British MP Zarah Sultana demands that the UK government immediately cease all arms sales to Israel.

[G&T]

Failures of Unit 8200 Before Operation Al-Aqsa Flood

Israeli journalist Omri Munif exposes significant operational failures within Unit 8200 prior to Operation Al-Aqsa Flood.

1. Nine months before the Hamas attack, Military Intelligence head Haliva predicted a five-year period of calm post-2021 conflict.

Military Intelligence Division exhibited overconfidence, as noted by senior officers.

2.Haliva rated the division’s performance 90 out of 100, which shocked evaluators who believed the actual performance warranted a score of 40-50 but ultimately assigned a 60 to avoid demoralization.

3.Former Chief of Staff Kochavi and ex-military intelligence official Tamir Hayman appointed Yossi Sariel to lead Unit 8200 despite warnings of his unsuitability.

Sariel's tenure led to a serious operational decline over 2.5 years.

4.Intelligence officers reported a significant lack of effective intelligence coverage in Gaza by Unit 8200.

In May 2023, the Southern Front Command intelligence officer raised concerns, acknowledged by the head of the Agent Operations Unit but left unaddressed.

5.At a subsequent meeting, Sariel criticized the Southern Front intelligence officer, accusing him of incompetence.

Sariel did not accept responsibility for the ongoing failures nor indicated any intention to resign.

6.The Chief Officer of the Customer Operations Unit, expected to issue an alert, failed to take responsibility and is seeking to become the next commander of Unit 8200.

The report highlights deep-seated issues within Unit 8200, marked by misjudgment, overconfidence, leadership failings, and significant intelligence gaps preceding the Glorious Oct 7th operation.

[G&T]