Kh-31P anti-radar missile to Zatoka, Odesa Oblast.
๐ฅ86 11โค6๐5๐คฃ3๐2
Forwarded from Geopolitics Watch (Deigo)
OZON is the second largest e-commerce platform in Russia behind Wildberries, whose warehouses have been systematically targeted and destroyed by Ukrainian strikes.
@GeoPWatch
Please open Telegram to view this post
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
Please open Telegram to view this post
VIEW IN TELEGRAM
๐คฎ136โค59๐ฅ40๐คฌ30๐15๐10 10๐3๐2๐1๐ค1
According to a well-known Ukrainian soldier, Russia is launching 1500-2000 radio-controlled FPV drones, and an unknown number of Fibre-optic drones, towards the Druzhkivka area and nearby logistical routes every single day.
He also reports that around 1,200 radio-controlled FPV drones target the Dobropillya direction daily. These numbers are constantly increasing, as more and more drone operators are deployed to Donetsk Oblast.
He also reports that around 1,200 radio-controlled FPV drones target the Dobropillya direction daily. These numbers are constantly increasing, as more and more drone operators are deployed to Donetsk Oblast.
โค148๐53๐29๐ฅ15๐7โ5๐คฎ5๐ซก4๐3๐คฃ2๐2
It seems like the defence of Dobropillya is fully collapsing.
Maybe I'm wrong, but right now it looks like we may see some major changes in the coming weeks.
Maybe I'm wrong, but right now it looks like we may see some major changes in the coming weeks.
๐ฅ243๐31๐30 20๐ค13โค11๐6๐ฏ4๐คฃ4๐3๐คฎ3
Explosions in Boryspil, Kyiv Oblast.
4-6 Iskander-M ballistic missiles were used in total.
4-6 Iskander-M ballistic missiles were used in total.
1โค51๐ฅ23๐7 6๐5๐คฌ3๐2๐คฎ1
Another Iskander-M on Kyiv via Nizhyn, Chernihiv Oblast
๐49๐ฅ12โค8๐4๐คฌ4๐3
2 missiles. Flying to Boryspil again, from the east
๐ฅ51โค8๐8๐คฌ5๐4 2๐1
They disappeared near Baryshivka, Kyiv Oblast.
All clear now.
All clear now.
๐45 16๐ค4๐1
Iskander-M threat from Bryansk again
Edit: no missiles detected
Edit: no missiles detected
โค38๐25๐คฌ6๐4๐1๐คฃ1
AMK Mapping
Over the last few weeks, forced mobilisation of men into the Ukrainian military has been significantly stepped up in Kyiv, as Ukraine continues to face disastrous manpower shortages. I would like to shed some light on these changes, and the issues which comeโฆ
After making this post about the increase in forced mobilisation in Kyiv, several more Ukrainians reached out to me with additional details, which I am allowed to share. So, I thought I would make a part two to this post to help emphasise the rapidly changing situation for residents of Kyiv.
In Kyiv, the TCC (territorial recruitment) has been very active in recent months, even in busier areas, which they previously largely avoided due to the risk of facing resistance from the public. More checkpoints are being installed at main streets, arterial roads, and bridges, which block all traffic going both ways, preventing people from moving from the eastern bank to the western bank. Mobile checkpoints are installed for short periods of time (between tens of minutes to several hours) before changing locations to throw off online maps tracking their activity. The domains of these online maps are also periodically blacklisted to support the TCC's operations.
When men try to escape checkpoints, the TCC sometimes throws spikes under their wheels, or begin car chases. Those who try to escape also have their driver's licences revoked and receive large fines. Police collaborate with the TCC, and require those stopped at checkpoints to scan a" Reserv+" QR code to find their mobilisation status in the TCC's database, if they refuse to provide driver's licences or insurance. If they have problems with military enrolment, police are required to forcibly bring them to their local TCC office. Sometimes they even break the windows of cars if the men refuse to get out. As a result, every day there are dozens of empty cars abandoned near checkpoints, until relatives or friends pick up the car or it gets towed.
Checkpoints are installed randomly, even violating road rules. Police assist with this. Some more dangerous areas are well known and avoided by the TCC. In some cases, all men on public transport are checked. If the police refuse to collaborate, they are often fired, lose deferment from military service, and risk being immediately mobilised themselves. Calls to emergency services regarding traffic violations by the TCC are typically ignored by law enforcement. TCC members also wear balaclavas to hide their faces, in order to avoid being identified.
Previously in Kyiv, men could usually safely go to out parks or play sports. Now the TCC uses these recreational areas to catch sportsmen or bicyclists in any area where they can quickly move in and out of by cars and minibuses. Essentially, every single public area carries a high risk for mobilisation-aged men, except for some busier public spaces such as central streets or shopping centres.
The number of bribes the TCC takes has decreased substantially to an insignificant number, as it becomes very heavily controlled by the SBU. You only sometimes would have a chance to leave a minibus by paying a bribe in cash, typically between $5,000 and $15,000 USD, but these cases are very rare and often just rumours.
Some people have attributed this increase in mobilisation activity to the new minister of defence Yevhenii Khmara. Similar changes have also been observed in other major Ukrainian cities. According to one source, citing the online maps of TCC activity, in Dnipro, eyewitnesses record an average of 120 events per day. In Zaporizhzhia City, which is smaller than Dnipro, an average of 150 per day are recorded. Odesa and other cities (especially in western Ukraine) have also witnessed similar increases. Although, its worth noting that not all recorded events result in mobilisation into the army, and a portion of mobilised personnel are able to escape training grounds and medical screening sessions. However, some TCC groups may mobilise multiple people at once.
Ukrainian authorities and special services are struggling to identify and shut down Telegram channels and online maps tracking TCC movement. Sometimes they are able to identify the owners and shut down the channels, but the main ones for each major city remain up.
(Post continues below) โฌ๏ธ
In Kyiv, the TCC (territorial recruitment) has been very active in recent months, even in busier areas, which they previously largely avoided due to the risk of facing resistance from the public. More checkpoints are being installed at main streets, arterial roads, and bridges, which block all traffic going both ways, preventing people from moving from the eastern bank to the western bank. Mobile checkpoints are installed for short periods of time (between tens of minutes to several hours) before changing locations to throw off online maps tracking their activity. The domains of these online maps are also periodically blacklisted to support the TCC's operations.
When men try to escape checkpoints, the TCC sometimes throws spikes under their wheels, or begin car chases. Those who try to escape also have their driver's licences revoked and receive large fines. Police collaborate with the TCC, and require those stopped at checkpoints to scan a" Reserv+" QR code to find their mobilisation status in the TCC's database, if they refuse to provide driver's licences or insurance. If they have problems with military enrolment, police are required to forcibly bring them to their local TCC office. Sometimes they even break the windows of cars if the men refuse to get out. As a result, every day there are dozens of empty cars abandoned near checkpoints, until relatives or friends pick up the car or it gets towed.
Checkpoints are installed randomly, even violating road rules. Police assist with this. Some more dangerous areas are well known and avoided by the TCC. In some cases, all men on public transport are checked. If the police refuse to collaborate, they are often fired, lose deferment from military service, and risk being immediately mobilised themselves. Calls to emergency services regarding traffic violations by the TCC are typically ignored by law enforcement. TCC members also wear balaclavas to hide their faces, in order to avoid being identified.
Previously in Kyiv, men could usually safely go to out parks or play sports. Now the TCC uses these recreational areas to catch sportsmen or bicyclists in any area where they can quickly move in and out of by cars and minibuses. Essentially, every single public area carries a high risk for mobilisation-aged men, except for some busier public spaces such as central streets or shopping centres.
The number of bribes the TCC takes has decreased substantially to an insignificant number, as it becomes very heavily controlled by the SBU. You only sometimes would have a chance to leave a minibus by paying a bribe in cash, typically between $5,000 and $15,000 USD, but these cases are very rare and often just rumours.
Some people have attributed this increase in mobilisation activity to the new minister of defence Yevhenii Khmara. Similar changes have also been observed in other major Ukrainian cities. According to one source, citing the online maps of TCC activity, in Dnipro, eyewitnesses record an average of 120 events per day. In Zaporizhzhia City, which is smaller than Dnipro, an average of 150 per day are recorded. Odesa and other cities (especially in western Ukraine) have also witnessed similar increases. Although, its worth noting that not all recorded events result in mobilisation into the army, and a portion of mobilised personnel are able to escape training grounds and medical screening sessions. However, some TCC groups may mobilise multiple people at once.
Ukrainian authorities and special services are struggling to identify and shut down Telegram channels and online maps tracking TCC movement. Sometimes they are able to identify the owners and shut down the channels, but the main ones for each major city remain up.
(Post continues below) โฌ๏ธ
2โค62 53๐15๐คฎ11๐คฃ9๐ญ9๐9๐คฌ4๐ฏ2
AMK Mapping
After making this post about the increase in forced mobilisation in Kyiv, several more Ukrainians reached out to me with additional details, which I am allowed to share. So, I thought I would make a part two to this post to help emphasise the rapidly changingโฆ
As for volunteer fighters, one source told me that he doesn't know anyone who would agree to go fight on the frontline for money. He specified that this is only among people he personally knows, and that there are some people, usually with debts, or those who need quick money (e.g. to save a loved one with a medical issue), who would volunteer. There was also a category of people who were afraid that they would be mobilised from the streets, so would instead register at the TCC office themselves after receiving their summons, and choose one of the branches of the army or units to be deployed to. However, this category has been largely exhausted, and is now a small percentage of those who are mobilised.
The source specifies that the largest percentage of mobilised people are taken from the street by mobile groups of the TCC, who kidnap them and sometimes fight off passer-by groups attempting to resist. Often, the TCC drive through the streets of villages, towns, and cities in buses (this is the most common method for smaller settlements). When they identify a potential victim, several men jump out to catch him. If the victim is able to escape, the remaining men in the bus immediately drive to intercept him. This source also mentions the possibility of using bribes, anywhere between $3,000 and $7,000 USD, which is a lot considering the average monthly salary in Ukraine is between $570 and $680 USD. Sometimes you can attempt to buy someone off once then reach the training centre, but by then they increase the amount of money required.
Those who do not have the money to bribe the TCC have the hope of escaping from training centres, or sometimes even as they are being transported there. In some cases, there is an order from the training centre to kill an escapee. The TCC then kidnaps them, takes them out somewhere, records them in their database as a deserter (as if they left the army, and no one knows anything about them), before killing them.
As for resistance to the TCC, this is increasing day by day, as hatred for them grows. One source estimated that 50% of mobilisation attempts result in interventions from bystanders, with most of these interventions involving force. Cars containing 1-2 members of the TCC sometimes patrol alongside police officers, with the police providing protection against members of the public who intervene. Not all mobilisation attempts are violent, as some men don't even try to resist. There are also some groups of teenagers and young adults who support (and may even actively help) the TCC, which include members and affiliates of Azov and other military units.
Note: while I can confirm the authenticity of the people sending me this information, I cannot independently confirm every single detail of their accounts. This post is not designed to be a 100% accurate depiction of current events, but is instead aimed at illustrating the general situation in Kyiv, and how it is changing.
The source specifies that the largest percentage of mobilised people are taken from the street by mobile groups of the TCC, who kidnap them and sometimes fight off passer-by groups attempting to resist. Often, the TCC drive through the streets of villages, towns, and cities in buses (this is the most common method for smaller settlements). When they identify a potential victim, several men jump out to catch him. If the victim is able to escape, the remaining men in the bus immediately drive to intercept him. This source also mentions the possibility of using bribes, anywhere between $3,000 and $7,000 USD, which is a lot considering the average monthly salary in Ukraine is between $570 and $680 USD. Sometimes you can attempt to buy someone off once then reach the training centre, but by then they increase the amount of money required.
Those who do not have the money to bribe the TCC have the hope of escaping from training centres, or sometimes even as they are being transported there. In some cases, there is an order from the training centre to kill an escapee. The TCC then kidnaps them, takes them out somewhere, records them in their database as a deserter (as if they left the army, and no one knows anything about them), before killing them.
As for resistance to the TCC, this is increasing day by day, as hatred for them grows. One source estimated that 50% of mobilisation attempts result in interventions from bystanders, with most of these interventions involving force. Cars containing 1-2 members of the TCC sometimes patrol alongside police officers, with the police providing protection against members of the public who intervene. Not all mobilisation attempts are violent, as some men don't even try to resist. There are also some groups of teenagers and young adults who support (and may even actively help) the TCC, which include members and affiliates of Azov and other military units.
Note: while I can confirm the authenticity of the people sending me this information, I cannot independently confirm every single detail of their accounts. This post is not designed to be a 100% accurate depiction of current events, but is instead aimed at illustrating the general situation in Kyiv, and how it is changing.
1 83๐35โค21๐ญ12๐คฌ6๐ฏ5๐4๐คฎ3๐3๐ค2๐1