Oh yea if you are using distrobox on your system, and your xdg-open, distrobox-host-exec, or even host-spawn did not do anything, and you check you already installed flatpak, try to upgrade host-spawn on the container to it's latest version.
Do be noted that you need to download the binary manually from the github releases and replaced the one from distrobox built in host-spawn.
Also you need these variables on your host system or else distrobox might freak out when you try to kickstart the container after a host restart: DBX_SKIP_WORKDIR=1
Do be noted that you need to download the binary manually from the github releases and replaced the one from distrobox built in host-spawn.
Also you need these variables on your host system or else distrobox might freak out when you try to kickstart the container after a host restart: DBX_SKIP_WORKDIR=1
GitHub
GitHub - 1player/host-spawn: Run commands on your host from inside your toolbox or flatpak sandbox
Run commands on your host from inside your toolbox or flatpak sandbox - 1player/host-spawn
Forwarded from Tech & Leaks Zone
EXPOSED: Source Code Evidence of Nekogram Phone Number Harvesting
1. Exfiltration Logic: The function uo5.g() (reconstructed as logNumberPhones) silently collects the UserID and Phone Number of every account logged into the app (up to 8 accounts).
2. Transmission: Data is sent via Inline Queries to the bot @nekonotificationbot. This is done programmatically, so no message appears in your "Sent" history.
3. Target Bots: Three bots embedded in the client's obfuscated code:
@nekonotificationbot: Receives the automated phone number uploads.
@tgdb_search_bot and @usinfobot: : An OSINT bot mentioned in the obfuscated classes.
4. Security Token: The app uses a hardcoded secret key 741ad28818eab17668bc2c70bd419fc25ff56481758a4ac87e7ca164fb6ae1b1 as a prefix for the stolen data, likely to authenticate with the bot's backend.
5. The image shows that Nekogram always wants to get the "reg date".
Unfortunately the Google Play Store version is also affected!!!
Follow @TechLeaksZone
1. Exfiltration Logic: The function uo5.g() (reconstructed as logNumberPhones) silently collects the UserID and Phone Number of every account logged into the app (up to 8 accounts).
2. Transmission: Data is sent via Inline Queries to the bot @nekonotificationbot. This is done programmatically, so no message appears in your "Sent" history.
3. Target Bots: Three bots embedded in the client's obfuscated code:
@nekonotificationbot: Receives the automated phone number uploads.
@tgdb_search_bot and @usinfobot: : An OSINT bot mentioned in the obfuscated classes.
4. Security Token: The app uses a hardcoded secret key 741ad28818eab17668bc2c70bd419fc25ff56481758a4ac87e7ca164fb6ae1b1 as a prefix for the stolen data, likely to authenticate with the bot's backend.
5. The image shows that Nekogram always wants to get the "reg date".
Unfortunately the Google Play Store version is also affected!!!
Follow @TechLeaksZone
Tech & Leaks Zone
Photo
I'm starting to believe that every third party telegram client is having something like this not gonna lie.
Where to go? Probably Forkgram.
That telegram Client is the ONLY one that PASSED F-Droid.
And F-Droid are strict with their apps list.
Where to go? Probably Forkgram.
That telegram Client is the ONLY one that PASSED F-Droid.
And F-Droid are strict with their apps list.
T.R.M.'s Flexes
Also, are you guys moving to Artix?
I kinda wished Artix works like CachyOS, where they put their packages on top of arch instead of recompiling everything on their own
Also, their region specific mirrors is less than arch did, and at the same time not synced properly with their main repos
Also, their region specific mirrors is less than arch did, and at the same time not synced properly with their main repos
https://www.instagram.com/reel/DWoyH-qDoS8/
imagine u r struggling because microslop broke your outlook
imagine u r struggling because microslop broke your outlook