian forces continued infiltrating through Novodanylivka to the southeastern part of Orikhiv, where fighting is slowly shifting towards the city centre. Russia is unable to gain a foothold here, however, due to the continued presence of Ukrainian formations in Novodanylivka, where fighting is ongoing. Russian forces are also attempting to infiltrate the forests west of Mala Tokmachka, which, if captured, they could use to accumulate and enter Orikhiv in much larger numbers.

To the east, the Russians continued advancing northeast of Mala Tokmachka, capturing new positions along the tactical heights, and further threatening Ukrainian formations in Bilohirya with encirclement. They are now actively trying to capture positions in and around the forests further west, in coordination with infiltrations north from Mala Tokmachka towards the nearby trench fortification network. Heavy fighting continues for Mala Tokmachka itself.

To the northeast, Russian forces improved their positions west and southwest of Charivne, and are continuing attempts at infiltrating up to the eastern and western parts of Novoselivka. Meanwhile, heavy fighting continues for fields west of Hirke and Verkhnya Tersa, as Russian assault groups continue attempts at advancing towards Kopani, Babashi, Rivne, and Dolynka.

+ ~6.08 km² in favour of Russia.

Interactive map: amkmapping.com

Situation on the Novopavlivka direction, Donetsk/Dnipropetrovsk Oblast:

Over the last two weeks, Ukrainian forces continued their assault operations south of Novopavlivka, attempting to force a Russian withdrawal from the Dachne area.

In the southwest, Ukrainian forces intensified their infiltrations into Zaporizhzhya, reaching the eastern part of the village. The capture of Zaporizhzhya would threaten Russian positions in Dachne with attacks from the south. Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces continued their slow advance through the Filiya forests, clearing the remaining positions west of the Solena River and beginning infiltrations into the village.

To the east, the Ukrainians continued advancing through the fields south of Novopavlivka towards Dachne, recapturing additional treeline positions along the highway. From there, they are attempting to infiltrate south over the tributary of the Solena River, attacking a number of Russian strongpoints in this area. They also recaptured some treeline positions in the direction of Horikhove.

+ ~9.09 km² in favour of Ukraine.

Interactive map: amkmapping.com

Russian forces have captured the town of Rai-Oleksandrivka, Slovyansk direction, Donetsk Oblast (Kramatorsk District).

Pre-war population: ~1,090.
Total land area: ~5.51 km².

The fighting for Rai-Oleksandrivka lasted approximately 4 months.