Flying to Myrhorod

Disappeared in Poltava/Kharkiv Oblast. It was launched from Belgorod Oblast.

Regarding the situation in Kostyantynivka (Part one):

The situation in Kostyantynivka has recently resulted in a lot of conflicting and contradictory claims being made in the information space. I managed to clarify the situation based on a mix of open and closed sources, in a process that has taken me several weeks.

Before I get into the main details, I would like to preface this with a few points for people to read, as I know there are a lot of people who will only read the first few sentences and leave an uninformed comment accusing me of being a propagandist for either Russia or Ukraine.

These points are:

1. No map in this area is correct.
2. Both the Russian and Ukrainian maps of Kostyantynivka are very misleading and exaggerated - the truth lies somewhere in the middle.
3. Russia does not control Kostyantynivka.
4. Ukraine does not control Kostyantynivka.
5. Russia controls most of Kostyantynivka.
6. There is a very large grey-zone due to a lack of soldiers present on both sides on the frontline (caused by heavy drone usage). This grey-zone extends from northern Kostyantynivka up to Oleksijevo-Druzhkivka, and outwards to the surrounding fields

Now with that out of the way, I would like to outline what information I have managed to gather and personally confirm over the last several weeks.

The current situation is as follows. Russian forces militarily control the main part of Kostyantynivka, including the northeastern, eastern, southern, and western suburbs, and are actively fighting for the remaining northern and northwestern districts. Fighting is also ongoing for areas north and northwest of the city, where the grey-zone extends to.

Ukrainian forces remain present in insignificant numbers throughout the main part of the city. Their presence is not strong enough for me to mark it as a contested zone, as Russia can move largely freely throughout the city towards the main zone of fighting (their main concern is drones rather than these scattered Ukrainian soldiers). This is similar to the scale of Russia's presence within Oleksijevo-Druzhkivka, which Ukraine also militarily holds control over (except for the outskirts). Russia has long had drone operator positions in the inner industrial zones, and is working to fully consolidate its control over the rest of the city.

The most active fighting is still concentrated in the northwestern and northern parts of the city. In parts of these districts, Ukrainian soldiers are still more numerous than Russians, however the Russians are present in high enough numbers for it to be considered a grey-zone. The balance is slowly but surely tipping in Russia's favour in these last districts, but is not yet progressed enough for it to be considered under their control, let alone consolidated. Russian artillery and MLRS continues to heavily target the outer-most streets of Kostyantynivka, as well as the villages of Osykove, Stinky, Izhevka, and the town of Oleksijevo-Druzhkivka, in between infiltration operations. Ukrainian artillery, MLRS and airstrikes does the same for the central, northern, and western districts.

Ukrainian forces are still trying to enter Kostyantynivka in groups of 2 and 3, infiltrating through the streets of Oleksijevo-Druzhkivka, along the railway line, and through treelines. Russia does the same, moving in the opposite direction. Neither side can prevent these infiltrations due to a lack of soldiers present on both sides on the frontline, which is caused by heavy drone activity preventing any meaningful accumulations from occurring. This creates a very chaotic situation, with assault groups from either side are operating as detached and sometimes independent groups, without flanking support, while sitting in overlapping and intermingled positions under heavy drone and artillery fire. This grey-zone continues to expand, now encompassing large areas throughout northwestern/northern Kostyantynivka, Osykove, and the surrounding fields.

(Part two below)

Regarding the situation in Kostyantynivka (Part two):

Most soldiers in this large grey-zone are being resupplied by UAVs and ground-drones. Both sides are actively trying to intercept the other's UAVs and strike ground-drones to cut off logistics. Ukrainian ground logistics is currently in a worse situation than Russia's, with almost any movement from Druzhkivka instantly detected by Russian drones, and subsequently struck. FPV drones are also constantly striking Ukrainian logistics in Kramatorsk, as well as Ukrainian drone operators throughout this sector. Russia suffers similar issues with logistics from Bakhmut and Toretsk, but not nearly to the same scale as Ukraine.

Once Ukraine fully withdraws from the salient west of Chasiv Yar and the Mykolaipillya area, Russia will find consolidation in the remaining districts of Kostyantynivka much more easy, and we will see the main focus of the battles properly shift up to Oleksijevo-Druzhkivka. Russian soldiers are already being detected in larger and larger accumulations in the main part of Kostyantynivka as they further cement their presence, which could suggest they intend to launch a large-scale attack on this area in the coming weeks.

Overall, the situation remains chaotic, but the "fog of war" has lifted somewhat. I reiterate: Russia does not fully control Kostyantynivka, and battles are still ongoing in some of the outer districts. But the situation for Ukraine is very bad, and Russia firmly has the upper hand. Maps like Deepstate are extremely far behind, and only serve to prolong the battle in the information space. Russian maps are also very misleading, and only serve to exaggerate Russian progress for propaganda purposes.

As I've said before, the side with the upper hand (in this case, Russia) tends to exaggerate information, while the side in the worse position (in this case, Ukraine) tends to fabricate information.

(Part one above)

In a recent interview, Deputy Chief of Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence Major General Vadym Skibitskyi made a series of interesting claims about Russian missile and drone production rates.

According to him, Russia is producing the following missiles at these rates:

- Iskander-M ballistic missile: 65 missiles in July (exceeding the set target of 60 by 108%)
- Kh-101 cruise missile: 87 missiles in July (exceeding the set target of 72 by 140%).
- Kalibr cruise missile: 29 missiles in July (exceeding the set target of 26 by 111%). Most of these are reportedly being allocated to reserve stockpiles other fleets rather than for attacks on Ukraine.
- Zircon hypersonic cruise missile: 33 missiles during the first 7 months of 2026 (average of 4.7 per month).
- Oniks supersonic cruise missile: 60 missiles during the first 7 months of 2026 (average of 8.6 per month).

Additionally, he claimed that Russia has suspended production of Kinzhal hypersonic aeroballistic missiles and Kh-32 supersonic cruise missiles due to their extremely low accuracy, and are instead focusing on increasing production of Iskander-M ballistic missiles. (This would explain why Russia has not launched any Kinzhals for multiple months, and very few Kh-32s).

He also stated that Russia aims to produce a record 11,000 Geran-2, Geran-3, Geran-4, Geran-5, Garpiya, and Gerbera, drones during August. Russia reportedly reduced the production rate of Geran-2s to focus on producing Geran-4 and Geran-5 jet-drones, which consisted of around 50% of all drones used in a recent large-scale attack.

Furthermore, he claimed that Russia's planned production rates for RM-48U modified S-400 ballistic missiles is 40 units for August, which recently entered mass production. The production rate of Kh-35 supersonic cruise missiles was reportedly exceeded by 200% so far this year.

Despite Ukraine launching four (newly delivered) Patriot PAC-3 interceptors towards the two Kn-23 ballistic missiles in Kyiv, there were no interceptions during last night's Russian attack on the capital and Zaporizhzhia City.

Due to the fact that Ukraine currently cannot shoot down Russian Iskander-M ballistic missiles and Zircons, the Ukrainian Air Force has stopped providing daily reports on the numbers of missiles being shot down so they don't have to admit to a 0% interception rate.

Just like the last two nights, there is a threat to Kyiv City and Kyiv Oblast for the next few hours. Russia may launch a ballistic missile attack.

I find it funny how the IDF uses terms like "kidnapped" and "hostages" for Israeli soldiers taken as POWs.

NBC:

Iran is strengthening the influence of hardline figures within decision-making centers, particularly in security and defense. This suggests that Tehran is preparing for the possibility of continued escalation and confrontation, rather than making quick concessions.

If the Ballistic missile attack on Kyiv is to go ahead, the most likely thing to be targeted is defence industries meaning drone producing facilities may take a heavy blow tonight aswell as any weapon making industries in general

Russia stopped producing the jet-powered Geran-3, which became a transitional step toward the Geran-4, according to Ukraine’s HUR. The Geran-3 largely retained the Geran-2 airframe while replacing its piston engine with a Telefly JT80 jet engine. The newer Geran-4 instead uses an airframe specifically adapted for the more powerful Telefly LX-WP-160, increasing both cruising speed and range.

Geran-3 hasn't been spotted in use for a while now, so this makes sense. The Geran-4 is much more effective in pretty much every aspect.

Large Geran-2 drone attack on Kherson City is ongoing right now.

This is the second large Geran attack on Kherson in the last week, which is unusual as Russia mainly uses artillery, FPV drones, MLRS, and KABs for attacks here.